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The economy is perhaps the central topic of political debate in the world today. 
Yet familiarity has obscured the concept’s novelty. Far from being a natural feature of 
social life, the economy has a history—in crucial respects, a surprisingly recent one. 
Inventing the American Economy considers the place of the United States in this history, 
exploring the intellectual, economic, and political shifts that allowed the economy to 
become an object of governance and a way of understanding the divisions of collective 
life. 
Offering a coherent narrative of a history that has been addressed in more 
scattershot form elsewhere, centering it on the experience of the United States, and 
pushing the chronology into the second half of the twentieth century, this dissertation 
analyzes the recasting of politics brought about in the twentieth century by the rise of the 
social sciences, above all economics. Weaving together studies of the economists who 
made this transformation thinkable, the institutions that supported their work, and the 
novel styles of governance that became possible as a result, Inventing the American 
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Introduction 
In the autumn of 2008, Alexis Feliciano, a nine-year-old girl from Brooklyn, 
decided to give President-elect Barack Obama some advice. “One thing you could fix,” 
she suggested, “is the economy.” Alexis wasn’t the only pre-teen with the economy on 
her mind.1 From New Jersey, eight-year-old Hanna wrote, “I watch the news with my 
parents at dinner and my parents make noises when the economy is mentioned.”2 Eleven-
year-old Henri, a self-described “Obama fanatic,” leveled with his idol: “The economy, it 
is bad.”3  
Almost a century earlier, not far from where Alexis Feliciano would some day 
grow up, one of America’s leading economists struggled to explain the meaning of a 
concept these children regarded as a natural part of their world. Wesley Mitchell is 
forgotten today, but in 1916 he was just entering the prime of a career that would see him 
become a counselor to presidents and inspiration to figures ranging from partisans of the 
market like Friedrich Hayek to socialist planners in the Soviet Union. A specialist in the 
nascent field of business cycle theory, Mitchell had done graduate work in Germany, 
where he encountered a term he now attempted to explain to undergraduates enrolled in 
his economics seminar at Columbia University.  
The troublesome word was Volkswirtschaft. Mitchell noted that “national 
economy” was the most direct translation, but he was not sure it captured the meaning. 
“Commonwealth,” he suggested, might be a better fit. Volkswirtschaft, Mitchell told his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jory John, ed., Thanks and Have Fun Running the Country: Kids’ Letters to President Obama 
(San Francisco: McSweeney’s Books, 2009) 7. 
 
2 Bill Adler and Bill Adler, Jr., eds., Kids’ Letters to President Obama (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 2009), 112. 
 
3 John, ed., Thanks and Have Fun Running the Country, 78. 
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students, blended two different subjects: “economic activity” and the “social organization 
of human life.” National economy was not just a matter of buying and selling goods. It 
was about relationships among the “the fundamental features of social life”—about race, 
law, land, culture, psyche, and so much more. Whatever this strange thing called 
“national economy” was, its existence could not be taken for granted.4 
Mitchell’s foray in translation gave him so much difficulty because Americans, 
like most people across the world, did not yet use the concept of “the economy” to make 
sense of their collective life. Though we often describe figures of this era, and much 
earlier, as preoccupied with the economy, the phrase did not enjoy anything like its 
current prominence until well into the twentieth century. Political leaders have long 
sought to encourage prosperity, but the identification of that broad ideal with a growing 
economy is a much more recent development. Large-scale surveys like the Google 
Ngram Viewer suggest what close readings of sources demonstrate. Americans of 
Mitchell’s generation relied on a variety of concepts to interpret the world, but the 
economy was not one of them.5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Wesley Clair Mitchell “Historical School, Value and Distribution, L. Maxwell,” May 10, 1916, 
Box 1, Series 1, Wesley Clair Mitchell Papers, Columbia University.  
 
5 On the conceptual history of the economy, see Hugo Radice, “The National Economy: A 
Keynesian Myth?” Capital & Class 22 (1984), 111-140; Susan Buck-Morss, “Envisioning Capital: Political 
Economy on Display,” Critical Inquiry 21.2 (1995), 434-467; Timothy Mitchell, “Fixing the Economy,” 
Cultural Studies 12.1 (1998), 82-101 and Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (New 
York: Verso, 2011), esp. 123-143; Adam Tooze, “Imagining National Economies,” in Imagining Nations, 
ed. Geoffrey Cubitt (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 212-228 and Statistics and the 
German State: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001); U. Kalpagam, “Colonial Governmentality and the 'Economy,'” Economy and Society 29.3 (2000), 
418-438; Alain Desrosières, “Managing the Economy: The State, The Market, and Statistics,” in Theodore 
Porter and Dorothy Ross, ed., The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 7: Modern Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 553-564; Daniel Breslau, “Economics Invents the 
Economy: Mathematics, Statistics, and Models in the Work of Irving Fisher and Wesley Mitchell,” Theory 
and Society 32.3 (June 2003), 379-411; Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to 
National Space (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004); Mary Morgan and Marcel Boumans, 
“Secrets Hidden by Two-Dimensionality: The Economy as a Hydraulic Machine,” in Models: The Third 
Dimension of Science, eds. Soraya de Chadarevian and Nick Hopwood (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
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 Figure 1: Usage of “the American economy” in English-language books, 1890-1990.6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Press, 2004), 369-401; Margaret Schabas, The Natural Origins of Economics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2005) and “Constructing ‘The Economy,’” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39.3 (Jan. 
2009), 3-19; Quinn Slobodian, “How to See the World Economy: Statistics, Maps, and Schumpeter’s 
Camera in the First Age of Globalization,” Journal of Global History 10.2 (July 2015), 307-322; Keith 
Tribe, The Economy of the Word: Language, History, and Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015); and Daniel Hirschman, “Inventing the Economy: Or, How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 
the GDP” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2015). David Grewal, The Invention of the Economy: A 
History of Economic Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming). promises to be 
significant, although to my eyes a more appropriate title would be “The Invention of The Economic.” The 
argument, to the extent there is one, turns on the value of conflating eighteenth-century notions of 
commercial society, nineteenth-century understandings of national economy, and later discussion of the 
economy (and, in Grewal’s case, “the market”). The United States has figured prominently in some of this 
literature, but historians of the United States have so far not engaged with this scholarship, despite the 
obvious relevance. See, for instance, Andrew Yarrow’s observation that “Articles about the economy as a 
seemingly autonomous entity or about the social consequences of economic change began to appear in the 
late 1920s and 1930s.” Yarrow, Measuring America, 105. In addition to providing a coherent, analytic 
narrative of the emergence of the economy in the United States, this dissertation makes two further 
contributions to current scholarship: it extends the chronology into the twenty-first century, exploring the 
ramifications of the economy’s appearance, and it broadens the scope of its inquiry, treating the economy’s 
creation as part of a political history that reaches back to the eighteenth-century invention of society.  
 
6 On the uses of surveys like the Ngram Viewer, see Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva 
Presser Aiden, et al., “Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books,” Science 
331.6014 (January 2011), 176–182.  
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Other measurements of the term’s usage replicate these findings. In the New York Times, 
for example, references to the economy did not occur regularly until the 1940s.
 




 The economy was one member in an ensemble of concepts that became part of 
everyday descriptions of economic activity during this period. Discussions of 
unemployment, inflation, deflation, business cycles, recessions, and economic growth 
were all vastly more frequent at the close of the twentieth century than they were at its 
start. Meanwhile, expressions that had once been familiar, like “money economy” or 
“commercial crises,” faded away.  
 Charts of a word’s usage cannot by themselves demonstrate a concept’s rise or 
fall. Putting aside the challenges that particular surveys face, there remains the deeper 
problem of tracking the prevalence of a notion like the economy, which has both a 
precise technical definition and a vaguer public meaning. Economists think of the 
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of money, but outside the academy it stands for much more than this specialized 
classification allows. Viewed as an entity operating by its own logics that exists in uneasy 
relation to state and society, the economy has become the central object of domestic 
political debate, both in the United States and across the world. Ideas may exist without 
the words later attached to them: liberalism, for instance, whose history long precedes its 
coinage early in the nineteenth century.7 In the case of the economy, however, a shift in 
terminology was bound up with a much larger history—a history at once economic, 
cultural, intellectual, and, crucially, political. That is the history examined in this 
dissertation. 
 
“TRADE WAS NEVER ESTEEMED AN AFFAIR OF STATE till the last century,” 
observed the Scottish philosopher David Hume, with only some exaggeration, in 1742.8 
Shortly after Hume wrote, the first comprehensive interpretations of what was known as 
“political economy” appeared.9 Claiming to have uncovered laws that not even the most 
powerful monarch could defy, political economists drew attention to an economic logic 
they applied to subjects ranging from money and trade to agriculture and population. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Duncan Bell, “What Is Liberalism?,” Political Theory 42.6 (December 2014), 682-715. 
 
8 David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), 
available at www.econlib.org/index.html.  
 
9 On political economy in the early modern period, see Keith Tribe, Land, Labour, and Economic 
Discourse (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International 
Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); 
Donald Winch, Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750-1834; 
Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001) and “Global Commerce and the Question of Sovereignty,” Modern 
Intellectual History 1 (2004), 3-25; Isaac Nakhimovsky, The Close Commercial State: Perpetual Peace and 
Commercial Society from Rousseau to Fichte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Jonathan 
Sheehan and Dror Wahrman, Invisible Hands: Self-Organization and the Eighteenth Century (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
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wise sovereign would seek not to impose his will on the market but to respect its verdict 
and to practice “economy”—that is, to use the state’s resources effectively. 
 Voicing a common sentiment, one early political economist insisted that 
“economic science” was “nothing but the application of natural order to the government 
of societies.”10 The object of this dictum was just as important as its subject. Political 
economy came into its own during the same period that faith in the divine basis of 
political authority came under withering assault, setting off a search for new foundations 
of collective life.  Civilization, the public, and the nation were just a few of the concepts 
that appeared during this period, but in this crowded field society remained an especially 
popular candidate. “And thus civil government is the defence and security of human 
society,” declared the authors of Cato’s Letters, one of the most widely read political 
tracts in colonial America.11 “Upon this point all speculative politicians will agree,” John 
Adams remarked in 1776, “the happiness of society is the end of government.”12 The 
consensus was large enough to include leaders of the French Revolution, which Adams 
fiercely opposed, who in 1790 debated the measure: “Resolved: that the National 
Assembly considers the entire human race as forming but a single and same society, 
whose object is the peace and happiness of each and all of its members.”13 The belief that 
society existed prior to the state, that it obeyed its own internally generated rules, and that 
these rules could be discovered by rational investigation was a quintessential product of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Quoted in Tribe, Economy of the Word, 50. 
 
11 John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, Cato’s Letters, or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, 
and Other Important Subjects, ed. Ronald Hamowy, vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995), 155. 
 
12 John Adams, “Thoughts on Government,” in The Political Writings of John Adams, ed. George 
Peek, Jr. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003), 85.  
 
13 Quoted in David Bell, Shadows of Revolution: Reflections on France, Past and Present (New 
York: Oxford University Press), 191.  
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the age.14 Despite the intensity of the disagreements that separated Adams from the 
radicals he condemned in Paris, they were united by a shared commitment to promoting 
the interests of society—however they defined it.  
Political economy was an essential part of a more comprehensive science of 
society that underpinned a distinctively liberal style of government.15 The archetypal 
subject of this new regime was the economic man, a rational actor devoted to pursuing 
self-interest. When these economic agents came together, however, a novel creation 
emerged that had imperatives of its own—a society. Humans were inherently sociable, 
but society was a frail institution that demanded constant protection, especially from 
threats posed by an overweening state. Society became an independent arbiter of the 
state, a judge whose rulings determined the value of government action.  
Developing alongside this nascent liberalism was a republican worldview that 
traced social disorders to defects in the body politic. Prosperous societies were the 
products of well-designed governments led by disinterested representatives of the 
common good. Danger came when corrupt politicians acting in the name of a faction or 
their own self-interest seized power. Capable of accommodating opposed views about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, 
Totalitarianism, ed. John Thompson (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 139-236; Michel Foucault, Birth of 
Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 291-
316; Keith Baker, “Enlightenment and the Institution of Society: Notes for a Conceptual History,” in Main 
Trends in Cultural History, ed., Willem Melching and Wyger Velema (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), 95-120; 
Daniel Gordon, Citizens Without Sovereignty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 43-85; David 
Bell, The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680-1800 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), 22-49; and Sheehan and Wahrman, Invisible Hands. 
 
15 On liberalism in this period, see Andreas Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson, Liberal Beginnings: 
Making a Republic for the Moderns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Cautions against 
reading the history of the United States as the unfolding of a liberal tradition like those offered by James 
Kloppenberg, “Requiescat in Pacem: The Liberal Tradition of Louis Hartz,” in The American Liberal 
Tradition Reconsidered: The Contested Legacy of Louis Hartz, ed. Mark Hulliung (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2010), 90-124 are well taken, but Kloppenberg does not reckon with the subtler 
reinterpretation of liberalism as boundary condition offered by J. David Greenstone, The Lincoln 
Persuasion: Remaking American Liberalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
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who counted as “disinterested” and “corrupt,” republicanism encouraged Americans to 
find the origins of society’s ills in the structure of their polity.16 
Operating on a less abstract level, practitioners of “political arithmetick” had 
sought to quantify the common good since the seventeenth century, when William Petty 
devised his pioneering estimates of England’s national income. Petty had supporters, but 
they held little influence over the actual practice of politics. Although proponents of 
statistical inquiry gained influence over the eighteenth century, measuring national 
income continued to be an idiosyncratic concern, and even political economists made 
little effort to adapt their theories to the cascade of statistics.17 
Numbers alone could not resolve the debate over what constituted prosperity. 
According to Adam Smith, political economy was an art of governance—“the science of 
a statesman,” in his words—that had “two distinct objects”: “to provide a plentiful 
revenue or subsistence for the people” and “to supply the state or commonwealth with a 
revenue sufficient for the public services.”18 During political economy’s formative years, 
population growth was widely seen as the surest means of promoting both ends.19 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1967); Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1969); Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1976); Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the 
American Working Class, 1788-1850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984); and Daniel Rodgers, 
“Republicanism: The Career of a Concept,” Journal of American History 79.1 (June 1992), 11-38. 
 
17 Ted McCormick, William Petty: And the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). On economic statistics in early modern Europe, see Mary Poovey, A History of the 
Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998) and William Deringer, Calculated Values: Financial Politics and the Quantitative 
Age, 1688-1776 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, forthcoming). 
 
18 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: 
Methuen & Co., 1904), available at www.econlib.org/index.html.  
 
19 Keith Tribe, “Continental Political Economy From the Physiocrats to the Marginal Revolution,” 
in The Cambridge History of Science, Volume 7: The Modern Social Sciences, ed. Theodore Porter and 
Dorothy Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 155. 
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connection between population and prosperity was broken in the nineteenth century, 
when Malthusian fears raised the specter of ferocious struggles over scarce resources, but 
national income estimates did not step into the space previously occupied by 
demographic tallies. Countries could be rich or poor, but how to determine national 
wealth remained a puzzle. 
Confusion did not preclude the development of a variety of economic 
nationalisms.20 In the United States, Alexander Hamilton, Henry Clay, and Abraham 
Lincoln were only some of the most celebrated advocates of programs designed to bolster 
national prosperity. The German economist Friedrich List became an ardent proponent of 
Hamilton’s system after living in the United States, attracting disciples around the world 
with his enormously influential National System of Political Economy.21 But economic 
nationalists did not take what we think of as the economy as their focus. According to 
List, “national economy” was equivalent to “state administration”—that is, the set of 
policies that managed economic transactions within a nation. “The economy of the 
people becomes identical with national economy,” he explained, “where the State or the 
confederated State embraces a whole nation fitted for independence by the number of its 
population, its extent of territory, by its political institutions, civilisation, wealth, and 
power.”22 In fact, List explicitly rejected one of the key features of later definitions of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For the United States, see Alfred Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in 
American Business (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) and Richard Bensel, The Political 
Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
Cynthia Taft Morris and Irma Adelman, Comparative Patterns of Economic Development, 1850-1914 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). 
 
21 On List, see Keith Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse, 1750-
1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 32-65.  
 
22 Friedrich List, National System of Political Economy, trans. Sampson Lloyd (Kitchener: 
Batoche, 2001), 188.  
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economy when he dismissed the claim that a nation’s wealth could be judged by totaling 
“the mere exchangeable value of things.”23  
Matters became even more uncertain when the conversation moved outside 
learned treatises. Genealogists of the economy sometimes cite the eighteenth-century 
Frenchman and self-described “économiste” François Quesnay’s “tableau économique” 
as proof of the concept’s arrival.  
 
Figure 3: François Quesnay’s tableau économique.24 
Quesnay did make an important early contribution to breaking the identification of wealth 
and population, but portraying the tableau économique as an early model of the economy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 List, National System, 169.  
 
24 There are multiple versions of the tableau. This one appears in Smith, Wealth of Nations, 
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/tableau1.jpg. 
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does not capture Quesnay’s own understanding of his project.25 He saw the tableau as a 
representation of the path revenue generated by agriculture took through society. In his 
eyes, it was a tool for revealing “the source and product of earthly riches” and unlocking 
“the principles behind the ‘economic governance’ of agricultural nations.”26  
Even if Quesnay were a founding investigator of the economy, another mystery 
would arise: why did so few people understand what he was talking about? One of his 
critics labeled the tableau “an obscure metaphysical conceit,” and even his followers 
admitted they could not decipher it.27 (Karl Marx encountered similar difficulties when 
he wrestled with the tableau a century later.28) By contrast, what distinguished the 
economy in the twentieth century is that it was simultaneously a technical object for 
experts to debate and a commonplace that Americans could evaluate for themselves. It 
was complex and simple, academic and democratic, all at the same time.  
Economic debates before the twentieth century were oriented around a broad 
array of subjects that fell within the range of what John Stuart Mill called, in his popular 
survey of political economy, “the economical phenomena of society.”29 Economic 
reasoning could be applied to particular situations, the word “economic” could be 
attached to a variety of objects or practices, and over time references to larger “economic 
systems” became more frequent. Following Mill, however, it is better to think of these as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 My account follows Liana Vardi, The Physiocrats and the World of the Enlightenment 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
 
26 Quoted in Vardi, Physiocrats, 81.  
 
27 Quoted in Vardi, Physiocrats, 146. 
 
28 Christian Gehrke and Heinz Kurz, “Karl Marx on Physiocracy,” European Journal of the 
History of Economic Thought 2.1 (Spring 1995), 53-90.  
 
29 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social 
Philosophy (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1871), 421. 
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arguments about a cluster of issues revolving around the category of “the economic” than 
as discussions of an object called “the economy.”30 The economy is our preoccupation, 
not theirs. Projecting the economy backward does more than distort our analysis of 
economic debate. It also conceals a more important—and more surprising—history that 
had begun to unfold. 
 
“THE POLITICS OF THE FUTURE ARE SOCIAL POLITICS,” declared the reform-
minded British politician Joseph Chamberlain in 1883.31 A century later, Friedrich Hayek 
looked back on the era that Chamberlain had foreseen and complained that the “weasel 
word ‘social’” had “become the most confusing expression in our entire moral and 
political vocabulary.”32 Chamberlain’s announcement came at the dawning of the age of 
social politics, Hayek’s after it had drawn to a close, but both recognized the magnitude 
of this transition. By the turn of the twentieth century, a new political vocabulary had 
emerged across the Atlantic world. Building upon earlier liberal, republican, and 
democratic traditions in some respects, breaking from them in others, advocates of social 
politics depicted themselves as adapting older traditions to deal with transformations they 
believed were no less than revolutionary.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Keith Tribe has tracked the development of the economic as a category of analysis in Economy 
of the Word and Land, Labour and Economic Discourse, but also see Karl Polanyi, The Great 
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944); 
Louis Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1977); Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the 
Collège de France, 1977-1978 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Hirschman, “Inventing the 
Economy,” 22-59 is especially insightful on this point.  
 
31 Quoted in Daniel Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 54. Also see Daniel Rodgers, “An Age of Social Politics,” in Rethinking 
American History in a Global Age, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 
250-273. 
 
32 F.A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991), 114. 
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Economic growth is the concept often used today to summarize these changes. 
Persistent rates of economic growth over extended lengths of time were not a part of the 
human experience before the eighteenth century, when a slow but steady uptick became a 
norm in the United States and parts of Europe. The real breakthrough, however, occurred 
in the 1870s, the dawning of what the economist Robert Gordon has termed a “special 
century” of economic growth in the United States that exceeded anything that prevailed 
before—or since. With economic growth came both spectacular increases in the standard 
of living and violent clashes over the distribution of its benefits.33  
For most of this “special century,” however, Americans did not attribute the 
changes the country was experiencing to economic growth. The limits of an old political 
vocabulary and the uncertain promise of the new collided early in this period. In the 
aftermath of a devastating Civil War, the extension of voting rights to African-American 
men during the Reconstruction that followed was meant to provide the ultimate 
expression of American democracy’s forward march, turning chattel into citizens with the 
stroke of a pen. Instead, the rapid collapse of Reconstruction marked the beginning of 
democracy’s retreat across the nation. Even when bolstered by state governments taking 
on expanded responsibilities for the general welfare, suffrage by itself was not enough to 
protect African Americans from enemies of the new regime intent on terminating this 
experiment in interracial democracy. Reconstruction’s demise was hastened by the onset 
of a panic in 1873 that ushered in what one journal referred to as “the politics of class 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Robert Gordon, The Rise and Fall of Economic Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living Since the 
Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 3.  
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feeling.”34 While self-described liberals concluded that democracy would lead to mob 
rule, their opponents focused on the limits of narrowly political reform. “All political 
Republics,” announced one labor newspaper, “have heretofore perished because not 
based on a social Republic.”35  
Strained by pressures from all sides, the fusion of republican and liberal tenets 
that had framed political debate for a century broke down. Society remained the 
foundation of collective life, but it had taken on a darker cast. No longer were political 
fixes enough to secure a healthy society. In an age of escalating conflict between the 
leaders of ever expanding corporations and increasingly recalcitrant workers, cries grew 
louder for an answer to “the social question”—a question that, at the end of the 
nineteenth century, gave rise to the new field of “social economy.”36  
Scientific research proved an especially attractive means for confronting this 
challenge. In 1865, the American Social Science Association was founded in 
Massachusetts.37 Not coincidentally, Massachusetts was also one of the most 
industrialized states in the country, and in 1869 it also became the first state with its own 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.38 Although society’s workings now seemed more opaque than 
earlier theorists had assumed, faith that its laws could be revealed united a group large 
enough to include Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill. Because society was one object—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Quoted in Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New 
York: Harper Perennial, 1989), 484. 
 
35 Quoted in Foner, Reconstruction, 479. 
 
36 Holly Case, “The ‘Social Question,’ 1820-1920,” Modern Intellectual History 12.1 (April 
2015), 1-29.  
 
37 Lawrence Goldman, “Exceptionalism and Internationalism: The Origins of American Social 
Science Reconsidered,” Journal of Historical Sociology 11.1 (March 1998), 6.  
 
38 Barbara Young Welke, Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law, and the Railroad 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 9. 
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even a society riven by class struggle, like Marx’s capitalist mode of production—its 
investigators needed to be similarly comprehensive. “We can never either understand in 
theory or command in practice the condition of a society in any one respect,” Mill 
remarked, “without taking into consideration its condition in all other respects.”39 The 
campaign to establish specialized disciplines gained momentum at the end of the 
nineteenth century, especially in the United States, but this remained an age of social 
science, not of the social sciences.40  
The dream of a unified social science was especially popular among economists. 
One typical nineteenth century text described political economy as “a department of the 
science of society which selects a special class of social phenomena for special 
investigation”—namely, those that had an “economic” aspect. “The phenomena of 
wealth,” it continued, “may be made the subject of a special inquiry by a special set of 
inquirers, but the laws of coexistence and sequence by which they are governed must be 
sought in the great Science of Society.”41 An 1888 textbook from Richard Ely, one of the 
most influential of a rising generation of American economists, described political 
economy as a “branch of sociology” devoted to maximizing “the welfare of society.”42 
“Humanity is now ‘society,’” insisted Ely’s younger colleague Allyn Young, who added 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the 
Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1900), 
622. 
 
40 On this distinction see Cheryl Welch “Social Science From the French Revolution to 
Positivism,” in The Cambridge History of Nineteenth Century Political Thought, eds. Gareth Stedman 
Jones and Gregory Claeys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 171-199 and Howard Brick 
“Society,” in Encyclopedia of the United States in the Twentieth Century, vol. 2, eds. Stanley Kutler, 
Robert Dallek, David Hollinger, and Thomas McGraw (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1996), pp. 
917-39. 
 
41 Thomas Leslie, Essays in Political and Moral Philosophy (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 
1879), 404, 241. 
 
42 Richard Ely, An Introduction to Political Economy (New York: Hunt & Eaton, 1889), 14, 98. 
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that society was “the concrete reality, of which the individual is a mere abstraction.”43 
There was a warning here for those who trimmed their intellectual horizons. If political 
economy could not supply a comprehensive account of the social laws regulating 
economic conduct, another discipline would. 
Even the leaders of a campaign among economists hoping to turn their discipline 
into a mathematical science of markets, a drive that gathered force in the last quarter of 
the nineteenth century, acknowledged the significance of the social.44 Léon Walras, 
usually cited as one of this movement’s founding fathers, built his theories upon a very 
specific kind of market: a well-regulated stock exchange. Markets had a similar, tangible 
quality for Alfred Marshall, though in Marshall’s case the archetypal instance was not a 
stock exchange but one of the marketplaces that had become landmarks in cities around 
the world. (Marshall’s celebrated Principles of Economics also defined its subject as the 
study of “the economic aspects” of “social life.” 45) The American economist John Bates 
Clark believed that “value is a measure of utility made by society considered as one great 
isolated being.”46 All of these figures accepted that markets could only be understood if 
they were set against thickly social contexts.  
Economics was a social science, just like anthropology, political science, 
psychology, and, of course, sociology. And all of these fields included members who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Allyn Young, “Social Economy,” 1908, Box 2, Folder 8, Allyn Abbot Young Papers, Harvard 
University Archives. 
 
44 This is often called a marginal revolution. On the term and its limits, see R.D. Black, A.W. 
Coats, and Crauford Goodwin, eds., The Marginal Revolution in Economics (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1973). 
 
45 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1920), available at 
www.econlib.org/index.html.  
 
46 John Bates Clark, The Philosophy of Wealth: Economic Principles Newly Formulated (Boston: 
Gin & Company, 1894), 82. 
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believed they had an obligation to answer “the social question.” Advocates of “modern 
social movements” pushed for a variety of policies—curbing monopolies, instituting 
progressive taxation, and promoting labor rights, to name some of the most prominent—
united by a common grounding in the demands they claimed to have discerned within 
society.47 For skeptics, the range of subjects grouped under society could prove 
exasperating. As one grumbled, “There should evidently be somewhere a social insane 
asylum in which to confine the social organism.”48 
 
BY 1950, ALL THAT HAD CHANGED. Society remained an item of concern, but the 
economy now stood alongside it. This was not the strange, vaguely Teutonic notion that 
Wesley Mitchell had labored to explain to his students. The new understanding of an 
economy was thinner than its predecessor. It had a weightless quality that gave it 
elasticity, allowing it to be stretched across a wider terrain: the economy, not a village 
economy, a national economy, a world economy, or any of the other modifier-dependent 
variations that had earlier prevailed. No longer viewed as particular structures that had to 
be made over time, economies now appeared as much a natural part of collective life as 
society itself.           
 That conceptual adjustment occurred alongside a series of technical, institutional, 
and political developments that turned the economy into an object that political leaders 
could plausibly argue they had tamed. This complicated history can be usefully 
simplified by focusing on three connected innovations from this era. Think of it as a story 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 For example, F.W. Taussig, Principles of Economics, vol. 1 (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1911), 137. 
 
48 Herbert Joseph Davenport, The Economics of Enterprise (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1919), 391.  
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of three M’s: measurement, via statistics like national income accounts, which the United 
States government, like a handful of other governments, began regularly producing 
during the Great Depression; modeling, which became the lingua franca of economics, 
replacing looser styles of verbal reasoning that had dominated the discipline at the turn of 
century; and management through fiscal and monetary policies implemented by an 
ensemble of institutions at the federal level, made possible in the United States by events 
like the creation of the Federal Reserve and passage of a national income tax, both 
approved in 1913.          
 Combined, these advances created a perpetual-motion machine devoted to the 
production of economic knowledge: economic statistics encouraged the construction of 
more ambitious economic models, which guided the conduct of economic policymaking, 
which called for better statistics, which led to another turn of the cycle. Where social 
politics were amorphous, the economy lent itself to precise formulations. Not just an 
abstract “economic system,” the economy was a measurable object whose fluctuations 
could, with the appropriate policies, be controlled.      
 The invention of the economy reflected important changes in what members of an 
earlier generation would have called “economic life.” A wave of economic concentration 
had given rise to corporations of previously unimaginable size that became some of the 
most reliable producers and consumers of economic statistics. With fewer firms to count, 
leviathan corporations also simplified the task of economic calculation. Household 
production and self-employment waned, turning wage labor into an increasingly 
prevalent mode of life, once again making it easier to gather data. The Federal Reserve 
helped bring order to a crazy-quilt system of rival currencies, while the obligation to file 
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income taxes made economic tabulation into an annual ritual for a rising number of 
Americans.49            
 Yet, as a young Alan Greenspan discovered in the 1950s when he sought to 
recruit clients for his economic consulting agency, reports on the economy had little 
interest for executives worried about next quarter’s bottom line. “Knowing what the gross 
national product (GNP) was going to do wasn’t useful to him,” he recalled. “But if you 
talked to the CEO of an automobile parts manufacturing company and could tell him that 
‘assemblies for Chevrolet over the next six months are going to be different from what 
General Motors has announced,’ that was something he could understand and act on.” 50 
Economists supplied a more enthusiastic audience for research into the broader 
economy. Political economy, observed the journalist Walter Bagehot in 1885,“is an 
abstract science which labors under a special hardship. Those who are conversant with its 
abstractions are usually without a true contact with its facts; those who are in true contact 
with its facts have usually little sympathy with and little cognizance of its abstraction.”51 
That, too, had changed by 1950. An explosion of economic statistics enabled the 
transformation in economic theory often described as the “Keynesian Revolution.” That 
label obscures the character of this history, casting a global intellectual and political shift 
as the product of a notion dreamed up by a single Cambridge don. John Maynard Keynes 
is better understood as one contributor to the larger enterprise of turning the economy 
into an object that could be governed.       
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 On this combination of factors, see Hirschman, “Inventing the Economy,” 64-68. 
 
50 Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2008), 46.  
 
51 Walter Bagehot, The Postulates of English Political Economy (London: Longmans, Green, and 
Co., 1885), 10.  
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 Like other economists at roughly the same time, Keynes turned the aggregate 
economic statistics that had started to appear with predictable regularity into the elements 
of what would soon be called macroeconomics. Even among self-described Keynesians, 
interest quickly moved away from Keynes’s baroque masterpiece, The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest, and Money, a text whose simple mathematics and reliance on 
largely verbal argument stamped it as a product of a period before economists 
refashioned themselves as practitioners of an essentially mathematical science. The 
cutting edge of academic economics in the middle of the twentieth century, 
macroeconomics provided fertile ground for advocates of this mathematical turn, who 
generated innumerable models designed to represent the economy as a whole.52 
 The global scale of this turn raises a question that has so far lurked in the 
background of this account. Although the American economy is an inherently national 
phenomenon, the intellectual history of the economy spilled outside national borders 
from the start. In the USSR, bureaucrats at organizations like the Supreme Council of the 
Economy sought to give meaning to the ideal of a planned economy.53 Members of the 
so-called Stockholm School made Sweden a site of macroeconomic theorizing that 
rivaled anything taking place in Cambridge.54 Germany, where talk about the economy 
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54 Don Patinkin, “On the Relation between Keynesian Economics and the ‘Stockholm School,” 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 80.2 (1978), 135-143. For background, see Mark Blyth, Great 
	  
	   21	  
began in the first place, also pioneered the application of these macroeconomic theories 
to practical policy.55 And the list could be multiplied.    
 Yet the place of United States in this international history deserves an 
examination of its own. During the same period in which the economy became a settled 
mode of thinking about collective life, the United States experienced the most rapid 
economic growth in the world. This growth funded the creation of an unrivaled system of 
higher education that, by the middle of the twentieth century, made the United States into 
the world’s preeminent site for the study of economics. 56 With would-be economists 
from around the globe flocking to universities from Boston to Berkeley, a particular 
approach to economics became one of the country’s most important exports. Close study 
of the United States does more than show how a particular notion that flourished across 
the globe took on a particular meaning in one nation. It reveals something important 
about how power was exercised in the American century.     
 Nor, simply because this history took place in the United States, does that make it 
an exclusively American project. Some of the earliest people to speak of the American 
economy did so with foreign accents. A Dutch socialist acting at the behest of the League 
of Nations created the first model of the American economy, and the first national 
income accounts issued by the Commerce Department were produced by a team working 
under the supervision of a Russian émigré. In this case, as in so many others, national and 
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global histories developed in tandem.       
 But the birth of macroeconomics alone cannot explain how the subjects of articles 
in academic journals became the stuff of everyday life. If economists could not do it by 
themselves, and if businessmen showed little interest in the project, who helped introduce 
the concept to the wider world? That riddle can be answered by looking not to corporate 
boardrooms or academic conferences but to figures Americans welcomed into their living 
rooms every night, first in their radios and then on their televisions.   
                   
IN 1946, ALMOST ONE YEAR INTO HIS TENURE AS PRESIDENT, Harry Truman 
delivered his first State of the Union address. In the speech, he noted an important, recent 
change. “With the growing responsibility of modern government to foster economic 
expansion and to promote conditions that assure full and steady employment 
opportunities,” he announced, “it has become necessary to formulate and determine the 
Government program in the light of national economic conditions as a whole.”57 Almost 
fifty years later, Bill Clinton stood at the same podium to deliver his first speech to 
Congress. What had seemed novel to Truman was natural to Clinton. “[F]or all the many 
tasks that require our attention,” he said, “I believe tonight one calls on us to focus, to 
unite, and to act. And that is our economy. For more than anything else, our task tonight 
as Americans is to make our economy thrive again.”58    
 A survey of references to the economy and its cognates in earlier State of the 
Unions explains why Truman felt compelled to draw attention to the originality of his 
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program. Before the 1920s, presidents did not consider the economy in their annual 
messages to Congress. Even Franklin Roosevelt made only occasional references to the 
subject. It was Truman himself who established the topic’s centrality in the speech. By 
the time Lyndon Johnson gave the first State of the Union broadcast on television during 
the evening, the economy had become a routine subject of inquiry for the president.  
 
Figure 4: References to the economy and its cognates in State of the Union addresses and  
messages, 1900-2016. Author’s calculation. 
Explicit discussion of the economy is just a partial measure of the concept’s 
prominence. Even more illuminating, and staying within the State of the Union genre, is a 
study that tracks clusters of terms that appear together over time. Beginning with George 
Washington, two streams of discourse ran next to each other without intersecting, one 
focused on the federal government’s budget, another on agriculture and industry. Around 
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domestic, economy.”59
 
                          Figure 5: River network of State of the Union discourse.60 
This was not just a matter of rhetorical presentation. Politicians had become 
covinced that their careers were bound up with the economy’s trajectory. John Kennedy 
was assasinated on November 22, 1963. On November 23, Lyndon Johnson had his first 
meeting with the head of the Council of Economic Advisers.61 Soon, his administration 
was taken over by the campaign to achieve one of Kennedy’s great unfinished tasks: 
passing the first tax cut in American history designed to stimulate the economy. During 
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Johnson’s presidential campaign a year later, the Democratic Party platform described the 
“expansion of the American economy” as “the national purpose.”62 That same year the 
New York Times remarked on “the contemporary concept of a strong President as chief 
legislator and chief economist of the Republic,” a union consummated when Johnson 
won approval for his tax cut.63       
 Politicians fixated on the economy because of the problems it seemed to resolve. 
Some were as straightforward as a balance sheet. Before approval of the income tax in 
1913, most of the federal government’s funding came from customs duties, with another 
third provided by taxes on alcohol and tobacco. By 1920, the income tax supplied two-
thirds of the budget, linking the financing of the American state to the fluctuations of 
national income. 
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Figure 6: Sources of US federal budget, 1880-1930.64 
Other concerns were more abstract but no less exigent. Despite the country’s 
reputation for stability, fears of violent political upheaval surged regularly in the United 
States from the Gilded Age through World War II. Whether those concerns seem 
reasonable in history’s cool retrospect is not the point; what matters is how they felt at the 
time—and for many Americans, including some of the most powerful figures in the 
country, the threats appeared very real.65 A healthy economy promised steady 
employment, keeping potential firebrands on the clock and out of the streets. Putting 
aside the the possibility of revolutionary turmoil, politicians soon learned to identify their 
chances of reelection with the economy’s fortunes, a conclusion validated by political 
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scientists researching the connection between economic and electoral performance.66 
Loyal partisans looking for policies that could bind together factious coalitions found it in 
economic growth, an objective they argued could transcend divisions of race, class, 
region, religion, or ideology—that could, for instance, unite both conservative 
segregationists and liberal civil rights activists, two pillars of the Democratic Party at 
mid-century. The economy’s performance also offered a scorecard in the Cold War, a 
seemingly neutral way of measuring the achievements of rival powers.67 And it gave 
coherence to policymaking. The details were complex, the data partial, and the tools 
limited, but the ideal could still bring consistency to a process always threatening to lurch 
out of control. In the possibility of unity, there even lay the hope of moving beyond 
politics altogether, replacing squabbling politicians with disinterested technocrats.68 
  Bolstered by its political significance, the economy became the subject of endless 
conversation—in stump speeches, newspaper headlines, radio broadcasts, television 
specials, and, in the twenty-first century, phones buzzing with updates on the latest GDP 
numbers. That is how an academic conceit became a cultural fact.    
 What is most striking, looking at aggregate measurments of the economy’s usage 
over time, is how quickly the change occurred. Time and again, these charts depict a 
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virtually nonexistent concept rocketing upward in just a few years. Although the 
transformation was sudden, it owed more to an earlier history than such broad-gauge 
surveys allow. Grappling with this transition requires a better understanding of the ideas, 
the institutions, the technical innovations, and even the inidviduals below the trend lines. 
Providing that more fine-grained analysis is the goal of this dissertation. 
 
THE BEST PLACE TO BEGIN IS WITH ECONOMISTS. Though not representative of 
the larger population, this group of highly educated, generally well-off, typically white 
men clarified the scope of what was economically thinkable. If the concept did not appear 
in their work, it was not going to appear anywhere else. Their number was still small at 
the onset of the twentieth century, which gave a handful of figures outsize influence—
patriarchs standing at the top of rapidly growing family trees.69  
“The world is ours,” said the president of the American Economic Association in 
a 1908 speech to his colleagues, “if we enter it by the right door.”70 A decade later, World 
War I kicked that door open. Economists were brought into the government in record 
levels, giving them a taste of what it meant to wield power. They were forced out just as 
swiftly after the war ended, but their time in Washington inspired a generation to look for 
ways they could use economic theory to remake politics. Launched in the aftermath of 
the war, the National Bureau of Economic Research, or NBER, was a quintessential 
example of this impulse. It straddled the division between the age of social politics and 
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the new regime concerned with the state of the economy already coming into being. So 
did its intellectual leader, Wesley Mitchell. Through a careful investigation of the ideas 
that guided this group in its early years, a much broader history—the history behind the 
invention of the economy—comes into focus. 
The Bureau soon attracted the attention of a formidable benefator. Herbert Hoover 
became Secretary of Commerce the year after the NBER’s founding. An admirer of 
Mitchell’s, Hoover enlisted the Bureau in his effort to use social science to remold 
government. An economic theory associated with both Mitchell and the NBER became 
an essential feature of this campaign: business cycle theory, a way of thinking about 
issues now understood as macroeconomic before the emergence of macroeconomics as 
such. Just as rigorous intellectually, but not nearly as successful politically, was a 
simultaneous campaign to reorient policymaking at the Federal Reserve around another 
precocious instance of macroeconomic theorizing, a controversial economic doctrine 
known as the quantity theory of money. Two examples of how ideas shape politics, or 
fail to, the histories of these programs reveal the contours of economic policy in the last 
moment before the economy became an obsession.  
Then came the Great Depression. The New Deal ushered in a period of 
extraordinary intellectual fertility that witnessed the creation of the first national income 
accounts regularly published by the United States government and the first model of the 
nation’s economy. Observers recognized that government was taking on a new role, but 
the full effect of that shift was unclear. At the start of the New Deal, some economically 
minded reformers yoked robust programs for a planned economy to visions of a 
transformed society. During Franklin Roosevelt’s second term, however, a more modest 
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alternative stepped forward. Instead of nationalizing industries and breaking up 
monopolies, this agenda relied on more distant measures—tax cuts to boost waning 
demand, interest rate hikes to curb unsustainable booms, and constant oversight from 
trained economists. Quickly but misleadingly dubbed “Keynesian,” this approach was 
compatible with more comprehensive visions of economic planning, at least in theory. 
Whatever the details of the vision for governing the economy, however, the importance 
of the economy had been established. 
With this account in mind, the history of the United States in the second half of 
the twentieth century looks different than it is usually understood. A postwar economic 
boom led politicians and economists alike to claim they had unlocked the secrets of 
managing the economy. After growth rates slipped in the 1970s, politicians across the 
world retreated from the responsibility to govern the economy they had claimed during 
more prosperous times and sought to hand off that authority to central bankers. But the 
disavowal was never complete. Like it or not, politicians knew they would be held 
responsible for the economy’s performance. As James Carville pointed out during Bill 
Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign, a person would have to be stupid to think 
otherwise.71 This was not a period of triumphant neoliberalism where deference to 
markets became the watchword for policymakers. Though deregulation could proceed on 
any number of fronts, there was one object too important to be left alone: the economy 
itself.  
That is not the only facet of the American experience that takes on a different cast 
when seen from this vantage point. Following the economy’s ascent forces us to move 
across the divides that too often separate economic, political, intellectual, and cultural 
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history.72 Blending these methods produces a kind of synthesis, but one that cuts across 
customary narratives. It is an economic history, but not one dictated by the relentless 
expansion of capitalism.73 It is an intellectual history, but not one focused on self-
described intellectuals.74 It is a political history, but not one defined by the struggle 
between left and right or the rise and fall of a New Deal order.75 It is a history of the 
twentieth century, told at a slant. 
Consider, for example, the unlikely legacy of Wesley Mitchell. A former student 
of John Dewey and Thorstein Veblen’s, Mitchell devoted his life to fusing the legacy of 
these two influences. The NBER was his practical realization of this ideal, an 
organization devoted to revising economic theory so that it better captured the realities of 
economic life. Mitchell had two great students. One, Simon Kuznets, pioneered the 
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development of national-income accounting and conducted path-breaking studies of 
economic inequality.76 If Kuznets carried the torch in academic research, Arthur Burns 
took up the mantle in policymaking. Head of the Council of Economic Advisers under 
Dwight Eisenhower, Burns later became the first chairman of the Federal Reserve to hold 
a doctorate in economics. Before any of that happened, Burns succeeded Mitchell as 
research director at the NBER.77  
At the NBER, Burns encouraged a protégé of his own. While a graduate student at 
Columbia, where he was studying under Mitchell, Burns helped make ends meet by 
lecturing undergraduates at Rutgers. There he met a young Milton Friedman, who had 
arrived at Rutgers planning to become an actuary, but who, under Burns’s influence, 
graduated an aspiring economist.78 Friedman split his graduate career between the 
University of Chicago and Columbia, where he also worked with Mitchell. That 
connection helped secure him a post at the NBER, a valuable opportunity in the midst of 
the Depression. There, Friedman served as a research assistant for Kuznets, who 
ultimately co-authored the younger man’s dissertation.  
With his doctorate in hand, Friedman embarked on an extraordinarily successful 
career, but his affiliation with the NBER was not done yet. In 1950, Burns asked 
Friedman to study the influence of the money supply on business cycles, enlisting his 
former student in a project that dated back to the Bureau’s founding. Thirteen years later, 
Burns’s request led to the publication of the book for which Friedman is most known 
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among economists. Weighing in at more than eight-hundred pages, A Monetary History 
of the United States, 1867-1960 did more than any other work to make Friedman’s views 
on macroeconomics acceptable to the rest of his profession—and, eventually, to 
politicians, central bankers, and the general public.79 (Ben Bernanke is one of many who 
credits it with sparking his interest in monetary theory.)80 It was an NBER book through 
and through: published under the NBER’s auspices, based on data produced by NBER 
investigations, and co-authored with Anna Schwartz, a NBER staffer. There is a thread 
running from John Dewey to Milton Friedman, and it goes through Wesley Mitchell.  
Libraries could be filled with histories of the twentieth century focused on the 
clash of ideologies in an age of extremes, and just as many based on the unfolding of 
grand structures like capitalism or modernity. Tracing the history of the economy brings a 
different subject into the spotlight—namely, the technical practices that became essential 
to exercising power. Grassroots activists can put politicians in office—if they are lucky, 
even the White House—but the repertoire of policies available to these newly elected 
representatives are crafted by different hands. Emphasizing the practices of power and 
the objects they helped create displays the limits of accounts that depict the twentieth 
century as a battle between a clearly defined left and right. There are objects in political 
debate—objects like the economy—that warp these seemingly established categories, just 
like black holes can become large enough to bend normally straight rays of light. We live 
today with the legacy of this history: a politics with a different vocabulary, different 
goals, different tools, and different kind of policymaker than anything that existed when 
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Mitchell introduced his students to Volkswirtschaft. The economy is the favorite child of 
a third age in the history of American democracy—not the republican politics of the 
founding, or the social politics that flourished a century ago, but the techno-politics that 
today defines the boundaries of the possible.81  
Behemoth corporations and commodified production, a federal government 
dedicated to maintaining national prosperity, economists claiming to have mastered their 
subject with the instruments of science—all of this still appeared strange just a hundred 
years ago. The economy is the name Americans used to make sense of this world after it 








	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 On techno-politics, see Gabrielle Hecht, “Technology, Politics, and National Identity in 
France,” in Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parker Hughes and Agatha Chipley 
Hughes, eds. Michael Allen and Gabrielle Hecht (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 253-294; Timothy 
Mitchell, Rule of Experts; Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2002); James Vernon, “The Ethics of Hunger and the Assembly of Society: The Techno-Politics of the 
School Mean in Modern Britain,” American Historical Review 110.3 (June 2005), 693-725; and Iginio 
Gagliardone, “‘A Country in Order’: Technopolitics, Nation Building, and the Development of ICT in 
Ethiopia,” Information Technologies and International Development 10.1 (Spring 2014), 3-19. Sheila 
Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 2005) reflects on consequences this shift has had for political theory and 
democratic practice.  
	  
	   35	  
Chapter 1: Economics Before The Economy 
 
IN DECEMBER 1918, a band of economists, statisticians, sociologists, and technically 
minded reformers gathered at a hotel in Virginia to decide how they would save the world. 
Visitors had flocked to Richmond for the annual conferences of the five societies—the 
American Economic Association, American Statistical Association, American Sociological 
Association, the American Association for Labor Legislation, and the American 
Association for Agricultural Legislation—that had chosen to hold their meetings jointly 
that year. They intended to review finances, elect officers, plan for the year ahead, and 
offer panels on subjects more tractable than recasting geopolitics. But larger aspirations 
lurked beneath these pedestrian surfaces. 
The old order lay in ruins. Peace had been reached in Europe a few weeks earlier, 
bringing an end to what was then known as the Great War, but the conflict had thrown 
much of the continent into a revolutionary crisis that continued to unfold. Many 
commenters, both sympathetic and critical, believed they were observing the birth pangs 
of a socialist epoch—or something that did not yet have a name. There were skeptics, 
inevitably, but they recognized that war had shattered the world they had known.82  
Matters looked different on the other side of the Atlantic. With a homeland 
untouched by war and a political system that emerged from the ordeal bruised but intact, 
the United States had become the world’s dominant power.83 Yet even there, as one 
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observer remarked, it seemed that “the trend of the time is leveling.”84 A novel 
constellation of possibilities had appeared, and the prospects were exhilarating. The 
United States could conquer the internal divisions that had fractured its society, often 
violently, and then redeem the world. The question for those who had come to Richmond 
was what kind of world the United States would create, and whether they would be lucky 
enough to help build it.  
Some of them would get that chance. Two decades earlier, Alfred Marshall had 
observed that “the problem of social aims takes on new forms in every age.”85 Even when 
ideals remained constant, the problems confronting reformers shifted, and so did the 
resources they could draw upon to address them. Within his own discipline of economics, 
Marshall predicted that novel social challenges would inspire the next generation to 
produce “far greater work” than any of its predecessors.86 Marshall was too cautious to 
predict what that “greater work” would resemble.87 He did not realize that social sciences 
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would help reinvent politics, nor could he see that his own discipline would be at the 
vanguard of this transition.  
The economists who travelled to Richmond in 1918 knew their Marshall but did 
not share this humility. Visions of a democracy remade by social science beguiled these 
would-be reformers, but they approached the project strategically. During his presidential 
address to the American Economic Association, Yale’s Irving Fisher predicted that soon 
the three rightful pillars of economic governance—“labor, capital, and economists”—
would take up their appropriate roles. Before that occurred, however, the country 
required a humbler reform: “a laboratory for the study of the great economic problems 
before us,” in Fisher’s words.88 This recommendation was seconded by Wesley Mitchell 
in his presidential address to the American Statistical Association, delivered in the same 
room a few hours after Fisher’s lecture.  
According to Mitchell, a center where the statistics generated by the industrial age 
in such daunting amounts could be compiled, studied, and synthesized would perform 
two functions. It would bring empirical precision to the social sciences, which despite 
their recent advances were still “immature, speculative, filled with controversies,” and it 
would guard the polity against the “wasteful” temptations of “reform by agitation or class 
struggle.”89 Better social science would make for better politics. Achieving those goals, 
however, demanded more than a mastery of statistics. Economists would have to link 
their empirical research to a social vision large enough to encompass the challenges they 
faced. As Fisher remarked, “if we are to serve the great world democracy which we hope 
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to see arise from the ashes of this great world conflagration, we must see the problem 
whole.”90 
One year later, the institution Fisher and Mitchell called for had become a reality. 
The National Bureau of Economic Research—or, as the inevitable acronym had it, the 
NBER—had important supporters from the outset, including Mitchell himself, who 
served as its research director. It soon acquired an even more valuable patron in Herbert 
Hoover, leader of the campaign to reorient politics around information and Secretary of 
Commerce from 1921 to 1929, when he was inaugurated President of the United States.91  
The NBER was a modest institution that owed its existence to enormous 
transformations. It was, as Mitchell later noted, “a World War I baby, posthumously 
born.”92 The triple shocks of continuing fallout from the Great War, the beginning of the 
transition to peace, and Bolshevik victory in Russia all helped spur the NBER’s founding. 
But there was a deeper history, too, one that connected the tiny organization to some of 
the largest forces remaking the United States and much of the world—the growth of a 
robust national state,93 the ascent of the corporation,94 and the birth of an academic 
system with grand ambitions and an unprecedented scale to match. 95 
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Recognizing the political, economic, and institutional transformations that made 
the NBER possible still does not explain why it seemed like a compelling response to 
these changes. Although the sight of economists seeking to replace political conflict with 
expert consensus would soon become familiar, the NBER, like American economics as a 
whole, belonged to a conceptual world that quickly became foreign—a world where the 
study of economics was inextricably tied to larger visions of society, where the specific 
challenges of industrialism had become an obsession, and where the idea of the economy 
had a marginal position in academic and political debates, when it figured at all. The 
staffers at the NBER considered themselves expert observers. A century later, watching 
these watchers captures a moment of transition. The language, theory, and politics of the 
economy had not yet emerged, but elements indispensable to this later history were being 
assembled. A new world was incubating within the old, and a vocabulary developed in 
the eighteenth century was giving way to one that would dominate the twentieth.  
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 “THE POINT OF VIEW FROM WHICH THE EARLY, and even the later, classical 
economists discussed economic life was that of ‘the society’ taken as a collective whole 
and conceived as an organic unit,” Thorstein Veblen remarked in 1901.96 Veblen was an 
insightful reader of his predecessors, but his comment also reflected the preoccupations 
of his time. As it had for more than a century, society remained the unifying framework 
for economic inquiry. As Irving Fisher put it, economics was “only one branch of a 
greater subject,—Sociology,” or, as he elsewhere phrased it “Societology.”97 
 By the close of the nineteenth century, however, an increasing number of 
Americans were convinced the character of their society had changed. The country had 
become “industrial.” The rise of massive corporations had created an “industrial society,” 
or “industrial world,” or “industrial organism” that generated both “industrial discontent” 
and “industrial crises,” along with calls for an “industrial democracy” adapted to the 
demands of the new order, all the more necessary after 1919, with humanity tending its 
wounds after an encounter with “industrial warfare.” Many of these changes were 
scrutinized by the aptly named United States Commission on Industrial Relations, which 
related a troubling discovery in its final report, issued in 1915: “The conviction that the 
wealth of the country and the income which is produced through the toil of the workers is 
distributed without regard to any standard of justice is as widespread as it is deep-
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seated.”98 Nostalgia for a more innocent time runs through these laments, but that was a 
psychic consolation, not a program for the future. Political debate turned, instead, around 
competing proposals for managing the transition to an industrial age—Theodore 
Roosevelt’s New Nationalism, Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom, and the revolutionary 
socialism advocated by a small but vocal minority were just some of the most significant 
projects united by the belief that (as the ubiquitous modifier emphasized) a “new” age 
was dawning. 
Woodrow Wilson traced the contours of this moment in a speech he delivered two 
years before his election to the presidency. “Society is looking itself over, in our day, 
from top to bottom,” he announced. 99 It was a period with few, if any, precedents. The 
nation’s industrial capacity had reached levels Americans just a few decades earlier could 
not have imagined, but so had tensions between labor and capital. Wilson attributed all of 
this to a single culprit. “The economic power of society,” he explained, had become 
focused in corporations, each of which constituted “an economic society, a little 
economic State” that existed in uneasy relation to the national state.100 That 
transformation had brought economic concerns to the fore of American politics, replacing 
the political issues that Wilson said had occupied earlier generations. “The life of the 
nation” no longer revolved around “questions of governmental structure or of the 
distribution of governmental powers. It centres upon economic questions, questions of 
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the very structure and operation of society itself.”101 Economic laws had once guarded 
society against the state; now, Wilson argued, economic conditions demanded state 
intervention. This was the sweeping historical narrative behind the reimagining of 
American liberalism undertaken in the Progressive era.102 According to Wilson, the 
stakes were as high as could be imagined: society itself hung in the balance. 
For economists, this grim diagnosis sounded like a call to arms. Despite his 
fixation on the corporation, Wilson paid little attention to the dismal science. Under his 
watch, however, economists flocked to Washington. Over a hundred worked directly for 
more than twenty federal agencies during the Great War, helping to allocate food and 
fuel, guns and boats, and much more besides.103 With the prospect of rebuilding Europe 
looming, economists would be more in demand than ever. Most of them agreed that 
laissez faire was dead, and so were the debates that had torn apart the discipline before 
the war, which typically pitted Anglophile skeptics of state intervention against Germanic 
enthusiasm for social change. The dichotomy caricatured both German and British 
economics, but it had rhetorical force, and it also mapped onto a generational divide that 
pitted younger, reform-minded scholars trained in Germany against their older, generally 
more conservative colleagues.  
By 1918, however, those debates were confined to the dusty pages of archived 
journals, and Irving Fisher could inform his assembled colleagues that the next era would 
be neither British nor German but distinctively American. This was, in part, a clever 
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attempt to strip the profession of any lingering affiliation with Germany, which the 
United States government had spent the war portraying as the epitome of despotism. (The 
term “institutional economics,” coined in 1919, was one product of this rebranding.104) 
But Fisher also had a more substantive rationale. Germans had shown that economists 
could serve the state; Americans would prove they could be the agents of a far greater 
cause. “It is our opportunity and our duty,” he announced, “to dedicate ourselves to the 
task of working out economic measures in the interests of humanity and democracy.”105  
Nowhere was the public demand for wise counsel greater, Fisher believed, than 
on the question of economic inequality. Fisher acknowledged that many issues required 
attention from “scientific students of society,” but he dwelled on inequality, spending 
over a third of his address on various proposals for its amelioration.106 “The war revealed 
great industrial discontent in our country,” he elsewhere maintained, adding that 
“something radically wrong” had occurred in American society.107 Fisher could summon 
Olympian disdain for economists who defended labor radicalism while acknowledging 
that every subject he touched upon seemed to be framed by a widening chasm between 
the classes. Or, at least, he thought the chasm was widening. “The real scientific study of 
the distribution of wealth,” he admitted, “has scarcely begun.”108  
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And that was as good a place as any for an economic research center to start. 
Fisher was too mercurial a thinker to devote himself to the laborious task of leading such 
an enterprise, but his diagnosis of the forces at play was acute. One of the few people 
who better understood the dynamics of the moment was Wesley Mitchell. 
 
FISHER AND MITCHELL WERE ABOUT AS DIFFERENT as two hyper-educated 
white American men of roughly the same age could be. The oldest surviving child of a 
Congregational minister, Fisher inherited his father’s crusading zeal but harnessed it to 
his own ambitions. After graduating as valedictorian of his class at Yale, he produced a 
doctoral dissertation under the mentorship of the sociologist William Graham Sumner 
and the mathematician-cum-physicist Josiah Willard Gibbs. The dissertation, 
Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and Prices, fused the influences of 
his teachers. Fisher’s methodology would be conventional half a century later, but at the 
time it broke from the standards of a discipline still more comfortable with verbal 
reasoning than mathematical modeling. Not many of his colleagues understood the book, 
but they respected his analytical rigor. That earned Fisher renown across his profession, 
both in and outside the United States, and won him a post in Yale’s faculty of social and 
political science that he held for the rest of his career. It was a career defined by 
obsessions: prohibition, eugenics, conservation, dietary reform, financial consulting, and 
American membership in the League of Nations, to name some of the most prominent.109 
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If Fisher was a prophet, Mitchell was a pragmatist. A native of Illinois, Mitchell 
spent his childhood scraping just above poverty. In 1892, he became a member of the 
first class at the recently founded University of Chicago, where he fell under the 
influence of two of professors: John Dewey, who taught Mitchell’s first course in 
philosophy, and Thorstein Veblen, who did the same for economics. Many years later, 
when both Mitchell and Dewey were teaching at Columbia University, the younger man 
told his former teacher, “There is no one to whom I feel under heavier intellectual 
obligation than yourself.”110 But Veblen came close. Iconoclastic and pugnacious, Veblen 
was just beginning to attract attention from an economics profession that he devoted 
considerable energy to antagonizing. Like Fisher at around the same time, though for 
very different reasons, Mitchell viewed the English economic tradition as admirable but 
limited, and the attempted German reformation of economics as already showing signs of 
exhaustion. But Mitchell channeled his heterodox views into meticulous empirical 
inquiries using skills he acquired under J. Laurence Laughlin, chair of Chicago’s 
economics department and a more conventional figure than Veblen. Out of this 
incongruous collection, Mitchell forged a synthesis distinctly his own.111 
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“Money economy” was the name he gave to the framework that integrated his 
disparate influences. The term came from the German economist Bruno Hildebrand, who 
used it in an 1864 essay to clarify the difference between a society where exchanges were 
conducted with money and one that relied on “natural economy” (i.e. barter or credit).112 
According to Mitchell, Veblen later gave the phrase a much “broader and deeper 
meaning” than Hildebrand imagined.113 For Veblen, money was not just a tool that 
simplified a messy trading process. The introduction of money, Veblen argued, had 
reframed the perennial desire for distinction, turning the world into a site where profits 
could always be calculated, and extracted. Money also gave rise to an ensemble of 
institutions that molded economic life to fit a pecuniary logic—and made a category like 
“economic life” thinkable in the first place. Economics itself, Veblen insisted, was an 
unknowing byproduct of this transformation.   
Veblen had sketched an outline of money economy’s ascent, but he left the details 
blank. Here, Mitchell spotted an opportunity. Convinced by Dewey that economic 
theories must rest on solid empirical foundations, Mitchell set out to write the treatise that 
Veblen never could. By Mitchell’s own admissions, his first two books, both detailed 
excavations of American monetary history, bore stronger evidence of Laughlin’s 
empirical rigor than Veblen or Dewey’s philosophical ambitions. By 1911, Mitchell was 
ready to undertake a project he judged much “larger in its scope and more penetrating in 
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its interest.”114 He pictured a grand narrative centered on the triumph of money economy. 
It would be much more than a simple work of economics. Plucking insights from across 
the sciences of society, it would capture the social world in its totality. 
Mitchell’s vision was ambitious—too ambitious for him to pull off. He worked 
diligently but could never get his jumble of manuscript pages to come together. Instead, 
he spun off a piece of the larger enterprise into a standalone work on business cycles. 
Discussions of what had been more frequently referred to as credit cycles—locating the 
phenomenon in the sphere of banking and finance—were common in the nineteenth 
century, and so were accounts of crises that punctured boom times.115 But the belief that a 
cohesive business world experienced rhythmic oscillations of prosperity and depression 
was newer, and still controversial. Business cycle theory was, at its core, an attempt to 
tailor economics to fit the dimensions of industrial society—a new kind of theory for a 
new kind of world. Even skeptics of that project were impressed by Mitchell’s dogged 
statistical research. He stuffed the book with details gathered by researchers in the United 
States, Germany, England, and France on wages, bankruptcies, unemployment population 
movement, the quantity of money, equity markets, and the volume of trade (both in 
money and in mass).116  
It was not the masterpiece he had hoped for, but it was enough to establish 
Mitchell, still in his thirties, as one of the country’s premier economists. Soon, he was on 
his way to making himself, as a friend later remarked, "connected up with more different 
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sorts of undertakings, statistical and economic, than anyone else in the country.”117 He 
left Chicago for Columbia, lured to New York by the promise of ready access to the 
objects of his inquiry. The work on money economy, he wrote to his future wife, required 
“a chance to come into contact at first hand with the workings of pecuniary 
institutions.”118 He would stay in New York, and Columbia, for the rest of his career, 
minus a few interruptions.  
The most significant of those gaps came when the United States entered the Great 
War. Mitchell’s expertise made him a logical recruit for a government bent on 
maximizing military production, and his fate was essentially sealed when his friend 
Edwin Gay—who, in his capacity as dean of Harvard Business School, had tried to hire 
Mitchell away a few years earlier to run what became Harvard’s Committee of Economic 
Research—received an appointment to the War Industries Board, one of the most 
important planning agencies in wartime Washington.119 Mitchell began work in February 
1918, just a few months after being elected president of the American Statistical 
Association. Few people in the country rivaled Mitchell’s command of the numbers 
flooding into and out of the government, but even he was overwhelmed. At one moment 
he might be asked to evaluate demand for lambskin, the next for canned meat, then for 
corn, and then on to another item in a parade of decisions only partially grounded in what 
he regarded as trustworthy data. Although the establishment of a Central Bureau of 
Planning and Statistics in the summer of 1918 brought some order to this confusion, 
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Mitchell left government work frustrated. More records were available than ever, but they 
were, as he later wrote, “bewildering in their very abundance.”120 The war had been a 
triumph for the nation, yet this virtuoso of quantification was not sure how to measure his 
own contribution.  
Mitchell channeled this ambivalence into his lecture at Richmond. Fisher had 
spoken in his capacity as head of the AEA; Mitchell gave his talk as a statistician. The 
border separating their subjects was porous, but a contrast in tone was clear from the 
outset. After congratulating members of the audience for their work in the war, Mitchell 
framed their recent experience as a test of statistics in government. It was a test he said 
they had failed, not due to individual incompetence but because of a bureaucracy 
overwhelmed by the scale of the challenge it faced. 
Despite the bleak opening, Mitchell looked to the future with anticipation. True, 
the challenges ahead were substantial. “No thoughtful person can be satisfied by our 
present social regime” of “revolting inequality” and “frightful waste,” he taught his 
students at Columbia.121 In Richmond, he told the audience, “we could not keep social 
organization what it is even if we wanted to.”122 The dangers they faced were enormous 
in scope and unprecedented in complexity, muddying the line between natural and social, 
economic and political. Rapidly declining coal reserves left humanity’s future up to the 
invention of an alternative energy source, while the intensifying feud between capital and 
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labor made it increasingly likely that discontented masses would no longer be restrained 
by democratic niceties.  
In typically Progressive fashion, Mitchell thought both problems could be solved 
with “intelligent experimenting and detailed planning”—in short, “knowledge.” Mitchell 
could never match Fisher’s messianic fervor. He presented his argument in a humbler 
key, noting that for statistics to have the most effect they should be “presented concisely, 
in standardized form, both in charts and in tables” and “must be simple enough to be sent 
by telegraph and compiled overnight.”123 Try as he might, he could not stray too far from 
the details of his data, the materiality of his labor. What he could not know was how well 
this inclination would serve him in the decade ahead. Fisher had sketched an impressive 
vision of the world to come, but he would do little to bring it into being. The world 
already had plenty of prophets. What the times demanded were engineers. 
 
FISHER AND MITCHELL WERE FAR from the only figures calling for economic 
research in the Great War’s aftermath. By the end of the 1920s, connoisseurs of data had 
an unprecedented array of sources to draw from, including Harvard’s Committee of 
Economic Research, the Institute of Economics (later to become the Brookings 
Institution), numerous bureaus of business research established within universities, and 
even more private organizations launched by corporations and unions. The government 
moved aggressively into the game as well.  
All that was just in one country. Glancing around the world turned up an 
overwhelming profusion of knowledge production, especially around economics: 
Germany and Austrian both had institutes for business cycle research (the latter run by 
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Friedrich Hayek, who credited the idea to Mitchell); France the Institute of Statistics; 
Great Britain the London and Cambridge Economic Service; Russia the Conjuncture 
Institute, under the guidance of Nikolai Kondratieff; and the League of Nations its 
Committee of Experts on Economic Barometers.124  
The ubiquity of these associations makes their creation seem inevitable. But to 
contemporaries matters were far murkier. In 1912, economic research became an object 
of discussion among some of the most powerful men in the United States—J.P. Morgan, 
Jr.; John D. Rockefeller, Sr. and Jr.; Theodore Vail, then president of AT&T; and Senator 
Nelson Aldrich, key shaper of policy on such issues as tariffs and the nascent Federal 
Reserve. (Aldrich was also Rockefeller Jr.’s father-in-law). These men wielded 
remarkable influence, yet they felt themselves besieged. Large portions of the public had 
turned against them, a dangerous situation in a democracy. Summarizing the consensus, 
the younger Rockefeller worried that “radical and ill-digested legislation” was 
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“rampant.”125 The battle against this assault would have to take place on many fronts, but 
all agreed on “the urgent need” for “systematic education of public sentiment in matters, 
[sic] financial, economic, and industrial” by “some intelligent, well-conceived, non-
political” organization.126  
Luckily, AT&T supplied a model for this kind of endeavor. It already published 
economic research, including a monthly report on business conditions. These studies 
were part of Vail’s larger attempt to weaken the hold of “demagogues” on the popular 
imagination.127 Articles in newspapers, lectures across the country—he would entertain 
anything that might aid the cause. With both envy and admiration, Rockefeller, Jr. noted 
the results of this effort: AT&T “one of the greatest, if not the greatest, single monopoly 
in the country, is allowed to continue unmolested.”128 All parties recognized that others 
might challenge the notion that a group funded by icons of capital would offer a neutral 
perspective, but the exigency of their mission and confidence that honest scholarship 
could only aid their cause pushed them onward.  
Still, the task confronting them appeared daunting. A memo on the proposed 
“Bureau of Economic Research” coauthored by the Rockefellers and Vail revealed their 
anxiety. “The political, social and economic organization of society is the subject of 
general complaint,” they announced. “A feeling of unrest and of dissatisfaction with 
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existing conditions is now prevalent throughout the country,” fueled by a climate of 
“undiscriminating distrust and suspicion.” What was worse, they could see no basis for 
the attacks. Heroes of industry were transformed into villains, and “an unprecedented era 
of prosperity” became justification for some of the most ferocious labor battles the world 
had ever seen. Politics had somehow become detached from reality; the solution was to 
ground public debate in basic truths. “Full and exact information on social and economic 
industrial and commercial conditions” would restore balance to a democracy unhinged.129  
With the outlines of the project set, responsibility for carrying out the proposal 
shifted to the Rockefeller Foundation, the family’s recently established philanthropic 
organization. Then the economists were brought in. Edwin Gay presided over a team that 
included Mitchell’s former teacher J. Laurence Laughlin. Less concerned than their 
patrons with protecting the interests of business, Gay and his colleagues focused on the 
details of the proposed institute. A lofty vision soon developed: an “Institute for 
Economic Research” that would serve as “a laboratory for the ascertainment of facts and 
methods derived from a minute study of human society in its economic and social 
relations.”130 The economists might have sensed that the opportunity was right for an 
ambitious program. A few months earlier, the death in Ludlow, Colorado of more than 
twenty workers and their family members participating in a strike against Rockefeller-
owned mining companies had become a national scandal.131 Perhaps a foray into 
scientific reform could redeem the family in the public’s eyes. 
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Much rested on selecting the right subject for the Institute. An investigation of 
prices quickly emerged as the consensus pick for its first undertaking. Existing 
information was “notoriously incomplete and unreliable,” and a firm grasp of prices—
everything from commodities and precious metals to wages and rents—was a prerequisite 
for almost any major research program the Institute would conduct. The subject had the 
added benefit of contributing to a better grasp of the issue skulking behind the 
Rockefellers’ deepest concerns: “the problem of distribution,” which, the economists 
noted, “is bound to be increasingly pressing.” The problem was a deep one that could not 
be settled by statistics alone. But, they insisted, “the first requisite for its study is the 
statistical information which such a study could supply.” Empirical research of 
impeccable quality on such a controversial issue would have the added benefit of 
burnishing the Institute’s reputation for unbiased inquiry. Gay even had a candidate in 
mind to oversee the operation: Wesley Mitchell.132 
Already, differences between the Rockefellers and the economists had surfaced. 
Propaganda had no place in the institute envisaged by the economists; even popular 
outreach seemed out of place for an essentially academic organization. To be sure, the 
professors had pragmatic aspirations. Gay and his colleagues assured the Foundation that 
they, too, valued the “discovery or invention of practical devices conducing to industrial 
peace and welfare.”133 They wanted the Institute to narrow the gap separating the 
academy from the public, and hoped to turn the pursuit of knowledge into a mission with 
obvious benefits for the wider world. But the economists wanted the duty to change that 
world to fall on those who drew upon data the Institute supplied, not the Institute itself.  
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The economists also encountered intellectual obstacles that had not occurred to 
the businessmen. A topic like prices that might appear narrow to the general observer 
raised a seemingly endless series of difficulties. Looming over them all was the challenge 
of examining in manageable form problems that were ultimately international in scope. 
Before their first day on the job, the economists were urging the Rockefellers to imagine 
“the more complete whole” a global exploration would disclose.134 
Prior to reaching that happy resolution, more immediate complications would 
have to be overcome. Frederick Taylor Gates, Rockefeller Sr.’s most respected counselor, 
warned that the entire exercise would almost certainly be a waste of effort. The economic 
landscape was rife with conflict, and academics could not be trusted to navigate such 
hazardous terrain. Reliable testimony could only be elicited by a state agency that had the 
power to force testimony under oath; anything else would yield distortions that were 
harmless at best, actively misleading at worst. Far better, Gates advised, to return to the 
original plan of promoting “elemental principles of economics on which all sensible 
persons are substantially agreed,” the most important being that strikes and other tactics 
endorsed by “labor agitators” were the surest routes to lower wages. There was no need 
to embark on baroque explorations of prices when “simple, one syllable words, with 
simple, homely illustrations” could accomplish their goals with a fraction of the time, and 
cost. “Beware of an institute of economic research,” he concluded. “But create, if you 
can, a bureau of economic publicity, that for once shall be really popular and 
efficient.”135 
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Gates need not have worried. By the time Gay’s committee gathered their 
thoughts in the summer of 1914, war had broken out in Europe. Suddenly, detailed 
surveys of prices seemed less compelling to the Rockefellers. (Though not, of course, to 
the federal government, which summoned Gay to Washington.) The Institute was 
scuttled, an early and unlamented casualty of the Great War.  
 
WHILE THE BATTLE RAGED OVERSEAS, the man charged with producing the 
monthly reports on business that Vail boasted about to his colleagues launched a project 
of his own. Malcolm Rorty had picked up degrees in mechanical and electrical 
engineering at Cornell two decades earlier, but economics became his passion after he 
was hired by AT&T.136 The life of a researcher soon came to feel constricting, and Rorty 
tip-toed into public activism. These forays into the public sphere brought him into contact 
with an especially nettlesome adversary. Nahum Stone was a statistician, socialist, 
translator of Karl Marx, and, in their first encounters, a persistent irritant to Rorty. Later, 
while perusing an issue of a socialist journal, Rorty came upon Stone again, this time as 
the author of a review dismantling a study on the controversial subject of national 
income. Impressed with the critical rigor displayed by a man he had once considered a 
lunatic radical, Rorty struck up a friendship with Stone. Though superficially a curious 
pairing, the two recognized each other as kindred spirits, happy to let a shared reverence 
for data trump clashing politics. 
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Soon, the onetime sparring partners were collaborators on a project blending their 
common interests. As Stone recalled many years later, at their second meeting Rorty 
grumbled that, despite the vast store of data researchers could draw upon, no consensus 
existed on “what part of the national income goes to each element of society.”137 Stone, 
as Rorty already knew, shared his frustration. Both also realized they were far from 
alone. What the United States needed, they agreed, was an institute that would conduct 
unbiased research on income inequality. Economists would be essential to the endeavor, 
but so would representatives from the country’s major interests, including finance, labor, 
industry, and agriculture. The undertaking would be demanding, but they knew just who 
to start with: Edwin Gay and Wesley Mitchell. 
Gay and Mitchell signed up quickly, helped along by Rorty, for whom the 
endeavor had become something of an obsession. The economists would handle the 
scholarship, Rorty assured them, while he would take care of the money. Gay endorsed 
the program and pushed for them to base the organization out of the Chamber of 
Commerce and the Research Division of Harvard Business School. Meanwhile, Rorty 
drafted board members and composed a memo outlining the institute’s goals and naming 
the group advocating its creation: the Committee on the Distribution of Income.  
The Committee, Rorty explained, had emerged “to meet a growing demand for a 
scientific determination of the distribution of national income,” a question “of vital 
consequence in the consideration of almost every important political and social problem,” 
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especially those connected to funding and supplying the war effort.138 Rorty brandished 
the names of the economists and statisticians he had enlisted, promising that farmers, 
workers, and industrialists would all have roles. Together, they would ensure that the 
Committee maintained the “freedom of action and impartiality of attitude” essential to its 
functioning.139 Given the institute’s manifold benefits, the small sum he asked for—
$10,000—appeared eminently reasonable. At least, that is how it seemed to Rorty.  
Few shared his enthusiasm. The Committee fizzled, deprived of funding by 
widespread apathy and of Rorty’s energies by his volunteering for military service. Gay 
lobbied for the cause from his post at the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, 
where he urged Woodrow Wilson to preserve the Bureau in peacetime. The Bureau could 
provide the League of Nations with information on the United States, he enthused, and 
supply government officials with the data they needed to establish an effective national 
budget system that would bring order to a bewildering appropriations process.  
Wilson shrugged off Gay’s entreaties. This was the same president, after all, who 
included no economists in his roster for the Peace Commission when he was preparing to 
leave for Versailles. Though Wilson added one, eventually, to quell the mild furor the 
exclusion had caused, Gay and his subordinates had no substantive influence over 
postwar planning.140  
It was a disappointing resolution, though not an entirely surprising one. Gay and 
Mitchell both ended the war feeling like an opportunity had slipped from their hands. 
They had come so close, they were sure, to showing what a politics made statistical could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Quoted in Stone, “Beginnings,” 8.  
 
139 Quoted in Stone, “Beginnings,” 9.  
 
140 Heaton, Edwin Gay, 132. 
	  
	   59	  
achieve. All they had needed was a little more time to launch their most ambitious 
projects—a national “business barometer” was one favorite candidate—and consolidate 
their gains.141 That was a comforting belief, and it became more comforting still when the 
Central Bureau expired altogether, trimmed from the government’s ledgers by a 
legislature that viewed statistical inquiry as an easy target for postwar economizing.  
Congressional apathy, repeated proclamations of neutrality, and the banality of 
data all might make it seem as if Rorty, Stone, Gay, Mitchell, and their fellow advocates 
for expanding economic research had embarked on a disinterested exercise in knowledge 
production. But the project’s appeal stretched across ideological divides not because it 
was antipolitical but because of how many different political interests it might serve. Two 
battles were going on simultaneously, and the coalitions changed with the subject under 
consideration. First, there was the question of whether research into social conditions was 
worth conducting in the first place. Then there was the related but distinct issue of what 
to do with the information after it was produced.  
For those comfortable with the status quo, statistics offered the possibility of 
scientific confirmation for beliefs that could otherwise be dismissed as convenient 
prejudices. Working conditions might be harsh, but they were improving; inequality 
might be high, but expropriating the rich would raise median incomes by paltry sums; 
class struggle might seem like a panacea, but progress would only come when labor and 
capital acted as one, with assistance from impartial experts. Yet socialists could also 
make faith in statistics a cornerstone of their creed. Rorty would later quote an 
anonymous socialist critic (almost certainly Stone) who insisted that “socialists believe 
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that society as a whole, with hundreds of statisticians at its command” could “perform the 
function of saving and investing now performed by the individual capitalist more 
economically and wisely than at present.”142 Then there were those, like Mitchell, who 
saw the pursuit of unbiased information as both a necessary tool for states trying to 
govern a rapidly changing industrial world and a test case for democracy itself. If trained 
experts could not come to a consensus, who could? More optimistically, if those experts 
overcame clashing ideologies and reached agreement they would furnish a template for 
modern democratic debate.  
Champions of all these positions came together at Chicago’s LaSalle Hotel in the 
last days of 1919. One year had passed since Mitchell and Fisher had issued their calls for 
a national institute of economic research. The demise of the Central Bureau dimmed their 
hope that the federal government would take up the task. But, with his military service 
completed, Rorty had thrown himself back into fundraising, and this time he found a 
more receptive audience. A majority of the first board of directors for the proposed 
institute had come to Chicago that December for the annual meeting of the American 
Economic Association. They broke away from the larger conference to approve the 
bylaws for their organization. And so the NBER was born. 
 
ECONOMIC STATISTICS WERE AS MUCH PRODUCTS of this moment as the 
NBER itself. Railroads, telegraphs, and the other constitutive elements of the new 
corporate world made it possible to create new kinds of economic statistics, and a 
thriving financial sector created a potential market for this data among investors. AT&T 
had pioneered statistical research among corporations, but even critics of the system did 
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their part to document its effects: trade unions, for example, supplied the most important 
early data on unemployment. Newspapers and other private enterprises dedicated to 
tracking what was described as “economic life” proliferated; the Wall Street Journal was 
launched in 1883, and Charles Dow’s index of stocks, including the famous Dow Jones 
Industrial Average, followed soon after. Economic periodicals both reported on a 
community and helped bring one into being. By doing so, they endowed the statistics 
they presented with new, and greater, meaning.143  
Economists gazed with anticipation at the vistas these statistics opened up. From 
David Ricardo to Léon Walras, even economists with a knack for mathematics had often 
left no space for data in their theorizing. But in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
more and more economists, especially those of a historical bent, became convinced that 
statistics were an essential item in their instrumentalism. To their advocates, statistics 
would do more than add color and nuance to existing theories. In Mitchell’s words, 
statistics promised “to reorganize the framework of our science.”144 Economic theory 
would be transformed by revolutions in economic knowledge.  
Economists could foresee grand restructurings of their discipline because its 
foundations were already shaking. Although the intellectual history of economics in the 
early twentieth century is still too often depicted as the unfolding of a marginalist 
revolution launched in the 1870s, this account caricatures a much more complex process. 
It is true that for political economy’s traditional concern with cycles of production and 
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consumption and the distribution of value among social classes, some who would later be 
termed marginalists substituted a problematic centered on individual economic agents 
relying on prices to maximize utility and, albeit unintentionally, arrive at market 
equilibrium. But, especially in the United States, the field was characterized much more 
by the extent of its pluralism than by the force of any consensus. Institutional structures, 
natural resource management, the mechanics of empire, the intricacies of finance, and 
racial improvement were only some of the subjects that vied for disciplinary dominance 
with more familiar work now gathered under the misleading title of neoclassical 
economics.145  
World War I inaugurated a new stage in this history by providing American 
economists with an invaluable prospective client: the United States government. Neither 
Wilson nor his successor, Warren Harding, paid much attention to economists, but the 
federal bureaucracy was porous, and enthusiasm for economics spread throughout its 
ranks. Hoover was an invaluable ally, but far from the only one. The Department of 
Agriculture, for example, became a stronghold for the discipline after it established the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics in 1922.146 
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The economists descending on Washington understood that their options were 
shaped by an object that had emerged within living memory: the immense, 
bureaucratically administered corporation. In the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century, the corporation had sidelined its chief rival, the small, family-owned firm that 
had dominated before the Civil War. During what the historian Jefferson Cowie has 
called “the age of incorporation,” ready access to capital, an exploding population, an 
accommodating government, and the development of a national communications and 
transportation infrastructure provided outstanding conditions for expansion.147 Savvy 
businessmen seized the opportunity, gobbling up competitors and firms along the supply 
chain. Managerial posts multiplied, along with novel types of economic calculation. 
Revealingly, both Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, Sr. had started out their 
careers as clerks. When the mindset of an accountant was yoked to the productive 
capacity of what advocates proudly labeled the modern corporation, the antebellum era 
that had given rise to free labor ideals of independent proprietorship receded into an 
irretrievable past. 
Together, the reformation of economic life brought about by the triumph of the 
corporation and support from a national government invigorated by wartime 
achievements made a new kind of economics possible. Nobody was a keener observer of 
these developments than Wesley Mitchell. Spurred on by support from both the state and 
the business community, “the statistical movement,” he announced, was “proceeding at a 
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pace which leaves many of us rather breathless.”148 Empirically oriented economists 
credited their advances not to luck but to the exigencies of the age. Mitchell drew up a 
lengthy catalogue of “social needs” that had thrust statistics into prominence: “the 
increasing interdependence among individuals and nations, the expansion of marketing 
areas, the efforts to use government as a common agency for promoting welfare, and 
above all the imperative need of mobilizing all economic resources in wartime.”149 Just 
one “modern large-scale business” absorbed and generated data at a rate that dwarfed 
anything its predecessors could boast. Governments, from municipal to national, required 
information on a dizzying array of issues: “agriculture, mining, fisheries, forestry, foreign 
and domestic commerce, railroads, shipping, labor, banking, business combinations, 
education, public lands, patents, law enforcement, child welfare, public health, weights 
and measures, income and corporation taxes, coinage, paper currency, and many other 
matters.” With so many topics jostling for attention, the market for statistical inquiries 
had boomed. Mitchell’s list of potential consumers included “philanthropic foundations, 
universities, libraries, business enterprises, labor unions, governmental agencies, and 
hundreds of individuals from different walks of life.”150 
The details might seem overwhelming, but Mitchell detected an underlying logic. 
“As society becomes more highly integrated,” he explained, “it becomes increasingly 
necessary to know about other groups.” 151 Forces that knit society closer together also 
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produced the cascade of statistics that made its components seem so distinct. But there 
was a way to uncover the higher unity that could be lost in the avalanche of numbers. 
Increasingly sophisticated statistical research techniques could break apart the data and 
stitch it back together, synthesizing otherwise disparate records and revealing the larger 
tendencies behind them. With those mysteries exposed, all that remained was to use these 
insights to address the problems they revealed. Knowledge and mastery were intertwined 
from the outset. As Mitchell later explained, the goal of all his efforts was to establish a 
solid grounding “for more intelligent efforts to control.”152 
One nation supplied an especially striking illustration of the dynamics at work. 
“Probably,” Mitchell speculated, “the United States collects and publishes more square 
yards of statistics per capita than any other country in the world.”153 The same powers 
that turned the country into an industrial giant during the closing decades of the 
nineteenth century also made it a leader in the development of statistical knowledge. But 
the United States was distinctive in this narrative only for its timing. Americans charted a 
path that others were already following, and the rest of the world was sure to come along 
eventually. 
All of these weighty trends converged around figures that would otherwise appear 
innocuous: economists buried in their studies of production and exchange, wages and 
profits, commodities and prices. They created a novel kind of knowledge, less sweeping 
than the majestic theorizing of their predecessors, but more precise. Theirs was a world, 
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as Mitchell put it, of “compilers, copyists and computers,” housed in new laboratories of 
research.154 The trends converged, in short, around the staffers of the NBER. 
 
MITCHELL AND HIS ALLIES FELT THEY WERE moving with the tides of history. 
Before the war, the most insidious fear was that industry could no longer be managed. 
Booms and busts were fiercer and more frequent than ever, class conflict more intense, 
and technological change accelerating at a rate that was both thrilling and terrifying. 
Modernity had unleashed intimidating powers, but nobody knew if they could be 
controlled—until wartime planning supplied a model validated by success on the 
battlefield. The state was slimmed down after the war, but the style of governance 
pioneered during the conflict offered a program that could be adapted to meet the 
challenges of peace. 
Social scientists believed that if anybody was going to master the new order it 
should be them. Mitchell proudly, though inelegantly, labeled the 1920s “The Social 
Science-Conscious Decade.”155 While experts grew more confident in their mastery of 
discrete fields, they hoped that their efforts would cohere into something larger. 
According to Mitchell, “the several social sciences are gaining a clearer conception that 
they have a common task—the understanding of human behavior—and that they must 
pool their resources to attain the best results.”156 Better still, it looked like there would be 
more resources to pool. Money had begun to sluice through foundations designed to 
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promote inquiries that transcended disciplinary boundaries, most prominently at the 
Rockefeller-supported Social Science Research Council.  
All the social sciences were buoyed, but none floated higher than economics. 
Although other disciplines were useful, economics had a special claim on the public’s 
attention: it could unlock the secrets of prosperity. The goal was an old one, reaching 
back centuries, but the forms it took had changed significantly with time. Defining 
“prosperity” was a way of settling a political argument over what constituted the common 
good disguised as a dispute over terminology.  
It was clear that the United States produced more stuff—more commodities, more 
consumer items, more manufactured goods, even more people—than ever before. But 
how to measure the contribution this made to the general welfare provoked sharp 
disputes. No official estimates of national income existed, and even if they had 
economists regarded the statistic as a distorted reflection of social welfare. That suspicion 
had deep roots. As one nineteenth-century political economist had warned, “what we call 
prosperity is on the contrary a national calamity” if “it creates proletarians.”157 Decades 
later, Arthur Pigou, Alfred Marshall’s student and successor as professor of political 
economy at Cambridge, argued “that any transference of income from a relatively rich 
man to a relatively poor man of similar temperament, since it enables more intense wants 
to be satisfied at the expense of less intense wants, must increase the aggregate sum of 
satisfaction.”158 For the same reason that marginal utility in general tended to decline, 
wealth also suffered diminishing returns, meaning that an extra dollar offered greater 
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benefits to the poor than to the rich. At a time when it was widely agreed that, in the 
words of Irving Fisher, economic inequality was “the most important subject in political 
economy,” Pigou’s caveat was significant.159  
That did not stop advocates of national income measurement—including, despite 
his caveats, Pigou—from trumpeting the statistic’s potential use. According to Pigou, 
national income was “not an academic toy but a practical instrument of great power 
designed for service in the concrete solution of social problems.”160 Yet the subject had 
to be approached with a keen sense of its limits. In the words of an introductory 
economics textbook published in 1926, while obtaining reliable information on inequality 
was “important,” knowledge of national and per capita income was merely “of 
interest.”161  
As for collective prosperity, Mitchell and his likeminded colleagues recast it as a 
stage in the business cycle, the study of which had become an obsession at the NBER. 
Familiar though the concept would become, in the 1920s the business cycle was still a 
novel conceit. As noted above, in the nineteenth century, theorists had concerned 
themselves more with the “credit cycle,” a phenomenon they located not in society at 
large but in the smaller world of finance. Measures of bank lending, interest rates, 
commodity prices, and the money supply were the crucial indices. What connection these 
fluctuations had to variables like employment remained opaque.  
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Theories suggesting potential links abounded. One prominent hypothesis named 
the sun as the culprit: sunspots affected the harvest, which set off a process that led to 
oscillations in finance. Others kept the blame in the heavens, but shifted culpability to 
Venus, whose eight-year cycles around the sun were alleged to form “the natural, 
material current which drags upon its surface the lagging, rhythmically changing values 
and prices with which the economist is more immediately concerned.”162 The German 
economist Werner Sombart, by contrast, highlighted discrepancies between agricultural 
and industrial cycles. Socialists homed in on contradictions as well, but their analysis 
made the divergence between individual profits and collective production into the chief 
causal factor. (Marx himself never developed a unified theory of the cycle.) Less radical 
observers attributed fluctuations to the caprices of investor psychology, sometimes linked 
to changes in the death rate, on the assumption that bereavement made for gloomy 
economic actors.163 
And there were still more, including popular discussions where vaguely defined 
“hard times” could be attributed to everything from the machinations of scheming 
politicians to the whims of Providence. Despite the number of explanations available, 
theories of the credit cycle, or its slightly grander cousin “the commercial cycle,” 
remained a minority interest through the nineteenth century. There was much talk of 
“crisis,” but the structure that could fit these periodic breakdowns—sometimes confined 
to single industries, at other times more widely diffused—into a larger framework had not 
yet appeared.  
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By the onset of the twentieth century, however, the business cycle had emerged as 
the leading candidate for the job. Reflecting on recent trends in his field, one economist 
noted in 1924 that after the war theories of the cycle had undergone “a growth almost 
miraculous.”164 Mitchell’s voluminous writings on the subject marked him as the leading 
authority on the topic in the United States, and arguably the world. As he did with the 
progress of the social sciences more generally, Mitchell depicted growing concern with 
the business cycle as a predictable response to structural changes in the country and 
technical innovations within the academy. A proliferation of companies that claimed to 
be able to forecast business fluctuations offered one marker of this larger process. More 
inspiring, to the civic minded, was an investigation launched at Hoover’s request by the 
NBER into business cycles and unemployment, finally making a connection that had 
eluded prior generations of economic thinkers. If the business cycle could be understood, 
then it could be predicted for profit, but it might also be tamed for the public good.  
There was, in this certainty, something comforting about the cycle. Bad times 
would come, but theorists of the cycle promised that prosperity would soon follow and 
that coordinated action might even abolish the cycle altogether. Modern life need not feel 
like a railroad charging ahead with breaks cut; it could be gentler, more like waves 
undulating rhythmically before washing onto shore. Beneath the remorseless cycling of 
vertiginous expansions careening into ruinous panics, economists discerned a calming 
regularity: equilibrium, the logic by which the industrial world regulated itself.165  
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BUSINESS CYLE THEORISTS TAPPED into a hunger for efficiency that was at the 
heart of Progressivism. Liberalism and the maximization of utility had been joined 
together for more than a century, but Progressives turned the determination of utility into 
a question for experts to adjudicate. “He didn’t believe in democracy; he believed simply 
in government,” H.L Mencken observed of Theodore Roosevelt, in a line that applied to 
many of TR’s followers.166 Faith in endless expansion appeared lost to a time before the 
frontier closed and overproduction seemed a constant threat. In the twentieth century, 
trusting to the free play of economic forces fell somewhere between an outdated fantasy 
and an unaffordable luxury. Waste was the enemy, conservation the ideal.167 In 1912, 
Roosevelt described “national efficiency” as both the goal of his entire agenda and “the 
principle of conservation widely applied.”168 This was also the heyday of Taylorism and, 
during the war, of nationwide drives for maximizing productivity, both of which Hoover 
and his acolytes later drew upon in their campaign to rationalize government. Students of 
the business cycle could easily fit their subject into this larger fixation. “From the 
viewpoint of society,” Mitchell insisted, “booms are wasteful, crises are costly, and 
depressions are periods of wide-spread suffering.”169 It was a problem ripe for what 
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economists specialized in: exacting the greatest returns from scarce resources. Or, more 
simply, economizing.  
By the 1920s, a new vocabulary for discussing these issues had developed, a 
language filled with terms like economic community, economic world, economic 
situation, economic life, economic environment, economic machine, the economic 
structure of society, and economic commonwealth. The economy was part of this group, 
but its definition was vague. In 1893, one political scientist had complained “that the 
English language contains no generally accepted word to describe the conscious activity 
of human beings in the joint satisfaction of their individual desires” and suggested that 
“economy” might be an acceptable translation for what the Germans called 
“Wirtschaft.”170 But before deploying the concept he felt compelled to ascertain its 
“constituent elements”—“first, the surface of the earth, with its annuity of heat, light, air 
and moisture, and second, the human beings who inhabit this surface”—and then moved 
to an explication of Socrates on the duality of human nature and the essence of the self.171  
Less metaphysical definitions of the economy avoided these difficulties, but the 
term’s meaning was contested and unstable. Bearing older connotations, it could still be 
used to explain a style of economic management, as when the Progressive journalist 
Herbert Croly wrote, “a system of national economy appears to make for a higher level 
of economic vitality than a system of international economy.”172 Almost inevitably, 
“economy” appeared as the second item in a pair: for instance, village economy, town 
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economy, slave economy, capitalist economy, planned economy, market economy, 
national economy, world economy, and money economy (a favorite subject at the 
NBER). In these formulations, an economy was not a natural feature of collective life. It 
was something that had to be created through the extension of commerce and subsequent 
remaking of state and society. “The economic life of a politically organized independent 
people,” a textbook published in 1889 observed, “is often called a national economy,” but 
without “independent political unity” supported by “an independent state” no economy 
could be said to exist.173 The question was not, for example, what kind of world economy 
existed, but whether the idea of a “world economy” made sense. Assuming that it did, 
debate then turned to whether an infrastructure had emerged that justified the term’s use.  
These complexities help account for the concept’s marginality in the early 
decades of the twentieth century. References to various kinds of economy appeared in 
economic tracts, especially from authors who had studied in Germany, but they were 
sporadic. Often, scholars dodged the challenge of translation altogether by deploying the 
original German (Wirtschaft, Volkswirtschaft, Weltwirtschaft, and so on).   
Economists did not refrain from discussing “the economy” because they had little 
to say. If anything, they had too much—a profusion of concepts offered a variety of 
competing frameworks, each of which could provide larger meaning for local problems. 
It was a time when a typical introductory economics textbook could include, in addition 
to discussions of supply and demand, chapters on “the economics of railroad 
transportation,” “industrial monopoly and its control,” “population,” “immigration,” 
“problems of the working day,” “the organized labor movement,” and, often by way of 
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conclusion, “socialism.”174 When economists reached for those bigger structures, they 
were far more likely to use “society” than “economy.”  
It might seem that the “industrial world” and “business cycle” referred to by so 
many figures—including radical socialists, academic economists, and hustling economic 
forecasters on Wall Street—were synonyms for what later generations would call “the 
economy.” But a closer look at what fell within the purview of industrial reveals a more 
complicated relationship. There was no agreement on what constituted the industrial 
system’s key metrics, or on how to understand the relationships among them.175 A 
hodgepodge of sources was available—Mitchell listed “bank clearings, railway gross 
earnings, number of idle cars, imports and exports, coal, copper, pig-iron, and steel 
output, shipments of grain, cotton, live stock” as some of the most prominent—with no 
obvious way of determining priority among them. With so much conflicting information 
to draw upon, it could seem as if each supposed expert on the cycle had an idiosyncratic 
favorite: the physical volume of business, perhaps, or wholesale prices, or 
unemployment. National income seemed far too crude a measure to serve as a proxy for 
industrial rhythms, even if reliable data on its fluctuations were available. When subjects 
ranging from alcohol consumption to the marriage rate could be counted as part of the 
cycle, it was impossible to know where to stop.176 
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But economists could switch in an instant to complaining about what they did not 
have. Data on vital issues like corporate profits were frustratingly meager. Research that 
was supposed to endow vague references to booms and busts with empirical clarity could 
muddy things even further. With a few adjustments to the formula, prosperity could turn 
into depression and reverse itself just as quickly. 
There were also questions about the boundaries of the industrial system that 
statistics could not resolve. The most aggressive proponents of business cycle theory still 
acknowledged the limits of their investigations. Mitchell insisted that his analysis was 
“primarily” confined “to a certain type of business enterprise.”177 Oil was one “very 
peculiar” sector that fell outside the purview of business cycle theory. Even more 
important was agriculture.178 Both had profound influences on prosperity, but they moved 
at rhythms that could not be reduced to those of business. Cycles appeared when a 
cohesive business community moved as one. Although the reach of that community had 
expanded, it was still far from universal. That point was driven home during the 1920s, 
when boom times for much of the nation coincided with a disastrous period for its 
farmers.  
Agriculture’s deep history in economic thought made it an especially significant 
exclusion from the industrial sphere. Ecology and economy had grown out of a shared 
etymological root, the Greek oikos. Sciences of commerce and cultivation had flourished 
alongside each other since the eighteenth century, often within the same text. They 
continued to do so in Mitchell’s time, when one of America’s leading agricultural 
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journals was founded by an economist and titled Land Economics. Agricultural 
economics, and subdisciplines like “forest economics,” were recognized elements of the 
larger economics discipline. This was a moment when the country’s leading economic 
journal could dedicate a roundtable to “farm management.”179 By the turn of the 
twentieth century, it seemed to many economists, especially in the United States, that the 
discipline was poised between two alternative paths: becoming a science of resource 
management or a science of money.  
Contemporaries described this as a choice between a focus on efficiency and 
scarcity. As Mitchell explained, “Efficiency is the theme of engineering economics, 
which deals with the relations of man to nature, with the physical input and output of 
industrial processes, with use values. Scarcity is the theme of institutional economics, 
which deals with the relations of man to man, with pecuniary outgo and income, with 
scarcity values.”180 Veblen had done much to spread this view within the profession, but 
similar claims had also become a staple of socialist tracts. There, socialism was depicted 
as the mode of production where profit seeking would finally be subordinated to the 
exigencies of production—where engineers would replace businessmen. More straitlaced 
economists were inclined to restrict their field to issues circling around scarcity, but 
whether they would succeed in that effort was by no means obvious. In these disputes, 
more than the outlines of the industrial system were unclear. The contours of collective 
life—the divisions separating the social, economic, and natural—threatened to collapse 
into each other.  
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One object that crossed these borders, and had become an obsession for many, 
was racial purity. Fisher provided a particularly striking example of this prevalent 
fixation with race. A staunch advocate of promoting “racial economy,” Fisher viewed 
economic prosperity and racial vitality as inseparable elements of national wealth.181 His 
embrace of eugenics put him within the mainstream of a profession composed of men 
like Edward Ross, one of the founding members of the American Economic Association 
and coiner of the phrase “race suicide”—a racialized variant on political economy’s 
traditional concern with managing population.182 Some of population’s centrality had 
been lost in recent decades, but it had plenty of advocates, including Mitchell, who 
believed that “population must be restored as one of the basic factors in economic 
theory.”183 In this environment, race was a standard part of economic analysis, and of the 
social sciences more generally. (The country’s first publication devoted to international 
relations theory was titled Journal of Race Development, and it counted Veblen among its 
contributors.)184 Debates over eugenics were standbys of introductory textbooks, where 
endorsements of sterilization and other tools for what one described as “getting rid of an 
inferior population” were common.185 From this perspective, race was just another factor 
determining potential productivity. Statistics themselves were bound up with eugenics: 
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biometric analyses of populations relied on advanced statistical methods to justify 
eugenicist conclusions, employing techniques that later migrated to economics.  
Fisher’s promotion of racial economy was part of his quintessentially Progressive 
fixation with efficiency. In a report for Theodore Roosevelt’s Conservation Commission, 
Fisher listed three areas in need of economizing: “physical environment,” “social 
environment,” and “human nature.”186 Physical efficiency included the conservation of 
land, water, and other natural resources; social efficiency the management of the era’s 
major public controversies; and human efficiency the maximizing of individual potential 
through promotion of hygiene, both of the body and the soul.187 The body was a 
persistent source of concern for Fisher, who warned that “social diseases” like syphilis 
posed “one of the gravest of the menaces to national efficiency.”188 Guarding the purity 
of rivers, regulating the working day, and (in Fisher’s words) “the unsexing of rapists, 
criminals, idiots, and degenerates generally” were all aspects of his campaign to 
maximize national efficiency.189  
General concerns with population management often took specific shape around 
questions relating to immigration. Frank Fetter, then early in his career as the founding 
chairman of Princeton’s revealingly titled “Department of Economics and Social 
Institutions,” used a 1912 presidential address at the American Economic Association to 
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explore the subject.190 Offering an analysis he portrayed as “wholly impersonal and 
without race prejudice,” he declared that an influx of immigrants endangered the delicate 
balance between population and resources that he claimed was essential to maintaining 
prosperity.191 Fetter’s colleagues did not always play so coy on race. As Rorty noted, the 
belief that a nation “striving for an advanced civilization must preserve a substantial unity 
of races” enjoyed widespread acceptance.192  
Immigration, though, was only one way that global trends framed national 
conflicts. The extent to which business cycles rippled across national borders sparked 
pitched debate among economists, as did the related question of whether nationally 
bound research institutes could hope to grasp forces that transcended their humbler 
domains of inquiry. Fear that excess production would lead to crisis without the opening 
of new markets abroad preoccupied economic and political elites, while calculating 
wartime reparations propelled economic statistics into the forefront of some of the 
period’s most vicious international disputes.193  
Economists trying to untangle the relationship between national and international 
economic trends also faced a statistical problem. Estimating flows across borders, 
whether of commodities or currency, had been a standard part of commercial life for 
hundreds of years. Tariffs supplied the federal government with its chief source of 
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funding, and customhouses provided a site for tabulating the value of export and imports. 
Through the early years of the twentieth century, production of statistics on international 
trade dwarfed what was available on the domestic side. Economists believed this 
imbalance had warped the popular understanding of foreign trade’s significance. As one 
textbook speculated, although “the domestic trade of the United States is much larger in 
volume and hence presumably more significant to the welfare of the nation than the 
foreign trade,” because statistics on exchanges across borders were more readily 
available, “the course of our foreign trade is eagerly followed by business men, and as a 
result popular emphasis is wrongly placed.”194 National taxation on income and 
corporations would help alleviate this discrepancy—and shift the bulk of the state’s 
revenues to the domestic front—but it was not easy to shrug off the accumulated weight 
of habits built up over generations. 
 
THE NBER WAS BUILT TO produce the kinds of statistics that would illuminate the 
domestic market until then cloaked in relative obscurity. Its charter announced that the 
organization had been founded  
To encourage, in the broadest and most liberal manner, investigation, 
research, and discovery, and the application of knowledge to the well-
being of mankind; and in particular to conduct, or assist in the making of, 
exact and impartial investigations in the fields of economic, social, and 
industrial science, and to cooperate with governments, universities, 
learned societies, and individuals.195 
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These aspirations could seem mundane, but they would have been inconceivable without 
earlier changes of extraordinary magnitude. The transformations were both conceptual 
and structural, and they blurred the boundaries demarcating political, economic, social, 
and natural. A new era was dawning, and the stafffers at the NBER believed their role—
experts capable of providing disinterested counsel to leaders of the indispensable 
nation—had earned them a vital part in the drama ahead. Economists had already been 
called upon for their advice on a host of novel issues. A partial list from Fetter included 
“banking, immigration, railroads, public utilities, labor, accident compensation, [and] tax 
reform.”196 And their advice on these matters was sought both at home and abroad, from 
Mexico and Colombia to China and Poland.197  
Yet the work that still needed to be done in the United States carried special 
importance. Economists were convinced that they could supply essential guidance on the 
pivotal debates of their time—debates over conserving natural resources, disciplining the 
industrial system, controlling the population, and grappling with income inequality. 
These were the great challenges of modern society, but they could be solved. And who 
better to solve them than the foremost authorities of the planet’s most powerful country?  
The NBER’s founders can seem both pedestrian and grandiose, bureaucrats and 
academics stuffed with delusions of grandeur, trying to save the world one national 
income estimate at a time. Of course, their dreams went unrealized. But their 
accomplishments were almost as impressive, and more surprising. A distinctive 
assemblage of concepts and institutions had made an organization like the NBER 
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possible: a politics centered around the exigencies of society, an economics attuned to the 
particularities of industry, a planet haunted by the prospect of revolution, and a nation 
confident that it was about to assume its rightful place as global leader. With remarkable 
speed, however, a different set of forces appeared that fostered another way of governing 
the social world, and understanding it. Just a few years earlier, American political 
economy had revolved around the gold standard, a government funded chiefly by tariffs, 
and a decentralized banking system. By 1920, the gold standard had broken down, the 
United States had instituted a national income tax, and the Federal Reserve System 
provided the country with the foundation of what could become a central bank.198 A new 
kind of governance that had recently not even been plausible soon came into sight: an 
economic program that used monetary and fiscal policy to promote a steadily rising 
national income.  
Much intellectual, institutional, and political work remained to be done before 
that vision could be made into a plausible, or thinkable, economic agenda. Economists 
would do much to make that order seem tractable. In the process, they helped reframe the 
study of economics, recast the meaning of prosperity, and reorient politics around an 
object that took on the importance that society had possessed for more than a century. 
Though a novel concept, this object had a familiar name: “the economy.” 
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Chapter 2: Charting the Economic Seas 
 
A “GIFT TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY,” and to humanity—that was the goal.199 
Dismissing laissez-faire as a relic of the eighteenth century, Herbert Hoover called for a 
philosophy, and a government, that responded to the demands of a new age. As Hoover 
explained it, the United States had pioneered a social order that transcended the division 
between capitalism and socialism. American traditions—above all, its individualism—
could be preserved in the twentieth century, but only if they were reinvented.200 
There was little time to wait. A wave of unrest swept across the country in 1919, 
the year a fifth of the country’s labor force went on strike and a string of anarchist 
bombings provoked a crackdown dubbed the Red Scare.201 Even more disconcerting for 
partisans of order was the turmoil spreading outside the nation’s borders. “Every wind 
that blows carries to our shores an infection of social disease from this great ferment,” 
Hoover said in 1920 during a short-lived campaign for the presidency.202 He returned to 
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the subject two years later in a 1922 booklet-cum-manifesto, American Individualism. 
“Without question,” he wrote, “there exists, almost all over the world, unprecedented 
disquietude at the functioning of government itself.”203  
The most pressing concerns circled around a particular cluster of issues. Not the 
old challenges of preserving liberty, promoting virtue, or upholding social order, where 
tested strategies for managing unrest were available. These new questions centered on the 
state’s attempt “to chart its relations to the economic seas.” 204 “Our Government’s 
greatest troubles and failures are in the economic field,” Hoover insisted: “These seas are 
new and only partly discovered.”205  
Before the explosion of industrial development that had remade the country, the 
government could afford to maintain a distance from much of what Hoover called 
“economic life.”206 According to Hoover, the emergence of leviathan corporations forced 
a new relationship between state and citizen, just as it had society and the individual, 
turning the government into both the greatest protector and the greatest threat to Hoover’s 
cherished individualist tradition. The most pressing issues of the time were economic, 
and the United States needed a strategy for navigating this unmapped territory. Resolving 
this dilemma would ensure domestic tranquility and enable Americans to take up their 
rightful place at the head of a new global order.  
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The goal was clear; how to reach it was not. What theories could make sense of 
economic problems that no previous generation had confronted? How should the 
government respond to these discoveries? What about the nation’s corporate leaders? Or 
its workers? Hoover wanted to replace political conflict with a consensus of experts, but 
in 1920 there was no expert consensus on how to steer through the “economic seas.” 
Intellectual confusion, political unrest, and economic upheaval braided together in this 
disorienting moment. 
Just a few years later, that had all changed. While the twenties roared, Hoover 
trumpeted the intellectual discoveries he claimed had remade American life—its 
economics, its politics, and society itself. And he attributed much of this success to the 
economists whose research had guided the project—none more so than Wesley Mitchell 
and his team at the NBER. Shortly after becoming Secretary of Commerce, Hoover told 
Mitchell, “we need you to come to Washington to give us a hand.” “If this Department is 
to become the economic interpreter to the American people (and they badly need one) it 
has simply got to be stiffened up with stronger economic operators.” Proposing that 
Mitchell serve as general economic adviser to the department, Hoover offered an 
expansive portfolio: postwar debt negotiations, German reparations, Argentine exchange 
policy, and the “100 domestic troubles in which this department must give some voice” 
would fall under Mitchell’s purview.207 
Mitchell declined the appeal, but he remained close to the energetic Secretary. 
“Your efforts to utilize whatever help economics can render to government,” he wrote to 
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Hoover, “seem to me one of the most promising developments of our time."208 Though 
Mitchell did not join the administration, he became the intellectual leader of its attempt to 
lay the foundations for a new kind of economic governance. In a mutually reinforcing 
cycle, the NBER’s studies made them into a candidate for Hoover’s support, Hoover’s 
support legitimated the NBER in the eyes of donors, more funding led to more studies, 
and so on. The titles alone indicate the expansion of the NBER’s ambitions. Beginning 
with a two volume study of Income in the United States, it moved to a report on Business 
Cycles and Unemployment commissioned by Hoover, then widened its purview to 
include subjects like The Growth of American Trade Unions, 1880-1923 and Migration 
and Business Cycles, brought these issues together in an updated version of Mitchell’s 
1913 work on Business Cycles, and concluded the decade with a sweeping survey, again 
conducted at Hoover’s request, of Recent Economic Changes.209 As the phrase’s 
recurrence in this list suggests, business cycle theory provided the unifying framework 
for the project. Before the war, Mitchell’s notions had been the stuff of academic 
monographs; now they had become the basis for an attempt to remake politics.  
The shift was made all the stranger by the persistent dispute among economists 
over whether business cycles existed at all. That was the position endorsed by Irving 
Fisher, who believed the vicissitudes of business activity were no more cyclical than the 
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fortunes of a gambler over a long night at the casino.210 The swings Mitchell attributed to 
the logics of modern industry, were, according to Fisher, fluctuations around a mean 
produced by changes in the amount of money coursing through society. The divergence 
between these judgments was immense: different theories for understanding the 
vicissitudes of economic life, different statistics for measuring these shifts, and different 
tactics for responding to this instability. Where Mitchell dwelled on the almost 
unfathomable complexity of a business cycle thick with institutional peculiarity, Fisher 
offered the bracing simplicity of an equation known to economists as the quantity theory 
of money; where Mitchell’s countercyclical policies reserved a substantial role for private 
institutions with public aspirations like the NBER, Fisher’s required the support of a 
quasi-public institution that often appeared more like the agent of private interests—the 
Federal Reserve.  
Money and the business cycle—this was not macroeconomics as it would be 
known among economists in just a few decades, but these were the debates that made the 
birth of macroeconomics possible, and with it a politics preoccupied with governing the 
economy. Mitchell and Fisher themselves shared more than a superficial appraisal 
suggests. Both linked deep statistical research with a commitment to building larger 
theories that could make sense of their ever increasing collections of data; both fastened 
on money as the decisive causal factor in their analyses; both struggled to reconcile 
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systems that took the nation as their implicit frame with the realities of an international 
economic order dominated by the United States; and both wanted to provide theories 
policymakers could use to guide their increasingly complicated work. A generation later, 
the collection of tools for governing the American economy—a phrase that became more 
familiar as this decade progressed, but had not yet assumed its later centrality—included 
pieces from both of their schemas while taking all of neither. Unthinkable without these 
earlier interventions, the program that emerged was something neither Fisher nor 
Mitchell could have envisioned.  
In the 1920s, however, all that lay ahead. To understand the complicated interplay 
of political, economic, and intellectual history during this period, it helps to split the 
discussion into two parts, and then consider how the pieces fit together. On one side lies 
the effort to understand and manage the business cycle led by Hoover and Mitchell; on 
the other is the related but distinct attempt to define the role of the Federal Reserve under 
conditions its founders had never anticipated. Both subjects have attracted substantial 
academic commentary, but they are usually treated as discrete. That division reflects the 
different institutional and intellectual histories at work, but it undermines the attempt to 
grasp the tactics and strategies that directed—or obstructed—economic policymaking as 
a whole. 
When brought together, these histories become a study of how ideas gain traction 
in policymaking. Both Hoover’s Commerce Department and the Federal Reserve are 
often seen as quintessential examples of technocratic policymaking, but the experts 
themselves were acutely aware of how little they knew. In 1920, that included the 
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national income of the United States. That was where the NBER decided to begin its 
research. 
 
THE NBER TEAM HAD GOOD REASONS FOR starting with national income. An 
intimidating assortment of problems confronted those who would appraise the country’s 
worth. The economist and statistician Willford King described the problem in 1915 when 
he published his path-breaking findings on national income. “Everyone is aware that 
wealth has increased,” he wrote, but “in the present time of searching inquiry into the 
fundamentals of economics and politics, people wish to know more than this.”211 They 
wanted precision, clarity, and rigor, where before they had been content with hazy 
generalizations.          
 Those standards were difficult to meet when economists were forced to rely upon 
such inadequate data. As the esteemed Harvard economist Allyn Young complained in 
1917, statistics for the national income of the United States were “largely guesswork, and 
their meaning and significance uncertain.”212 King himself drew upon a hodgepodge of 
sources for his 1915 estimates—scattered reports on wages, surveys of workers, records 
from Wisconsin state income tax returns, and federal income tax returns (limited in 
number, since a constitutional amendment permitting the establishment of a federal 
income tax had only passed in 1913).       
 The most immaculate data would still have left researchers with a litany of 
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conceptual difficulties. National income was a lackluster proxy for King’s ideal statistic. 
King described the ultimate object of his inquiry as “social wealth,” but he believed that 
object could only be judged by the utility it generated, and money value was at best an 
“indirect route” to this more robust (yet unattainable) metric.213 In one of the book’s most 
fascinating moves, however, King offered a qualified defense of his investigation. “In 
recent times, when a larger and larger percentage of social wealth is becoming 
economic,” he argued, “measures of economic wealth become better and better criteria of 
the actual social wealth of a community or nation.”214 Society was being economized, 
which made new types of measurement valuable and transformed the objects of economic 
inquiry.           
 Then there was the persistent question of how much national income mattered, 
when the real subject of debate was not the total amount of wealth but its distribution. 
“The average wealth would be greatly increased by the addition of a few dozen 
billionaires to our population,” King noted, “but this might give little more shelter to the 
homeless or food to the hungry.”215 Then there were the difficulties of quantifying the 
effects of population growth, a statistic that was easier to grasp than national income and 
had a much-debated relationship to social welfare. King believed resource constraints 
placed insuperable limits on potential prosperity, and he thought ignoring those 
constraints ensured catastrophe. His portrait of a society straining at the edge of resource 
exploitation doubled as a thinly concealed representation of the United States in 1915: a 
nation where the frontier had closed, where railways and canals brought distant markets 
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together, where factories churned out goods with unprecedented speed, where energy was 
generated with the most modern technologies, where a powerful state ensured protection 
against enemies foreign and domestic—according to King, that was a nation where rising 
population diminished general welfare, and that was the contemporary United States.  
 A thoroughgoing progressive, King sought an answer to this challenge in a 
powerful state acting in tandem with the latest developments in social science. He 
insisted that poverty would only be abolished if the country raised barriers against “low-
standard alien invaders” and resolved to “eliminate the section of our population 
remaining, from the reproductive standpoint, on the low plane of their four-footed 
ancestors.”216 Americans had become familiar with the consequences of inaction: 
“riotous strikes, wholesale murders, dynamite outrages and that most contemptible of all 
modes of attack, sabotage.”217 Prosperity was a fragile thing, and the secret to its 
maintenance was not government management of the national income, at least not 
directly, but the less abstract work of ending “the absurd folly of breeding great troops of 
paupers, defectives and criminals to be a burden upon organized society.”218
 Fevered denunciations of reprobate foreigners and native-born degenerates were 
common enough to attract little commentary from King’s reviewers. Some quibbled with 
his analysis, and it was often suggested that he demanded more of his sources than they 
could provide. But the significance of research into the distribution of income helped 
excuse King’s sometimes implausible conclusions. “We know just enough about the real 
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facts to be certain of their tremendous import,” remarked Allyn Young.219 The North 
American Review stepped back from academic disputes to explain why King’s topic 
deserved their consideration. Anticipating Hoover by several years, the journal noted that 
“[i]ntelligent citizenship” now required “something like accurate knowledge of the facts 
underlying those economic conditions concerning which so many questions are asked and 
so many assertions are made.”220 King’s study was an early response to this demand, but 
it was one raindrop in what would become a flood. 
 
PESCIENCE HAS ITS REWARDS, and King’s pioneering efforts made him a logical 
choice when the NBER was searching for assistance on their study of national income. 
King joined a team, becoming one of four authors credited in the NBER’s first 
publication, Income in the United States: Its Amount and Distribution, 1909-1919. The 
book was not King’s work; it was the NBER’s. That distinction was evident from the 
outset. The study replaced King’s occasionally fulminating tone for a style that Mitchell, 
not without pride, called “a cross between a census report and a treatise on statistical 
method.”221 Brandishing the diversity of their supporters like a weapon, the authors 
opened by declaring their hope “to aid all thoughtful men, however divergent their views 
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of public policy, to base their discussions on objective knowledge.”222 They followed this 
statement of intent with a list of the Bureau’s directors, a group that included academics, 
government officials, and journalists, along with representative for banking, agriculture, 
industry, and labor.          
 More important than the sponsors were the statistics. Enumerating thirteen kinds 
of sources they drew upon—ranging from rent surveys conducted by AT&T to appraisals 
of crop value issues by the Department of Agriculture—the authors depicted their 
conclusions as the best that could be arrived at with data that left “much to be desired.”223 
Despite the imperfections, continued accumulation of income tax data supplied the most 
reliable evidence researchers had yet acquired on income and its distribution. That held 
true outside the United States as well. Placing their effort in a global frame, Mitchell and 
his co-authors cited studies in Germany and England that relied upon income tax data, 
and offered a special commendation to Australia for launching a 1915 income 
“census.”224 When combined with the cataloguing of source material, these myriad 
examples of the quantifying spirit suggested a project that was both possible (because of 
new evidence) and necessary (to avoid falling behind in a global race).   
 But the authors could not escape the politics of their project, a fact they embraced 
at some moments and denied at others. While their account of total national income 
conveyed the impression that their conclusions were chiefly a subject of interest to 
specialists, they recognized that income distribution had urgent political relevance. The 
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report formalized this separation, devoting one chapter to measuring the size of the 
income and another to its distribution. Though preferring to cast themselves as impartial 
scientists, recognition of the politics behind their empiricism broke into the text: the 
exclusion from their calculations of unpaid labor performed by women in the household, 
for instance, which they admitted could have led to an “appreciable” overstatement of 
recent economic progress.225 Less troubling, they believed, was their refusal to account 
for declining natural resources. Though actions taken today might reduce wealth in the 
future, they did not believe that should force a reduction in their evaluations of the 
present.         
 Mastery of data also justified academic interventions with obvious political 
relevance. Most notable on this front was their assault on a thesis advanced by the Italian 
economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, who had argued that income distribution 
obeyed iron laws that reflected the logic of economic life.226 Pareto had developed this 
argument by using the logarithmic scale, a tool that allowed researchers to plot shifts in 
the rate of change, rather than just tracking overall levels. (Fisher had devoted an article 
to explaining the value of this strange device to his colleagues in 1913 for a journal 
published by the American Statistical Association.227) The device makes large numbers 
more tractable than they would otherwise be, but for that reason, the NBER authors 
charged, it endowed a jagged pattern with deceptive uniformity. Pareto’s mistake did not 
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oblige economists to discard this “powerful instrument.”228 The logarithmic scale would 
remain in the economist's toolkit, and it would be taken up after World War II by a later 
generation more concerned with analyzing the growth of national income than its 
distribution.           
 In the 1920s, the hierarchy was reversed. Reviews often described the book as a 
study of income distribution rather than (as the report presented itself) of both total 
overall income and its distribution. As one explained matters, “popular writers and 
speakers are likely to be more interested in the inequality of distribution of income than 
in its total.”229 If the NBER’s staffers wanted to reflect the nation back to itself, there was 
no guarantee that the image would be attractive. Those who marshaled the Bureau’s 
evidence to indict the United States were, Mitchell later wrote, “dealing with 
inconsistencies, foibles, and superficialities in our scheme of institutions, which are rather 
cruelly exposed when one sums up in definite figures society's own records of its 
economic valuations.”230 
Academics praised the NBER for navigating politically charged territory. One 
review judged the book “a landmark in the progress of statistical research”; another 
claimed that “it ranks with the best that American economic scholarship is producing”; 
yet another deemed it an “excellent work” that supplied “the most reliable source of 
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information” on its subject.231 The NBER did not escape criticism, especially from those 
still unsatisfied with the available data on national income, but even those strictures were 
restrained.          
 Overcoming apathy presented a more difficult challenge. Despite the academic 
plaudits, the study had a tepid reception in the wider world, putting further pressure on 
the Bureau’s already shaky finances. Disappointing public support had forced the Bureau 
to rely upon a small number of large downers, not the broad base of contributors they had 
intended. Even then, the funding never seemed to be enough, and straitened conditions in 
the early years left NBER staffers feeling that the organization was, as Malcolm Rorty 
complained, “operating almost from hand to mouth.”232 In 1922, Mitchell warned that 
without “a considerable addition to our income we shall be forced to shut up shop.”233 
Faith in the academic merit and ultimate relevance of their work brought the 
NBER to the attention of a key figure in the Rockefellers’ philanthropic empire. After 
receiving a PhD in psychology and education from the University of Chicago, Beardsley 
Ruml had sought refuge from the academy with a career in the nation’s expanding 
network of philanthropies.234 He followed a yearlong stint at the Carnegie Corporation 
with a lengthy tenure as head of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial. Ruml 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Arthur Bowley, “Review,” 510; Jacob Hollander, “Review: Income in the United States, Its 
Amount and Distribution, 1909-19. By the Staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Incorporated; Wesley C. Mitchell; Willford I. King; Frederick R. Macauley; Oswald W. Knauth; Willford 
I. King,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 18.139 (September 1922), 411; J.C.S., “Review: 
Income in the United States, 1909-19. By Wesley C. Mitchell; Willford J. King; Frederick R. Macaulay; 
Oswald W. Knauth,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 85.4 (June 1922), 635. 
 
232 Malcolm Rorty to H.S. Learned, October 28, 1922, Box 51, Folder 538, Series 3, S Laura 
Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter Spelman Papers). 
 
233 Wesley Mitchell, “Annual Report of the Director of Research,” February 6, 1922, 9, available 
at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12271.pdf.  
 
234 Patrick Reagan, Designing a New America: The Origins of New Deal Planning, 1890-1943 
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 140-167 details Ruml’s biography.  
	  
	   97	  
considered the NBER “one of the most important influences in the establishing of 
opinion in this country,” and he persuaded the Rockefeller to back up that opinion with 
$25,000 of annual funding.235  
Dipping into Rockefeller coffers supplied its own set of problems. “It is a moral 
certainty,” the New Republic journalist and NBER director George Soule informed 
Malcolm Rorty, “that if Rockefeller should be the main supporter of the Bureau, and the 
Bureau should at any time issue figures which labor leaders for any reason wished to 
discount, the charge would be made that these figures were the result of Rockefeller 
influence.”236 Soule still encouraged accepting the contribution, but only after its 
potential costs were tallied. Rorty conveyed these anxieties to Ruml, writing in the letter 
agreeing to the offer that he could take this move because it had received unanimous 
support from the NBER’s “radical directors.”237      
 After the war, it had become more difficult to argue that an organization like the 
NBER was, as one skeptic cautioned the Rockefellers when they were considering their 
own economic research institute, a “merely academic and futile instrument for gathering 
useless data.”238 But not impossible. Even Hoover recognized that the government would 
not take up the kinds of inquiries that occupied the NBER. Writing to Edwin Gay, 
Rorty’s predecessor as head of the NBER, Hoover said he could not foresee “any 
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possibility that Congress would for a moment entertain the necessary appropriations to 
make such studies” of national income.239 Conditions were more amenable to an 
enterprise like the NBER than they had ever been, yet that still did not make for a 
welcoming environment. Not even a masterful treatise on a subject widely viewed as 
possessing existential importance for American democracy could accomplish that feat. 
But economic crisis would. 
 
HERBERT HOOVER WAS NOT THE FIRST government official to call for 
investigations of economic activity, but he pushed that project farther than any of his 
predecessors. Even before taking office as Secretary of Commerce, he initiated a “survey 
of waste” overseen by the Federated American Engineering Societies. The project took 
on new urgency in 1921. Prices had climbed across the world during the war, and the 
United States offered no exception to the trend. Military expenditure had surged, but 
neither overall output nor taxation rates had matched the pace of its rise. Inflation made 
up the difference, escalating at a speedy clip through 1919. When demobilization 
commenced, interest rates soared. Concerned about ensuring financial liquidity during the 
transition to peacetime and maintaining gold reserves at a legally mandated minimum, 
officials at the Federal Reserve pushed the discount rate—the interest it charged 
commercial banks—to 7 percent, and kept it there until May 1921. Meanwhile, prices 
collapsed, taking production down with them and sending unemployment skyrocketing. 
While Americans worried about malign foreign influences fomenting unrest at home, the 
rest of the world grappled with the consequences of a vicious deflationary cycle 
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unleashed by the United States.240       
 All this, however, only became clear in retrospect. The government was swarming 
with social scientists—in Hoover’s Commerce Department, but also in the Department of 
Labor, the Federal Trade Commission, the Census Office, and the Department of 
Agriculture, not to mention the Federal Reserve. Yet the statistical blindness that Mitchell 
had complained about during the war continued in peacetime. There were no official 
measurements of national income or output, the government had only recently begun 
producing a general cost of living index, and estimates of unemployment differed by 
millions.241           
 The downturn was more than a year old when Warren Harding became president, 
but his inaugural address urged Americans to resign themselves to their circumstances. 
“Perhaps we shall never know the old level of wages again,” he said. “We must face a 
condition of grim reality, charge off our losses and start afresh.”242 While Fed officials 
denied responsibility for falling prices, anxiety continued to mount as they struggled to 
comprehend a slump whose causes remained opaque and whose extent they lacked 
statistics to measure. Meanwhile, calls for action grew louder. “The purpose and place of 
the Government in expediting economic recovery is raised in Washington every hour of 
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the day,” Hoover said in the summer of 1921.243    
 Though Hoover rejected demands for wage and price controls, he did not believe 
these policies exhausted the government’s potential role. He hoped to center 
responsibility for economic management at Commerce, but soon encountered resistance 
from rival bureaucrats, hostile business leaders, and government officials worried that his 
more ambitious programs ran afoul of antitrust laws. The combined force of this 
opposition compelled Hoover to abandon his most ambitious proposal: an economic 
advisory council drawing its members from the country’s major industrial and trade 
organizations.          
 By now, the scale of the downturn was becoming apparent, and Hoover devoted 
his energies to crafting a recovery program. The resulting agenda emphasized three goals: 
promoting spending among private businesses, slashing waste, and publicizing economic 
statistics. Hoover waged this struggle on multiple fronts: the introduction of a monthly 
Survey of Current Business produced by the Census Bureau; bureaucratic reorganization 
designed to streamline policymaking; and a seemingly unending parade of conferences. A 
summit called the Conference on Unemployment that took place in the fall of 1921 
became a crucial front in this larger war.      
 Woodrow Wilson’s administration had hosted two similar meetings—the first and 
second “Industrial Conference”—but Hoover and his followers were keen to distinguish 
their version from its predecessors. Reflecting on the effort, Hoover factotum and 
secretary for the Conference on Unemployment Edward Hunt depicted it as having found 
a successful middle ground: not so open that it tempted participants to upset debate with 
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grandstanding, but transparent enough that it might “educate the country.”244 Where 
representatives of labor had withdrawn from Wilson’s first conference, Hoover’s sequel 
had closed with a “moving valedictory” delivered by Samuel Gompers, head of the 
American Federation of Labor.245 Hunt admitted that “labor was baited” during the 
conference, and he skipped past areas where the supposedly diverse group was decidedly 
homogenous: out of about one hundred attendees, the conference included one African-
American man and four women, all white.246 But Hunt was too busy celebrating what he 
considered the meeting’s signal achievement to note these deficiencies.   
 One break from the Wilson administration escaped Hunt’s notice: the shift in title 
from “Industrial” to “Unemployment.” He was clearer about the transition elsewhere, 
writing that, as a result of the Conference, “‘Public opinion for the first time in American 
history has been focused on unemployment.”247 From Hunt’s perspective, the decision 
might have seemed too obvious to require much comment. The conference was prompted 
by a business depression whose most visible manifestation was a rising number of jobless 
Americans. Hoover wanted to cleanse the nation of waste, and unemployment was the 
greatest waste of all.        
 Following the conference, Hoover’s team set out to institutionalize their gains by 
launching a Standing Committee on Unemployment charged with ascertaining the causes 
of the crisis and preventing future downturns. Responsibility for distilling the latest 
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findings on the business cycle fell to the NBER, which had provided four members for an 
“Advisory Committee” to Hoover’s conference. Political time moved at a faster rate than 
the stately pace the NBER was accustomed to, and Mitchell complained that their work 
was rushed, but its release attracted all the publicity the Bureau’s supporters had hoped 
would greet their investigation of national income. Hunt judged the outpouring of 
commentary “astonishing.”248 Published by McGraw Hill under the title Business Cycles 
and Unemployment, the report sold over twelve thousand copies and more than eight 
hundred editorials lauded the effort, with even more articles providing a less partisan 
evaluation of its contents.249  
The study benefitted from exquisite timing. Prices had stabilized, and a recovery 
from the short but sharp downturn was underway by the time Hoover assembled his 
conference. Though it was not yet clear, the combination of severe decline followed by a 
return to prosperous conditions for much of the country—along with a determined 
campaign of state repression that accompanied the Red Scare—undercut the radical 
menace that had once loomed so ominously. Hoover and his supporters declared victory 
over the business cycle. Much work still remained if they were going to complete their 
mapping of the “economic seas,” but they were convinced the administration had done 
enough to protect the nation against the most dangerous storms.   
 Economists recognized the importance of focusing on unemployment. As the 
NBER report noted, unemployment—defined as “society refus[ing] participation in its 
organized activities of production”—occupied a “position midway between the economic 
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and the social.”250 The “connecting link” between two realms, unemployment was bound 
up with both economic and social welfare—as tied to commerce and industry as to 
“suicide, crime, prostitution, pauperism, marriages, migration, and other social 
phenomena.”251 Neither “purely” economic nor social, unemployment was almost 
uniquely positioned to serve as a measure of general prosperity.252  
Important though unemployment was, the economists insisted that it could not be 
understood in isolation. The title of the report made their position clear. A study of 
Business Cycles and Unemployment, it presented episodic surges in joblessness as a 
characteristic feature of the business cycle. Nor was this just an economist’s conceit. 
Hoover endorsed the position wholeheartedly, writing in the report’s preface that 
everything covered in the document was tied to the ebbs and flows of “the so-called 
business cycle.”253 The “so-called” catches the idea’s novelty, but that was no hindrance 
for so ardent a proponent of the new world disclosed by the marvels of scientific inquiry.  
Distancing himself from peddlers of “panaceas or economic revolution,” Hoover 
cast his project as a pragmatic endeavor.254 He supported research into business cycles 
not because of his enthusiasm for academic inquiry—otherwise he might also have put 
more effort into promoting studies of national income—but because he believed they had 
influenced the course of the cycle itself. For Hoover and his supporters, the report itself 
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proved the point. In their telling, its publication in the spring of 1923 had curtailed a 
potentially dangerous boom, ensuring the continuation of a more sustainable prosperity. 
Historians have tended to dismiss this position as a conveniently self-interested delusion, 
but if the goal is to understand policymaking in the 1920s what matters is that senior 
government officials believed they had discovered, in Hoover’s words, a “strategic point 
of attack” for the crusade against the business cycle—namely, the production and 
dissemination of economic information.255  
Publicity was not an end in itself, although they reveled in that too. “I have never 
known of an economic investigation which had anywhere near so much attention,” Hunt 
bragged in 1923.256 Four years later, he was even bolder, writing that the inquiry was 
“without doubt the most important economic investigation ever undertaken,” and 
declaring that the business cycle’s “more violent and destructive extremes have been 
definitely curtailed because of this study.”257 Hunt conceded that the idea of business 
cycles was already familiar to economists, but he credited the Conference with liberating 
the doctrine from its academic confines. As he boasted, thanks to the governments efforts 
“newspapers continue to refer to the idea of business cycles and the technical papers 
indicate that most business men have accepted it substantially as gospel.”258 
Businessmen were the crucial figures here. The report succeeded as a 
countercyclical measure, Hoover partisans believed, to the extent that it encouraged 
entrepreneurs to calibrate their actions to fit the cycle’s rhythms, pulling back when an 
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unsustainable boom threatened and rushing forward when a depression loomed. Their 
policy would work by creating a new kind of entrepreneur.  
A survey conducted for the report hinted at the challenge they faced. The 
questionnaire elicited many responses supporting increased production of economic 
statistics, but that opinion was not universally shared. "We do not require any additional 
information,” one critic replied, “and would not have the time or inclination to read any 
more than we now use."259 Even those who called for statistical research had not adjusted 
their own behavior, and the report concluded by observing, “The necessity for predicting 
and preparing for approaching changes in the major cycle and taking business advantage 
of them before the changes occur appears not yet to be recognized as a business 
principle.”260 That glum appraisal also served as a call to action. Belief in the cycle had 
always enjoyed a stronger hold on economists than business leaders; now, the 
government set out to change that. 
The project was an experiment in economic self-fashioning on a national scale, 
and optimists believed its success was difficult to deny. As the postwar depression 
receded into memory, more evidence of the policy’s triumph accumulated, at least from 
the perspective of its supporters. Reflecting on the project in 1930, Hunt argued that 
despite a wealth of academic research, “the idea of business cycles made no apparent 
impression on the policy of business men or of the Government until the calling of the 
President’s Conference on Unemployment.”261 Disseminating economic information had 
shaped the decisions of businessmen, bringing rationality to disorder, and pacifying the 
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cycle. “There are no monetary terms by which such an achievement can be measured,” 
Hunt wrote, perhaps not realizing the extent to which by his own telling this supposed 
conquest owed itself to monetary measurements.262  
Nor were these celebrations restricted to the United States. It was a decade where 
governance by experts was routinely proclaimed the essence of the age, a conviction on 
full display at a 1927 meeting of the World Economic Conference hosted at Geneva by 
the League of Nations. The omnipresent Hunt attended for the United States and 
produced a report summarizing its noteworthy elements—the “amazing amount of data” 
prepared by the Economic Section of the League of Nations, for instance, or the behavior 
of a Soviet delegation that “chose to use the Conference as a forum for ideas which were 
news in 1917 but which seemed stale and unprofitable in 1927.”263 While lauding the 
goals of the non-Soviet conference goers, Hunt expressed skepticism about their 
feasibility. Absent effective mechanisms for global economic governance, all League 
meetings were preludes to actions taken by national governments.264 They posed “a 
challenge to the organized movement for scientific management the world over; and a 
challenge which must be accepted”—but not a challenge the League itself could 
address.265 That test could only be met at a national level. 
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Insistence on returning to the national scale might appear curious, especially when 
the nation in question is the United States in 1927. Subjects that could only be addressed 
internationally—from conflicts over repayment of war debts to the speed with which the 
gold standard would be restored—preoccupied the same officials in Washington who 
trumpeted their taming of the business cycle. Students of business cycles in the United 
States also recognized that they had yet to develop a serious interpretation of the 
relationship between domestic and transnational, perhaps even global, cycles. In a 
characteristic move, Mitchell acknowledged the view “that business enterprise has been 
silently establishing” what he called, flanked by quotation marks, a “world economy” or 
“commercial league of nations,” while adding that reliable data for the hypothesis 
remained lacking.266 (This marked a change from his 1913 work on business cycles, 
when he had used the German “Weltwirtschaft” without translation.)267 Justified partly by 
inadequacies of data, a national focus also provided a comforting excuse for discarding 
fears about domestic overproduction that had shadowed economic debate for decades.268  
Critics of Hoover’s approach to the business cycle shared his nationalist focus. 
The Conference on Unemployment had ended with Washington officials encouraging 
mayors across the country to take responsibility for mitigating the cycle, a disappointing 
resolution for those who favored a stronger role for the federal government. One of those 
mayors charged with picking up the burden, William Thompson of Chicago, denounced 
the program as “a capitalistic move with the following objects: a blacklist, a refusal of 
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charity to American union laboring men, a drive against union labor, a conspiracy to 
lower wages.”269 Thompson was one of many local skeptics, a number that included an 
especially sizable proportion of Democrats. Advocates of expansive public works 
programs considered Hoover’s preferred cocktail of policy measures, with its focus on 
self-regulation, a tepid substitute for their ideal. And even champions of the cycle 
acknowledged that the national could be both too small a framework for policymaking 
and too large. As Mitchell observed, “in a large country whose economic organization is 
not highly integrated different sections sometimes have cyclical fluctuations more 
divergent than those of neighboring nations.”270 
The mere idea of regulating the ebbs and flows of business proved offensive to 
some. That group included Republicans like Senator George Norris of Nebraska, who 
said that, with respect to business activity, “we had better let God run it as in the past, and 
not take the power away from Him and give it to Hoover.”271 Partisanship also influenced 
perceptions of economic conditions. Democratic Senator James Heflin asked, “when 
Woodrow Wilson—God bless him—was in strength in the White House was anybody out 
of employment?” (“We destroyed your hobo army under Democratic rule,” he also 
claimed.) 272 Prophets of the new era defended their faith, but they had to do it against a 
sizable contingent of doubters.  
Although the business cycle could only be mapped with statistics, the discussion 
had a moralizing undercurrent. Calvin Coolidge illustrated the tendency in a 1925 State 
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of the Union message that chastised the “selfishness” of those who risked another 
depression by either “seeking immediate riches by nonproductive speculation” or 
“wasteful quarreling over the returns from industry.” Coolidge placed himself above 
irresponsible financiers and misguided labor activists—above class struggle altogether.273 
  Anxieties over the business cycle gave a new force to this old tactic. With 
prosperity always threatening to collapsing into depression, the class conflicts that had so 
recently been a familiar aspect of American life became a threat to the rhythms of the 
industrial world. Booms were not inherent to modern business; they had to be earned 
with virtuous behavior. 
Yet the results of all that self-denial still had to be measured, and here the 
quantifiers returned. The United States had more of them in the 1920s than in all its 
previous history. Economists took special pleasure in this development. The University 
of Wisconsin’s John Commons spoke for many when he declared in 1923 the launching 
of “a new era in economic theory.”274 Statistical knowledge was remaking economic 
theory, with ramifications that spread far beyond the universities. According to 
Commons, the union of economic knowledge and political power that had begun during 
the Great War and flourished in its aftermath marked a profound rupture. “For the first 
time,” he declared, “economic theory has the foundations for a theory of prosperity, and 
such a theory is at the same time the foundation for a national economic policy.”275 
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Manifestations of the trend were abundant, but in an increasingly congested field one 
organization retained a privileged standing: the NBER. 
 
READ WITH THE RIGHT SPIRIT, it sounded like the start of an adventure. As Wesley 
Mitchell explained in the opening of Business Cycles and Unemployment, the report was 
“a reconnaissance survey, run quickly through a wide territory.”276 Though Mitchell 
claimed that he and his coauthors adhered to rigorous empirical standards, this was a map 
for “social engineers,” not an exercise in satisfying academic curiosity.277 The groups 
thanked for their contributions to the report testified to the novel intellectual community 
that had come into being: the NBER, of course, and their chief funders the Carnegie 
Corporation, but also government departments (Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor) and 
professional associations (the American Statistical Association, the American Economic 
Association, and the Federated American Engineering Societies), along with dozens of 
individuals.278  
What distinguished the NBER from its rivals, and encouraged Hoover to select 
them to lead his prized investigation? According to Mitchell, the explanation had its 
origins in the Bureau’s work on national income. Examining that subject had opened up a 
host of issues neglected by previous researchers, including the question of what factors 
accounted for changes in national income. Having mastered the empirics of national 
income, they could develop a theory explaining its fluctuations. Mitchell’s earlier work 
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on business cycles made that framework an obvious choice, but he insisted there was a 
deeper rationale. As their research progressed, he claimed, the Bureau’s staffers had 
made a startling discovery: “our investigations were contributing to one another, 
revealing relations that bound superficially diverse undertakings into an organic 
whole.”279 The NBER’s studies had formed a coherent program, but not because of any 
prefabricated agenda. “The unity inheres in the process we are trying to understand,” he 
argued, “and forces itself upon the attention of everyone who examines them 
thoughtfully.”280  
The object slowly coming into sight was the interconnected world of business, a 
subject linked to Mitchell’s earlier fixation, money economy. In Mitchell’s telling, the 
NBER happened to be ideally suited to investigate that business world and the strange 
phenomena it brought into existence. Those issues “grew out of its own work, they were 
of grave importance to the country, they could be attacked by quantitative methods—in 
short, they were questions of precisely the sort which the National Bureau had been 
organized to treat.”281 Much about the business world and its attendant cycles remained 
unknown, but Mitchell could date its emergence with relative precision. After first 
appearing in parts of Europe around the turn of the eighteenth century, it had spread 
across the globe. Though he believed that measuring the gains and losses incurred by the 
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cycle was “impossible,” Mitchell offered national income as a substitute for this 
unattainable ideal.282  
Even at this late stage in the evolution of the business cycle, Mitchell still 
recognized limits to its scope. Agriculture offered the greatest exception to the cycle’s 
dominance. There, Mitchell wrote, “production is affected more by the weather than by 
the business cycle.”283 This was no small exception, since, as Mitchell elsewhere noted, 
at the time “small-scale agriculture” was “the most important form of economic 
organization in the world.””284  
But independence from the cycle did not guarantee prosperity. Quite the opposite 
held in the United States during the 1920s, where much of the nation enjoyed a boom 
while farmers struggled to claw out of a protracted downturn. This disjuncture became 
one of the decade’s great economic riddles, and kept the boundaries of business’s 
influence at the center of debates over the cycle. While Calvin Coolidge reassured 
citizens outraged by the plight of farmers, “the Government has given this subject more 
attention than any other,” the Bureau found itself with little to say, outmatched by the 
army of researchers devoted to canvassing the subject in Washington.285 
Though lagging on agriculture, staffers at the NBER plunged ahead on a variety 
of other fronts: reports on international migration, the health of the labor movement, 
trends in philanthropy, variations of income among states, and a collection of “business 
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annals” for seventeen countries that gathered journalistic and state-sponsored 
observations on business conditions. That last volume supplied information on total 
population, railway mileage, imports, exports, and other statistics deemed of pressing 
interests—statistics that were gathered with the assistance of an eclectic group of 
supporters that included both Friedrich Hayek and the Soviet economist Nikolai 
Kondratieff.286  
National income was conspicuous by its absence in this statistical catalogue, but it 
remained a preoccupation at the Bureau. As the NBER’s annual report observed in 1925, 
“The first reputation of the Bureau gained in this field practically necessitates the 
periodical extension and revision of our estimates.”287 From the outset, Mitchell and his 
colleagues had hoped to move from their “central field” of national income to studies on 
connected subjects—rent, wages, and profits were some of the candidates—united by the 
business cycle. As the decade advanced, the question of prices became more enticing. 
Studies of the general price level, they believed, had stayed at the surface of much deeper 
phenomena. Content with this superficial perspective, economists had left the latticework 
of interconnections within the price level unexamined. Mitchell had long referred to the 
price system as a “living organism,” but he still believed the Bureau’s latest project 
constituted an important departure.288 Unlike their previous inquiries, this “pioneer effort, 
to explore, with all available statistical instruments, the recesses of the labyrinth of 
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prices” promised not just to enrich the understanding of an already existing topic, but to 
break open a novel field of inquiry.289  
Yet just as they depicted their research on business cycles as flowing out of the 
study of national income, Mitchell and Gay described the NBER’s report on the inner 
logics of the price system as a natural sequel to Business Cycles and Unemployment. And 
from a certain perspective it was: for those who accepted Mitchell’s history, national 
income, business cycles, and the price system were all children of the money economy.290 
Not coincidentally, this was the same period when Mitchell offered a course at Columbia 
on a subject that, in his lecture notes, he claimed had “Never before given, so far as I 
know” and “May never be given again": money economy.291  
Not that readers had to subscribe to Mitchell’s worldview in order to appreciate 
the effort. Mitchell might have aligned himself with Hoover, but NBER staffer Leo 
Wolman became a valued counselor to Sidney Hillman’s Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers Union, which put a left-wing spin on Hoover’s zeal for efficiency.292 Across the 
Atlantic, John Maynard Keynes deemed the NBER’s study of prices a “very high-grade 
work,” but he added a caveat. Pronouncing it a “work of a kind which, as yet, simply 
does not exist outside the United States,” he marveled that after hundreds of pages of 
statistical research the text ended without trying to draw any major theoretical 
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conclusions.293 The economists at the NBER had prepared a feast while declining to 
sample it for themselves. 
Much the same charge was leveled at the NBER’s other major study of this 
period. Mitchell’s Business Cycles: The Problem and its Setting appeared in 1927, little 
more than a decade after his first book on that question. Yet as one reviewer observed, 
“not fifteen years but fifty seem to separate the present work from its 1913 
predecessor.”294 The earlier work had drawn on statistics from four countries that 
stretched back just over twenty years; the sequel had data from seventeen countries that, 
in the case of England and the United States, reached into the eighteenth century. 
Although the subject attracted commentary on both sides of the Atlantic, Mitchell 
insisted that “the statistical study of business cycles has had its headquarters in the United 
States.”295 And while he nodded to contributions from other American economists—
including Alvin Hansen, William Foster, and Waddill Catchings—there was little doubt 
that he put the NBER at the top of this hierarchy. 
Despite the abundance of new data, Mitchell acknowledged one stark omission: 
”we have,” he wrote, “no statistical evidence of business cycles as wholes.”296 Some 
industries generated abundant data, but scaling upward from the individual to the general 
had so far defied investigators. The problem sprang from the fundamental character of 
business in the twentieth century—a “maze of interacting processes” always looping into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293 J.M. Keynes, “Review: The Behaviour of Prices,” Economic Journal 38.152 (December 1928), 
606. 
 
294 O. Ingraham, “Review: Business Cycles,” American Economic Review 18.4 (December 1928), 
748. 
 
295 Wesley Mitchell, The Business Cycle: The Problem and its Setting, 201. 
 
296 Mitchell, Business Cycles: The Problem and its Setting, 2. 
	  
	   116	  
itself; a “congeries of diverse fluctuations in numerous processes” at once “physical, 
psychological, and economic.”297 “A real chart of one business cycle,” he concluded, 
“would be a hopelessly complex tangle of hundreds of curves.” What comprehensive 
measure could emerge from such a morass? National income supplied a handy 
“measuring stick,” but more ambitious projects required caution.298 
Caution—it was the theme Mitchell always returned to. Caution with statistics: 
“once data have been compiled into neatly published tables,” Mitchell warned, “the 
figures gain a pontifical authority over many minds.”299 Caution with theory: the business 
cycle was both a reflection of reality and a label applied to make sense of a messy world. 
Caution, above all, with language: sounding more like a philosopher of language than an 
economist, Mitchell declared that “the words we use set traps for us.”300  
By the 1920s, he was also more cautious politically. His standing in the world had 
risen, and he recalibrated his tone to fit this elevated position. The 1913 study of business 
cycles, for example, had referred to “The great captains of finance and industry wield an 
authority swollen by the capital which their prestige attracts…and often augmented still 
further by working alliances among themselves.” The tamer 1927 edition noted, “The 
captains of finance and industry wield an influence increased by the capital which their 
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prestige attracts…and sometimes augments still further.”301 Increased, not swollen; 
sometimes, not often; and no need for the “great,” with its sarcastic pitch.  
Mitchell would move forward, but tortoise-like. Reflecting on business cycles 
near the book’s close, he noted the modesty of his findings. “Even now,” he wrote, “we 
can do no more than frame a working definition to use in trying to learn more.”302 He 
offered a precise definition grounded in all that had come before, carefully restricting its 
purview to a specific realm (“activities which are systematically conducted on a 
commercial basis”) exhibiting a specific pattern (“fluctuations which . . . recur with a 
measure of regularity”).303 
Not all of Mitchell’s partners were so cautious. Rorty, for one, declared that the 
NBER’s studies had revealed “the essential soundness of American institutions.”304 He 
acknowledged that challenges remained, among them managing population growth,  
ensuring the efficient use of natural resources, and keeping income inequality within 
tolerable limits. But these were matters for expert administrators, not the stuff of 
revolution. 
Little wonder that journalists translating the Bureau’s work for the general public 
treated any potential radicalism as conjectural. The New York Times explained the 
concept of per capita income to their readers—underneath a headline blaring “America’s 
Prosperity Reaches New Heights”—as “how much every man, woman and child would  
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get if a hypothetical Communist State were to distribute its earnings equally.”305 There 
was talk of revolution, but it was the “second industrial revolution fully as important as 
the first.”306 
This second industrial revolution was far better documented than its predecessor, 
thanks to the work of groups like the NBER. The Bureau alone was responsible for 
seventeen books, each volume charting a limb of what Rorty, grasping for a label, called 
the nation’s “economic tree.”307 Combined, these publications sold just under forty 
thousand copies, but millions more came across their conclusions in the rhetoric of the 
politicians and the columns of newspapers.308 In these articles, the NBER became a 
chronicler of the roaring twenties, the accountant in green eyeshades tallying the costs of 
every party at Gatsby’s.  
 
STAFFERS AT THE NBER were far from the only economists who fancied themselves 
suited to charting their times and counseling the powerful. The discipline was thriving 
thanks to the continued expansion of the university system and growing demand for 
economic guidance from both government officials and corporate magnates. And during 
this booming period, few questions received more attention than those surrounding the 
proper management of money. The subject had figured prominently in American politics 
for decades, most famously in William Jennings Bryan’s presidential campaigns, with its 
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thundering denunciations of a nation crucified upon a cross of gold. Devastating 
hyperinflation in Germany during the 1920s made debates over currency into a global 
concern, as did the campaign to revive the gold standard. Economists in the United States 
found their advice sought by governments across the planet, and a contingent flitted 
across the globe—from China to Mexico to Poland—playing “money doctors” to the 
world.309 
Irving Fisher preferred a more domesticated lifestyle, but only a handful of his 
colleagues—not just in the United States, but anywhere—rivaled his authority over 
monetary theory. By the 1920s, he had been publishing major contributions in the field 
for decades, and he had acquired an enviable pulpit for disseminating his views. Author 
of a syndicated column on business conditions, he also supervised the production of 
statistical reports regularly sent out to newspapers across the country.  
Undergirding this prodigious output was Fisher’s conviction that business cycles 
were for the most part a statistical artifact produced by chance vacillations around a 
mean. Fisher valued statistical research —hence all those reports to newspapers—but he 
combined an empirical mindset with a mastery of abstract mathematical reasoning 
matched by few economists in his lifetime. Seen from this perspective, tributes to the 
unending complexity of modern business of the kind favored at the NBER were more 
than anything signs of their authors’ intellectual limitations. Their faces pressed against 
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the wall, Mitchell and his colleagues could not step back and see the portrait hanging in 
front of them. 
More to the point, they missed the engine of the fluctuations they studied. 
Referring to the NBER’s recent work, Fisher claimed that ”almost every other factor that 
might influence employment was given careful consideration” except for what mattered 
most: inflation and deflation, which Fisher called “the dance of the dollar.”310According 
to Fisher, changes in unemployment or in overall trade levels reflected prior and more 
causally significant changes in the price level.  
The rationale behind this argument had a genealogy that reached back centuries, 
but Fisher was one of the crucial figures in a generation that gave a distinctive twist to 
this long-standing conceit. Known today as the quantity theory of money, its basic 
assumptions were simple. The astronomer and dabbler in economics Simon Newcomb, 
writing in 1885, identified the quantity theory with what he called the “equation of 
societary circulation,” though it would later be more commonly known as the equation of 
exchange. Fisher, who dedicated one of his many books to Newcomb, developed this 
modification of the equation: MV = PT, where M is the stock of money, V is the velocity 
of circulation (or speed at which money changes hand), P is the price level, and T is the 
total number of market transactions during a set period. The mathematics are simple, but 
economists looking for predecessors to the Keynesian revolution judge the quantity 
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theory of money as close to macroeconomic reasoning as anything available before the 
Great Depression.311  
It is also as a tautology. The equation is an accounting identity that reveals 
nothing about the causal relationship among its components; if the measurements of its 
variables are accurate, then by definition it holds true. Money could be the driving force 
in the relationship, or it could not. Useful for simplifying the complexities of monetary 
exchange, the equation by itself offered no guidance to economists seeking a deeper 
understanding of causation. 
Here was where Fisher made his greatest contribution. Invoking “supplementary 
knowledge” derived from his own research, Fisher offered empirical backing for his 
insistence that the stock of money was the decisive variable in the equation.312 In his 
words (and italics), “The price level is normally the one absolutely passive element in the 
equation of exchange.”313 The details were complex, but the core of the quantity theory 
was simple. With prices held constant, a growing money supply pushed dollars into 
businesses, creating the illusion of surging demand; reductions to the money supply had 
the opposite effect, withdrawing funds and pushing economic activity downward. This 
relationship faded with time as prices adjusted, which meant that increases in the money 
supply would eventually lead to inflation, not permanent prosperity. But in the short run 
the influence of money was profound: “every enlargement of the dollar tends to hurt 
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business shortly afterward,” Fisher argued, while “every shrinkage of the dollar tends 
temporarily to boost business.”314 
Price levels, inflation, deflation—a litany of concepts was propelled into the 
foreground by the quantity theory. Fisher was not the only economist defending this 
position during the 1920s, but his advocacy was distinguished by its rigor, and its 
enthusiasm. He credited part of his insight to experience with index numbers. “Prior to 
the advent of the index number as an instrument for measuring,” he claimed, “the concept 
of a stable buying power of money was too vague to form the basis of reform.”315 Even 
now, he believed, the notion that prices were determined by more than just the play of 
supply and demand—that inflation might push them up, or deflation down—was 
confined mostly to experts. As Fisher lamented, “the general public has no idea that 
money varies in value at all.”316 But the technical innovation of index numbers and the 
rendering of an old argument in mathematical terms had launched a new stage in the 
quantity theory’s history: a matter of economic theory had become a potential guide for 
policymaking.         
 Fisher’s monetary theory yoked his gifts for abstraction and empirical dexterity. 
Mathematical brilliance had established Fisher’s reputation in the field. At a time when 
economists were still chiefly concerned with ascertaining economic laws that could be 
expressed verbally, Fisher was comfortable enough modeling his conclusion that he built 
a hydraulic machine to illustrate what he called “that beautiful and intricate equilibrium 
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which manifests itself on the ‘exchanges’ of a great city.”317 But in his later work, Fisher 
grounded theoretical flights on empirical measurements, often of his own devising. He 
was not shy about highlighting these contributions. “During the last three years,” he 
noted in an article on the relationship between the price level and unemployment, “I have 
had at least one computer in my office almost constantly at work on this problem.”318 (By 
“computer” he meant an employee using a calculator.) His theoretical work depicted 
money flows detached from particular origins—from land, from labor, from capital, those 
preoccupations of nineteenth-century political economy—but to achieve purposes he 
believed eminently practical. And high on that list of practical concerns was his hope that 
policies concerned with managing the price level would replace the misguided attempt to 
regulate an illusory business cycle. 
Fisher’s concern with the business cycle was new to the 1920s, but the politics of 
money had drawn his attention for some time. He had denounced Populist bimetallism in 
1896, arguing that the woes Bryan and his supporters attributed to the gold standard were 
addressed by automatic shifts among interest rates. Later, Fisher concluded that he had 
been too hasty in his dismissal. While refusing to admit that he should have backed the 
Populists, he conceded that neither Bryan nor the Republicans had a plan for achieving 
the monetary goals they claimed to support. In retrospect, Fisher concluded that all the 
positions in 1896 had been misguided, including his own.319  
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Instead of resurrecting either platform, Fisher offered a new target: stability of the 
price level was the goal, and beginning in 1911 he argued that it could be achieved with a 
“compensated dollar.” Instead of tying the dollar’s value to gold, Fisher’s program would 
have linked it to an index determined by a variety of commodity prices. He insisted that 
the compensated dollar could be reconciled with the gold standard, but he later claimed 
that he was motivated in part by an awareness that in this period “any proposal to ‘go off 
gold’ completely…would have been lampooned and hooted down.”320  
Fisher was right to anticipate opposition. Even among economists, and even when 
discussion was confined to the quantity theory of money, rather than any policies that 
flowed from it, the conversation soon became heated. J. Laurence Laughlin—first head of 
the University of Chicago’s economics department, and one of his day’s most influential 
monetary theorists—was not alone in his conviction that “if the quantity theory is sound, 
if it is possible to regulate by government control of the quantity of money—we have 
socialism pure and simple.”321 The gold standard was cherished by the businessmen 
Fisher appealed to, not least because it helped clarify the mess that characterized the 
actual condition of American money. One textbook from the period counted ten varieties, 
including “three kinds of coin,” ‘two forms of representative money,” and “five forms of 
credit money”—a chaotic jumble simplified by a common backing in gold.322   
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Even other skeptics of gold-standard orthodoxy doubted the quantity theory. 
Thorstein Veblen, Laughlin’s colleague at Chicago, dismissed it as one of “those 
creatures of the myth-maker.”323 Laughlin and Veblen’s former student Wesley Mitchell 
offered a more restrained appraisal of Fisher’s proposals. Mitchell was no stranger to the 
questions Fisher addressed. His first article—published in his senior year at Chicago—
was a critique of the quantity theory, and he returned to the subject intermittently in the 
following decades.324 He addressed the topic explicitly in a 1904 article that sought to 
reorient debate away from disputes over theory toward more practical concerns amenable 
to statistical measurement.325 In a critical review of Fisher’s Purchasing Power of Money, 
published in 1911, Mitchell cast Fisher as “a loyal devotee of the mechanical type of 
economic theory,” a type he opposed to “the realistic viewpoint” adopted by economists 
like himself concerned with “actual economic processes.”326 Fisher’s attacks on business 
cycle theory in the 1920s pushed Mitchell even further away, and in the 1927 Business 
Cycles volume Mitchell argued that while money could in theory drive the cycle in 
practice it was usually a passive factor.  
 Despite all this, Mitchell endorsed the broad thrust of Fisher’s campaign. In 1913, 
he deemed Fisher’s proposal to stabilize the dollar one of the most “promising lines of 
effort” for smoothing the cycle, and the NEBR’s reports of the 1920s regularly hailed the 
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benefits of price stability.327 The two also corresponded, privately continuing arguments 
initiated in journals, but also offering advice on statistical projects, along with mutual 
flattery. Mitchell supported Fisher enough to sign on to one of his most quixotic projects. 
The Stable Money League was born on New Year’s Eve, 1921. As Fisher 
recalled, what began as a dinner bringing together a group devoted to monetary 
stabilization culminated “with a midnight visit by many of us to the Washington 
Monument where we ushered in the New Year by dedicating ourselves to the new 
movement.”328 The organization charged with leading that movement would go through 
several names over the next decade—from the Stable Money League to the National 
Monetary Association and then compromising on the Stable Money Association—but its 
dedication to controlling the price level endured. That ideal had been endorsed by a 
committee of the American Economic Association, and in the 1920s it attracted a diverse 
array of supporters. Economists, including Mitchell, enlisted in predictably large 
numbers, but more impressive were the recruits drawn from the wider world: John Davis, 
leader of the failed 1924 Democratic presidential campaign volunteered, and so did 
Charles Dawes, vice presidential nominee on the ticket that defeated him; Henry Wallace 
served as Vice President of the Stable Money League before going on to serve as Vice 
President of the United States under Franklin Roosevelt, whose uncle, Frederic Delano, 
was president of the Stable Money Association.  
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The stabilizers had specific policy goals, but they had broader intentions as well. 
First on their agenda was the creation of a price index—“the Official Index Number,” as 
they termed it—whose authority was vouchsafed by the federal government. The statistic 
could guide policymakers, but it was also meant to reshape the business world. As one of 
their statements of principle explained, their proposal “would bring the Official Index 
Number into the daily thoughs [sic] of men as a matter of vital importance in their 
everyday life, and would cause them to scrutinize closely measures tending to affect its 
movement.”329 Even when distancing themselves from explicit policy recommendations, 
they retained a commitment to reshaping public debate and private behavior. They would 
alter the trajectory of American politics, Rotary Club meeting by Rotary Club meeting. 
Fisher’s optimism sprang from his conviction that any rational adult could 
understand his thesis. He admitted that at first his views might appear implausible. “In a 
matter as intensely human as the employment problem,” he wrote, “it seems a far cry 
from money and banking to an explanation of why working men are thrown out of 
jobs.”330 But his theory should have cleared away that confusion; even better, it had an 
obvious, and heartening, implication. If what economists had erroneously referred to as 
the business cycle was a byproduct of changes in the price level, and if the price level 
could be managed by the government, then unemployment could be, if not abolished, 
then at least severely curtailed. In Fisher’s words, “we have in our power, as a means of 
substantially preventing unemployment, the stabilisation of the purchasing power of the 
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dollar”—or of any currency, for that matter.331 Hoover and his ilk were optimistic about 
their ability to control the cycle, but Fisher’s confidence exceeded even theirs 
Best of all, the government already had the tools it needed, and an institution 
designed to make use of them. The Federal Reserve was less than a decade old when the 
Stable Money League was founded, and it had been created to grapple with a very 
different set of problems than the kind Fisher drew attention to. But the Fed had 
accumulated remarkable powers in its short lifespan. Fisher believed it had abused those 
powers, and he blamed the postwar downturn chiefly on what he considered a bungled 
attempted by the Reserve to check inflation. Yet even that indictment was a kind of 
compliment: he believed the Federal Reserve had enormous powers; now it just needed to 
learn how to use them.  
Fisher’s rationale for the Federal Reserve taking on this role as manager of the 
price level, and therefore of unemployment, was clear; and he could point to a collection 
of statistics and policy options that would allow them to achieve this goal. But one major 
problem remained. Irving Fisher, regarded by colleagues as one the most brilliant minds 
in economics, was viewed inside the Federal Reserve as a “crank.”332 
 
ADOLPH MILLER WAS A FOUNDING MEMBER of the Federal Reserve’s Board of 
Governors, and the only person in that cohort trained as an economist. Expertise gave 
him some leverage within the institution, but he benefitted even more from his 
connections with the powerful. Miller was friends with Herbert Hoover, an easy enough 
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task to accomplish given that the two were neighbors. He was also, as it happens, one of 
Laughlin’s former students and Wesley Mitchell’s brother-in-law.333 
Though economists had little presence in the upper echelons of the Reserve, 
economic theory had a deep influence over the institution’s formation and subsequent 
trajectory. A central bank tailored to fit the demands suggested by the quantity theory 
would have been a very different creature from the institution born in 1913. The founders 
of the Federal Reserve had not even intended to construct a true central bank. Restrained 
by anxieties over concentrating power, they had designed a Federal Reserve System—as 
the institution was formally labeled—where power was parceled out among twelve 
regional banks and a Board of Governors in Washington. The precise delineation of these 
powers was left fuzzy, providing a source of frequent conflict.334 
Less controversial within the Federal Reserve was the intellectual justification for 
their efforts, which also happened to be the rationale most congenial to skeptics of a 
central bank. Called the real bills doctrine, it held that, in Laughlin’s words, the money 
supply was “a machine which expands exactly in proportion to the work to be done, and 
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contracts as transactions fall off.”335 Contra Fisher, real bills advocates focused not on 
fluctuations in the money supply but on whether credit was used to fund productive 
activity or mere speculation. Guided by the real bills doctrine, most of the Fed’s senior 
figures believed that their task was to ensure adequate funding for the “needs of trade.” 
Shifts in “real” economic activity governed the money supply, not the other way around.   
When combined with support for the gold standard, the result was a conceptual 
framework that left no room for the management of price level and output through 
manipulation of the money supply. The Federal Reserve had a humbler job description: 
helping bring some order to the money stock by disseminating Federal Reserve notes, 
ensuring ready access to credit in the wake of financial panics, and guarding against 
seasonal fluctuations that accompanied the agricultural cycle. With those obligations 
fulfilled, the money supply could be trusted to regulate itself. 
At least, that was the theory when the Federal Reserve Act passed in 1913. But 
then war broke out, the gold standard collapsed, and Fed officials were forced to 
improvise. The bank was transformed into an agent of war, becoming a key instrument in 
the financing of American military involvement. Exigencies of war justified temporary 
suspension of both the principles that had guided the institution’s formation and the 
restrictions curbing its power. 
The Federal Reserve’s influence expanded further in peacetime. By the close of 
the 1920s, it was clear that, as one economist remarked, “few of the persons who were 
most active in planning the system had a clear vision of the possibilities of the machinery 
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which they were bringing into existence.”336 Senior figures within the Fed believed they 
had an important role to play in restoring the international gold standard and in 
maintaining price stability until the gold standard revived. The absence of guidelines 
once provided by gold supplies forced policymakers to look for new measures they could 
use to set their course.  
Although the real bills doctrine still commanded majority support, it had 
undergone substantial modifications. The Fed’s creators had assumed its activities would 
be restricted to commercial loans, where requests for funds could be met by member 
banks borrowing from the discount window. According to the Federal Reserve Act, so 
long as these loans were used for legitimate “agricultural, industrial, or commercial 
purposes”—not “stocks, bonds, or other investment securities”—it would be impossible 
for the money supply to become excessive.337 But the war pushed the Fed into the novel 
realm of Treasury debt, and those experiments continued during peacetime.  
In 1922, Fed officials discovered that buying and selling government securities—
so-called “open-market operations”—supplied a potentially powerful tool for conducting 
monetary policy. Defending this shift in policy, they portrayed it as a necessary response 
to changed circumstances: “until the restoration in some form of the international gold 
standard,” a 1923 report maintained, “discretion must inevitably play a larger role in 
central banking administration.”338 Intervening in the market for government debt 
constituted an aggressive display of government intervention for an institution whose 
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creators said would passively respond to external demands. Hardline devotees of the real 
bills doctrine opposed stepping into territory they regarded as the province of speculators. 
Fed officials continued to deny that they had either the capacity or the desire to regulate 
the price level, but perceptive outsiders believed a profound transition was underway—
the cautious acceptance of a duty new to central banking whose meaning, though obscure 
to the public, amounted to a transformation of the Fed.339  
To make matters even more complicated, the most powerful figure at the Fed did 
not adhere to either the quantity theory or the real bills doctrine. As Governor of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Benjamin Strong was the closet substitute the entire 
system had for a national leader. Strong insisted that it was “not the business, the duty, or 
the function of the Federal Reserve System, or of central banks generally, to deal with 
prices,” but he also rejected the metrics relied supporters of the real bills doctrine relied 
upon to determine whether credit was being used for speculative purposes.340 Instead, 
Strong focused on the total volume of borrowing from member banks, with more 
borrowing indicating that policy was loose and cutbacks that it had become tighter.  
Strong’s technical argument was part of a larger vision that shifted over time. At 
the start of the 1920s, Strong listened sympathetically to calls for the bank to push against 
the business cycle, but by the decade’s midpoint he was increasingly preoccupied with 
resurrecting the international gold standard. That did not mean he believed the US always 
had to abide by the rules a functioning gold standard would have prescribed, especially 
when they would have led to inflation. But restoring the gold standard was important 
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enough to cause a rift between Strong and his colleagues who placed more emphasis on 
the domestic than on the international. 
On this issue, Miller was one of Strong’s chief antagonists, and he had a powerful 
supporter. Strong’s priorities had generally accorded with Miller’s in the first half of the 
1920s, which meant that they also generally accorded with Herbert Hoover’s.341 Miller 
was Hoover’s man at the Fed, and when he conveyed displeasure with Strong’s turn 
toward an international stage he spoke for the Secretary of Commerce. The conflict 
between Miller and Hoover stemmed from so many differences that it can seem 
inevitable: economist versus banker, Washington versus New York, national versus 
global, real bills versus Strong’s more eclectic criteria. But the clash took concrete form 
over a push for lower interest rates led by Strong in 1927. While Miller and Hoover 
worried about inflation, Strong defended the move as a necessary sacrifice that would 
ease the United Kingdom’s return to gold.  
Miller and Hoover tried to undermine Strong’s campaign, but neither had 
sufficient pull within the bank to win the battle. Hoover was an outsider with competing 
demands on his attention, and soon he withdrew from the contest. Miller’s toxic 
unpopularity within the Fed did little to help the cause. According to a later survey, 
Miller “was familiarly known among the younger members of the staff as ‘that 
S.O.B.’”342 The same unpleasantness that made him a pariah at the office was well 
known to his family members, including his sister-in-law, Wesley Mitchell’s wife, who 
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remembered Miller as “tighter than a frozen nickel.”343 (She told an interviewer that 
shortly before Miller’s death he had “frightened his wife badly by threatening to kill 
himself and saying at the same time, ‘I do not intend to die alone.’”344) 
More persistent, and more willing to mobilize forces outside the bank, was Fisher. 
He saw grounds for optimism on a number of fronts. Discussion of monetary stabilization 
policies occupied a series of international conferences organized in the aftermath of the 
war, and in 1922 representatives from over thirty nations meeting at Geneva agreed on 
the importance of maintaining price stability. “Still more epoch-making,” he added, “was 
the inauguration of actual efforts in this direction by the Federal Reserve System in 
1922.”345 He was referring to open-market operations, which he believed had given the 
Fed the power to act as “the greatest public service institution in the world.”346  
Fisher received a sympathetic audience in Congress’s farm bloc. Representatives 
of an agricultural sector mired in depression, they had also inherited a Populist hostility 
toward moneyed interests. (The first congressional hearings on Federal Reserve policy 
were conducted by an agricultural committee.347) Fisher’s congressional allies were 
strong enough to get their legislation considered—one hearing featured testimony from 
the eminent Swedish economist Gustav Cassel—but not to win a majority.348 Opposition 
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from the bank helped stymie their movement, but the most effective impediment to 
reform was the general conviction that the organization was functioning as it should. 
“The Federal reserve system is not a panacea for all economic or financial ills,” Calvin 
Coolidge said in his 1926 State of the Union address, but he claimed that it had enjoyed 
admirable success achieving its more modest agenda of “exercis[ing] a steadying 
influence on credit conditions.”349 Supporters of the Fed could point to the same evidence 
that Hoover’s partisans relied upon to trumpet their success: steady prices, a pacified 
business cycle, a thriving stock market, and an international economic order moving back 
toward the gold standard. Farmers complained, but their protests were drowned out by 
self-congratulation, and in 1927 Congress made the Fed’s charter permanent. 
Stability within the bank meant that it would continue to serve another function 
less noticed by the public but of significant importance for economists. When Miller had 
joined the Federal Reserve Board in 1914, it did not even have an internal research 
division he could consult. By the 1920s, the Fed had become a major producer of 
economic knowledge. A sizable portion of the credit for that achievement was owed to 
Walter Stewart, another former Veblen student and head of the Fed’s major research 
office for much of the decade. Stewart had worked under Wesley Mitchell during the 
war, and Mitchell’s glowing recommendation had convinced Miller to bring him onto the 
bank. There, Stewart represented Mitchell’s brand of empirically oriented economics, 
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presiding over investigations designed to provide Fed officials with the data that would 
guide their decisions.350 
What data should serve that purpose triggered fierce disagreement. “It is no 
accident,” one historian has observed, “that the age of measurement in economics 
coincides with the rise of central banking, for that epoch produced the statistical 
indicators that central bankers employ in conducting monetary and credit policy.”351 
Abundant information provided grounds for radically different evaluations of economic 
conditions. These arguments were especially significant for policymakers in the United 
States because the country’s enormous supply of gold provided them with considerable 
leeway in charting their course domestically. Global dominance was the hidden 
foundation of national autonomy. 
Monetary theorists relied on competing sets of data to justify their evaluations. 
Those who sided with Fisher looked to indicators that gauged the price level and money 
stock; adherents of the real bills doctrine preferred estimates of commercial loans and a 
measurement of industrial production that Stewart had helped create (which borrowed 
from an earlier statistic Mitchell had devised for the War Production Board). Where 
quantity theorists focused on shifts in the total money supply, their opponents looked to 
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the uses money was put to; so long as credit matched the needs of business and was not 
funding speculation, they did not worry about inflation.352  
Abstract disagreements had real consequences. As the 1920s came to a close, the 
booming stock market fostered anxiety over the prospect of inflation among real bills 
advocates at the Federal Reserve, a concern that baffled Fisher and other quantity 
theorists, who saw the country’s declining price level as proof that deflation was the more 
immediate threat. Strong, characteristically, preferred his own set of measurements, and 
balanced domestic concerns with his sense of responsibility for the international financial 
order.  
Others just struggled to keep up. In a 1930 meeting with a governor on the 
Federal Reserve Board, Fisher drew attention to a reduction in demand deposits, a key 
part of the money supply. The confused Governor responded by asking Fisher what 
demand deposits were.353 
With an economic boom rolling along, ignorance seemed innocuous, even among 
the policymaking elite. The United States experienced two mild recessions after 1921, but 
these temporary interruptions did little to dampen the good feelings. For most people, the 
theories explaining prosperity were complicated, and the statistics dull. When combined 
with evaluations of their own experiences, arguments voiced by academics and 
politicians could help turn headlines in newspapers and snippets from radio broadcasts 
into a cultural fact: prosperity had arrived. This conviction was plausible enough to 
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legitimize the Federal Reserve in the eyes of Congress, but that was just one of its 
consequences. In 1927, with no end to the good times in sight, and a presidential election 
looming, one of the boom’s greatest beneficiaries—Herbert Hoover—launched what was 
at the time the most ambitious investigations of economic conditions in American 
history. Though it drew on the experience of previous surveys, the inquiry was a novel 
enterprise, and it had a novel object of investigation. Its goal, as the report that emerged 
from this process would explain, was “to observe and to describe the American economy 
as a whole.”354 
 
THE MYSTERY FASCINATED AUDIENCES far outside the United States. “As you 
know,” Hoover wrote to the head of the Carnegie Corporation, “a number of 
investigating bodies have come here from Europe to look into the sources of American 
prosperity.”355 Hoover waved off those studies: “their contributions to our thinking are 
insignificant,” he wrote, adding that Americans would not “be satisfied with the 
superficial conclusions of strangers.”356 The time was ripe for such an inquiry. 
Explorations of economic activity had multiplied in recent years—“at least four or five 
times as numerous as they were a decade ago,” by Hoover’s estimation. One observer 
judged the explosion of research tantamount to “the new Discovery of America.”357 But 
more work—much more work—lay ahead. Hoover believed “an overhauling of some of 
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our basic statistics” was due, and he saw a thorough canvassing of the economic terrain 
as a valuable prelude to that project.358 Better data would lead to better policy, which was 
Hoover’s other goal for the report.  
Taming the business cycle had preoccupied Hoover since the postwar depression, 
and he depicted the forthcoming investigation as the next stage of the project begun with 
the Conference on Unemployment. As with that earlier venture, this would be the joint 
product of private and public efforts. It would be conducted under the auspices of a 
Committee on Recent Economic Changes. Hoover superintended, while Hunt served as 
the Committee’s secretary. But, as with Business Cycles and Unemployment, the research 
was led by the NBER, with funding supplied by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Memorial and the Carnegie Corporation. The biggest change was intellectual, not 
structural, and it was evident in the broad sweep of the title given to the volume that 
resulted from the investigation: Recent Economic Changes in the United States. 
Following another pattern set by prior experiments in managing the cycle, 
publicity was crucial. In January 1928 the New York Times announced that Hoover had 
brought together “leading business men and economists” for “a broad inquiry into 
changes in economic currents.” (References to “the economy” were becoming more 
frequent, but the concept was unfamiliar enough to require locutions that would strike 
later generations as strange linguistic contortions.) The template for the project was 
already set, but the article noted one significant departure from precedent. As Wesley 
Mitchell explained, where the Conference on Unemployment was called “to learn why 
things had gone wrong in business following the war,” this sequel was supposed “to find 
out why the nation has done so well economically since 1923.” Especially puzzling was 
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the coinciding of general prosperity with a falling price level.359 “Economists are 
thoroughly at sea in endeavoring to explain the current phenomenon,” Mitchell admitted; 
but if the committee met Hoover’s request they would supply “a basis for drawing rules 
for continued prosperity in the future.”360  
Over the next year, accounts of the committee’s work leaked out in dribs and 
drabs, building anticipation for the final document. Early in 1929, the Times reported 
“much interest today in an announcement that a compilation of the findings of the 
Committee on Recent Economic Changes of the President’s Unemployment Conference 
was nearing completing.”361 Between the first story and this latest update, Hoover had 
won a landslide election to the presidency, lending special weight to the findings of a 
group so associated with the new president. More previews followed: a story on the 
Committee’s research on railroads, one on women’s purchasing habits, another on 
construction, then prices.362 
Finally, in May 1929, came the debut. “I have never known anything like the 
interest in Recent Economic Changes,” Hunt had written to Edwin Gay two weeks 
earlier.363 (Probably forgetting he had said virtually the same thing about Business Cycles 
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and Unemployment.364) “Both here and in New York we have been stormed by 
newspaper and magazine men,” Hunt continued. “Our publicity men tell me that it is 
unprecedented in their experience.”365 Its publisher, McGraw-Hill, received more than 
two thousand advance orders for the book. By April 1930, the full report had gone into its 
fourth printing and, Hunt bragged, was “constantly referred to in magazines, newspapers 
and public addresses.”366 Those who lacked the zeal required to make it through the two-
volume document could refer to an abridged one-volume edition that later appeared. 
There was an international audience for its findings as well, and a Russian edition was 
released that May. Closer to home, a movement emerged at Columbia University to add 
Mitchell’s summary chapter to its course on Contemporary Civilization, a survey course 
that had been hastily assembled during the Great War to stiffen undergraduate resolve for 
the battle against the Kaiser by familiarizing them with Columbia’s version of the 
Western canon. 
Americans with less grandiose pretensions could turn to their newspapers for 
summaries of the report. The New York Times greeted the story with a lavish spread 
under the headline “The Rise of a New America: A Stirring Drama Underlies the Report 
on Economic Changes.” After initial complaints about the abundance of material spread, 
the Times remarked on the “national interest” excited by this moving tale “of human 
achievement, of revolutionary social and cultural change, of swiftly shifting scenes of 
human life and work.” Announcing that “no greater changes have come upon the 
economic and social life of a community than in the United States during the past two 
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decades,” the newspaper trumpeted Recent Economic Changes as the best available 
rendition of a drama with world-historical significance.367 
What were the contents of the report that aroused such enthusiasm? They included 
discussions of construction, transportation, marketing, labor, management, agriculture, 
price movements, money and credit, foreign markets, and national income. Mitchell 
described it as a “moving picture of the economic changes now going on in the United 
States,” combining “scenes from real life” with “impersonal records” supplied by 
economic statistics.368 “No individual is equipped to gather and to analyze all of the 
evidence which should be canvassed,” he argued, which is why the NBER relied upon a 
team of specialists to survey the transformations that had remade the United States: 
“engineers, business executives, public officials, bankers, economists, statisticians, labor 
specialists, and agricultural experts,” the standard roll call in Hoover’s program for 
modern governance.369 
Speed was the clue to unraveling the mystery Hoover had called upon his experts 
to solve. Americans had earned their prosperity—and the report emphasized that 
prosperity was earned—by working existing resources more intelligently. Two factors 
loomed especially large in this narrative: scientific progress and the triumph of finance. 
“Besides being an era of extraordinary technical advance,” the report observed, “the 
present is likewise, as in no other stage of history, a money and credit age.”370 The spread 
of electricity symbolized one advance, the growing sophistication of finance the other. 
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Both accelerated the pace of economic activity driving the economic boom. Minds, not 
bodies, were the agents of this revolution; they had devised the “intricate machine” 
responsible for prosperity.371 
Those complex mechanisms were susceptible to breakdowns, a weakness that 
compelled the state to take up a new role. The pace of economic activity would continue 
to accelerate “only if we develop a technique of balance.”372 Prosperity was the product 
of a delicate but dynamic equilibrium, and the perpetuation of this order could not be left 
to chance, or, what amounted to the same thing, the whims of private actors. “[T]he 
outstanding fact which is illuminated by this survey,” the report argued, was that 
Americans must “consciously accept the principle of equilibrium and apply it skillfully in 
every economic relation.”373 Justifying both its own existence and Hoover’s domestic 
agenda, the report insisted that Americans would “learn to maintain the economic 
balance” only with “incessant observation and adjustment of our economy.”374  
Shuttling across scales was essential to this project. Mastery of the system as a 
whole rested “upon a general knowledge of the relations of the parts each to the other.”375 
No comprehending the particular without understanding the general, or the general 
without the particular. The leaps could be jarring: from estimates of national 
unemployment to apologies for the absence of “accurate figures on the production of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Recent Economic Changes, xxi.  
 
372Recent Economic Changes, xxii. 
 
373Recent Economic Changes, xx. 
 
374Recent Economic Changes, xxii. 
 
375 Recent Economic Changes, xxii. 
	  
	   145	  
electric refrigerators which produce their own ice.”376 After almost a decade of work, the 
NBER was no closer to distilling the findings of their grand surveys into an elegant 
model. Complexity remained the Bureau’s watchword, and their report had made it into a 
guiding principle for national policymaking. 
Attention to detail could turn up remarkable discoveries, including the spread of a 
similar commitment to rationalizing economic life among the nation’s business leaders. 
Noting the surging popularity of budget-making among businesses—about eighty percent 
of businesses with budgets, the report estimated, had adopted them after 1920—the 
committee celebrated the ordering of a previously chaotic realm. In these undertakings, it 
saw “the germ of what is likely some day to be a full-fledged and functionalized 
Department of the Future” that would allow businesses to predict and accommodate 
swings of the business cycle, internalizing “the principle of balance” Hoover and his 
allies brought to the government.377 The federal government had also joined in the trend, 
establishing both the Bureau of the Budget and General Accounting Office in 1921.  
As for monetary policy, the report devoted only part of a single chapter to an 
explicit assessment of the Federal Reserve. Arguing that such an appraisal should “be 
done tentatively” because the Fed was just “one of many influences” on recent economic 
history, the report dwelled on the institution’s role as manager of gold flows and guardian 
of the international monetary system.378 Eventually, however, it moved to less 
cosmopolitan matters, concluding that while there was “no convincing proof that the 
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Reserve System has reduced the fluctuations of the business cycle” it seemed likely that 
“its influence has been in that direction.”379 
The report was just as cautious when addressing national income. Emphasizing 
that the statistics “need to be used with care,” it described them as “not perfectly 
accurate” and possessed of “several different meanings.” “Conditions in different 
countries are so dissimilar that international comparisons are fraught with danger,” it 
warned.380 Matters were also tricky within the United States. National measures reflected 
“an era of great prosperity,” but regional breakdowns revealed this prosperity was mostly 
confined to sections of the country that accounted for under half the total population. 
Steering clear of political controversy, it found “little satisfactory information on the 
question as to distribution of national income among the different income classes.”381 The 
evaluation of national income—the first topic investigated by the NBER; the last chapter 
in the body of the report—might have provided the opportunity for grandiose statements 
on the progress of knowledge. Those did appear elsewhere, but the report approached this 
essential subject with humility.  
This careful tone helped account for the warm reception that Recent Economic 
Changes found among both academics and the general public. The Nation judged it 
“probably as good a picture of the economic position of the United States as it is possible 
to draw,” and even found justification for a repudiation of Republican policies. 382 “There 
is no ground in this whole study,” it claimed, “for prosperity ‘blah’ of the Coolidge 
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variety.”383 The New Republic was even more enthusiastic. Its editors noted the 
occasionally questionable statistics the committee had to rely upon and nodded to the 
duller aspects of a project that was “long,” “not easy reading,” and “full of statistical 
tables and charts.”384 But the magazine urged readers to look deeper: through inquiries 
that might appear “of slight import or dull” ran “the golden thread of enthusiasm for the 
effort of modern man to master his economic processes for the greater fulfillment of 
human life.”385 That was a dream worth sacrificing for, even if the sacrifices required 
wading through tomes filled with sentences like “The per capita use of cereals in the 
United States—notably corn meal and wheat flour—has tended downward for many 
years.”386 Acknowledging the possibility that “those with the greatest economic power” 
might have bent the social order to their will, the magazine’s editors insisted that a 
struggle against this corrupt elite would be futile without a precise grasp of the situation 
confronting them and a set of institutions to build an alternative model.387  
For academics, the details were part of the book’s triumph. “No nation ever 
before had nearly as much information about its own economic life,” declared a reviewer 
in the Journal of Political Economy.388 The statement was echoed by William Ogburn, a 
dissenter in the Conference on Unemployment—he endorsed more extensive measures 
than Hoover preferred—who claimed that “never before has the economic life of a nation 
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been so exactly measured and analyzed.”389 No wonder a statistician remarked on the 
“virtually unanimous praise” Mitchell and his colleagues had received.390 
The book was widely discussed, but even more telling than the number of articles 
was their character. After the glowing tributes, reviewers often moved to expansive 
ruminations on the issues raised by the report. A British economist found in it evidence 
for “a contest between two types of civilisation”—an American variety dedicated to 
maximizing production and consumption, and a European alternative willing to trade a 
reduction in per capita output for greater equality, more worker autonomy, and the 
preservation of artisanal craftsmanship.391 For Richard Ely, an honored member in the 
generation of economist’s that preceded Mitchell’s, the report provided an opportunity to 
announce the victory of a reforming project within economics that he traced back to the 
founding of the American Economic Association almost half a century earlier. According 
to Ely, that generation had been guided by the belief that “A new world needs a new 
political economy.”392 Zeal for empirical research defined this new political economy—
or new economics, as it would soon be dubbed. And a generation later, Recent Economic 
Changes marked the latest milestone on this path. 
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While Ely looked to the past, one of the few critical reviews came from a young 
economist with his gaze locked on the future. Arthur R. Burns taught economics at 
Barnard, across the street from Mitchell at Columbia. (He was not related to Arthur F. 
Burns, a Mitchell protégé who later became a professor at Columbia and research director 
at the NBER.) Collegiality did not stop Burns from writing that “the study has revealed 
no new relationships between economic phenomena” and complaining that despite its 
quantitative rigor the report had “failed to yield a sharper or more comprehensive and 
satisfying picture” of its subject.393 Burns placed a sizable portion of the blame on one of 
the report’s most novel features. The NBER had been tasked with scrutinizing “the 
American economy as a whole,” but that mission, Burns argued, was fraught with 
“vagueness” and “ambiguity.”394 The economy might be a striking formulation, but it 
offered “no precise standard of relevance” for investigation.  
For Burns, this pointed to a still deeper problem: “the difficulty of classifying the 
data of the economic world into existing analytical categories,” he argued, suggested the 
need for “a new system of categories.”395 Especially necessary, he believed, were 
statistics that could build “bridges between the categories in which the data are available 
and those in which the economist and, to a large extent the common man thinking 
economically, expresses himself.” These categories would have to satisfy both practical 
and theoretical requirements. Based upon data that could “in practice, be made 
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available,” they would also have to “prove capable of interrelation” and reflect the 
connectedness of the phenomena they captured.396  
When they paused to reflect, even the most enthusiastic proponents of Recent 
Economic Changes acknowledged flaws in the report. Gay and Mitchell conceded that 
“exigencies of time and space” pushed them to work faster than they preferred.397 
Commenting on similar research projects undertaken by Germany and the United 
Kingdom, Hunt remarked in May 1929 that “Fact-finding seems to be in fashion the 
world over.”398 But he later acknowledged that a global trend had fostered a 
provincialism of its own: “The method adopted implies an isolation of American society” 
that, he wrote to Mitchell, “while a convenience for research purposes, falsifies the 
findings.”399 
Such concessions did little to curb celebrations of their accomplishments. 
Technical achievements were made all the sweeter by electoral validation. Hoover had 
won election to the presidency just a few months earlier with almost sixty percent of the 
popular vote, and an even more lopsided victory in the electoral college. Whatever their 
disagreements on economic theory, Mitchell and Fisher united in their approval of 
Hoover. Fisher made his endorsement in the New York Times, where he depicted Hoover 
as heir to the reforming tradition embodied by Roosevelt and Wilson in an earlier 
generation and as “a practical economist . . . to whom is due more largely than to any 
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other one man improvement in our prosperity.”400 The president as “practical economist”: 
it truly was a new era. 
 
“[W]E HAVE REACHED A HIGHER DEGREE of comfort and security than ever 
existed before in the history of the world,” Hoover intoned from the steps of the 
Capitol.401 Technological innovation made Hoover’s the first inaugural address captured 
on talking newsreel, and he intended to carry that same ardor for experimentation to the 
White House. Nowhere was this spirit more evident than in his plans for economic 
policy. Just a few years earlier, he had insisted that “Our Government’s greatest troubles 
and failures are in the economic field,” where it sought to navigate “economic seas” that 
were “new and only partly discovered.”402 Almost a decade of research had illuminated 
much that was previously shrouded in darkness. Now Hoover was looking to the next 
step. 
The American economy was a monumental subject of inquiry, but the economy 
was one part of an even larger entity—society—that Hoover believed was now ready for 
its own comprehensive investigation. Funded by a grant of over half a million dollars 
from the Rockefeller Foundation, it would provide the culmination of a mission that had 
occupied him since the war.403 Once again, the choice to lead the project was obvious: 
Wesley Mitchell.          
 That was not the only social scientific endeavor making demands upon Mitchell’s 
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attention. The NBER continued its work, but Mitchell carved out time to serve on the 
“Advisory Council” for a new but promising organization called the Econometric 
Society. Founded in 1930, its lengthy full title characterized it as “an International 
Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in its Relation to Statistics and 
Mathematics.” Though launched in the United States—in a Cleveland hotel, to be 
precise—membership reached outside the nation’s borders from the outset. Soon its ranks 
swelled to include many of the profession’s most prominent figures, including John 
Maynard Keynes, Ragnar Frisch, Joseph Schumpeter, and Nikolai Kondratieff, along 
with less remembered figures like the NBER’s Malcolm Rorty and Carl Snyder, one of 
the Federal Reserve’s few quantity theory sympathizers. It was an impressive collection, 
but when it came time to select the society’s first president the decision was as 
uncontroversial as selecting Mitchell had been for Hoover’s investigation of society: 
Irving Fisher. 
A patron in the White House, major research initiatives, advances within the 
academy—economists had achieved considerable progress in the past decade, and 
conditions seemed ideal for sustaining their forward march. Prosperity had kept the 
stakes of disputes among economists low. Outside their rarified circles, theoretical 
disputes mattered far less than the more pragmatic conviction that deft economic 
governance had led to unprecedented prosperity. Scientific management of the American 
economy was a new conceit, like the idea of the economy itself. In the early months of 
1930, it was just one concern among many, subordinate to the more ambitious program of 
mastering society that Mitchell and his colleagues were about to undertake. The business 
cycle theories propagated by the NBER, the quantity theory advocated by Fisher, and the 
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conflicting interpretations bruited about within the Federal Reserve—advocates of all 
these positions could find evidence for their cause in the history of the last decade. 
Looking back on this period, Mitchell recalled that at the time “it was hard not to 
believe that we had solved all our major economic problems.”404 Not even Wall Street’s 
dramatic crash in October 1929 could dampen their spirits. Four months later, Mitchell 
was still warning about the threat not of a collapse in employment but of “the danger that 
we may upset our working economic equilibrium by producing too many goods.”405 The 
one hundredth issue of the Commerce Department’s Survey of Contemporary Business 
had recently maintained that “While it may be too early to say that the utilization of 
business data has entirely eliminated the business cycle, there is agreement today among 
business leaders everywhere that the wider use of facts will mitigate in a large degree 
many of the disastrous effects of the one-time recurrent business cycle.”406 Mitchell 
seconded this confident appraisal. Judging the government’s reaction to the downturn a 
subject “of great technical interest,” he lauded early steps from Hoover to “organiz[e] the 
economic forces of the country to check the threatened decline at the start.”407 “A more 
significant experiment in the technique of balance,” he added, “could not be devised than 
the one which is being performed before our eyes."408  
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Chapter 3: The Politics of the Economy 
 
A DIRE WARNING FOR THE NEW YEAR greeted readers of the New York Times 
when they opened their newspapers on January 2, 1933. A committee of “fifty eminent 
authorities and many assistants” organized by President Hoover had concluded “that the 
United States could have no assurance against violent revolution if it failed to coordinate 
its governmental, economic, scientific and educational forces by some form of integrated 
national planning.”409 A special eight-page section within the paper reprinted the 
committee’s official summary of its findings, with, the Times noted, “the pages being so 
arranged that they can be detached and folded for preservation.”410 It was a document 
worth remembering.  
But it was not the document Hoover had envisioned three years earlier when he 
announced the formation of a Research Committee on Social Trends. Staffed by “trained 
technicians” concerned with “strictly scientific research,” the committee would produce a 
sequel to the blockbuster report on Recent Economic Changes published earlier that 
year.411 Building on the success of its predecessor, the new study—titled, filially, Recent 
Social Trends—would synthesize the results of the inquiries that had occupied Hoover’s 
attention for almost a decade. At each step, the ambitions of the reports had expanded, 
advancing from industrial efficiency to unemployment to business cycles to the American 
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economy as a whole. But there was one final stage left—a study of society that would 
synthesize these earlier efforts while placing them in the largest possible context.  
Two weeks before unveiling his latest foray into combining the social sciences 
with the arts of governing, Hoover used his first State of the Union address to celebrate 
the country that made his project possible. Bound together by economic, social, religious, 
and national ties, Americans had “created a solidarity in a great people unparalleled in all 
human history.”412 The stock market crash of October had threatened that harmony, but 
quick action by the Federal Reserve had limited the damage to the financial sector and 
protected the world outside Wall Street from spreading contamination.  
As the months passed and the scale of what Hoover later called “the greatest 
economic emergency in all the history of the world” came into sight, the assumptions that 
had framed the committee’s inquiry at the outset—domestic tranquility, economic 
stability, national unity—became increasingly untenable.413 On its surface, the 
investigation remained a quintessential Hoover product. Though initiated by the 
president, the committee was organized by an independent group of expects funded with 
a hefty contribution from the Rockefeller Foundation and chaired by Wesley Mitchell.  
Yet this familiar cast of characters produced a report the Nation judged, in a 
triumphant editorial, “the most formidable revolutionary document in our day and 
country.”414 “It is no slight irony,” the magazine observed, that “under the aegis of the 
apostle of ‘rugged individualism,’ . . . the interpretative material was assembled which 
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makes plain the imminence of and the imperative necessity for a profoundly altered 
political, economic, and social order.”415 The president appeared to distance himself from 
his prized endeavor, writing in a terse foreword that the report was “entirely the work of 
the committee.”416 He signed this introduction in October 1932, a month before his 
overwhelming loss Franklin Roosevelt in that year’s election.  
Hoover left Washington soon after, but members of the Committee on Social 
Trends received a warm welcome from the new administration. Roosevelt had promised 
the nation a New Deal, but he left the contents of that program vague. The spirit of his 
pledge, though, was echoed by Hoover’s experts. Declaring that “the line between so-
called ‘pure’ economics and ‘pure’ politics has been blurred” almost beyond recognition, 
Recent Social Trends urged the creation of “hybrid” entities, “quasi-governmental 
agencies” adapted to the “new social boundaries” of the age.417 The country faced a 
“bewildering confusion of problems,” including “dangerous torsions and tensions in our 
social arrangements” and rising fear of “plutocratic dictatorship.” 418 But there were 
grounds for optimism too. Lauding the readiness with which Americans had previously 
embraced scientific advances and the country’s growing comfort with planning—an 
attribute “keenly appreciated by the Soviets”—Mitchell and his colleagues expected the 
nation would emerge from its trials intact.419  
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Reviving one of Hoover’s favorite themes, the committee insisted that American 
institutions would be preserved only if they were transformed—transformed not by the 
collision of forces beyond human control, but by government planners guided by a 
cohesive vision of the society they wished to make. And there was no doubt that 
“society” was the center of this vision. Noting “the emphasis upon ‘society’ as the 
dominant ‘entity’” in the report, the Wall Street Journal shrewdly observed that the 
document portrayed the social order “as a machine with many parts and it lays the 
troubles of our time to a lack of synchronization in the changes affecting each one of 
those parts.”420  
Dedication to viewing society as a totality shaped the committee’s views on what 
the government should do next. Committed to stitching together a nation they feared was 
breaking apart, the authors urged the adoption of a “new synthesis” in planning that 
brought together “the scientific, the educational, as well as the economic (including here 
the industrial and agricultural)”—in short, all the forces “inextricably intertwined in 
modern life.”421 This new order would baffle ideologues, but its necessity was clear to 
“the student of social trends.”422 Ending with language more suited to a sermon than a 
bureaucratic document, the report trumpeted its own role in “the construction of the new 
symbols to thrill men’s souls,” along with the “new ideals, ideas and emotional values” 
that would make possible novel “ways of life” in the world to come. 423 The great 
challenges of the day could only be mastered if experts placed them within their social 
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context, revealing the hidden threads tying seemingly disconnected phenomena together. 
There was one society, and one common good.  
Roosevelt offered a ringing endorsement of that principle on the same day he 
replaced Hoover as president. In his inaugural address, Roosevelt explained that the 
“basic thought” behind his incoming administration’s program was “insistence…upon the 
interdependence of the various elements in and parts of the United States,” an 
interdependence Americans “now realize[d] as we have never realized before.”424 He 
gave this sentiment colloquial expression in an early fireside chat, where he told listeners 
that the strategy behind his recovery program was inspired by “the basic idea of society” 
and the connected belief “that people acting in a group can accomplish things which no 
individual acting alone could even hope to bring about.”425 Roosevelt depicted his 
administration as a radical break from Hoover’s, and in crucial respects it was. But, 
consciously or not, he was reiterating a central claim from the Committee on Social 
Trends. “The outstanding problem,” according to their report, was “that of bringing about 
a realization of the interdependence of the factors of our complicated social structure.”426  
The continuity was both intellectual and institutional. In the words of Mordecai 
Ezekiel—an economist at the Department of Agriculture under Hoover who transitioned 
smoothly to the Roosevelt era—“There were a lot of, if you want to call them, ‘economic 
liberals’ working in Washington and who, as a result of our experience, were developing 
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ideas and proposals and the Roosevelt Administration took them and used them.”427 That 
number included the two most important members of the team that produced Recent 
Social Trends—the University of Chicago political scientist Charles Merriam, and 
Wesley Mitchell himself, both of whom joined a new government organization called the 
National Planning Board. Over the next decade, the group would shuffle through names, 
becoming first the National Resources Board, then the National Resources Committee, 
before finally landing on a synthesis in 1939 that dubbed it the National Resources 
Planning Board. Despite the shifting nomenclature, it remained a bastion for those who 
hoped to apply the social sciences to the problems of government.428 
Enthusiasm for that project was not confined to Washington. The Great 
Depression ushered in a boom for peddlers offering cures to the nation’s ills. It was a 
time when responsible figures complained about a country gone “technocrazy” for 
Technocracy, a movement claiming that prosperity would resume if the dollar was 
replaced with a price system administered by experts and based on energy 
consumption.429 And that was still one of the more respectable options. 
Writing for the New Republic, John Maynard Keynes outlined an alternative path, 
turning the crisis into the jumping-off point for an expansive reflection on the 
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relationship between economic efficiency and social welfare. Although he described his 
“ideal” as a society that “put economic considerations into a back seat,” achieving that 
goal required a temporary sacrifice. “For the next twenty-five years,” he wrote, 
“economists, at present the most incompetent, will be nevertheless the most important, 
[sic] group of scientists in the world.”430 That would mean passing through a “horrid 
interval when these creatures mattered.”431 But there was an upside: “it is to be hoped—if 
they are successful—that after that they will never be important again.”432  
According to Keynes, the Depression had turned longtime pillars of the socialist 
agenda like centralized control of investment and a more egalitarian income distribution 
into economic necessities. Yet socialists had not realized that the ground had shifted 
under their feet. Blind to the changing times, they clung to obsolete principles, like faith 
in the gold standard and a conviction that falling wages could restore prosperity. Keynes 
portrayed a topsy-turvy world where bourgeois economics called for socialist politics, 
while actually existing socialists remained prisoners of economic orthodoxy. Only in this 
confused period, where economic crisis and intellectual uncertainty fed off each other, 
did the economist deserve a central role in policymaking, and economic efficiency merit 
as much consideration as social welfare. 
It was a strange image, not least because of how much it contrasted with the 
vision outlined in Recent Social Changes. Hoover’s team had insisted on the primacy of 
the social, the inevitability of planning, the need for a recasting of American values, and 
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the useful but ultimately subsidiary place of economists. Keynes offered a more modest 
prescription, stripped of exhortations to spiritual rejuvenation but readier to accord 
economists a crucial part in making a new society.  
Ultimately, neither of these would-be prophets grasped what was to come, even 
though both helped bring it into being. Within a generation, a system of planning had 
emerged that was as ambitious in its own way as anything Mitchell and his colleagues 
had imagined. The system, however, was staffed by economists dedicated to managing 
the economy, not to controlling society. This commitment required its own set of 
institutions, and it vested economists with a significance that proved far more durable 
than Keynes had foreseen. In retrospect, it was common for the agents of this transition, 
and later historians, to describe it as a pragmatic response to shifting circumstance. But 
that perspective obscures all of the work needed to make the transition seem like a self-
evident response to the necessities of the moment.  
While New Dealers set up shop in Washington—moving into offices, building 
networks, and planning their first steps—advocates of conflicting agendas jostled for 
supremacy. Though confident in these heady early days, they acted in a world of 
profound uncertainty— uncertainty over what theories could make sense of the crisis; 
uncertainty over whether the upheaval spreading across the planet would reach the United 
States; uncertainty over whether American democracy could weather the coming storm. 
Lacking reliable measurements, they did not even know how bad economic conditions 
had become. 
A profusion of theories, statistics, institutions, and other tools for making sense of 
the Depression arose in response to this confusion. Reactions to a crisis that 
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contemporaries viewed as a fundamental challenge to society, they underpinned a new 
phase in the campaign to reinvent government that Hoover had once embodied. Hoover’s 
successors built on his legacy while making it serve purposes of their own. 
Understanding this shift requires moving across scales, from the speeches of presidents to 
the ruminations of journalists to the debates of academics to the pages of bureaucratic 
reports. An examination of the change could begin at any of these levels, and it must 
eventually cross all of them, but it helps to start with the officials who bore the brunt of 
the novel obligation to govern the economy.  
 
WHILE HOOVER STYLED HIMSELF an engineer in politics, claiming a scientific 
authority that lifted him above the messiness of democratic debate, Franklin Roosevelt 
made an ethic of political life.433 Historians have long sought to make sense of the almost 
volcanic eruption of government activity that took place during FDR’s administration by 
slicing the New Deal into discrete segments.434 But New Deal Washington contained 
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multitudes. Devotees of balanced budgets and a constricted state competed for influence 
with—and sometimes found unlikely allies in—fellow travellers straddling the division 
between socialist and communist (along with official party members).435 This was a time 
when a young radical could remark in a letter home that “Without revolution which 
transfers power to the workers and sets up a socialized state, little will be gained,” and 
then return to his day job as legislative assistant and privileged counselor to one of the 
nation’s most influential senators.436 One of the few characteristics that united this 
ideological menagerie was the conviction that the country was in crisis—and, perhaps, 
appreciation for the irony that Hoover’s attempt to transcend politics had given rise to 
such ferocious political debates. 
Caricatured as a disciple of laissez-faire by contemporary rivals and some later 
scholars, Hoover responded to the Great Depression with what he described in his 
campaign against Roosevelt as “the most gigantic program of economic defense and 
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counterattack ever evolved in the history of the Republic.”437 These were the pleas of a 
desperate politician up for reelection, but Hoover was right to draw attention to a 
program that had no precedent in American history. Although statistics on unemployment 
and output were slow to appear and unreliable when they did, once it became clear that 
the downturn had spread beyond Wall Street, Hoover initiated an aggressive 
countercyclical program based on lessons drawn from a decade of economic 
management. Against the advice of his more orthodox advisers, he advocated low interest 
rates and increased government spending. And there were the conferences—conferences 
to persuade corporate leaders to keep up wages and investment, conferences to coordinate 
the response to the slump, conferences to publicize the benefits that had supposedly 
resulted from his administration’s policies (including the other conferences).  
Throughout, Hoover sought guidance from the lessons of history, as interpreted 
by his favored economists. Late in 1930, he informed an audience of bankers that their 
current struggles were just the latest stage of the business cycle. Noting that 
“interruptions to the orderly march of progress have been recurrent for a century,” he 
assured the audience, “The leaders of business, of economic thought, and of government 
have, for the last decade, given earnest search into cause and remedy of this sort of 
instability.”438 Unlike earlier generations, today Americans understood what was 
happening and could take steps to contain the damage. They even had an instructive 
example from within living memory—what Hoover called the “far more severe” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 Herbert Hoover, “Message Accepting the Republican Presidential Nomination,” June 16, 1932, 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=23129.  
 
438 Herbert Hoover, “Address to the American Bankers Association in Cleveland, Ohio” October 
2, 1930, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=22371.  
	  
	   165	  
downturn of 1920 to 1921.439 Thanks to scientific advances and practical experience, the 
road back to prosperity would be smoother and shorter than ever. 
The postwar example was especially instructive because of one crucial parallel 
between that moment and their own. In both cases, policymakers had to rely chiefly on 
national tools for problems they considered fundamentally international. With the 
Depression grinding on, Hoover assigned a larger portion of the blame to the rest of the 
world. Overproduction in sites ranging from Brazil to China had flooded markets and 
sent prices tumbling downward. “[O]ur self-contained national economy,” he remarked, 
in one of his rare uses of the phrase from this period, “would have enabled us to recover 
long since but for the continued dislocations, shocks, and setbacks from abroad.”440 
Invoking this global backdrop provided Hoover with a convenient scapegoat, but it also 
forced a critical reappraisal of the nationalistic focus of the forays into economic and 
social analysis conducted at his behest.  
That altered perspective was shared by Edward Hunt, who continued to advise 
Hoover in the White House. Looking back on their earlier report, Hunt saw that the 
committee had portrayed the United States “as a self-contained economy,” a picture that 
appeared dubious “in view of the events of 1929-31.”441 Hunt’s cosmopolitan turn was 
encouraged by his participation in a League of Nations conference on “World Economic 
Depression,” where he presented the findings of the Committee on Recent Economic 
Changes. (He also found time to read James Joyce’s Ulysses, which he deemed both 
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“extraordinary” and “the most detailed catalogue of filth that I have ever come upon in 
any language”).442 Despite the retrospective concern about their earlier parochialism, 
Hunt remarked with pride on the appreciation for Recent Economic Changes at the 
League. Anxiety about the future, however, soon darkened his mood. “Things economic 
and political seem to have pulled loose form their moorings and to be amazingly adrift,” 
he wrote to Mitchell after a month at the conference.443 Periods of cautious optimism 
gave way to moments when it seemed “as if all the prophecies of the Bolsheviks were 
about to be fulfilled.”444 Global depression was enough of a challenge by itself, but the 
mounting prospect of another war in Europe threatened even greater devastation. 
With uncertainty mounting across the world and economic conditions at home 
worse than ever, Hoover recalibrated his approach. A countercyclical program remained 
his ideal, but he was increasingly worried about the stability of the financial community. 
That concern pushed him toward the policies that would define the memory of his 
administration. Convinced that reviving business confidence was the essential 
prerequisite for economic recovery, Hoover transformed himself into an unyielding 
defender of balanced budgets and the gold standard.445 
Hoover was clear about his position, but, in 1932, his opponent was not. 
Roosevelt promised fundamental change, but he was cagy about what that would mean. 
The specifics he offered usually hewed close to orthodoxy. On the budget, for instance, 
Roosevelt cast himself as a proponent of fiscal discipline and Hoover as a reckless 
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spender. Nor was the difference, as New Dealers later insisted, a result of Hoover’s 
doctrinal rigidity and Roosevelt’s pragmatism. Both considered themselves pragmatists, 
they just disagreed over what it meant to act pragmatically. What distinguished the two 
was not a willingness to experiment in pursuit of their goals, but the goals they deemed 
worth pursuing. Like Hoover, Roosevelt believed that confidence must be restored, but 
his target was as much political as economic: national confidence in the country’s ability 
to endure its latest trials, not just the confidence of a financial elite worried about the 
viability of its banks and the prospects for their investments.   
 Roosevelt acknowledged that the fate of American democracy was bound up with 
its economic trajectory. “[I]t is inevitable,” he declared in 1932, “that the main issue of 
this campaign should revolve about the clear fact of our economic condition.”446 Yet even 
the language he used to discuss these issues differed from Hoover’s. Roosevelt spoke 
with the colloquial tones of a seasoned politician holding a conversation about what he 
called “simple economics, the kind of economics that you and I and the average man and 
woman talk.”447 Economic statistics had their place, but when Roosevelt asked 
Americans to evaluate their condition, he opted for a simpler measure: “Are you better 
off than you were last year?”448  
He could be just as pointed when he shifted from “simple economics” to the 
teachings of academic economists. “I happen to know,” he remarked in one of his early 
fireside chats, “that professional economists have changed their definition of economic 
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laws every five or ten years for a very long time.”449 He was even harsher during the 
campaign, when he depicted the Republicans as slaves to the delusion that “sacred, 
inviolable, unchangeable” economic laws condemned the nation to depression. “We must 
lay hold of the fact that economic laws are not made by nature,” he declared.450 “They are 
made by human beings,” and they could be remade.451     
 For Roosevelt, economic debates were never simply economic. Americans, he 
argued in one of his major addresses in the 1932 campaign, needed “a reappraisal of 
values.”452 The closing of the frontier and the completion of the Industrial Revolution had 
brought a period of radical change to an end. “Our task now is not discovery or 
exploitation of natural resources, or necessarily producing more goods,” he said.453 “It is 
the soberer, less dramatic business of administering resources and plants already in 
hand.”454 Rexford Tugwell, a Columbia economist and member of Roosevelt’s so-called 
brain trust, elaborated the point a year later for an article on the philosophy of the New 
Deal. “We are learning,” he wrote, “to accept the limitations of maturity.”455 Expansion 
was no longer a panacea; in fact, it had become part of the problem. New challenges 
confronted the nation, and they demanded a new kind of government.  
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 “The day of enlightened administration has come,” Roosevelt announced.456 
Despite his shots at economists, he welcomed support from sympathetic practitioners of 
the dismal science, who descended on Washington in unprecedented numbers after he 
assumed office. As the widely read columnist Walter Lippmann observed, this group 
constituted “something new in American politics”—namely, “men who are professionally 
trained in the field of political economy.” Though a familiar presence in much of Europe, 
Lippmann explained, “professional economists are an innovation here.” With a sigh, he 
conceded, “the presence of professors in government posts is a sight to which we shall 
probably have to accustom ourselves.”457 
 No single ideology united all of these economists, but many would have seconded 
a qualified version of Roosevelt’s statement on the malleability of economic laws. The 
contingent and historical character of economic life enjoyed vigorous support from much 
of the discipline, including Wesley Mitchell. But the change in vocabulary signaled a 
more basic commitment: Roosevelt would govern not as an engineer but as a politician.  
 More specifically, he would govern as a politician in a democracy. Looking back 
on his first term in 1937, Roosevelt observed, “Ours was the task to prove that democracy 
could be made to function in the world of today as effectively as in the simpler world of a 
hundred years ago.”458 That was a comparatively minor theme in 1932, but it gathered 
force during his presidency, eventually becoming the frame of his reelection effort—and, 
later still, the heart of the argument he used to mobilize the nation for World War II.  
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 As Roosevelt began his first term, however, the only war he envisioned was a war 
against the Depression. He believed that a united country would enlist for the battle, and 
too much emphasis on democracy risked upsetting the more affluent troops. Democracy 
assumed a new centrality in his rhetoric as the sense of crisis faded, opposition from the 
business community surged, an expanding labor movement grew more confident in its 
powers, and the next presidential campaign began in earnest. Roosevelt’s first inaugural 
contained one reference to democracy; his second had eleven. By then, his dream of a 
united people had given way to the humbler but more achievable goal of building the 
largest possible electoral coalition, and he had exchanged tributes to national consensus 
for denunciations of “economic royalists.”459 Conjuring up a usable past for the New 
Deal, he depicted Hoover’s presidency as the final days of an “industrial dictatorship” 
ruled by a corporate aristocracy that had seized power during the Gilded Age.460 
Roosevelt’s account split American history into three stages: first youthful democratic 
exuberance, then industrial maturity joined to political repression, and finally a New Deal 
synthesis that used democratic authority to bring industrial titans to heel.  
 Roosevelt was an unreliable historian, not least for his own administration, which 
had sought the backing of economic royalists in the past, and would continue to do so in 
the future. But his narrative suggested the ideals that motivated New Dealers when their 
hopes were at their grandest. As Roosevelt put it following his landslide reelection, their 
goal was never just economic recovery: “Government in a democratic Nation does not 
exist solely, or even primarily, for that purpose. It is not enough that the wheels turn. 
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They must carry us in the direction of a greater satisfaction in life for the average 
man.”461  
 That standard was exacting but vague. Easy to dismiss as pandering—which it 
was, partly—it also marked a substantive commitment shared by much his 
administration. As one member of that group later recalled, among the thousands of 
officials who served in Washington during the 1930s, the core of “the New Dealers 
numbered probably no more than 200 or 300 people.”462 Though hailing from a variety of 
backgrounds, a disproportionate number of that group consisted of lawyers and 
economists. Roosevelt had sketched the contours of a democratic political economy. Now 
this group had to decide what that actually meant.  
 
DID ECONOMISTS DESERVE SUCH PROMINENCE? Felix Frankfurter was among 
the skeptical. A professor at Harvard Law School and Roosevelt’s friend since their time 
serving in Washington together during World War I, Frankfurter used his personal 
connections, intellectual energy, and institutional savvy to make himself, as the most 
astute historian of the New Dealers has observed, “something like a patron saint to 
liberals in Washington.”463 A bevvy of Roosevelt’s new hires would owe their selection 
to Frankfurter. In the summer of 1932, with the election looming, it seemed unlikely that 
any of them would be economists—or, as Frankfurter called them, “the damned 
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economists.”464 Before their chastening in the Depression, he fumed in a letter, 
economists had carried themselves with “an awful swagger and done a lot of talking 
about ‘the new economic era’ and what statistics prove, and in too many instances they 
have managed to produce a strange coincidence between money-making and 
‘science.’”465 
 One of the exceptions Frankfurter admitted to this rule was the man he was writing 
to. Jacob Viner was an intimate of Frankfurter—“You have no idea how often I have 
longed for talk with you during these days,” Frankfurter had written, immediately before 
launching into his denunciation—and a longtime professor of economics at the 
University of Chicago.466 Viner objected that Frankfurter was tarring all economists with 
errors committed by a handful, but that protest did little to calm his friend. After naming 
Irving Fisher as one pernicious voice, Frankfurter set his sights on to an even bigger 
target, lamenting “the mischievous influence” wielded by Wesley Mitchell and his 
supporters.467 “Think of the volume on economic trends published on the very eve of the 
October crash,” he marveled, before attributing responsibility for that debacle to “the 
drugging of minds through all these so-called cooperative efforts and organized 
research.”468 Frankfurter did not oppose economics as such, but he was furious that after 
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“all the outpour[ing] of money for economic investigation during the last two decades” 
the country lacked a figure “even remotely comparable to Keynes in guts and insight.”469  
 Passing over what he could have perceived as a slight, Viner insisted that 
Frankfurter’s ire was misplaced. “The great American authorities on economics,” Viner 
wrote, “are the men who have made, or inherited, or stolen a million dollars.”470 
Economists in the United States had pressed the case with the public for half a century, 
but so far “practically no attention has been paid to them.”471 Viner overstated his 
argument, but he expressed a common sentiment among his colleagues. Many continued 
to feel just as neglected under Roosevelt. But for a portion of the discipline—not all, but 
a larger number than ever before—FDR’s administration offered an extraordinary 
opportunity to shape policy.  
  Belying the New Deal’s reputation for ruthless pragmatism, academics who served 
in the administration often recalled it as a golden age for the politically minded 
intellectual. Columbia Law School professor and Roosevelt counselor Adolf Berle used 
almost exactly that language when he reminisced about a “golden period of being able to 
state a case with a fair hope that if it stood up it would be adopted.”472 Mordecai Ezekiel, 
the economist who moved so easily from Hoover’s government to Roosevelt’s, captured 
a similar feeling when he described the New Deal as a breakthrough for the “concept of 
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applying intelligence to government affairs” that brought about “a merger of the 
theoreticians from the outside with career people from the inside.”473  
 Hard numbers backed up these sepia-toned recollections. While employment 
opportunities for academic economists were generally bleak during the Depression, the 
federal government proved an eager customer. Pushing on an open door, at its 1934 
meeting the American Economics Association urged its members to sign up for 
government work.474 Two years later, one exuberant presenter at the AEA’s annual 
conference reported that “opportunities for economists and statisticians in the federal 
government are more extensive at the present moment than ever before in our history,” 
with their number doubling in the last two years alone.475 At the same gathering, Isador 
Lubin, head of the Bureau of Labor statistics, attributed the proliferation of economists to 
a “radical” extension of the government’s authority over a daunting array of subjects, 
including “monetary policy, domestic and international, international trade, labor 
relations, trade practices, agricultural policy, and transportation.”476  
 Economists’ presence in the federal bureaucracy expanded with the scope of their 
obligations. Attempting to answer just one question within a single department required 
the investigator to navigate a daunting array of institutions. Using a study at the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics on the effect increased work hours would have on unemployment as 
an example, Lubin outlined a path that would cross “the office of the Commissioner 
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himself, but also the resources of the Chief Economist, his economic assistants, members 
of the Chief Statistician's staff, the research staff of the Division of Employment 
Statistics, as well as several junior statisticians.”477 The solution to this problem, 
according to familiar bureaucratic logic, was obvious: hire more economists, the only 
people equipped with the skills to find their way through the labyrinth they helped create. 
While still not, for the most part, charged with determining policy, economists had 
become essential to implementing it. 
 The growth of economists’ influence in the government had begun well before 
Roosevelt arrived in Washington, as the careers of many New Dealers revealed. Consider 
Mordecai Ezekiel. After majoring in agronomy at the University of Maryland, Ezekiel 
parlayed a gift for statistics into a post at the Department of Agriculture, a hub for 
economists during his time there in the 1920s. A PhD in economics from the recently 
established Brookings Institution, which had created a graduate program designed for 
government workers looking to advance their careers, rounded out his academic training. 
Still based in the Department of Agriculture at the start of Roosevelt’s tenure, Ezekiel 
eventually became one of the New Deal’s most energetic advocates for using deficit 
spending to invigorate a faltering recovery.478 
 Like other New Dealers, however, Ezekiel turned toward fiscal policy only after 
rival approaches had run aground. For all the heterogeneity of Roosevelt’s 
administration, during its first term the major approaches to combatting the Depression 
fell into two broad camps. Each deemed Hoover a failure, but after that diverged 
considerably—a point that did not stop Roosevelt from drawing upon both. Rejecting 
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Hoover’s preoccupation with business cycles, they offered distinct evaluations of the 
Depression’s causes and advice on what to do next. For one group, the downturn was an 
essentially monetary phenomenon; the solution, therefore, was to “reflate” the price level 
by increasing the money supply. Their rivals agreed that the problem lay with prices, but 
they were concerned not with the overall price level but with the balance of prices within 
different sectors. The uneven rise of corporations left some industries exposed to market 
forces while protecting the beneficiaries of bigness from supply and demand, introducing 
a fundamental imbalance to the system: while farmers were whipsawed by price 
fluctuations outside their control, corporate behemoths could opt to keep prices (and 
profits) high by cutting back on production. Advocates of this “administered-prices” 
thesis were preoccupied with restoring equilibrium, which they believed could only be 
attained by measures that boosted the purchasing power of consumers while restraining 
the excesses of industry and agriculture. Capable of seemingly infinite complications, the 
dispute between the two camps turned on whether the Depression had come about 
because of “too little money” or “too much goods.”479       
 The phrase was Fisher’s, and he was an unwavering proponent of reflation (a term 
he also coined).480 Fisher met with Roosevelt occasionally and wrote to him much more 
frequently. Though he criticized much of the New Deal, Fisher considered Roosevelt “the 
first great statesman to recognize the importance of this monetary problem”—an 
achievement he rewarded by dedicating a 1934 history of the stable money movement to 
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the president, who he claimed embodied the cause.481 In private, Fisher bragged about his 
sway over the administration, telling one correspondent that on monetary questions he 
had “made more effort than is generally known to guide President Roosevelt.”482 This 
“effort” included writing 100 letters to the president, who responded 25 times.483 When 
concerned inquirers asked what he thought of the president’s conduct—as the poet Ezra 
Pound did in the fall of 1933—Fisher offered reassurance, in Pound’s case writing that 
Roosevelt was “quite clear-headed on the subject of reflation.”484  
 Pound was more eager to solicit Fisher’s opinion than the typical member of the 
Roosevelt administration. Even before Roosevelt’s inauguration, Tugwell noted in his 
diary that “Fisher has tried to see me a number of time” and congratulated himself on 
having so far “managed to avoid him.”485 Later, he remembered Fisher as “something of 
a nuisance,” who “was certain that he knew all the answers.”486 After seeing Fisher’s 
latest piece of advice in 1934, a New Dealer commented on the “generally low estimate 
of Fisher’s judgment” and warned against cultivating “any indication to the public that 
Fisher has any influence with the Administration.”487 That remark makes sense of a later 
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recollection from Viner—who, unlike Fisher, was granted a formal place in the New 
Deal, where he was charged with putting together a “Freshman Brain Trust” of 
economists at Treasury.488 Viner recalled that during a 1933 visit to Washington, a brief 
reference to Fisher in front of future Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau prompted 
Morgenthau to snap, “I’ve got nothing to do with Fisher and he has nothing to do with 
me.”489  
 Fisher’s views, however, received a friendlier hearing. Even Morgenthau agreed 
with Fisher, to a point, inviting him along with two other economists to tea at Roosevelt’s 
Hyde Park estate in the summer of 1933, where they urged the president to drive up the 
price of gold, arguing that it would provide a much needed reflationary jolt. Roosevelt, 
under pressure from a vocal faction in Congress backing inflationary measures, had 
already announced an indefinite embargo on gold exports and torpedoed an international 
conference designed to restore the gold standard with a telegram asserting that defending 
“[t]he sound internal economic system of a nation” outweighed “the old fetishes of so-
called international bankers.”490 Roosevelt did not rule out eventually returning to the 
gold standard, but the message made his priorities clear. By the end of 1933, Roosevelt 
had the resources to manage the nation’s currency, and he used that ability to push a bill 
through Congress devaluing the dollar by almost 60 percent.491 
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 This was a remarkable display of governmental power, but in the eyes of Fisher it 
was more like an immunization against further state intervention—a small portion of a 
disease that inoculated against a full-blown outbreak. As he explained it, “I am not a 
socialist; almost the opposite.”492 (A change from more measured comments decades 
earlier, when Fisher had insisted that he shared many of socialism’s ends but differed on 
how they could be achieved.) In the words of the Columbia economist and brain-truster 
Rexford Tugwell, Fisher was part of a “curious collection of reactionaries who regarded 
inflation as an alternative to planning and social management.”493 A purely monetary 
solution to the Depression held out the possibility of economic recovery without social 
transformation. Like an idealized version of the judicial system, it offered a program 
where the state instituted rules and then withdrew from the scene. 
 As Keynes had already observed in the New Republic, however, economic debates 
in this period scrambled conventional ideological alignments. Few issues proved more 
destabilizing than currency reform. Although most economists opposed FDR’s stance on 
gold, Tugwell could just as easily have included the University of Chicago’s Henry 
Simons in his collection of reactionaries who favored robust state action on the currency 
(though such a categorization would have distorted Simons’s more complex position).494 
That minority also included Lauchlin Currie and Harry Dexter White, two then-obscure 
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figures who later occupied key government positions under Roosevelt, while navigating 
the border between the mainstream and radical left.495  
 But Currie and White did not think that monetary policy alone could produce a 
recovery. That put them in the company of another ideologically disparate group. 
Encompassing respected business leaders and socialists alike, members of this faction 
believed modern industry had rendered the laws of the market obsolete. That conviction 
had existed since the Gilded Age among both robber barons and radicals, but it had 
abated in the 1920s, until the Depression renewed its urgency. Defenders of this 
position—superficially Marxist but more often inspired by Veblen—considered the 
monetary diagnosis a shallow evaluation that missed the deeper, structural causes behind 
the Depression. As Tugwell put it, by rejecting the monetary “panacea,” he and his allies 
were compelled to rely upon “the harder—but, as they believed, the indispensable—
necessity for managing price by forthright means.”496 From their point of view, printing 
more dollars was equivalent to pumping gas into a broken engine.  
 This argument provided the rationale for two pillars of the early New Deal: the 
National Recovery Administration (NRA) and Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
(AAA). (Though even here the break with the past was not absolute: business cycle 
theory had lost the spotlight, but New Dealers institutionalized the split it had established 
between agricultural and industrial spheres.) If markets could no longer be trusted to 
establish prices, then government planners would have to assume roles previously left to 
private actors. How much responsibility the state should take up and what place would 
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remain for business provoked irreconcilable disputes, but acknowledging that markets 
had failed supplied a popular starting point.  
 The consensus was broad enough to include Wesley Mitchell. Although Mitchell 
was welcomed into the Roosevelt administration’s National Planning Board, the 
Depression had tarnished his reputation. At the Carnegie Corporation, it was held that the 
NBER had “disgraced itself” by failing to predict the downturn.497 The NBER survived 
the decade, but only after making it through a budget crunch and placating the doubts of 
newly skeptical funders. As for Mitchell himself, while diagnoses of the slump 
multiplied, he said he had “grown gray in trying to achieve an understanding of the 
situation” and found himself unable to even “outline a specific policy which would 
remedy the enormous difficulties from which we suffer.”498 Despite endorsing planning, 
he believed, “All that the most competent economic planners can really accomplish at the 
moment is to frame a tentative plan for making a plan.”499 As he had for decades, 
Mitchell pleaded for more—more research, more statistics, more time. 
 Yet Mitchell, too, had his radical moments. At the same meeting where he 
confessed himself unable to account for the Depression, he reported having found hope in 
the Soviet Union, which he judged” the most interesting experiment in the world now, 
perhaps in human history.”500 He admitted the endeavor was “rash” but still believed the 
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Soviet Union had become a laboratory carrying out experiments of profound relevance 
for the United States.  
 Mitchell, though, left it to others to decide what the United States could borrow 
from the Soviets. After two years as one of Roosevelt’s planners, he resigned so that he 
could devote himself to the NBER. He objected to parts of the New Deal, but Mitchell 
did not renounce the ideals of Recent Social Trends. If anything, he was more ambitious 
than the New Dealers: their planning was fragmentary, not the coherent system he 
envisioned. Despite this criticism, Mitchell retained warm relations with his former 
colleagues, writing to one in 1937, “My moral support is always yours for whatever it 
may be worth."501 With his time in government at an end, Mitchell threw himself back 
into his academic work—above all, a gargantuan study of business cycles, conducted 
with assistance from a team of assistants at the NBER, that rapidly ballooned to 
thousands of pages.502  
 On one point, however, Mitchell was certain: the New Deal’s greatest faults were 
its internal contradictions. Advocates of departing from the gold standard wanted the 
government to expand production via inflation, while price hikes by the NRA and AAA 
drove production downward. Whatever rationale particular restrictions on production 
might have, taken as a whole they pushed national income downward, when expansion 
was needed.503 Mitchell’s critique was shared by many of his colleagues. Fisher called 
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FDR’s agenda “a strange mixture.”504 In Walter Lippmann’s harsher language, it was a 
“destructive contradiction” that produced “an economy of bedlam.”505  
 The difficulty of carrying out these programs magnified the challenge of holding 
together irreconcilable theories. By the close of Roosevelt’s first term, both sides had to 
explain why their predictions had not come to pass. Economic historians today view 
Roosevelt’s monetary policy more favorably than they do his experiments with planning, 
but the messiness of the gold purchasing program—famously dismissed by Keynes as “a 
gold standard on the booze”—contributed to a general sense that monetary measures by 
themselves were inadequate.506 The NRA suffered a more spectacular downfall: ruled 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1935, even many of its early supporters 
considered its demise a mercy killing. The troubled agency had its defenders, including 
the president, but hopes that the state could transcend class conflict through rational 
administration quickly proved beyond its powers. Although planners did not give up, 
political, economic, and legal obstacles forced a revaluation of their tactics.  
 From now on, they would face a more skeptical audience—government officials 
who questioned the feasibility of comprehensive planning; economists whose attention 
had turned to other programs; and business leaders whose bitter experiences with the 
NRA led them to conclude that the federal government, at least under Roosevelt, was not 
a reliable partner. Space had opened up for another way of interpreting the Depression, 
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and of curing it. Here, again, economists would have their say—but they would speak 
with new words, and old words given new meanings. 
 
WHAT HERBERT HOOVER WANTED, he said, was “an umpire.”507 Since Roosevelt 
had taken office, he complained to Wesley Mitchell in the last weeks of 1934, previously 
solid terms had become slippery. Planning was one of them, but Hoover listed thirteen 
others—including liberalism, capitalism, socialism, “economy of abundance,” and 
“economy of plenty”—before adding that he could think of “a dozen more.”  
 Laissez-faire was one of them. For decades, Americans had declared belief in 
unfettered markets a dusty relic of the nineteenth century. In 1907, Irving Fisher devoted 
an article to exploring the question “Why Has the Doctrine of Laissez-Faire Been 
Abandoned?”508 One year Woodrow Wilson observed that “No one now advocates the 
old laissez-faire.”509 Hoover made his repudiation of the ideal explicit in American 
Individualism, where he noted, “we have long since abandoned the laissez-faire of the 
18th Century.”510 Even before he took up the presidency, commentators praised him for 
defying stale dogmas: a review of the recommendations made by one of the economic 
conference’s he spearheaded, for example, described the suggested policies as “a bold 
challenge to laissez-faire.”511  
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 With remarkable speed, this onetime pioneer of a new economic order was 
transformed into the embodiment of orthodoxy. In 1932, Rexford Tugwell looked 
forward to a planning regime that would “finally” break the grip of laissez-faire.512 
Reflecting on the New Deal, Berle expressed a popular view among his former 
colleagues when he described the notion that “the federal government had to assume 
responsibility for the economic condition of the country” as a “revolutionary and 
dangerous” rejection of the adherence to “laissez-faire economics” that prevailed before 
Roosevelt’s election.513 Roosevelt accepted this interpretation. Cautioned by one adviser 
in the spring of 1933 that he was “taking an enormous step away from the philosophy of 
equalitarianism and laissez-faire,” he responded, “If that philosophy hadn’t proved to be 
bankrupt, Herbert Hoover would be sitting here right now.”514 
 Even opponents of the new administration picked up this revised history. In a 
critical survey of Roosevelt’s policies co-authored by a group of Harvard economists in 
1934, one contributor observed that laissez-faire had “been the dominant American ideal 
until the New Deal came along.”515 Laissez-faire had died many deaths before 
Roosevelt’s election to the presidency, but those earlier reforms—the work of 
generations—now seemed insignificant. The cause Hoover dedicated his political career 
to had become a footnote in someone else’s grand narrative. No wonder he spluttered. 
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 Yet the sense of lexical instability was not confined to Hoover. Some of the 
objections were long standing, like continued public uncertainty over the meaning of 
inflation. Two New Dealers complained that the word had taken on so many definitions 
that it was often easier to avoid using it altogether. In contemporary parlance, they 
observed, inflation could refer to “(1) anything bad, (2) too much money, (3) more 
money, (4) rising prices of commodities, (5) rising prices of securities.”516 But the radical 
uncertainty introduced by the Depression added a new element to the routine complaints, 
covering the future in a fog. In that ambiguity, some found hope. As Tugwell put it, a 
new order was coming, “something else” that, as yet, “has no name.”517  
 Within this broader struggle for conceptual and linguistic stability, references to 
the economy became increasingly common. Mentioned only in passing as recently as in 
the 1929 report on Recent Economic Changes, by decade’s end it became a familiar part 
of the lexicon. It was still more likely to appear in academic journals than in political 
debate, but economists did not outpace the general public by much. The phrase “economy 
as a whole” appeared in the American Economic Review for the first time in 1930.518 
Authors in the journal used the phrase occasionally for the rest of the decade, but not with 
the frequency that soon became the norm: it occurred twice as many times in the first two 
years of the 1940s than in the entirety of the 1930s.519  
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 Even then, discussing “the economy” could spark terminological disputes. The 
Rockefeller Foundation even proposed a conference dedicated to exploring one aspect of 
the controversy. Seeking the attention of the most prominent economists in the United 
States and Europe, it called for a meeting that would determine if a “consensus” existed 
on whether the nations of the world possessed enough “organic unity” to “warran[t] the 
conclusion that there is such a thing as a 'world economy'” or whether there was “nothing 
more than a physical aggregate of unrelated and disjointed forces.”520 Back in the United 
States, that first reference to the “economy as a whole” in the American Economic 
Review prompted a sharp reply from the University of Chicago economist Frank Knight. 
The phrase had appeared in a talk by Frederick Mills, a NBER economist, who 
reproached economists for failing to “secur[e] a comprehensive account of economic 
change in an economy as a whole.”521 Knight retorted by describing as “more than 
questionable” the belief that economic statistics premised on the assumption that “human 
acts and interests … can be cut apart from the living complex of individuals in society 
and interpreted and manipulated in isolation”—a popular objection at a time when 
invocations of a larger social totality that encompassed economic life were still common 
among economists.522 Some tried to split the difference between the concepts by 
employing “economic society,” where either economy or society could just as readily 
have served: for instance, Tugwell’s 1934 work Our Economic Society and its Problems.  
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 Meanwhile, earlier definitions of economy as style of governance or collection of 
institutions—definitions alive in the Rockefeller conference proposal—continued to 
shape usage of the term. When Roosevelt signed the “Economy Act” in 1933, he 
approved a bill that cut government spending in order to move toward a balanced 
budget—that is, to economize federal expenditure—not to govern the economy as a 
whole. That usage was connected to his inaugural address’s insistence that relationships 
with international trading partners must for the moment be “secondary to the 
establishment of a sound national economy”—that is, a fiscally sound collection of 
policies for governing a nation. Playing on a similar sense of that phrase, the economist 
(and socialist) Lewis Lorwin juxtaposed “national economy” with “individualism.”523 He 
then lamented the readiness with which the business community allowed “group interests 
to dominate its practical proposals in interpreting what is national economy.”524 Business 
leaders might have rejected that accusation, but they relied on the same understanding of 
“national economy” in a Chamber of Commerce report announcing that “We have left the 
period of extreme individualism and are living a period in which national economy must 
be recognized as the controlling factor.”525 For both socialist and industrialist, national 
economy was a way of thinking about the world, not an object within it. 
 The term gained ground, and not only among economists. Just a few years after 
Hoover complained to Mitchell about the grafting of new-fangled meanings onto words, 
the sociologist Robert Lynd wrote with advice on where to direct the NBER’s energies. 
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(Advice that came from a place of respect: Lynd was a former student of Mitchell’s, and 
he was also deeply influenced by Mitchell’s icons Dewey and Veblen.)526 “Of course we 
want to know how our economy works,” he noted, but that required metrics “outside the 
economy.”527 Lynd worried that “by working so completely on describing how things 
work in our economy, with its (the economy's) postulates as to what things are 
important,” the NBER “tends to draw the teeth of new workers who might otherwise be 
inclined to ask other kinds of questions that are no less realistic and important.”528 In 
Lynd’s telling, the economy could not establish the criteria by which it should be 
evaluated; but he did accept it as a member in good standing of the larger social world.  
 
SO DID WALTER LIPPMANN, an erstwhile socialist who had remade himself into one 
of liberalism’s most prominent defenders, and one of the New Deal’s most prominent 
skeptics.529 Holding forth in a syndicated column published in over a hundred 
newspapers, Lippmann reached an audience of millions, and he used that platform to 
explore the nascent politics of the economy. He was well aware that much of what fell 
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under this category “would have been meaningless” a generation earlier.530 But a “new 
imperative”—the title of a book he devoted to the subject, published in 1935—had 
emerged in recent decades, an “imperative” as significant for a modern state as its more 
familiar duties of enforcing the law at home and protecting the nation from assaults by 
foreign powers.531 In fact, it had become “the central task of government,” even though it 
was still not universally accepted as such.532 What was this obligation that demanded the 
state “assume a responsibility which it has never yet attempted to discharge before the era 
in which we are now living”?533 Summarizing it was simple enough: “making its people 
economically secure.”534 
 The scale of “this very great new duty” was large enough in Lippmann’s eyes to 
unite Hoover and Roosevelt, turning a gap their partisan’s described as a yawning chasm 
into a far less imposing divide.535 The two men, Lippmann believed, shared more than 
was commonly recognized; they were “much nearer to each other than either is, let us 
say, to Calvin Coolidge or to Grover Cleveland.”536 1929, not 1933, was the pivotal year 
in Lippmann’s history. Hoover and Roosevelt both stood on the other side of a 
fundamental break, joined by their common acceptance of “a radically new conception of 
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the functions of government.”537 Driven by his conviction that the government could 
manage the business cycle, Hoover had embarked on an “utterly unprecedented” 
campaign of economic management that Roosevelt later took up in his own fashion.538  
 Repeating a common binary, Lippmann split the New Deal into two halves: reform 
and recovery. Whatever the merits of Roosevelt’s reforms—the extension of financial 
regulation, the grand public works projects, and kindred initiatives—they all had lengthy 
genealogies. “[T]here is little if anything in the New Deal reforms,” he wrote, “which 
was not implicit in the New Nationalism or Theodore Roosevelt or the New Freedom of 
Woodrow Wilson.”539 But the recovery policies meant to respond to the Depression 
reached back only to Hoover. These were the “new and radical” elements of Roosevelt’s 
program that marked the government’s “assumption of responsibility for the operation of 
the whole national economy.”540 
 Time and again, Lippmann insisted on the revolutionary character of this turn 
toward the economy. He could have made the point by looking at his own work. 
Lippmann released his first book in 1913, just a few years after graduating from Harvard, 
and he followed it up with a sequel one year later. Both volumes—A Preface to Politics 
and Drift and Mastery—contain just a handful of references to economy, all of which 
borrow from older senses of the term: a passing allusion to the transition “from the old 
mercantilist economy to the capitalistic economics of the nineteenth century,”541 for 
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example, or a brief mention of “the economy of trusts” that had developed in the United 
States.542  
 By the 1930s, Lippmann’s writing was replete with economy talk. From 
Lippmann’s perspective, there was an impeccable justification for this addition to his 
vocabulary. It reflected “the fundamental assumption of the whole period since 1929”—
namely, “that we have a national economy and not a mere aggregation of individual 
enterprises.”543 He used “national economy” by itself here, but elsewhere he regularly 
attached (often with italics) the phrase “as a whole,” an emphasis that revealed the 
novelty of the concept.544 The basic assumptions of government had changed, and his 
language had to keep up.  
 Lippmann offered a suitably grand history to explain the birth of what he, quoting 
Edmund Burke, called “a new species of government.”545 Two major factors propelled 
his analysis: an economy that had “become infinitely complex” and a democracy that had 
“become increasingly conscious of its power.”546 Parroting the administered-prices thesis, 
he argued that corporations had replaced the workings of supply and demand with the 
decisions of a managerial elite. Meanwhile, democratic movements had grown more 
confident in making demands on the state, which meant “fatalistic acceptance” of 
economic downturns encouraged by business cycle theory had become a political 
impossibility. These intertwined developments—in Lippmann’s terms, both aspects of 
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the waning of “individualism” and the birth of “mass behavior”—had created “a new 
view of the state and of the economic order.”547  
 It was a novel political economy, and it confronted a problem unknown to earlier 
generations: “the social order has now become so intricate that any serious breakdown in 
its economy will unloose forces that may destroy it.”548 Protecting the economy had 
become a matter of existential importance for the state. This obligation had been thrust 
upon government officials, with profound consequences for politics: for the first time, 
“the state is now compelled to look upon the economy as a national establishment for 
which it is responsible.”549 The challenge was to craft an art of government suitable to 
this new duty, managing the economy. 
 Not everyone recognized the legitimacy of this enterprise. Anxieties that forced 
themselves on politicians in Washington proved easier to shrug off in corporate 
boardrooms. “The articulate belief of the industrial and financial leaders of America,” 
Lippmann maintained, was that the state had “no function to perform in governing the 
national economy as a whole.”550 For Lippmann, this blindness was doubly ironic: it 
revealed a failure of the elite to act its own self-interest, and it showed that corporate 
leaders did not understand the world they helped make. 
 Laissez-faire was the label typically attached to the positions defended by this 
group, but Lippmann warned against uncritically accepting the term. American history 
contained no prelapsarian moment free from the contamination of government influence. 
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“The new thing is not the amount, or the pervasiveness, or the rigor of government 
action,” Lippmann wrote, “but its purpose.”551 Merging this interpretation of laissez-faire 
with his larger account of recent political history, Lippmann explained that the 
government had refrained from interfering “only” with respect to its “new and 
unprecedented responsibility” to oversee “the operation of the economy as a whole.”552 
The reconceptualization of laissez-faire was inseparable from the history of the economy: 
only by judging American history against standards established after 1929 could it be 
seen as laissez-faire.  
 Nor was the injection of the economy into politics a distinctly American 
phenomenon. Soviet communism, Lippmann noted, had just recently been transformed 
by the exaltation of a planned economy as its ideal. A notion that Lippmann saw, at most, 
“faint indications of” in Karl Marx, and even the early Lenin, had become “the governing 
principle of the socialist order” with remarkable speed.553 Soviet socialists had developed 
their politics of the economy; now the United States would have to create a program of its 
own.  
  But Lippmann did not believe Americans were fated to pursue the same path as the 
Soviets. Rejecting an ideological mapping defined by communism on one side and 
fascism on the other, he portrayed the United States, along with supporting players like 
the United Kingdom and Sweden, as pioneers of a distinct method of governing the 
economy. Both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, he argued, had adopted a policy of 
“Directed Economy, or Absolute Collectivism”—one phrase putting the accent on the 
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economics of the system, the other on its politics.554 By contrast, the United States was 
developing a system of its own, a system he named “Compensated Economy, or Free 
Collectivism.”555 Collectivism, Lippmann explained, was his term for any regime where 
the state assumed “responsibility for the operation of the national economy as a 
whole.”556 But “Compensated Economy” would preserve a measure of freedom 
impossible under “Directed Economy.” It was, to use another of Lippmann’s key terms, a 
liberal collectivism that adapted the values of the creed to the demands of the present. 
“[I]f we are to have economic liberty,” he declared, “we must accept the ancient truth that 
liberty is not the natural state of man, but the achievement of an organized society.”557 
Freedom was the product of particular ways of structuring collective life, not an 
ahistorical constant. Immersed in time, liberalism could evolve or die. “Compensated 
Economy” was Lippmann’s name for the attempt to create a new kind of freedom that 
could survive, even flourish, in a collectivist age.  
 It was also a specific set of policies. Though he acknowledged that a full program 
would have to be international in scope, Lippmann focused on the domestic aspects of his 
vision. As indicated by the label, compensation was Lippmann’s guiding principle. The 
“vital defect” of the contemporary order, he believed, was “that the multitude of 
individual decisions is not sufficiently enlightened to keep the economy as a whole in 
working order.”558 An outside body endowed by the state with the power to correct the 
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disorders of collective behavior could save individualism from itself. Central banking had 
developed before the government had taken on responsibility for governing the economy, 
but it provided Lippmann with the best example of his program in action. When enough 
banks acted in concert—whether cutting back on credit, or offering too much of it—they 
created problems that no single private institution could solve. By offsetting these trends, 
central banks offered the stability promised by advocates of socializing finance without 
full public ownership.  
 A longtime follower of Keynes, Lippmann believed the principle applied by 
central banks could be expanded to the economy as a whole: management of the money 
supply, flexible public works spending, tax rates that curbed booms and cushioned 
slumps, and even countercyclical public utilities that charged more on the upswing and 
cut prices in downturns.559 He admitted that instituting all of this could raise “immense 
difficulties,” but he insisted they could be overcome—and that the incentives for doing so 
were great.560 “In the practice of statesmanship,” he declared, “the compensatory method 
is, I believe, an epoch-making invention.”561 It would provide the cornerstone for a 
modern liberalism coupling an economics that secured prosperity to a politics that 
nurtured liberty.  
 Modern liberalism—Lippmann was emphatic on that point. Although the 
doctrinaire proponent of laissez-faire might see directed economy and compensated 
economy as interchangeable rationales for the leviathan state, Lippmann portrayed his 
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approach as the chief alternative to being “swallowed by an imperious state socialism.”562 
Pure laissez-faire was a utopian dream, but compensated economy could provide a real 
measure of freedom—a state that presented itself not as “master” but as “a gigantic public 
corporation which stands ready to throw its weight into the scales” in the name of 
economic stability.563 Even here, Lippmann gave himself some room to maneuver. 
Conceding that “all social orders are a mixture of many theoretically inconsistent 
principles,” he noted that in practice compensated economy would probably require a 
hefty dose of “directed” commands.564 But these would be exceptions to a rule bent 
decidedly in the favor of Lippmann’s preferred form of liberty. 
 How democratic that system would be raised another challenge. “Representative 
government, as it has developed under laissez-faire in most countries,” Lippmann bluntly 
acknowledged, “is incompatible with a state which accepts responsibility for the 
economy as a whole.”565 Total democracy was as much a delusion as total laissez-faire. 
Countercyclical policies by their nature set themselves against the temper of the moment, 
chastening exuberant spirits during prosperous times and bleeding red ink in downturns.  
 Like capitalism, democracy had to be “reconstructed” so that it could survive.566 
To be just, a powerful state would have to be a less democratic state. Governments 
beholden to fickle public opinion could not “be trusted to administer policies that 
required independence and foresight,” which was the essence of compensated 
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economy.567 Again citing the experience of central banking as a model, Lippmann argued 
that the agencies charged with executing compensatory policies must be protected from 
the popular will. Independence from democratic accountability was, paradoxically, the 
best safeguard against a dictatorship, either of the left or the right. He depicted this vision 
as a path between proletarianism and plutocracy, calling it “frankly and unashamedly 
middle class” in its attempt to ensure the general prosperity upon which modern 
democracies had come to depend.568 
 Lippmann also harbored more transcendent ideals. Laissez-faire was a paltry faith 
in the modern world—a dogma that asked the heirs “of those who dared to undertake 
great enterprises and to settle a continent” to accept the vicissitudes of the business cycle, 
leaving them “to sit and wait, like Chinese coolies in a famine.”569 The temptations of 
socialism and communism; the mediocrity of public life; even the dire condition of a 
university system where hyper-specialization made it more difficult than ever to see a 
coherent whole—all of this could be traced to one basic deficiency: “it is disreputable to 
hold and to declare a positive and coherent conception of the function of the state in a 
modern economy.”570 This was an almost spiritual vision of what mastering the economy 
could accomplish.     
 Not even Lippmann granted the economy total primacy. His major work of the 
decade, after all, was called The Good Society (a tribute to his former teacher Graham 
Wallas’s 1914 work The Great Society). There he insisted on the need for a more 
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comprehensive perspective than even his ruminations on the economy provided, calling 
for a “syntax of society as a whole” that could make sense of the era, and its glut of 
statistics.571  
 The importance of this larger social context also continued to elicit support from 
economists. That predilection was on display in the 1934 presidential address to the 
American Economic Association, where Harvard’s Abbott Payson Usher invoked 
“society” seventeen times without ever mentioning “the economy.” Those references to 
society included numerous instances where a later generation would expect to see the 
word economy, like a description of the gold standard as “intimately bound into the early 
liberal concept of a self-regulated society” or an assertion that policymakers must seek to 
“reconcile the achievement of individual ends with the welfare of society.”572 Usher was 
in his fifties when he delivered this address, and he relied on a way of thinking about the 
world that had existed throughout his adult life—a conceptual framework with society at 
its center.  
 While usage of the economy became more frequent, it still had a powerful 
connection to earlier definitions. The economy was more likely to appear as the product 
of a specific historical and intellectual process than as a free-floating abstraction—still a 
town economy, or a national economy, or a world economy, rather than the economy. 
This institutionally thick understanding of the concept was essential to one of the most 
remarkable documents of the New Deal, a weighty tome published in 1939 under the 
revealing title The Structure of the American Economy.  
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THE FIRST ROUND OF WHAT WAS MEANT to become a longer investigation, The 
Structure of the American Economy was produced under the auspices of the National 
Resources Committee. It was a kind of sequel to Recent Social Trends, the study that had 
given birth to the organization that eventually became the NRC. In its early years, the 
group had focused on studies in keeping with the varied enthusiasms expressed in Recent 
Social Trends, examining subjects ranging from land use to population. That legacy was 
still evident in the analytic sweep, empirical bent, and political ambition expressed in The 
Structure of the American Economy. In that sense, the report was also a characteristic 
expression of an intellectual project shared by the more scholarly New Dealers. From 
their perspective, as Isador Lubin explained it, while “artificial barriers” within the 
university had fractured academic research, the exigencies of policymaking forced 
economists in government to adopt a more totalizing approach.573 The Structure of the 
American Economy captured that synthesizing impulse, while changing the concept 
meant to unify the analysis from society to economy. 
 That shift owed much to the leadership provided by the volume’s editor, the 
economist Gardiner Means. Co-author with fellow New Dealer Adolf Berle of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property—an influential study of the corporation’s rise 
whose statistical findings earned Means a PhD in economics from Harvard—Means won 
additional recognition in 1935 after the publication of Industrial Prices and their Relative 
Inflexibility. Prepared under the auspices of the Department of Agriculture, the report 
offered a powerful defense of the administered-prices thesis, just a few months before the 
demise of the NRA. Means was at the zenith of his influence, and he used the newfound 
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prominence to win a post as a director of research at the Industrial Committee of the 
NRC—an attractive position for an ambitious policymaker eager to think up the next 
steps for New Dealers recovering from the Supreme Court’s latest blow.574 
 A driven man, in 1936 Means co-authored with his wife, the historian and 
consumer activist Caroline Ware, a combination of economic history and policy 
manifesto titled The Modern Economy in Action, which provided a more accessible 
version of the arguments in Industrial Prices and their Relative Inflexibility. The book 
was rife with economy talk, and the authors recognized the recent origins of their 
language. Discussing the history of economic planning in the United States, they noted 
that when the Constitution detailed “the government’s power with respect to the 
economy” the framers “used the broadest word—‘commerce’—which was known to the 
pre-machine economy in which they lived.”575 They also grasped the novelty of orienting 
policy toward the economy. Discussing tariffs, they wrote that while “The government 
has always been concerned with international trade . . . it has used the controls for 
particularistic or political purposes rather than to meet the needs of the economy as a 
whole.”576  
 Ware and Means grounded this turn toward the economy in a larger historical 
narrative centered on the declining significance of markets and the rise of corporations 
large enough to shape—and in some cases dictate—prices. Remnants of “the old 
economy” endured. There, prices reflected the needs of markets and functioned in a way 
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Adam Smith would have recognized. But their importance had diminished in “the new 
economy” where prices followed the dictates of corporate boardrooms. The analysis 
reached back to Veblen, at least, but the stresses of the Depression and the concerns of 
the New Deal had pushed a new question into the foreground: “Can a modern economy 
be made to function within the framework of American democracy?”577 Published the 
same year Roosevelt won his thumping reelection, The Modern Economy in Action 
supplied an agenda tailor-made for liberals searching for a way out of the impasse that 
followed the abolition of the NRA and the marginalization of monetary policy.  
 With The Structure of the American Economy, Means used the powers of the NRC 
to fill in the details of a vision he and his wife had already sketched. At his most 
ambitious, Means hoped not to dictate policy, but to provide reliable information on the 
range of options available to policymakers and, ultimately, to the nation as a whole.578 
Although the NRC lacked direct influence over policy, it offered Means access to a 
network of statistical researchers that had grown to an unprecedented size. The 
acknowledgments of the report alone offered a tour of this new apparatus, thanking 
multiple government departments along with the NBER and a social science group at 
Harvard.579 And that left out the NRC, which by this time boasted an impressive staff of 
its own. 
 An introductory message from Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes set out the 
report’s unique contribution, describing it as “the first major attempt to show the inter-
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relations of the economic forces which determine the use of our national resources” (the 
last phrase supplying a connection to the ostensible purpose of a “National Resource 
Committee” housed within the Department of the Interior).580 The preface made the 
document’s goals even more explicit: “bringing all the different aspect of the national 
economy into a single frame of reference.”581 A body previously associated with detailed 
plans for land use and other related subjects had scaled its ambitions upward and 
reoriented its focus. The result had some resemblance to the program Mitchell had 
endorsed in Social Trends, but the departures were just as striking. That point was evident 
to contemporaries, one of whom described Means’s analysis as having “much in common 
with Wesley C. Mitchell,” but also possessing “a more comprehensive view of the 
functioning of our modern economy.”582  
 Appropriately enough, the report began by defining its central concept. “The 
American economy,” it declared, “is the organized activity through which the 130 million 
people in this country obtain their daily living,” an object made out of the “countless 
tasks required by modern living” and “combined in a huge and highly complex producing 
organization.”583 As the title suggested, Means’s definition of the economy emphasized 
its structural character. An economy was not a given; it took “organizing influences” to 
“weld the millions of separate individuals engaged in production into what is essentially a 
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single national economy.”584 (The report was explicit that farmers were included in those 
millions of individuals making up the economy, a break from the more restricted scope of 
business cycle theory.) Out of these innumerable relationships, something greater than its 
individual components emerged.  
 This dense thicket was more complicated than any one person could understand, 
but Means drew upon an impressive array of statistics to suggest its contours. The text 
was laden with charts, graphs, and maps. Some of these were familiar, like the 
representations of total employment or population. Others were more daring, like a table 
estimating the effects of a more egalitarian income distribution on consumption 
(spending on items ranging from tobacco to reading would tick upward, but the 
transportation industry would take a hit). One striking map illustrated the “population 
weighted by purchasing power”—that is, to reflect the income distribution, with richer 
Americans taking up more space.585 
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 The largest visual display, however, was reserved for a pullout illustrating the 
“interlocking directorates” that tied together 250 of the nation’s largest corporations.586 
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 That was just one piece of evidence the report drew upon to bolster its claim that 
outside of agriculture and a few other sectors market prices had given way to prices 
administered by corporations. Means and his coauthors were not composing a theoretical 
brief against markets. Instead, they rested their case on empirical grounds. Corporations 
had done their part to turn the market into an obsolete category of analysis, but they were 
just one of many forces—including labor unions, powerful financial institutions, and the 
federal government itself—breaking the laws of supply and demand. 
 Means’s economic analysis was shadowed by a political concern. With fascism 
and communism on the march, he warned, “other means will undoubtedly be sought if a 
democratic solution is not worked out” to the problem of prosperity. “The time for 
finding such a solution is not unlimited,” he added, with an ominous tone that marked a 
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noteworthy departure from the optimism Roosevelt had so recently expressed on the 
stump.587  
 That was not the only respect in which the report was out of step with other 
elements of the New Deal. Designed to launch an ongoing project—the book’s full title 
was The Structure of the American Economy: Part I: Basic Characteristics—Mean’s 
volume never received a proper sequel. But the impulse to subject the economy to 
rigorous empirical inquiry extended far beyond Washington. A new word had been 
coined to describe a burgeoning subfield within economics that best expressed this desire. 
This group would eventually wield a prominence in the discipline that far exceed its 
small size, but for now they were comparatively minor figures, saddled with a name that 
seemed designed to repel outsiders: econometrics.  
 
WHAT WAS ECONOMETRICS? The Norwegian economist Ragnar Frisch took up that 
question in an appropriate forum: the first issue of Econometrica, the journal of the aptly 
named Econometric Society.588 Frisch defined the society’s ideal as a combination of 
“the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-quantitative approach to economic 
problems,” joined to “rigorous thinking similar to that which has come to dominate in the 
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natural sciences.”589 Econometrics was not just a new kind of economic statistics, or 
economic theory, or mathematics, but a “unification” of them all.590  
 According to Frisch, econometrics had emerged in response to the demands of its 
moment. “Statistical information,” he declared, “is currently accumulating at an 
unprecedented rate.” Adding a plaintive note to what had become a familiar comment, he 
insisted, “If we are not to get lost in the overwhelming, bewildering mass of statistical 
data that are now becoming available, we need the guidance and help of a powerful 
theoretical framework.”591 Muddling through was no longer enough. There was too much 
to interpret, and without a more robust framework synthesis would be impossible. 
 Economists trying to make sense of this deluge of information turned in mounting 
numbers to a novel approach. Equations designed to simplify, and by simplifying 
illuminate, economic life had been a part of economic inquiry for over a century. Yet, as 
the subject’s premier historian has observed, “It was in the 1930s that economists really 
‘discovered’ the idea of models.”592 Fisher had anticipated the trend in his dissertation, 
with its mathematical rigor and sketch of a “mechanism” designed to act as “the physical 
analogue of the ideal economic market.”593 This “mechanism” illustrated the 
relationships that bound this market together, but Fisher also wanted it to serve “as an 
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instrument of investigation.”594 The doubled purpose was crucial. Fisher’s equations and 
devices were more than just another way of expressing verbal insights; they were meant 
to manufacture truths of their own. 
 
Mathematics was the preferred mode of representation, but by the 1930s illustrations also 
had become familiar parts of the economist’s toolkit. They proved especially popular for 
illustrating the course of money as it cycled through what economists called “the wheel 
of wealth.”595 The NBER’s Malcolm Rorty depicted the “round flow of money income 
and expenditures” in 1922596: 
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That same year William Foster, who with his co-author Waddill Catchings pioneered and 
popularized theories of underconsumption in the United States, offered a related take on 
“the circuit flow of money”597: 
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A decade later, this approach was even more popular. A New Dealer sketched this 
diagram of the “National Balance Sheet” in 1933598:  
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The next year, a report from the Brookings Institution supplied a diagram of the country’s 
“current flow of funds”599: 
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and supplemented it with “a bird’s-eye-view” of “the variety of institutions or 
organizations involved in the complex processes of the modern economic system”600: 
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Meanwhile, Frisch had developed an image of his own. He called it a “Tableau 
Economique,” a reference to the work of Francois Quesnay, whose work had undergone a 
revival at the turn of the twentieth century.601 But Quesnay’s tableau was notoriously 
difficult to interpret, and it was shaped by the assumptions of an agricultural age. Frisch’s 
“graphical illustration” of “the macro-dynamic system” took a different approach602:  
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Different assumptions were embedded within each of these examples, and they 
tracked different objects. But they also shared important characteristics: closed systems, 
they imposed coherence within their boundaries by excluding whatever fell outside them. 
They simplified the world, but that was the point. Only by diving below the endless 
variety of superficial phenomena could economists catch sight of the underlying trends. 
The success of the Econometric Society indicated the growing popularity of that 
mission. Fisher, one of the society’s founders, had initially been skeptical that it would 
attract enough members to justify its existence. He spoke from experience: in 1912, he 
had led—with support from Mitchell and a handful of others—an unsuccessful campaign 
to form a similar organization. A generation later, Fisher had more company. 173 
volunteers signed up as charter members of the society, and Econometrica soon became 
one of the major economics journals. The first issue’s masthead included some of the 
field’s most prominent names—Keynes, Schumpeter, and Mitchell among them. Over the 
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next decade, it published contributions from every spot on the ideological map, drawing 
along the way from both established names and rising stars.603 
 The most important member of the society, however, was not an economist. 
Alfred Cowles III was the heir to a family fortune—his grandfather had founded the 
Chicago Tribune—and he fancied himself a financial expert. The head of an investment 
consulting firm, his academic curiosity had been sparked in 1929 by the crash on Wall 
Street. Stock market forecasting had become a thriving field in the 1920s, and the 
spectacular failure of its supposed luminaries prompted Cowles to investigate the science 
behind predicting the economic future. Cowles’s inquiry led him to Fisher, who also 
happened to be a friend of his father and uncle, both Yale alums. To Fisher’s delight, 
Cowles offered sizable funding—$12,000 annually—to a group that had until then 
operated with a much stingier budget. With more money came a more ambitious agenda. 
Econometrica was one result; another was the Cowles Commission for Research in 
Economics. Launched in Colorado Springs in the fall of 1932, the Commission was 
meant to provide a home for econometric scholarship. (Especially when that scholarship 
interested its namesake: “the first major project of the Cowles Commission,” their court 
historian later noted, was “the construction of indexes of stock prices, earnings, and 
dividends in the United States.”604) Cowles’s support also gave econometrics new 
prominence. “The attempt to analyze economics by higher mathematics has brought a 
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new word, econometrics, into the language,” reported a Wall Street Journal article 
publicizing the launch of Cowles’s venture.605 
 Cowles received important early support from a potential rival: Wesley Mitchell, 
who in 1937 told the Rockefeller Foundation, “No other organization known to me is 
doing work of exactly the type on which they focus their attention.”606 Cowles made sure 
to distinguish his concerns from the NBER’s in his own letter to the Rockefeller 
Foundation. Noting that Mitchell had “from the beginning been a member of the advisory 
council of the Cowles Commission,” he insisted there would be no “overlapping or 
duplication in the activities of the two organizations."607  
 The contours of the Cowles program became clearer with the hiring of its first 
research director in September 1934. Though trained as a mathematician, Charles Roos 
had been concerned with economics from the outset of his career. He arrived in Colorado 
Springs from Washington D.C., where he had overseen the research division of the NRA. 
Disillusioned by his time in government, Roos used his position at Cowles to elaborate an 
indictment of the NRA that he had begun while still in Washington. Roos’s volume on 
the NRA was one of three books the commission published during his tenure. Although it 
eschewed the complex mathematics Cowles would come to be associated with, the book 
reflected the institution’s preoccupations. “No country had spent more in collecting 
statistics than the United States,” he wrote, “and yet with it all, definite answers were 
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available to comparatively few questions.”608 This deficiency was more than an irritating 
obstacle. “As long as such large gaps in statistical information exist,” Roos argued, 
“economic planning, even of a mild ‘fixing’ type, must remain impracticable.”609 It was a 
paradox: economic statistics proliferated at dizzying rates, hence the need for 
econometrics, but there was still not enough to make economic planning feasible.  
 Even the best statistics, however, could not overcome the failings of the political 
system. Roos tempered his critique with occasional nods to the good intentions of New 
Dealers, but those were outweighed by his blistering appraisals of the New Deal’s 
constitutive elements, including “disappointingly costly”610 public works projects and 
planners with “no appreciation whatever of the implications of their proposals.”611 He 
reserved his most vituperative rhetoric for unions that demanded too much for their 
members, writing that their “entirely selfish aims” made them “anti-social, a hindrance to 
re-employment and a menace to economic and social well-being.”612 Despite the vigor of 
Roos’s denunciations, Cowles remained a stopping point for Roosevelt’s economists, 
including Lubin and Ezekiel, both of whom participated in its conferences.  
 By the time Roos left in 1937, however, Cowles had not yet found its place. 
While Econometrica thrived, after Roos’s departure Cowles went without a research 
director for two years. Part of the problem was the difficulty of luring qualified 
candidates to Colorado Springs, a hurdle the commission did away with in 1939 by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608 Charles Roos, NRA Economic Planning (Cowles Commission for Research in Economics: 
Bloomington, 1937), 63. 
 
609 Roos, NRA Economic Planning, 467. 
 
610 Roos, NRA Economic Planning, 473. 
 
611 Roos, NRA Economic Planning, 453. 
 
612 Roos, NRA Economic Planning, 453. 
	  
	   219	  
relocating to the University of Chicago. (The move also enabled Cowles to avoid paying 
Colorado’s newly institute state income tax.613) This would be the home of the 
commission’s greatest intellectual achievements—achievements that would be 
substantial, but still lay in the future. Those looking for the foremost site of econometric 
research into the United States would have had to cast their gaze all the way across the 
Atlantic, to Geneva, home to the League of Nations, where a member of the Econometric 
Society was leading the first attempt to create an econometric model of the American 
business cycle.  
 
THE GOAL WAS UNUSUAL ENOUGH that it did not yet have a name. It was not until 
the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen, creator of the pioneering League model, borrowed a 
term from physics that “model” entered the economist’s lexicon. As Tinbergen explained, 
“By increasing or decreasing the number of phenomena, a more refined or a rougher 
picture or ‘model’ of reality may be obtained.”614 Even when introducing the word, 
Tinbergen distanced himself from it, flanking it with quotation marks that isolated the 
unfamiliar language.615 But the term made its way into reviews as well, which 
commented without fail on Tinbergen’s belief, in the words of one journal, that it was 
“possible to construct a mathematical model of the trade cycle which is sufficiently 
simple to be tested statistically and a sufficiently good approximation to reality to be 
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useful.”616 Equations based on statistical relationships would turn a morass of data into a 
more tractable object that could be used to both analyze what Tinbergen called “the 
structure of the economic community” and predict the consequences of policy changes.617  
 Tinbergen’s path toward this destination had begun with a doctorate in physics. 
Though a skilled mathematician, he was also a committed socialist, and he found himself 
increasingly attracted to economics. A stint researching business cycles for the Dutch 
Central Bureau of Statistics led him to build what was then called a “macrodynamic” 
model of the country’s business cycle, the first of its kind—not just for the Netherlands, 
but for anywhere. He was then brought onto the League of Nations, under whose auspices 
he published two volumes under the title, Statistical Testing of Business-Cycle 
Theories.618 The second of these volumes included his model of the business cycle in the 
United States. Despite the novelty of the device, Tinbergen insisted that his “ultimate 
objective” was “the same as of any system of business cycle research.”619 The pioneers of 
econometric modeling—above all Tinbergen and Frisch—wanted to link economic 
theory with empirical data, a project that Mitchell could just as easily have signed onto. 
While the econometricians plunged into theorizing, however, Mitchell continued to focus 
on statistical inquiries.  
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 The contrast was evident in the older man’s correspondence with Tinbergen. 
Perhaps sensing an ally, Tinbergen had sent Mitchell a copy of his League of Nations 
work, noting that it was “quite different” from Mitchell’s own endeavors.620 That was 
evident to Mitchell. “While you are ready to test numerous explanations of business 
cycles,” he wrote to Tinbergen, “I am still trying to find out more definitely what is to be 
explained.”621 That aspiration had consumed Mitchell for decades, and his interest 
showed no sign of abating, while evidence of progress accumulated at a painfully slow 
rate. Tinbergen moved at a faster clip. The League asked him to devise a model for the 
United States that could determine the merits of rival business cycle theories. He 
completed the project after a few years of work, and was back in the Netherlands by 
1939. Turning statistics devised for other purposes to his own ends, Tinbergen had given 
this data new meaning.  
 Tinbergen’s intellectual and political ambitions formed two halves of a cohesive 
whole. As Frisch later noted, an econometricians concerned with the “practical 
application of his science” looked “to economic planning at the national level.”622 This 
seemed a natural move to Frisch, who believed that economic planning should be “one of 
the pillars of a living democracy.”623 Models advanced this goal in three ways: they 
clarified the sources of economic fluctuations in the past, provided a way of predicting 
those fluctuations in the future, and suggested what policies would calm the cycle. These 
were also the goals of earlier business cycle theorists, but models promised to replace the 
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endless quest for better data with the appealing simplicity of an equation (for those who 
understood the mathematics).  
 Models also furnished straightforward criteria for adjudicating between 
competing interpretations. They did so, in part, by ruling out so many of the contenders. 
A successful model, Tinbergen argued, had to pass a few basic tests. The number of 
relationships, for example, must match the number of variables needing explanation. 
Judged by these standards, “very few, if any, ‘literary’ theories” passed.624 Tinbergen 
proposed to test all of these hypotheses with a model composed of almost fifty equations 
and see what survived. 
 The appeal of this exercise for a mathematically oriented economist was obvious, 
but the attraction for League officials requires more explanation. According to the 
director of the League’s department on economic research, Tinbergen’s approach fit the 
nature of his challenge. The business cycle was composed of “various forces acting and 
reacting on each other and constituting in the aggregate a sort of vital organism.”625 
Deciphering the workings of that organism required “an elaborate system of 
mathematical analysis” of the kind Tinbergen supplied.626 What emerged from this 
process drew upon familiar descriptions of society as an organic whole to justify a new 
mathematical imagining of that cohesive body.  
 The League, however, was more interested in practical results than philosophical 
innovations. Deploying economic statistics helped address this concern, but, as Mitchell’s 
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career demonstrated, statistics by themselves did not supply policy recommendations. 
Tinbergen relied on mathematics to cut through the empirical muddle. Regressions 
allowed him to establish relationships among his variables, a combination of data and 
theory essential to what he called the “purpose” of his work—“the explanation of real 
events.”627 His chief goal was accounting for the Depression’s origins in the United 
States, but along the way he stopped to note other discoveries his model had made: that 
open-market operations could influence long-term interest rates, for instance, or that rigid 
wages had not contributed much to the stubborn persistence of the downturn. He 
dismissed arguments that put the bulk of the blame for the depression on monetary 
policy, or excess investment, or agriculture. Like many other business cycle theorists, he 
traced the roots of the downturn to the preceding boom, but he held out the possibility 
that countercyclical fiscal policy or changes in “the economic structure of society”628 (for 
instance, “a less unequal distribution of incomes”629) could mitigate the cycle’s 
fluctuations.  
 Tinbergen’s findings supported Keynesian positions, but Keynes himself viewed 
the entire project with skepticism.630 In a review that became famous among economists, 
Keynes fired a barrage of attacks at Tinbergen, ranging from the defects of his regression 
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analysis to the “frightful inadequacy of most of the statistics.”631 The few token 
compliments Keynes included did little to cushion this assault, which depicted Tinbergen 
as besotted with mathematics and detached from reality. Calling the book “a nightmare to 
live with” and the whole endeavor “a singularly unpromising project,” he concluded by 
predicting that Tinbergen’s response to his criticism “will be to engage another ten 
computers and drown his sorrows in arithmetic. ”632 This was a caricature of Tinbergen, 
and of his book, but it found a receptive audience among the many economists who 
opposed what they saw as an attempt to turn their discipline into a branch of 
mathematics.  
 Keynes’s review, however, focused only on the first volume of Tinbergen’s study, 
a general exposition of his methodology. Tinbergen’s model of the United States 
appeared in a second volume that provoked fewer debates than its predecessor. But the 
reception was not uniformly positive, and an especially harsh appraisal issued from the 
young Milton Friedman. Though still more favorable than Keynes, Friedman criticized 
Tinbergen’s use of statistics, citing Mitchell in support, and concluding that, while 
Tinbergen’s report had supplied a useful provocation to theorists, its “methods . . . do not 
and cannot provide an empirically tested explanation of business cycle movements.”633 
Friedman’s skepticism reflected a disposition he had inherited from his teachers at both 
the University of Chicago and Columbia—he split his time as graduate student between 
the two institutions—and would remain with him after his return to Chicago as a 
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professor in 1946, where he clashed regularly with his new neighbors at the Cowles 
Commission. His most contentious encounters occurred with the Dutch economist 
Tjalling Koopmans, who became director of Cowles soon after Friedman’s arrival. 
Koopmans, in one of the inevitable coincidences produced by small networks, was a 
protégé of Tinbergen’s.  
 
BUT TINBERGEN’S WAS JUST ONE of many efforts to invigorate empirical 
economics with a dose of theory, and to use this synthesis to grasp the dynamics of the 
economy as a whole. Back in the United States, one of the most notable efforts was 
developed by a Harvard economist who arrived in Cambridge after a most improbable 
journey. 
 The son of an economics professor, Wassily Leontief was born in Munich in 
1905, twenty-six years before he took up his post at Harvard.634 His family soon left for 
Russia, and at fifteen Leontief enrolled in his local university—formerly Saint Petersburg 
Imperial University, renamed Petrograd State University after the revolution—where he 
threw himself into studying his father’s profession. “I read systematically,” he recalled, 
“practically all the economists from the beginning of the seventh century.”635 Though 
Leontief opposed the Bolsheviks, he developed an admiration for Marx, whom he 
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considered “possibly the greatest classical economist.”636 He also had the good fortune to 
be studying at a time of comparatively open debate in the USSR, where economic policy 
seemed like it would determine the fate of the Bolshevik experiment, and economists had 
an intellectual freedom that would seem fantastic under Stalin. 
 By 1925, Leontief had a master’s degree, and a diagnosis for a tumor that allowed 
him to travel to Berlin for medical attention. The tumor was benign, but he stayed in 
Germany, and received his doctoral degree in 1928, after studying under the sociologist 
Werner Sombart and the economist-cum-statistician Ladislaus Bortkiewicz (also 
originally from Russia, and famous among economists for his critique of Marx’s theory 
of value).  
 Leontief’s work bore the impress of these mentors for the rest of his career. He 
was, by the standards of his time, a mathematically sophisticated economist, but he 
viewed his technical studies as part of a larger social theory. This perspective came 
through in his dissertation, which he later described as an attempt “to provide an 
empirical framework for the study of interdependence of individual cells in the 
economy.”637 His practical skills were valuable enough to win him a job in 1929 as an 
advisor to China’s Ministry of Railroads, a year-long stint followed shortly after by his 
departure for the United States. (Though not before a return to Europe, where he worked 
alongside another Russian economist, Jacob Marschak, who later headed the Cowles 
Commission.) Upon reaching the United States, he was met by a fellow émigré named 
Simon Kuznets, who took him immediately to the NBER.  
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 His tenure at the NBER was brief, and Leontief soon moved to Harvard. Facility 
with mathematics distinguished him from most of the economics faculty, and earned him 
lifelong gratitude from some of the department’s most promising graduate students, chief 
among them Paul Samuelson, who claimed that “No other course I ever took so 
profoundly set me on the way of my life.”638 Politics also separated Leontief from his 
colleagues. A supporter of economic planning, Leontief viewed even Keynes as too 
willing to trim his theoretical ambitions for the sake of political plausibility.  
 By the time he joined Harvard’s faculty, Leontief had found a goal he considered 
worthy of his talents. Since Léon Walras, economists had sought a general equilibrium 
theory that uncovered the dense web of interconnected processes that determined prices. 
Leontief shared that aspiration, but he also wanted something that could be verified 
empirically and serve a practical purpose. Although more theoretically daring than the 
typical NBER researcher—Leontief would remember himself as a “very subversive” 
influence at the Bureau—he did not accept mathematical purity as an end in itself. 
 Input-output table provided him with the means to resolve that tension. As the 
name indicates, an input-output table represents the relationship between a set of inputs 
and the eventual outputs. Leontief used them to construct a matrix where the rows 
illustrated the destination of the items produced by a given industry, while the columns 
showed the purchases made by that industry. This, for example, appeared in Leontief’s 
first article on the subject 639: 
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So, according to this table, the sum of industry A’s revenue is the product of purchases 
made by industries B, C, D, and E, all of which are displayed in the fist row. The first 
column, meanwhile, reveals industry A’s total expenditures. In theory, a comprehensive 
enough table would reveal the consequences for the entire economy of changing one 
output. 
 Like Frisch, Leontief acknowledged a kinship between his work and Quesnay’s. 
In the 1936 article that unveiled the results of his project, Leontief called it “a Tableau 
Economique of the United States for the year 1919.”640 Marx had also drawn on the 
Physiocrats, and there had been a vogue for the technique in the Soviet Union during 
Leontief’s time there.641 Leontief’s interest in the subject had been reinforced during his 
years in Germany, where he found encouragement for his efforts to turn what had been an 
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intellectual speculation into a tool for policymaking.642 He attributed that shift to the 
explosion of economic statistics in recent decades, which provided him with the data that 
could, with some assistance from algebra, verify the relationships he recorded. “It is hard, 
now, to revive the excitement created by these first developments,” recalled one of 
Leontief’s contemporaries. “The time-honored theory was lifted suddenly out of the 
textbooks and treatises and placed in the arena of applied economic analysis.”643 It was 
an empirical move that had important theoretical consequences. As Leontief pursued his 
work, the previously marginal subject of intermediate goods—an output for one sector 
that became an input for another—took on a new centrality. It was yet another example of 
the links that bound economic actors together, the countless threads tied to seemingly 
isolated agents.  
 Both the empirical and theoretical aspects of his work received attention in 
Leontief’s descriptions of his project. In his words—forceful, if not elegant—he hoped to 
“suppl[y]an empirical background for the study of the interdependence between the 
different parts of our national economy on the basis of the theory of general economic 
equilibrium.”644 He drew from government source and trade publications, along with 
frequent borrowing from the NBER, whose studies on national income had been an 
inspiration. Though it was still impossible to build a comprehensive table with the 
available data, Leontief’s totalizing ambition was evident. In his table, he wrote, “The 
economic activity of the whole country is visualized as if it were covered by one huge 
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accounting system.”645 After a long discussion of the statistics undergirding this project, 




 This was an imposing display, and, for economists, its potential was tantalizing. 
Academics were Leontief’s natural audience, but policymakers with the requisite 
background also recognized its possible value.647 Gardiner Means struck up a 
correspondence with Leontief, who sent him tables for 1919 and 1929 to assist with his 
research on The Structure of the American Economy. Means viewed Leontief’s exclusion 
of exchanges that took place outside the market as an important defect, but he recognized 
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a kindred spirit.648 In 1939, government officials requested that Leontief draw up an 
input-output table for them, but he declined the offer, citing inadequate statistics. 
Washington persisted, and, after Leontief relented, a team from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics headed north and set up shop at Harvard. A man who had travelled across the 
world in search of safe harbor—from the USSR to Germany to China to the United 
States—could now wait for others to come to him.649  
 Leontief had profited from trends that were remaking economics, and whose 
influence on politics was already beginning to be felt. The birth of econometrics and 
Leontief’s input-output tables shared more than a common origin in the 1930s. Responses 
to their time, each tried to make sense of a crisis that what was more and more frequently 
traced to “the economy.” These innovations fed off each other too: more statistics 
supplied grist for more elaborate theories that attracted the notice of policymakers who 
then became even more likely to support greater funding for statistics, kicking off the 
cycle all over again.  
 
WHILE THE IMPULSE TO STUDY the economy was growing, particular ways of 
conducting that investigation could fall out of favor. Gardiner Means learned that lesson 
before he had finished The Structure of the American Economy. Means had started 
research in 1936, when the recovery was booming. By 1937, however, a recession was 
underway, and pressure mounted on Means to shift from broad-ranging inquiries toward 
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specific proposals for countering the slump. Like Mitchell before him, Means struggled 
with providing concrete policy recommendations and took refuge in calls for more study. 
“If a democratic solution is to be worked out, it will be the product of many minds 
working through a period of years,” he wrote in a draft of the conclusion. “It will require 
continuing analysis by the technicians of the different phases of the problem and a more 
detailed delineation of the characteristics of the national economy.”650  
 Those lines, like the rest of Means’s conclusion, would not be published.651 The 
reason why would become evident in 1940, when The Structure of the American 
Economy: Part II: Toward Full Use of Resources appeared. Meetings of the officials 
tasked with producing the document included both longtime planners and members of a 
group that had recently been dubbed “Keynesian.” The label was not entirely apt. Some 
of Washington’s so-called Keynesians had only a passing familiarity with the work of 
their supposed master, and even those well versed in his work had often followed their 
own paths to similar conclusions. But whatever the origins of their beliefs, the shared 
perspective was what mattered. Advocating policies that bore a distinct resemblance to 
the program outlined by Lippmann a few years earlier, they regarded Means’s program as 
a sideshow.  
 The change from the prior book was obvious at a glance. Coming in at under fifty 
pages, the sequel was a trifle compared to its hefty predecessor. Instead of providing a 
coherent summary of research, it was a symposium where Means’s voice was one among 
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five. Some common principles linked the disparate group, chief among them acceptance 
that “the organized way of producing goods and services, which is called the national 
economy” was an object worth analyzing, especially when it was so obviously failing to 
perform at its full capacity.652 The continued importance of finding a democratic way of 
addressing that problem also received a uniform endorsement.  
 After that, it was a free for all. Means used his chapter to reiterate his support for 
sweeping reform. Full employment was his central objective, and it could only be met 
with a comprehensive approach—that is, an approach operating at the scale of the 
economy. The economy, according to this interpretation, was an object that only needed 
to be accounted for when the government faced a certain kind of question. “Most 
problems of efficiency and balance,” he wrote, “can be worked out on a piece-meal 
basis.”653 But full employment was a different, larger obstacle—“necessarily one which 
involves the working of the national economy as a single whole.”654 As for his 
interpretation of the economy, Means was an optimist. He saw a country teeming with 
consumers hungry for more, with ample resources to satisfy these unmet demands. 
Restrictions imposed by “social organization” that he had diagnosed in the first part of 
The Structure of the American Economy prevented the system from reaching its full 
potential, but he remained confident that the appropriate reforms could usher in a new era 
of abundance. 
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 All the participants in this forum agreed with Means that economic theory should 
guide political practice, but the similarities ended soon after. One author chided him for 
neglecting the social, calling for a “report on The Structure and Use of Resources of 
Social Behavior” before discussion continued.655 Mordecai Ezekiel shared the desire for 
ambitious reforms, but believed that Means had only developed part of what would have 
to be an even bolder agenda. The most biting assessment came from Alvin Hansen, a 
Harvard economist and leading authority among Washington’s Keynesians. Hansen was 
a student of business cycle theory, and from his perspective both pillars of early New 
Deal economics—the reformist vision behind the NRA that Means sought to revive, and 
the faith in a managed money supply that had driven Fisher and the other reflationists—
shared a common misperception. They focused on prices, in one case the relation of 
prices among industries, in the other the total price level. What really mattered, Hansen 
believed, was the rate of investment, which was necessarily bound up with a host of 
concerns that had little to do with prices as such. While consumer demand was unlimited, 
in theory at least, that did not ensure prosperity. Means had overlooked the complicated 
relationship between savings and investments, a relationship best managed not by the 
reforms he favored but through savvy monetary and—here was the pivotal change—
fiscal policies. Even if prices among industries had been thrown out of balance, forcing 
them down in an attempt to restore equilibrium only depressed national income, the 
opposite of what expansionary policy required.  
 By 1940, Hansen’s argument had won out. In private reflections other New 
Dealers shrugged off part one of The Structure of the American Economy as—in the 
words of Harold Smith, director of the Bureau of the Budget—“a very tedious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655 Structure of the American Economy: Part II, 19. 
	  
	   235	  
performance.”656 Means resigned, and, following his departure, the NRPB became a 
stronghold for advocates of fiscal policy. It was a curious turn for a body that had begun 
its life in 1933 fired by visions of social transformation. Since then, the goals had 
changed, subtly but decisively, from governing society to managing the economy. In the 
arc of a committee so obscure that it could not even hold onto a name for more than a few 
years at a time, a much larger history revealed itself. A new obligation had been added to 
the sovereign’s traditional list of responsibilities, a duty as important in its own right as 
enforcing the rule of law or defending against attacks from abroad. A healthy economy 
had become a prerequisite for successful governance. It was a new goal that two 
presidential administrations, one Republican and one Democratic, had tried to achieve 
with policies that drew on a jumble of past experiences, from managing the money 
supply to winning a World War.  
 By the close of the 1930s, a distinct politics of the economy had begun to take 
shape, and it did so around fiscal policy. There was nothing foreordained about that 
result. The economy was a capacious object, and proponents of conflicting agendas had 
retrofitted their programs to accommodate this new addition. Fisher, Mitchell, Tugwell, 
Lippmann, Means, Leontief, Tinbergen had all in their own ways had contributed to this 
recentering of politics. So had the perceived failures of the early New Deal, the demands 
of electoral mobilization, the twinned ascents of fascism and communism, and, looming 
over it all, the unfolding crisis of the Depression.  
 Back in Washington, Keynesians proved the most skilled navigators of the altered 
landscape. The first wave of research on the economy had been characterized by its 
diversity. This was uncharted territory, and nobody yet know what instruments would 
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prove most useful for navigation. Keynesians brought clarity and precision to this 
muddle, supplying politically attractive proposals with sterling academic rationales to 
challenges perceived as exigent. Their victory did not rule out other approaches, at least 
not yet, but it would have momentous consequences, and it began with their mastery of a 
subject that in the popular imagination exemplified tedium—accounting, specifically 
national income accounting. And that, in turn, grew out of the effort to answer a 
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Chapter 4: The Birth of Fiscal Policy 
 
“INCREDIBLE AS IT SOUNDS, THE NEW DEAL DOES not have any program, good 
bad or indifferent.”657 So declared Walter Lippmann in the spring of 1938, when it was 
clear even inside the White House that the administration was in crisis. Some of the 
injuries were self-inflicted. After his landslide reelection in 1936, Roosevelt had backed 
two major initiatives: an expansion of the Supreme Court designed to fill out the bench 
with sympathetic New Dealers, and a reorganization of the executive branch that would 
increase the president’s ability to act without congressional approval. Both failed, dealing 
stinging blows to the White House and revealing the contours of an anti-Roosevelt 
congressional majority.658  
 Worse yet, in October 1937 the stock market collapsed. While evidence 
accumulated that economic weakness extended beyond Wall Street, New Dealers worried 
that the country was about to enter another depression without having fully recovered 
from the last one. They were not alone in this concern, and Roosevelt’s opponents treated 
the slump as proof of the administration’s failure.659   
 In Washington, the crisis was as much political and intellectual as economic. 
Prosperity had allowed New Dealers to paper over internal differences that had widened 
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as the sense of emergency prevalent during the worst of the Depression faded. Recovery 
had also obscured intellectual exhaustion settling across both of the camps that dominated 
economic policymaking in the first term, the reflationists and proponents of the 
administered-prices thesis. The 1937 downturn exposed all this, sparking debates that 
were even more contentious than in the administration’s early days, before the New 
Deal’s mixed track record equipped both sides with weapons for internecine battles.660  
 Amid the confusion, advocates of a strategy that had attracted little notice in 
Roosevelt’s first term received increasing attention. Fiscal policy, they argued, both 
explained the recent slump and supplied tools that could bring it to an end. This view was 
especially popular with young New Deal economists—people like Isador Lubin, head of 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics; or Leon Henderson, an alumnus of the NRA and, in 1936, 
economic counselor to the Democratic National Committee; or Lauchlin Currie, an 
unassuming Harvard PhD and Federal Reserve official who would soon become the 
White House’s first official economic adviser.661  
 As it happened, Lubin, Henderson, and Currie arrived together at the White House 
for an appointment with Roosevelt on November 8, 1937, just a few weeks after the stock 
market crash. They came bearing a memo drafted by Currie and signed by all three. 
“Graphs, charts and other data spread before the President revealed the state of industry 
and employment,” reported a front-page article detailing the meeting in the next day’s 
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New York Times.662  Harry Hopkins, one of FDR’s most valued advisers, had encouraged 
the meeting, convinced the president would benefit if he could “talk to the boys who 
actually write the heads of department’s memos and get some first hand dope on what is 
after all a highly technical matter.”663 That technical spirit made its way into Roosevelt’s 
rhetoric a week later, when he announced in a fireside chat on unemployment that “we 
need more facts.”664 
 New Dealers also needed a theory that could explain how the country had reached 
this parlous state. The downturn had dealt a powerful blow to business cycle theory, with 
its faith that, however painful, contractions would eventually give way to booms. Currie’s 
memo proceeded from an alternative set of assumptions, offering both diagnosis and cure 
for the disease. That theory was eventually labeled Keynesian, and Keynes did have the 
good luck to publish his major theorization of fiscal policy—The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest, and Money—shortly before the 1937 recession.665  
 The work earned Keynes notoriety in the United States. One booklet released by a 
business-friendly group in 1938 declared that policies “associated with the name of John 
Maynard Keynes have undoubtedly exercised a power more despotic in governmental 
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policies and pervasive in popular thinking than any other product of scholastic 
speculation.”666 But endorsements of fiscal policy existed well before Keynes’s summa, 
and Keynes himself had supported increased expenditures prior to elaborating their 
rationale. Nor was the General Theory designed to convert a general audience to the 
cause. Although Keynes was a gifted prose stylist, The General Theory is a notoriously 
dense work, and even trained economists—including his colleagues at Cambridge—
struggled to grasp its meaning. Among those who felt they understood the book, it 
provoked as many dissents as endorsements. Currie, in fact, was among the dissenters.  
 By 1936, Roosevelt was already familiar with, and skeptical of, Keynes. After a 
1934 meeting arranged by Felix Frankfurter, an enthusiastic supporter of Keynes, 
Roosevelt grumbled about the “rigamarole of figures” the Cambridge don left behind, 
adding that he “must be a mathematician rather than a political economist.”667 Three 
years later, the president’s statistics-filled meeting with Currie, Lubin, and Henderson left 
a very different impression. Seemingly neutral data that were in reality freighted with 
theoretical presumptions made policies that could otherwise seem controversial, even 
preposterous, appear eminently logical. This was the program later termed “Keynesian,” 
and it provided the foundation of the first politics centered on the economy in American 
history. And it began with a subject that had fascinated economists, and bored most 
others, for a generation: national income accounting. 
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IGNORED BY EVEN THE MOST FINE-GRAINED histories of the New Deal, national 
income accounting might seem like a purely technical exercise.668 But in the 1930s the 
effort inspired a government program that combined technical precision with 
philosophical ambition. In 1932, Americans still did not have reliable estimates of the 
national income’s trajectory since 1929. That it had fallen was obvious, but the extent of 
the decline was a mystery. Following a campaign by Wisconsin Senator and progressive 
Republican Robert La Follette—who acted at the prompting of his then-advisor, Isador 
Lubin—the Senate requested that the Commerce Department produce official estimates 
of national income from 1929 to 1931. This was not the first time the government had 
produced such a measure—the Federal Trade Commission had investigated the subject in 
1926—but the issue assumed new urgency in the Depression.669 The shift to Commerce 
was also significant: the department Hoover had done so much to build up during the 
1920s would now chart the catastrophe that destroyed his presidency.  
 Officials at Commerce soon found themselves overwhelmed, but they knew where 
they could look for help. Estimates of national income and output proliferated in the 
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1930s: there was a major study from the Brookings Institution, a national survey of 
productive capacity organized by a private group of engineers, and within the 
government research quickly expanded beyond Commerce. Yet the NBER remained the 
field’s acknowledged leader, and one of their longtime affiliates—Willard Thorp, author 
of a 1926 study for the Bureau—had moved to the section of Commerce charged with 
measuring national income. When Commerce proved unable to handle the job by itself, 
the NBER was eager to assist. 
That eagerness derived in part from a sense within the NBER that Commerce had 
granted them a fresh start in a subject where they had begun to slip behind. Edwin Gay 
expressed the views of his colleagues within the Bureau in 1932 when he remarked that 
their work had become “wooden in presentation” and “less dependable” empirically.670 
Aware that competition was growing, they planned to reassert their authority by 
recruiting Mitchell to supervise the project and bulking up the research team with “two or 
three women assistants.”671 (Both inside and outside the Bureau, women were often 
trusted with statistical computation, while theoretical inquiry remained a male preserve.) 
Before Mitchell took up the reins, however, a preliminary inquiry would be led by one of 
the NBER’s brightest, and most unlikely, stars. 
Born in the Russian empire just over thirty years earlier, Simon Kuznets was 
already a decade into his career as a statistician by the time he took over the NBER’s 
work on national income. He lived through the Bolshevik Revolution, and by the time he 
was twenty-one was running a section in the Ukrainian Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Kuznets left that post in 1922 when he emigrated to the United States. One year later, he 
had received a bachelor’s degree from Columbia University; three years after that, under 
Mitchell’s supervision, he rounded out his training with a doctorate in economics. 
Mitchell recruited his student to work for the NBER, a relationship Kuznets maintained 
after the University of Pennsylvania hired him in 1930. Kuznets was still in the early 
stages of a career that would see him author thirty-one books, more than two hundred 
papers, and, like Mitchell before him, assume the presidency of both the American 
Economic Association and American Statistical Association. Unlike his mentor, Kuznets 
lived long enough to add one more glittering bauble to his resume: a Nobel Prize, which 
he won in 1971, the third year the award was offered. (In its first year, the prize was 
shared by Ragnar Frisch and Jan Tinbergen.) 
Those accomplishments lay ahead when Kuznets studied under Mitchell, but the 
worldview that framed his later research was already apparent in his master’s thesis, a 
searching appraisal of Joseph Schumpeter’s economics. Chastising Schumpeter for 
indulging in armchair speculation, Kuznets wrote that “There is no reason on earth to 
accept Dr. Schumpeter’s scheme” as anything but “an unproven suggestion that might be 
fitted into the facts if they permit it.”672 Kuznets did not repudiate theory as such. 
Following Mitchell, he insisted that economic theorizing must be tested against empirical 
criteria.  
Kuznets produced his own empirical contributions at a steady rate. A doctoral 
dissertation measuring the effects of shifts in the business cycle on retail and wholesale 
trade appeared in 1926, bristling with charts and graphs designed to answer questions like 
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“How then did the sales in department stores move as compared to sales in groceries?”673 
He coupled these appraisals with broader reflections on the dynamics of what he called, 
like Mitchell, money economy. That same balance appeared in a 1933 volume produced 
under the auspices of the NBER that considered the effects of seasonal fluctuations on 
industrial and commercial activity. Detailed breakdowns of food production—ice cream, 
unsurprisingly, peaked in the summer674 —shared space with broader claims about the 
unparalleled coherence of modern economic life, the prospects of a “technical revolution” 
of the “inorganic” that could end seasonal fluctuations, and the possibilities of economic 
planning.675 
Despite his youth, then, Kuznets was a logical candidate for the NBER to suggest 
as leader for Commerce’s national income study, a position he took up in the winter of 
1932. The team of researchers was small, never more than nine at Commerce, along with 
a few part-time workers at the NBER. Early on, Kuznets only had to visit Washington 
once a month. But his intellectual influence was decisive from the outset, and as the 
project continued his trips to the capital became more frequent. Kuznets wrote most of 
the final report, and near the end worked at such a feverish pace that one Commerce 
official worried he had “endangered his health through devotion to the study.”676 
Although the prospect of using what Kuznets described as “the great resources and 
commanding powers of a government organization” had lured Kuznets to the job, he 
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relied on the NBER to verify Commerce’s findings and polish the final results.677 That 
check, Kuznets believed, was invaluable. While he believed “the basic work” of 
gathering data could be left to public agencies, “the pioneering step . . . cannot be 
comfortably entrusted to governmental agencies.”678 National income estimates were too 
important, and dangerous, for the state to monopolize.  The tension was profound: 
Kuznets’s work was valued because of its relevance for policymakers, but he feared that 
relevance would prove its undoing.  
 
THIS ANXIETY REVEALED SOMETHING IMPORTANT about Kuznets. Though 
remembered today for his empirical achievements, even his most technical work presents 
itself as an exercise in social theory. His report for Commerce began with a section titled 
“Uses and Abuses of National Income Measurements,” one of many reflections on the 
subject that he produced over his career.679 A common theme ran through all of these 
writings: while he recognized the hunger for statistical precision among policymakers, 
businessmen, and the general public, Kuznets warned that expectations of perfection 
were self-defeating. As he explained in one of these exegeses, Kuznets believed that 
“there is no hard and fast line by which economic activity can be distinguished from 
social and individual life in general.”680 What was considered “economic” by one group 
of people at one moment could just as easily be written out of that category by another 
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group at another moment. The instability of the economic had one significant 
consequence:  “The welfare of a nation,” Kuznets argued, “can scarcely be inferred from 
a measurement of national income.”681 
Just defining the national income was challenging enough. After offering the net 
value of the economic goods produced in a nation as one definition, he noted that each of 
those terms—“net value,” “economic goods,” “produced,” and “nation”—provoked 
debate. For Kuznets, the omission of domestic labor of the kind performed by 
homemakers was an object of particular concern.682 Barring an unforeseen improvement 
in the quality of data, national income could only be a complete record of the general 
welfare “if the family disappeared entirely as a producer of goods.”683  
His worries also had a moralizing aspect. “For those not intimately acquainted 
with this type of work,” he warned, “it is difficult to realize the degree to which estimates 
of national income have been and must be affected by implicit or explicit value 
judgments.”684 Should, for example, statisticians include “the compensation of robbers, 
murderers, drug peddlers, and smugglers” in their calculations of the common good?685 
Economic metrics did not exist in pristine form, untainted by theoretical judgments. 
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Researchers who pretended otherwise merely revealed their “unconscious acceptance of 
one social philosophy” over another.686  
One common metric made it especially easy to conceal the philosophical 
underpinnings of empirical conclusions. “It is the market,” Kuznets wrote, “that reveals 
the ties binding the separate units in the economic system and segregates economic goods 
from others.”687 But the market proved a deceptive guide. Perhaps the technocrats were 
correct and some kind of energy unit might supply a better measure; if Marx was right, it 
would take an exchange system based on labor. Kuznets did not endorse these proposals, 
but he outlined several objections of his own. In addition to the problems already 
mentioned, there was the question of how to judge the value of government spending and 
private philanthropy. Then there was the old puzzle of reckoning income inequality. 
“Economic welfare cannot be adequately measured,” Kuznets maintained, “unless the 
personal distribution of income is known.”688 Taken together, the limitations were 
considerable enough for Kuznets to issue a stark verdict: “market prices,” he insisted, “do 
not accurately measure how well goods and services satisfy the needs of the body 
social.”689 The last phrase—“body social”—was resonant. Economic, social, private, 
public—these were categories researchers had to shatter, boundaries they had to trespass. 
And what about the political? Neither “the body social” nor the marketplace could 
explain why calculations of income had to be national. Though Kuznets admitted there 
was no a priori rationale for limiting surveys to specific nations, he believed history 
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supplied a powerful defense. “Income totals are for national units,” he wrote, “because so 
much of our economic and social activity and of our thinking runs in these terms.”690 
States had established themselves as guardians of national prosperity, extending their 
sovereignty from the political to the economic, and justifying the national boundaries of 
income estimates. Kuznets recognized that even this argument faced opposition from 
“those who conceive of individuals as the active and ultimate units” of economic life and 
therefore rejected “the idea of the economic system as an organic whole.”691 He shared 
some of these concerns himself. “A national total,” he warned, “facilitates the ascription 
of independent significance to that vague entity called the national economy,” obscuring 
“millions of individuals and firms, and scores of industries, economic groups, and regions 
whose efforts add up to the national income total.”692  
Then there was the continued problem of inadequate data. To this general 
complaint, Kuznets introduced an important qualification. Lackluster statistics were not 
evenly distributed, and one group regularly produced the highest quality records: large 
corporations, which used sophisticated accounting practices and operated under more 
stringent government regulations than unincorporated firms.693 He did not add that 
national income accounting itself had a kinship with the corporation.  Seeing the nation 
through a monetary lens, describing it with a technical vocabulary that borrowed from the 
language of corporate accounting—the two methods were not identical, but they had a 
family resemblance. For Kuznets, the dependence of economic data upon specific 
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organizational types like the corporation revealed a larger truth: there were no universal 
economic statistics, only particular concepts bound up with the societies that created 
them.  
Despite all the objections, Kuznets retained his faith in the value of national 
income estimates. He wanted to make statistics better by illuminating their underlying 
assumptions and ensuring they reflected the judgments of the larger society. Dispensing 
with pretensions to unbiased views from nowhere allowed researchers to stake a more 
contingent but ultimately more stable claim on the public’s attention. 
  The 1934 release of the Commerce Department’s report on national income 
further strengthened this position. Kuznets was widely praised for the effort, celebrated as 
the most thorough study of its kind ever produced in the United States. Though it did not 
receive the breathless coverage that accompanied the publication of Recent Social 
Trends, the first edition sold briskly, and an excited Thorp told Kuznets that Commerce 
was “flooded with inquiries from various people wishing to have copies of the report.”694 
The findings were grim—“Our Income fell 40% in Four Years” reported the New York 
Times, in a small story buried inside the paper—but that was all the more reason for the 
government to support continued research.   
Still, Kuznets was not satisfied. Back at the NBER following his stint at 
Commerce, in 1936 Kuznets organized a series of meetings he hoped would establish a 
consensus among students of national income accounting. Called the Conference on 
Research in Income and Wealth, it drew participants from six of the major economics 
departments in the United States (among them Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, and 
Kuznets’s University of Pennsylvania) along with representatives from numerous 
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branches of the government (including the Federal Reserve and the National Resources 
Committee). Kuznets chaired the group’s executive committee, and he recruited his 
research assistant at the NBER, a young Milton Friedman, to serve as its secretary.695 
Also at the first meeting of the Conference was Robert Nathan, chief of staff in a 
new section at Commerce devoted to studying national income, and another Kuznets 
protégé. When Nathan was later asked to name the greatest influence on his intellectual 
development, he replied that there was “no question” it was Kuznets.696 After studying 
with Kuznets while a graduate student at Wharton, Nathan had left academia, over his 
professor’s objections, only to find himself working with his former teacher at the 
Commerce Department. Benefitting from Washington’s increasing fascination with the 
national income, Nathan was drawn into conversations with some of the capital’s most 
influential figures. That included leaders of other departments, such as Henry Wallace at 
Agriculture and Frances Perkins at Labor, and the network of young New Dealers 
scattered across the bureaucracy that fancy themselves the real agents of change. Buoyed 
by these connections, Nathan presided over a sizable expansion of his fiefdom. The 
national income section at Commerce became its own division, charged with issuing 
annual reports, quarterly estimates, and breakdowns of income by region, among other 
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statistics.697 What had begun with Kuznets as a response to economic crisis under Nathan 
became a routine administrative responsibility.  
To Franklin Roosevelt, however, national income was more than just a tool for 
governance. It was a political weapon—a marker of the depths to which the country had 
sunk under Hoover and of the progress that had been made under his watch. In the last 
month of his 1936 campaign, Roosevelt walked an audience in Pittsburg through national 
income’s recent history, trumpeting its recovery under his watch and justifying recent 
deficits as a consequence of its low levels. 698 The subject, however, was still obscure 
enough that, before he launched into his speech, he had to pause and explain what the 
measurement reflected.  
This esoteric quality ensured that national income remained a minor part of the 
president’s rhetoric.699 While accepting the presidential nomination at the Democratic 
Convention, Roosevelt eschewed statistics in favor of condemnations of “economic 
tyranny” and exhortations to wage “a war for the survival of democracy.”700 Following a 
resounding victory at the polls, Roosevelt left national income out of his second inaugural 
address. Though he celebrated the return of prosperity, the most resonant statistics in that 
speech were his measurements of poverty, the “one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, 
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ill-nourished.”701 Roosevelt tempered this gloom by reassuring his audience that New 
Dealers had discovered “a way to master economic epidemics” by uniting the forces of 
science and democracy. Even better, they had demonstrated “that in the long run 
economic morality pays.”702 His administration had fulfilled the promise he made four 
years earlier, the promise of a democratic economics. This was the vision that stirred 
Roosevelt—the grand historical accomplishments already achieved, and the triumphs 
sure to come. Measurements of national income had their place, but that place was, for 
the most part, in the pages of reports from the Commerce Department.  
 
WASHINGTON’S BUREAUCRACY COULD INCUBATE theories of its own. The 
memo Currie, Henderson, and Lubin brought to the Oval Office in 1937 was a 
quintessential example of this process. Titled “Causes of the Recession,” it attributed 
much of the downturn to cutbacks in government spending that Roosevelt had supported 
in a failed attempt to balance the budget.  The document, largely Currie’s work, proposed 
a new interpretation of recent economic history, depicting increased government 
expenditures as the greatest contribution to the economic recovery between 1934 to 
1936.703 Not a fundamental reinvention of the social order, as proposed by planners; not a 
recalibration of the money supply, like Fisher and his allies called for—no, what mattered 
most was that the government had supported “national buying power.”704  
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 Currie still accorded significant importance to what Means called the structure of 
the American economy (although his memo did not refer to the economy as such). He 
even included a favorable reference to the administered-price thesis that Means did so 
much to promote. Among New Dealers more generally, support for compensatory fiscal 
policy coexisted with what one called the “prevailing notion that analysis in terms of 
money somehow did not go ‘deep’ enough.”705 But Currie did not attribute the recent 
slump primarily to these deeper forces. Nor did he believe, as some proposed, that 
recovery would come about by reviving the NRA. Monetary policy also escaped blame in 
his assessment, a convenient judgment coming from an influential member of the Federal 
Reserve.           
 What figured most conspicuously in Currie’s analysis was the promise of a fiscal 
policy that compensated for swings in business activity. “Pump priming”—using 
government spending to jumpstart a recovery—was part of the early New Deal policy 
repertoire, though its advocates had to overcome considerable skepticism about the 
wisdom of departing from balanced budgets. After 1937 both the sanctity of balanced 
budgets and the feasibility of withdrawing government support came under challenge. 
The recession threatened many cherished beliefs, one the its most prominent casualties 
being the faith, supported by business cycle theory, that downturns were self-correcting. 
Sustained, compensatory fiscal policy roused little enthusiasm in Roosevelt’s first term, 
but the threat of protracted unemployment enhanced its popularity after 1937. 
 Some fiscal policy supporters already called themselves Keynesians, but Currie 
had a more complicated relationship with that label. He had encountered Keynes’s 
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writings more than a decade earlier, while studying for his undergraduate degree at the 
London School of Economics. He was impressed by Keynes’s 1930 work, A Treatise on 
Money, but more critical of the General Theory. He later remarked that he had supported 
“Keynesian” policies “long before The General Theory, and was a bit skeptical of the 
usefulness of the new treatment.”706 At the time, he chided Jacob Viner for having 
“pulled your punches a bit” in a review of The General Theory.707 In a 1938 discussion of 
the book, he complained, “all too often we find that familiar things are being described in 
unfamiliar language, that concepts cannot be given statistical meaning, and that precision 
and definiteness are being purchased at the expense of reality.” 
 Currie was more generous in a 1936 memo for the Federal Reserve Board, where 
he judged it “the most important work in the field of monetary and general economic 
theory that Keynes has so far done” and predicted it would “unquestionably dominate 
discussion and exert a profound influence on the writings of other economists for a 
considerable time to come.”708 But there was little sign of that influence in “Causes of the 
Recession,” which deployed few Keynesian tools while leaning heavily on statistics 
produced in Washington. 
 The New Dealers’ pace was frenetic, but the core of the bureaucracy was small, 
and the number of Keynesians—regardless of whether they considered themselves 
followers of Keynes—even smaller. But this small group was well positioned, and its 
members built a tightly bound network. “It would have been celebrated as a conspiracy 
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had the frequency of their meetings been known,” John Kenneth Galbraith later 
claimed.709  
 Galbraith was an anomaly, having arrived in Washington after spending a year at 
Cambridge, where he participated in a vibrant discussion of what Keynes had called his 
“theory of output as a whole”.710 Elsewhere in the General Theory, Keynes expressed the 
same goal using the vocabulary of economic statistics. “Our present object,” he wrote, “is 
to discover what determines at any time the national income of a given economic system 
and (which is almost the same) the amount of its employment.”711 Whatever the other 
differences between Cambridge Keynesians and their American counterparts, these 
ambitions fired both groups. In Washington, conversations about policy spread far 
beyond the office, with discussions taking place over private lunches and meetings after 
hours. For these shock troops of the fiscal turn, the New Deal was a way of life, and the 
line separating work from leisure vanished. 
 Ideological divisions became similarly fuzzy. Historians have portrayed the ascent 
of Washington’s Keynesians as a defeat for ambitious reform projects, but that analysis 
misses the fluidity of the moment. As one of the most insightful recent histories of the 
New Deal has observed, “leftists were closer to power in New Deal-era Washington than 
anyone not on the far right has recognized.”712 The economist Paul Sweezy described the 
period as rife with “inconsistencies” that—he added ruefully, in a nod to the Cold War’s 
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Red Scare—were “straightened out later on, by the other side.”713 Sweezy embodied 
these paradoxes. Though a Marxist, he produced a study for the National Resources 
Committee and contributed to a volume defending the New Deal that Roosevelt allegedly 
recommended to his son.714  
 Near the center of this group, and as ideologically polyvalent as any of its 
members, sat Lauchlin Currie—“simultaneously one of the most anonymous and most 
influential figures of the late New Deal,” in one historian’s astute judgment.715 
Combining academic connections with bureaucratic acumen, Currie was ideally suited to 
run what Galbraith called “an informal casting office” for Washington’s Keynesians.716 
Galbraith, who owed his own job in the administration to a recommendation from Currie, 
had personal experience with the benefits of this patronage system.717  
 Currie’s time as liaison between New Dealers and the nation’s economics 
department was a late stage in a longer journey that would have been inconceivable only 
a few decades earlier. “It is perhaps not much of a science,” Currie later wrote of 
economics.718 Whatever its scientific merits, a plausible claim to mastery of the subject 
had become a valuable skill for an aspiring policymaker. Nobody benefitted more from 
that shift than Currie. Following his winding path to the White House reveals both the 
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mechanics of influence in Roosevelt’s Washington and the shape of the new politics of 
the economy that was coming into being. 
 
MONEY: AS IT HAD BEEN for Wesley Mitchell and Irving Fisher, money was the 
central preoccupation of Currie’s economics. After a peripatetic childhood—mostly spent 
in his native Canada, but with brief stays in Massachusetts and California—Currie 
arrived at Harvard in 1925, just shy of his twenty-third birthday. He had recently 
graduated from the LSE, then the site of an ideological civil war within the faculty.719 
While its economists tended to lean to the right, the political science department provided 
a home for some of Britain’s most respected socialist intellectuals, including Harold 
Laski and R.H. Tawney. Students picked up on this intellectual energy, and debates 
spilled out of the classroom and into their lives with an energy similar to what Currie 
encountered in Washington a decade later.  
 But not at Harvard, whose political scene was dreary in comparison, and whose 
economics department lagged behind the LSE’s (along with several American rivals). 
There were bright lights, however, including the monetary theorist Allyn Young, known 
among economists for his attempt to chart a path between the real bills doctrine and the 
quantity theory of money.720 In 1927, Currie wrote in his diary that he “revered Young 
above all other men in the world.”721 An engaged political figure, Young had served as a 
delegate at Versailles in the aftermath of the Great War. That same year, Young traded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
  719 On the LSE in this periods, see A.W. Coats, “The Distinctive LSE Ethos in the Interwar 
Years,” Atlantic Economic Journal 10.1 (March 1982), 18–30.  
720 On Young, see Perry Mehrling, The Money Interest and the Public Interest: American 
Monetary Thought, 1920-1970 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 13-81 and Charles Blitch, 
Allyn Young: The Peripatetic Economist (New York: St. Martin’s, 1995). 
 
721 Sandilands, Lauchlin Currie, 19.  
	  
	   258	  
his post at Harvard for a chair at the LSE, reversing Currie’s earlier migration. Currie 
finished his dissertation under the supervision of John Williams, another specialist in 
monetary theory who blended academic inquiry with political activity. (Williams was 
later chosen as Vice President of the New York branch of the Federal Reserve.)  But 
Currie remained a disciple of Young’s, even after the latter’s death in 1929 during an 
outbreak of influenza. Demonstrating his continued fealty, Currie dedicating the book 
that emerged from his dissertation to his former mentor.722 
 The work was called The Supply and Control of Money in the United States, and it 
established the reputation that brought Currie to Washington. Blending rigorous 
empirical research with a sophisticated grasp of economic theory, it portrayed the Great 
Depression as an essentially monetary phenomenon brought about by a bungling Federal 
Reserve. Anticipating by several decades a thesis popularized by Milton Friedman, 
Currie’s argument rested on his interpretation of the quantity theory of money and his 
detailed statistical analysis.723 The book was one of many fusillades Currie launched 
against the Federal Reserve, and Currie later claimed, with reason, that his campaign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
722 Lauchlin Currie, The Supply and Control of Money in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1934), iii.  
 
723 For the debate over this connection, see David Laidler, “Hawtrey, Harvard, and the Origins of 
the Chicago Tradition,” Journal of Political Economy 101.6 (December 1993), 1068-1103 and George 
Tavlas, “Chicago, Harvard, and the Doctrinal Foundations of Monetary Economics,” Journal of Political 
Economy 105.1 (February 1997), 153-177. It was reprised in David Laidler and Roger Sandilands, “An 
Early Harvard Memorandum on Anti-depression Policies: An Introductory Note,” History of Political 
Economy 34.3 (Fall 2002), 515-532; James Ahiakpor, “On the Similarities Between the 1932 Harvard 
Memorandum and the Chicago Antidepression Recommendations,” History of Political Economy 42.3 (Fall 
2010), 547-571; and David Laidler and Roger Sandilands, “Harvard, the Chicago Tradition, and the 
Quantity Theory: A Reply to James Ahiakpor” History of Political Economy 42.3 (Fall 2010), 573-592. 
Building on Laidler and Sandilands, Michele Alacevich, Pier Francesco Asso, and Sebastiano Nerozzi, 
“Harvard Meets the Crisis: U.S. Fiscal Policy in the 1930s and the Political Economy of Lauchlin B. 
Currie, Jacob Viner, John H. Williams and Harry D. White,” (working paper, Dipartimento di Scienze 
Economiche, Università degli Studi di Firenze, Firenze, Italia, December 2010) offers the most 
comprehensive analysis of the connections between Chicago and Harvard.  
	  
	   259	  
made him “the most outspoken academic critic of Federal Reserve policy” of the 
period.724  
 Currie also stood out because for his support for the New Deal. Along with five of 
his colleagues at Harvard, he signed a 1934 letter supporting Roosevelt that the 
administration released to the New York Times.725 The letter received a chilly reception at 
Harvard, where a number of professors in the department had contributed to a volume 
denouncing the New Deal that same year.726 Currie had also supported aggressive 
government action earlier, most notably in an unpublished 1933 paper, co-authored with 
two other Harvard affiliates, that called for aggressive open-market operations by the 
Federal Reserve and substantial deficit spending.727  
 Some of the paper’s suggestions echoed proposals already endorsed by twenty-
four economists in 1932.728 Produced after a conference at the University of Chicago, the 
recommendations were outlined in a manifesto that bore the signatures of twelve Chicago 
economists and twelve outsiders, including Irving Fisher and John Williams. (One of the 
other signers, Alvin Hansen, became important in Currie’s later career.) The similarities 
between the two positions almost certainly occurred to Jacob Viner, another endorser of 
the Chicago manifesto, who turned to Currie when he was asked by Treasury Secretary 
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Henry Morgenthau to put together a “Freshman Brain Trust.” Currie had an impressive 
academic background in a field relevant to policy, plus he was young and loosely 
attached to his current post. Certain that a tenure-track position at Harvard was not in the 
offing, Currie jumped at the opportunity and moved to Washington.   
 After only a few months at Treasury, Currie was lured away by a surprising 
proposal. Roosevelt had selected Marriner Eccles, another staffer at Treasury, to head the 
Federal Reserve Board. A successful banker from Salt Lake City, Eccles was a bold 
defender of his beliefs and a savvy bureaucratic infighter.729 But he had never attended 
college and lacked formal training in economics. Currie shared his views on policy, and 
he provided technical justifications for opinions Eccles reached by a more intuitive 
means, including opposition to the real bills doctrine and support for centralizing the Fed. 
Currie agreed to serve as Eccles’s assistant, where he formulated an ambitious agenda for 
boosting the bank’s power and consolidating authority in Washington, rejecting the 
earlier decentralized system dominated by New York. The full program did not survive 
the legislative grinder, but much of it remained intact. After its passage in 1935, the 
United States was for the first time in undeniable possession of a central bank, with 
Eccles at the helm and Currie serving as assistant director of research, a title that 
considerably understated his influence. 
 Eccles and Currie, however, believed that in a depression even the newly 
empowered Federal Reserve was as useful as a gun without bullets.  They viewed 
monetary policy as a powerful tool for curtailing booms, not sparking recoveries. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
729 For Eccles’s perspective on his own life, see Beckoning Frontiers: Public and Personal 
Recollections, ed. Sidney Hyman (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951). Sidney Hyman, Marriner S. Eccles: 
Private Entrepreneur and Public Servant (Stanford: Stanford University School of Business, 1976) 
supplies a fuller evaluation.  
	  
	   261	  
leaders of the body charged with managing the nation’s monetary policy were convinced 
that fiscal policy was incomparably more significant. Policy remained largely static under 
their watch; if anything, Eccles leaned toward restriction in 1937, before the downturn 
was evident, when he feared that inflation might surge. The Fed also confronted a 
potential threat from Treasury, flush with cash that it could use to conduct open-market 
operations of its own.730  
 Currie had to navigate more personal obstacles, too. His broadsides against the 
status quo had not won him many allies at the Fed, and defenders of the institution as it 
existed before the 1935 overhaul bridled at what they regarded as his arrogance. Shortly 
after moving to his new job, Currie told Eccles, “I think I am a better monetary theorist 
than anyone on the staff.”731 His coworkers might have noticed. 
 Clashes were especially fierce with Emanuel Goldenweiser, director of research at 
the Fed. Technically, Currie was Goldenweiser’s deputy, but that relationship was 
complicated by Currie’s associations with Eccles. That structural tension was exacerbated 
by fundamental disputes over policy. A longtime stalwart at the bank, and friend of 
Wesley Mitchell’s, Goldenweiser embodied the positions Currie had denounced.732 
 But Currie found other ways to exercise power. Establishing a research unit of his 
own, Currie set a team to work producing statistics that could guide decision making 
under his preferred policy regime. The most important of these statistics was an indicator 
he originally referred to as the “pump-priming deficit”; later he opted for the lengthier 
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“net contribution of the federal government to national buying power,” or “net 
contribution.” Even more directly linked to the demands of policymakers than Kuznets’s 
national income accounts, the net contribution provided a way of evaluating the total 
influence of government spending. In 1937, it was most effective at highlighting the 
restrictive effects of taxes imposed to fund the new Social Security program.733 
 Personal connections bolstered Currie’s influence. Through Leon Henderson, 
Currie moved into what he called “the whole inner New Deal group,” a position that 
allowed him to build links between Washington policymakers and kindred spirits in the 
academy.734 Though Harvard could not compete with the LSE’s political dynamism, a 
healthy number of Currie’s former students eventually found their way to important 
positions in Washington: Walter Salant, Emile Despres, and Richard Goodwin were 
among the young Keynesians Currie helped place in Washington, along with many others 
who never spent time in his classroom. He also benefitted from the rapid ascent of Harry 
Dexter White, who had been a graduate student at Harvard with Currie, beating him out 
for the prize awarded to the best dissertation in their year. Like Currie, White came to the 
Treasury in 1934 as part of Viner’s “Freshman Brain Trust,” but he stayed in the 
department after Currie left, and became a close adviser to Secretary Morgenthau.735  
Currie unveiled the results of all these labors—statistics generated, networks built, 
policies devised—in 1939 when he testified before a congressional committee that 
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aroused what seemed in retrospect a bizarre level of enthusiasm.736 Comprising White 
House officials and representatives from both the House and the Senate, the Temporary 
National Economic Committee, or TNEC, had launched the previous December. It was a 
response to the 1937 recession, but supporters hoped that it would chart a way forward 
amidst a policy morass. As the Nation explained, the committee had “undertaken the 
difficult task of teaching the nation the lessons to be learned” from the tumultuous 
economic history of the last generation.737 In practice, the results were less edifying. 
Meant to establish consensus, the TNEC instead revealed the depth of disagreement. But 
it also provided a forum where fiscal policy’s evangelists could preach their cause, and 
they did not intend to miss their chance to shape the debate over the future of what 
Roosevelt called, in a letter to the committee, “the structure of democratic economy.”738  
 Currie was introduced to the TNEC as an expert of a particular kind: not a 
theorist, but “a fact factory.”739 Relying on statistics his team at the Federal Reserve had 
produced—along with other key sources, including Kuznets’s work at Commerce—he 
provided the empirical foundation for a turn toward fiscal policy. He prefaced this flurry 
of data with “a brief description of the conception of the way our economy works which 
underlies the choice of charts and figures.”740 According to Currie, that conception of the 
economy began with national income. Relying on a familiar trope, he compared the 
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national income to a “stream” that captured the flow of goods and services.741  With that 
image in mind, he explained, “we can take the next step and consider the factors that tend 
to keep the stream going uninterruptedly, and the factors that tend to obstruct and divert 
the stream.”742 National income was the standard against which policies should be 
judged, and the context—sometimes explicit, sometimes not—for narrower statistical 
inquiries. 
Managing the stream’s flow was the challenge the government now faced. Currie 
had recruited another expert—a “star witness,” he later said—to explain how to pursue 
that goal.743 Codes of bureaucratic conduct restricted Currie’s room for maneuver. He 
could present statistics and still plausibly claim neutrality, but making policy 
recommendations in public could have undermined his position. Academics, though, had 
an outsider’s freedom to provoke. The ideal candidate would support aggressive deficit 
spending, but the role demanded more than that. He—because the ideal candidate also 
had to be a man—would possess enough distance from the administration to present 
himself as an independent observer, along with impeccable academic credentials to lend 
authority to his claims. These were stringent requirements, but Currie found a perfect 
match.   
 
ALVIN HANSEN ARRIVED AT HARVARD in 1937, just a few years after Currie’s 
departure and shortly before the collapse of Roosevelt’s recovery. His position—a newly 
endowed “Chair of Political Economy”—was another laurel in a career that had already 
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won him approval from economists around the globe.744    
 Though a good year for Hansen, 1937 was a strange time for his discipline. While 
economists ascended the ranks in Washington, their colleagues in the academy struggled 
with doubt. “We cannot combat old heresies with the same whole-hearted confidence as 
our predecessors,” the Columbia economist John Maurice Clark said during a presidential 
address at the American Economic Association a few years earlier.745 Quantitative studies 
abounded, but they had not settled theoretical debates. A “mood of doubtful potency” had 
settled across the profession just as “we entered the gravest crisis of economic policy 
which this country has faced since the slavery question.”746 In the 1920s, economists had 
portrayed this confusion as a sign of intellectual vitality. But the Depression changed the 
stakes of their project, and in that state of emergency hesitation became, as Clark 
suggested, impotence.    
In retrospect, economists would describe these years as their discipline’s dark 
ages. The period seemed lost between tides—too far away from the parade of discoveries 
that stretched from Adam Smith to Alfred Marshall to share that earlier sense of 
intellectual adventure, and not yet settled into the patterns that defined the field after 
World War II. That periodization, conveniently, made the achievements of the generation 
coming of age in this moment all the grander, achievements later described as 
constituting the birth of macroeconomics.  
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Except for the occasional nod to earlier work on business cycles and the quantity 
theory of money, the pioneers of the turn toward theorizing the economy as a whole 
depicted their work as almost coming from nowhere.  “There was really no 
macroeconomics in the modern sense then,” one of them observed.747 Another added that 
the term itself  “had then not yet been coined, which is significant of the fact that there 
was nothing to apply it to.”748 Students who went on to become economists marveled at 
the subject’s absence from their education. James Tobin, one of his generation’s premier 
Keynesians, recalled that during his time as an undergraduate at Harvard in the 1930s, the 
faculty “simply didn’t pay much attention to any brand of what we now call 
macroeconomics.”749 An alumnus of the LSE “suspect[ed] the faculty of deliberately 
hiding from us such important and relevant books as…Kuznets’s work,” adding that “the 
very concept of national income and product was never even mentioned in any of the 
lectures.”750 They puzzled over their elders’ failure to grasp arguments that would later 
appear in introductory textbooks. Why, for example, did Irving Fisher, who in hindsight  
seemed to have had all the relevant pieces, not put together a coherent macroeconomics? 
That Fisher might have not considered fluctuations of national income a subject worth 
exploring only raised more questions. 
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Keynesians looking for a usable past found a more satisfying response by 
following the trajectory of Hansen’s career. A self-styled “farmer boy” from “the 
underprivileged class,”751 Hansen went on to become, in Tobin’s words, “the principal 
intellectual leader of the Keynesian conquest.”752 Born in South Dakota, he stayed close 
to home for his early life, enrolling at a small nearby college, where he majored in 
English. He toyed with the idea of doing graduate work in sociology, but eventually 
settled on economics, which he studied as a graduate student at the University of 
Wisconsin under Richard Ely and John Commons. His move to economics was revealing 
not because it signaled a momentous change but because of how easy it was for Hansen 
to make. When Hansen began his graduate career in 1913, the boundaries between 
sociology and economics were still porous enough that he could slip past them with ease. 
Both were social sciences that, especially in Wisconsin, promised to marry academic 
rigor and reforming zeal.  
A seminar run by Commons provided Hansen with a tangible manifestation of 
this ideal. Commons was at the time deep into researching a book on the history of 
American labor. The scholarship complemented his political activism. A member of the 
U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations—a congressional committee that ran from 1913 
to 1915 and produced an eleven-volume report on the country’s working conditions—
Commons also supplied the text for a Wisconsin bill that made the state the first in the 
nation to establish worker’s compensation. Commons’s seminar at Wisconsin reflected 
the interests of its instructor, and the students produced research he later incorporated in 
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his labor history. It also provided Hansen with a model he would turn to later in his 
career: a seminar that formed a community around a shared project blending academic 
work and political activism.753 
At Wisconsin, Hansen became a student of business cycle theory, a subject he 
credited Willford King, another Wisconsin product, with having inspired him to take 
up.754 Business cycles and labor remained Hansen’s fixations in the 1920s, but he viewed 
them from an unusually cosmopolitan perspective. Well-versed in the economic literature 
of continental Europe, he was as familiar with Karl Marx and less remembered figures 
like Arthur Spiethoff as he was with Veblen and Mitchell (though Henry George was also 
a major early influence). Like Currie, Hansen began his career a student of monetary 
theory. Over time he became absorbed with the economic consequences of technological 
progress, eventually concluding that scientific and industrial advances drove the business 
cycle, confining money to a secondary role.  
Hansen applied this eclectic approach to the international scene in a major study 
published in 1932 as Economic Stabilization in an Unbalanced World. There, he insisted 
that his contemporaries tended to overstate the importance of economic stability (despite 
the conspicuous position of “Economic Stabilization” in his title). Most of the instability 
that did exist, he claimed, was the product of “wrong governmental policies and other 
unfortunate forms of social control.”755 Hansen embedded this analysis in a much larger 
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historical narrative. “There was a time,” he wrote, “when ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’ 
presented a clean-cut antithesis, when they seemed poles apart. Such is no longer the 
case.”756 The systems had moved closer, with Stalin’s Five Year Plan pushing the USSR 
to place as much emphasis on efficiency as any of its capitalist rivals. (As for Stalin, 
Hansen judged him “one of the greatest personalities of the past decade” and his Five 
Year Plan “a constructive program.”757) Among the supposedly capitalist powers, even 
corporate executives increasingly accepted that “that some sort of planned economy is the 
way out.”758 This was not fully realized socialism, yet, but it was “a close cousin.”759 He 
even raised the prospect of an American capitalism made “into a huge coordinated 
system of gigantic trusts . . . and operating under a centralized national council of leading 
financiers and executives” doing battle with “a geared-up communism operating at full 
capacity”—a contest that in his estimation would be less a clash of mighty opposites than 
a family squabble.760 
According to Hansen, the (somewhat) capitalist nations were now grappling with 
the consequences of their more ordered world. “Social control tends to put society in a 
strait-jacket,” he wrote. “This might not be so bad in a static world,” he continued, “but it 
is very painful in a dynamic one.”761 The paradox was that attempts to govern society 
fostered greater economic uncertainty. When combined with his belief that business 
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fluctuations largely reflected technological shifts, this left Hansen skeptical of 
countercyclical policy. To make matters still more difficult, there was the perennial 
challenge of addressing problems that were often fundamentally international with the 
tools available to national governments. Hansen’s outlook was not entirely bleak. 
Rejecting the gold standard might open up more room for maneuvering, at least 
temporarily, although it would raise problems of its own. Purely domestic measures could 
help, too. Here, the Federal Reserve’s continued experimentation with open market 
operations—“one of the most vital problems immediately confronting the whole world,” 
he wrote—gave him some hope.762 But the fundamental economic logic of the business 
cycle endured. Government policy could relieve but not abolish the “birth pangs” 
required to bring forth a new world.763 
As the Depression unfolded, Hansen expanded the scope of his analysis, in the 
process undermining his earlier assumptions. He began to show greater concern for 
maintaining economic stability, but for reasons he described as more political than 
economic. This shift coincided with increased attention to the difficulties of economic 
management in a democracy—specifically, to the problem raised by voters and political 
leaders who “demonstrated a lack of capacity in self-control.”764 Displaying his 
characteristic sensitivity to paradox—a critic might have called it fetishization—Hansen 
argued that the challenges of compelling intemperate electorates to accept the restraints 
that sound economic policymaking required had become more acute in recent years 
because of advances within economics. Improvements in the production and 
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dissemination of economic statistics had introduced “a new and perhaps ominous fact in 
our national life.”765 “In former times,” he reminisced, 
we were more or less disposed to take things as they came. Indeed we had 
virtually no information on where we were from time to time in the trade 
cycle. Now all this has changed. Every newspaper carries charts and 
indices showing the progress of the recovery or of the recession, as the 
case may be. Almost everyone is more or less closely watching the 
development from day to day and from week to week. Reading the 
business cycle chart has become, so to speak, a national game, yet a 
desperately serious one, for on the turn of the cycle depend our jobs, our 
fortunes, and even, perchance, the survival of our established 
institutions.766 
 
The character of public life—of democracy itself—had been transformed. 
That tension was particularly evident to monetary policymakers. Though Hansen 
remained skeptical about the causal impact of money on the business cycle as a matter of 
theory, he believed that in practice “the institution of money is of overshadowing 
importance.”767 The price system provided the means through which democracies 
preserved freedom of choice in the economic sphere. Deploying a strained analogy, he 
wrote that “the money mechanism is called upon to drive the economic car upon the kind 
of a highway that modern democracies are constructing”—in contrast to totalitarian 
regimes, which could rely on more direct measures.768   
The shadow of totalitarianism hangs over these later writings. In the early years of 
the Depression, Hansen had warned against overstating the importance of economic 
stability. By 1936, he had changed his mind—a shift that, again, owed itself to the greater 
importance he attributed to politics. Radical economic uncertainty now threatened to 
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bring about radical dictatorships.769 Hansen did not believe the agent of revolution would 
be a working class endowed with consciousness of its powers, ready to topple an archaic 
regime by force; instead, it would be a revolution by default, where the evident failure of 
one order made its replacement inevitable. Seen from this vantage point, economic 
downturns became more than painful but necessary phases of the business cycle. As a 
question of economic theory, Hansen still saw merit in the argument; but the politics of 
the 1930s had made economic instability an existential threat.  
 
“WE ARE LIVING IN DANGEROUS TIMES,” Hansen warned his audience at the 
TNEC.770 That danger required economists to offer their counsel with humility, but it also 
made their advice, flawed though it may be, indispensable. Statistical evidence offered a 
way of sidestepping the tension in his argument, providing a seemingly neutral 
foundation for controversial policy recommendations. Kuznets’s work—“monumental,” 
Hansen called it—was a favorite point of reference, providing graphic illustration of the 
narrative he unspooled in front of the committee.771 Literally graphic: three of the four 
visual aids Hansen introduced in his opening session were taken from Kuznets. But 
Hansen stressed the limitations of his approach.  “One cannot emphasize too strongly,” 
he stated at the outset, “that we are dealing with material which is not subject to 
unequivocal mathematical demonstration.”772 The larger analytic framework was, 
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necessarily, even shakier. “We are caught,” he warned, “in the midst of powerful forces 
in the evolution of our economy which we but dimly understand.”773 
Hansen believed, however, that he had recently moved much closer to 
understanding those forces. Around the time he began his tenure at Harvard, he had 
become an enthusiastic advocate for a compensatory fiscal policy. This shift is still 
sometimes described as a Keynesian conversion. Certainly, his straightforward 
opposition to Keynes had diminished. A few years earlier, he had reprimanded a 
colleague for “follow[ing] too much along the Keynes line,” which he viewed “as 
definitely wrong.”774 That hostility was in keeping with his conviction that economic 
instability was a painful but necessary feature of a modern economy. After encountering 
The General Theory, Hansen still remained skeptical, writing at the end of a lengthy 
review that it “was more a symptom of economic trends than a foundation stone upon 
which a science can be built.”775 
 When Hansen included this review in a 1938 collection of previously published 
essays, he cut that concluding sentence. By 1936, he had already moved closer to Keynes. 
Or, to be more precise, he had followed with care one of the “trends” essential to 
Keynes’s own evolution. Hansen believed mounting government debt had turned the state 
into a mediator between the suppliers of capital—that is, savers—and prospective sources 
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of investment. “The government,” he asserted, “is becoming an investment banker.”776 
When he wrote this in 1936, Hansen was still not persuaded about fiscal policy’s ability 
to reverse the course of a business cycle, but he had a history that encouraged him to 
recognize its potential significance.  
Hansen also believed that following the release of The General Theory Keynes 
had moved closer to him. In a lecture to the Eugenics Society—a group Keynes served as 
director of between 1937 and 1944—the British economist had dwelled on the potentially 
dire economic consequences of a stagnant or contracting population.777 Keynes depicted 
himself as reversing a consensus that had existed since the turn of the nineteenth century, 
when Thomas Malthus claimed that population growth tended to outpace agricultural 
production. From the Malthusian perspective, expanding populations led to famine and 
painful regressions to the mean, while stationary populations made possible a general rise 
in standards of living. Keynes recognized that a static population could have benefits, but 
only if the state guarded against its dangers. Growing populations offered greater 
opportunities for investment, providing an outlet for capital and preventing 
unemployment. Eliminating that safety valve would force cutbacks in employment, 
unless the government compensated by creating a more favorable investment 
environment. As Keynes put it, there was a choice between devils—the Malthusian devil 
of population, and the contemporary devil of unemployment.  
That analysis resonated with Hansen, who in his TNEC testimony quoted another 
British economist—J.R. Hicks, a former Cambridge colleague of Keynes’s—speculating 
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“that perhaps the whole industrial revolution of the last 200 years has been nothing else 
but a large secular boom largely induced by the unparalleled rise in population.”778 A 
little later, he referred to the possibility of a falling population as “by far the most 
revolutionary event in modern times.”779 Expanding populations appealed to investors 
looking to ensure healthy rates of return. A static or declining population offered fewer 
options, choking off prospective investment and reducing employment in the present—
conditions that resembled the world Keynes had analyzed in his recent work. Rereading 
The General Theory, Hansen concluded that he had failed to grasp Keynes’s 
breakthrough, and that a more generous interpretation was in order. 
Hansen did not simply absorb Keynes’s thought, nor did he take his journey 
toward a broadly Keynesian position alone. Although a cascade of reviews followed hard 
on The General Theory’s publication, Keynes attracted few American disciples at first. In 
this early stage, sympathetic engagement with Keynes—the work of elaborating, 
revising, adapting—among professional economists in the United States was to a large 
degree confined to a single classroom. Called the Fiscal Policy Seminar, the course was 
run by Hansen and John Williams. Replicating at a national level the ambitions of the 
Commons seminar Hansen attended as a graduate student, the course was, effectively, a 
research center disguised as a class. Swaddled in nostalgia by former students, the 
seminar became an almost mythic totem in subsequent accounts. “One felt that it was the 
most important thing currently happening in the country,” Galbraith wrote, “and this 
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could have been the case.”780 Galbraith wildly exaggerated, but the hyperbole testified to 
the enthusiasm Hansen kindled.  
The seminar would go on for decades, but the template was set early. 
Participants—including undergraduates like Tobin, graduate students, other (typically 
young) professors like Wassily Leontief, and New Dealers visiting from Washington—
presented research and wrestled with the implications of the 1937 recession. In the 1939 
academic year alone, regular participants included economists from the Federal Reserve, 
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Treasury Department, the National Labor 
Relations Board, and the Social Security Board.781 A list of fifty-six subjects from one 
year had among its items “Government spending as a check to (a) a minor recession, (b) a 
major depression,” “Causes and implications of the decline in the role of central bank 
policy,” issues of particular relevance to the United States like “federal aid to states” and 
mainstays of Keynesian debate like the multiplier (the amount that overall spending rises 
in responses to an increase in government expenditures).782  
Two-hour meetings on Monday confined to academic discussion were followed 
by sessions on Friday where an outsider spoke. In the first three years of the seminar, 
visitors included a litany of Washington Keynesians, among them Marriner Eccles, Leon 
Henderson, and Isador Lubin. The seminar, however, brought in a more eclectic cast than 
this roster suggests. Lauchlin Currie visited twice, but so did his nemesis at the Fed, 
Emmanuel Goldenweiser. Also in attendance were Jacob Viner, Gunnar Myrdal, and 
Gardiner Means, who discussed The Structure of the American Economy. Debate after the 
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seminar continued until late in the evening, imbuing Cambridge with the energy of 
Roosevelt’s Washington.783  
Hansen drove the meeting, with Williams offering an intellectually skeptical but 
personally sympathetic vantage point on the proceedings. (Williams called Hansen “the 
closest friend I have ever had.”784) More a site of collective inquiry than of hierarchical 
instruction, both teachers appeared to students as “mother hens” presiding over a shared 
conversation, though it was not clear if Hansen, eyes closed underneath his trademark 
green eyeshade, was always paying attention.785 In his own recollections, Hansen named 
the first year of the seminar as his favorite, referring to it as a period when “we were all 
students trying to find our way about.”786 Stamped in memories, too, was the size of the 
proceedings: a room teeming with students, overflow spilling outside. This was the 
audience where Hansen tested ideas that later appeared in his writing, and in the writing 
of those who passed through the course, rising stars like Walter and William Salant, 
Emile Despres, Alan Sweezy, Richard Gilbert, and Paul Samuelson, all of whom went on 
become significant Washington Keynesians. The legacy would ramify for decades, when 
former students went on to posts in the Federal Reserve, Treasury, the State Department, 
and the Council of Economic Advisers—one alumnus became its chairman—along with 
academia and the business world. 
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Guidance from Keynes himself reached the seminar via participants who had 
spent time in Cambridge, one of whom prevailed upon his peers to read The General 
Theory immediately after its release. They defended Keynes on specific claims and 
illuminated the larger project, including one of its most compelling theoretical 
interventions—namely, Keynes’s shift from an economics focused on changes in price 
levels to one concerned with swings of employment and output. Here, again, national 
income received considerable attention. That was clear even before the course began, 
when one of Williams’s colleagues urged him “to give a good deal of attention to the 
seminar on Fiscal Policy or as I should prefer to call it Government and the National 
Income.”787 Economists had not needed Keynes’s license to address national income. But 
Keynes had supplied a conceptual framework that, when combined with the statistics 
governments were now generating in abundance, suggested the outlines of a potent new 
analytic.  
 
A SLENDER VOLUME WITH THE REVEALING TITLE An Economic Program for 
American Democracy provided one of the earliest suggestions of the discussion taking 
place in the Fiscal Policy Seminar.788 Published in the autumn of 1938, it briefly became 
a bestseller in Washington, where it was seen as one of the first serious attempts to 
reckon with the intellectual consequences of the 1937 recession. Seven authors, all 
economists at either Harvard or Tufts, were listed, but the preface noted that a handful of 
government officials who preferred to remain anonymous had also contributed.  
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While insisting that the New Deal had achieved “a striking degree of success,”789 
the book described the 1937 downturn as “a major catastrophe.”790 The most recent crisis, 
however, could only be understood if it were placed against a longer historical trajectory.  
Relying on a familiar New Deal periodization, it split American history in two: before 
and after 1929. That was the year when the consequences of two monumental shifts—the 
closing of the frontier, and a reduction in population growth—became apparent. An age 
of easy expansion had come to a halt, and if the steady rise in national output that had 
defined earlier American history were to continue, then the nature of growth would have 
to change. They backed up this abstract commitment with proposals designed to bolster 
consumption: old-age benefits, federal aid for education and healthcare, workmen’s 
compensation, unemployment relief, and “[d]ecent minimum wages and maximum 
hours.”791 Fiscal policy had a place, but as one instrument in a larger repertoire. The 
authors sounded more radical notes too—for instance, writing that if commercial banks 
sought to undermine the credit of a deficit-spending government “the public would 
clearly be justified in assuming control of the entire banking system.”792 Continuities 
with earlier reform movements were evident too—in condemnations of monopoly as a 
major impediment to recovery, in denunciations of corporations that pursued profit at the 
expense of the larger social good, and in vigorous support for labor. 
But the authors emphasized the novelty of their vision, above all when it came to 
the unfamiliar subject of the economy. Neither citizens nor governments, they claimed, 
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had yet grasped the particular challenges of managing an economy. “Few people are 
accustomed to thinking in terms of the economy as a whole,” they wrote, “much less in 
terms of the economy as an expanding organism.”793 Pointing to the recent experience of 
“governments which refused to accept the responsibility for the proper functioning of 
their national economies,” the authors traced the rise of dictatorships to failures of 
economic administration.794 Small wonder the book’s first chapter, setting out the context 
for everything to come, was titled “The Crisis of the American Economy.” Weaving 
together the book’s central themes, it depicted the economic crisis as a threat to 
democracy itself.  
What path led away from this crisis? With the economy staked as the terrain on 
which they would wage their battle, the authors nominated a single measurement as both 
a target for policy and arbiter of their success. “Here in America,” they declared, “we can 
save our free democratic institutions only by using them to expand our national 
income.”795 The economy was the object, and national income the tool for measuring 
their progress. Pairing a general goal with a numerical value, they asserted, “The 
government must assume responsibility for maintaining the national income,” and 
claimed their proposals would boost that income by $4 to $5 billion dollars.796 Mobilizing 
both the idea and the statistics of the economy for their agenda, they chained the destiny 
of the United States to its national income, then maintained that only “conscious social 
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endeavor” organized by the state would guarantee its continued escalation—and thereby 
preserve American democracy.797  
 
ALL THIS SEEMED LIKE OLD NEWS TO HANSEN, who grumbled that the major 
ideas in the book had come out of his work. He had a chance to sketch his own 
interpretation in December of 1938, a month after the release of An Economic Program. 
Delivering the presidential address of the American Economic Association, he observed 
that at this year’s meeting attention had focused on “a single, though broadly inclusive, 
subject”—“The Changing American Economy.”798 Hansen’s speech followed this 
pattern. Titled “Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth,” it is today 
remembered for its evocation of a coming “mature economy,” or what Hansen elsewhere 
called a “nonexpansionist economy.”799  
For Hansen, the mature economy was both a technical concept—an economy 
where the ratio of capital formation to national income ratcheted downward and 
population growth dwindled—and the most recent stage in a longer history. Having lost 
confidence in the ability of cycles to correct themselves, Hansen feared the advent of 
“secular stagnation—sick recoveries which die in their infancy and depressions which 
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feed on themselves.”800 Predicting “a structural change no less basic and profound” than 
the Industrial Revolution, Hansen proclaimed that “We are passing, so to speak, over a 
divide which separates the great era of growth and expansion of the nineteenth century 
from an era which no man, unwilling to embark on pure conjecture, can as yet 
characterize with clarity or precision.”801 With that display of epistemic humility 
completed, Hansen embarked on his own round of conjectures. 
Hansen’s view of the future was heavily influenced by his earlier intellectual 
formation. He retained the historical orientation and concern with institutions broadly 
defined—technology, resources, population, territory—that had characterized his 
scholarship from the beginning. The attention to the political economy of democracy that 
had become more pronounced since the onset of the Depression also endured. Adding his 
name to the roster of theorists who pronounced the death of laissez faire, he asserted that 
the twinned forces of corporate monopoly and union organization had obliterated the 
“impersonal and non-political” economic order.802 “It remains to be seen,” he warned, 
“whether political democracy can in the end survive the disappearance of the automatic 
price system.”803  
For all the continuities with his earlier work, this was not the Hansen his 
colleagues thought they knew. The mature economy was one example of his changed 
perspective, but he matched that gloomy prediction with a new source of optimism. 
Formerly dubious about the merits of fiscal policy, he had become a qualified convert. 
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The recalibration of his position came near the end of his address, when Hansen broached 
the subject of national income and government spending. Walking his audience through 
recent economic history, he traced the fall of “our national income” from its 1929 peak of 
about $80 billion to its Depression nadir at around half that amount. Americans had 
weathered that decline, but Hansen considered it a lucky break, maintaining “ that we 
cannot afford to let our income fall materially below $65,000,000,000, or say 
$60,000,000,000” without risking consequences “too serious to contemplate.”804 He now 
believed shrewd fiscal policy could avert that catastrophe. Again, he attached a number to 
this commitment. Though government spending could not ensure perpetual growth, it 
could keep national income around $70 billion—luckily enough, a total well above crisis 
levels. 
This was, clearly, a discussion of national income filtered through a distinctive 
political vision. Hansen believed that the efficacy of deficit spending tapered off at the 
$70 billion mark not because of a timeless economic law but because of the structure of 
the American economy, and polity. The “danger point,” he argued, was 
“reached sooner in a democratic country than in a totalitarian state.”805 Within 
democracies, the “precise point” turned on “the degree of discipline and self-restraint 
which the various economic groups have achieved or can achieve under democratic 
institutions.”806 The range of possible reactions to a uniform stimulus captured the 
challenge of economic governance, and paved the way for a conclusion that returned to 
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one of Hansen’s favorite themes: “There are no easy answers to the problems that 
confront us.”807 
  Yet Hansen’s search continued. Though his 1938 lecture has attracted renewed 
attention during our own Great Recession, it is typically discussed without reference to 
Hansen’s other writings, except perhaps a glancing nod to his reversal on deficit 
spending. But Hansen’s intellectual evolution continued after 1938, and his first major 
reckoning did not appear until 1941, with the publication of his next major work, Fiscal 
Policy and Business Cycles. One of the most significant forgotten texts of the twentieth 
century, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles was widely recognized following its release 
as the fullest defense yet offered of the latest turn in New Deal economics. It was a 
personal document, one that captured Hansen’s transformation over the 1930s, along with 
how much he kept from his earlier theorizing. But students in the Fiscal Policy Seminar, 
many of whom were thanked in the acknowledgments for their contributions, also treated 
it as a summary of their collective enterprise, and a more rigorous development of 
“Keynesianism” than anything offered by Keynes himself. Neglected even by historians, 
it demands a reappraisal today. 
 
A CHANGE WAS EVIDENT from the title alone. Pairing fiscal policy with business 
cycles, it highlighted a historic shift that Hansen dwelled on at length. In his AEA 
address, Hansen described had business cycles as “the problem of the nineteenth 
century.”808 Now he elaborated that thesis. Business cycles, he contended, were products 
of a “unique era of extensive growth” fueled by an expanding population, the acquisition 
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of new territories, and rapid technological advance.809 The mature economy of the 
twentieth century presented a different set of obstacles. While the Depression could be 
partly explained as the latest cyclical downturn, it also marked a more fundamental 
departure. The waning of extensive growth had taken the “atomistic order” of nineteenth 
century economic life down with it.810  
The rise of full employment as a policy ideal, and the declining significance of the 
business cycle as such, were both consequences of this transition. In contemporary 
conditions, failing to achieve full employment threatened economic ruin and political 
chaos. Faced with this dire prospect, only two options remained: “democratic planning 
and totalitarian regimentation.”811 Fiscal policy became for Hansen a quintessential 
example of democratic planning in action—a government policy that respected individual 
autonomy while promoting the full employment of existing resources. It was also the 
twentieth century’s solution to the problem of growth, a sequel to earlier methods—
territorial expansion, a burgeoning population—no longer available in a mature economy.  
Hansen’s intervention in economic theory was also a foray in the history of 
economic thought. Though Hansen defined the nineteenth century as the age of the 
business cycle, he claimed—echoing a generally accepted belief among economists—that 
awareness of the business cycles as such had not emerged until the twentieth century. 
Here, the pivotal event was the 1913 publication of Wesley Mitchell’s Business Cycles. 
“Rarely, indeed, has the central thesis of any book become so much an accepted part of 
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the thinking of an entire society,” Hansen observed.812 Mitchell’s work also constituted a 
theoretical innovation of the highest order—“The first really revolutionary change in 
economic thought” since the eighteenth century, in Hansen’s evaluation.813 By reckoning 
with economic instability, business cycle theorists overturned the fantasy of seamless 
economic adjustment, where prices maintained an exquisite balance of supply and 
demand. Set against this background, students of fiscal policy became the followers of a 
tradition started with research into the business cycle, and Hansen’s latest opus turned 
into a bid to alter “the thinking of an entire society” as Mitchell had before him.814 
While Hansen insinuated that he would be happy to become his generation’s 
Mitchell, there was little in the book that suggested a unique affiliation with Keynes. The 
first explicit reference to Keynes does not occur until more than halfway through the 
book. He is a more frequent character in the second half, but for the most part only 
mentioned in passing. Overall, Keynes received about as many citations as the much less 
celebrated Arthur Spiethoff, and fewer than Kuznets. Though Hansen used concepts 
developed by Keynes in The General Theory, he treated them as tools that could be used, 
and modified, as he saw fit.  
Direct citations, of course, are a poor metric of influence, and one of the book’s 
most revealing dialogues was almost subterranean. From the first page, Fiscal Policy and 
Business Cycles joined its positive program to an extended critique of Marx. Hansen kept 
the debate implicit, but the argument is there. Tying the Depression to the outbreak of 
World War II—well underway, albeit without American troops, when the book appeared 
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in 1941—Hansen traced “the failure to achieve a world order in the political sphere” to 
“the facts of economic frustration.”815 But this was an economic interpretation that 
rejected a Marxist narrative centered on the development of capitalism, and that as a 
consequence reached very different conclusions about the prospects of reform. 
The contrast expressed itself most vividly in Hansen’s discussion of fiscal 
policy’s origins, here depicted as the result on an ongoing “socialization of income.”816 
“While avowed socialists had their eyes fixed on the goal of social ownership of the 
means of production,” Hansen wrote, they missed an alternative history unfolding “more 
by accident than by design”—namely, the invention of compensatory fiscal policy.817 An 
ensemble of factors had to come together at just the right time for this option to present 
itself: a steady escalation of government expenditures that began around the turn of the 
twentieth century; the experience of World War I, which revealed the enormous social 
changes that progressive taxation could effect; and a Great Depression that spurred the 
government to pour vast sums into unemployment relief, which turned out to have 
benefits for the economy that even advocates of these programs had underestimated.  
Blindness to this history could be attributed in part to the difficulty of seeing the 
problem from the appropriate perspective. “The fiscal policies of the state cannot be 
conceived in terms of the collections of private enterprise,” Hansen argued, but only from 
their consequences for “the economy as a whole.”818 Hansen’s vision of the future 
encouraged him to revisit, and rewrite, the history of economic thought. Like Keynes in 
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his lecture on population, Hansen knew he was challenging traditional optimism about 
the possibilities of what prior economists had called the stationary state. Part of Hansen’s 
revision was terminological: “mature economy,” he asserted, was a better name for the 
phenomenon than “stationary state”—another marker of how far economic thought and 
policy had come since the nineteenth century.819  
But Hansen’s push to change the vocabulary was tied to a deeper critique. “The 
earlier economists looked forward to the stationary state,” he wrote, foreseeing a period 
that “would not have to carry the burden incident to continuous expansion” and “could 
enjoy in the present the full productive power of the society.”820 Hansen viewed this 
argument with skepticism. Business cycle theorists had first troubled the optimism of 
their predecessors by pointing out the frictions that would hinder the transition to a post-
expansionary society. For his own part, Hansen considered the likelihood of arriving at 
the stationary state “improbable.”821 Territorial expansion might have come to a close, 
and the population would probably fall, but technological innovation, helped along by 
appropriate fiscal policy, could provide for continued growth. And that was a good thing, 
because, given continued productivity increases, even a static national income “would 
wreck the economic order.”822 Nineteenth-century growth rates might be unattainable, but 
Americans had a right to expect more than stagnation for the remainder of the century—
around two-percent growth annually, Hansen estimated.  
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The shift Hansen tracked was also reflected in less dramatic changes. Consider, 
for example, the relevance of national income. For Hansen, it could serve as an 
unproblematic marker of economic performance. But he recognized this had not always 
been the case. Debates about the stationary state had erupted in the 1880s, prompted not 
by reports of a plateau in national income but by weakness in measurements of the 
industry that, Hansen noted, at the time served as “the central barometer of prosperity and 
economic activity, of which everyone was more or less consciously aware”: railroads.823  
Hansen recognized the logic of this decision. Railroads were the major investment 
of the period, and the dynamics of investment were central to his economic theory. 
Historians tend to link the rise of fiscal policy with a politics centered on consumerism, 
while economists often depict Keynesianism as focused upon investment.824 Grasping 
Hansen’s argument clarifies this seeming contradiction. According to Hansen, although 
consumption was crucial to overall economic performance, it was also stable: people 
spent and saved in a generally fixed ratio. The durability of this relationship—known 
among economists as the consumption function—is what gave swings in the rate of 
investment such influence over the business cycle. Investment was the source of volatility 
in what could otherwise be a placid economic scene, which is why having the 
government step in when businesses had withdrawn could prove such a steadying force. 
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When opportunities for investment flourished, this instability went hand in hand with 
growth; when they receded, dependence on investment led to stagnation, or depression.  
This provided the background for the emergence of fiscal policy, an instrument 
that worked on both consumption and investment, thereby simultaneously promoting 
economic and social stability. Although nineteenth-century sources of extensive 
investment were no longer available, the stimulus to consumption provided by 
government spending could take their place. Consumption would rise, thanks to a push 
from the public coffers, and investment would follow.  A theory of investment justified a 
politics devoted to bolstering consumption.825 
But Hansen wanted more than just a compensatory fiscal policy regime. He called 
his preferred system “the dual consumption economy” and traced the conditions for its 
appearance to a socialization of both production and income that had begun at the close 
of the nineteenth century then accelerated in recent decades.826 The corporation’s rise was 
evidence enough of the former, and he found support for the latter in everything from 
public housing to social security. While socialists had frequently responded to this trend 
by calling for further socialization of the means of production, Hansen favored 
socialization of consumption. Bringing more investment under the purview of the state 
could promote stability, he granted, but socialization of consumption was more 
conducive to full employment. A dual consumption economy would mix elements of 
public and private control—hence the “dual”—while boosting overall consumption 
levels, thereby cutting back on investment and easing the transition to economic maturity. 
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This was not the stationary state produced by the automatic workings of the price system 
that earlier economists had predicted, but Hansen believed it was as close to that ideal as 
a modern society would come.   
More in line with Keynes than anything Hansen published before his move to 
Harvard, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles was nevertheless far from a recapitulation of 
The General Theory. For Keynes, the crucial problem was moving from an equilibrium 
characterized by high unemployment to an equilibrium of low unemployment. This was a 
more static understanding of the issue, a matter of bumping from one level to another. 
Hansen, as he had been from the start of his career, was concerned with the trajectories of 
change. A historical narrative framed his analysis, and continued to set him apart from 
Keynes. 
It also separated him from the views that dominated the early New Deal. 
Dismissing the experience of the NRA with a shrug, he devoted a few paragraphs to the 
limitations of economic management via the manipulation of prices before moving on to 
the questions he considered truly significant. Hansen had no time for utopian rhapsodies, 
and he characterized his program of securing full employment through government 
spending as “essentially a conservative proposal.”827 He supported this interpretation by 
noting that, unlike rival programs, fiscal policy did not “necessarily” require a 
redistribution of income—a description that was, in part, a defense against critics who 
dismissed his program as concealed communism.828 Despite Hansen’s assurances, 
however, the debate over the politics of fiscal policy had only just begun. 
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ONE OF THE MOST STRIKING IRONIES in Hansen’s long career is that his 
appearance before the TNEC, which became a set piece in economists’ later histories of 
their profession’s ascent, was barely noticed at the time. It had a few publicists, including 
Walter Lippmann, who insisted that “irreconcilable controversy would give way to 
constructive debate among men be they economists, Republican businessmen, or New 
Dealers, who have studied and digested the Hansen and Currie testimony.”829 But even 
the sympathetic New Republic noted that most reporters had ignored his effort.830  
By contrast, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, forgotten today, was at the time 
treated as a milestone. A lengthy review in the New York Times deemed it “the best 
exposition of the compensated economy idea that has yet been produced.”831 The New 
Republic, finally able to give Hansen the attention his supporters though he deserved, 
called it “the necessary economics manual” for a coming planned society, and listed it 
alongside works from Bertrand Russell, Arthur Koestler, and Reinhold Niebhur as one of 
the year’s hundred notable books.832 In the Nation, Paul Sweezy—co-author of An 
Economic Program for American Democracy, and at the time an instructor at Harvard 
looking for ways to bridge the divide between the left wing of his university’s economics 
department and Marxism—praised Hansen for having done more to rescue “bourgeois 
political economy” from its long-standing “devotion to superficial apologetics and 
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elegant irrelevancies” than any other American.833 (Though Sweezy did not think 
Hansen’s theory capable of entirely transcending its bourgeois limitations, such as 
blindness to “the real nature of the capitalist system itself,” ruled by an elite that “seeks 
its own self-expansion and cares not a hang for a smoothly working economy or for the 
consumption of the masses if they stand in the way.”834)  
Academic journals also depicted the book as a major accomplishment. Simon 
Kuznets reviewed it twice, shuttling in characteristic fashion between technical criticism 
and the reflections on the broadest questions raised by Hansen. (A footnote thanked 
Milton Friedman for assisting him with one of those technical objections.835 Meanwhile, 
in private, Kuznets’s colleagues at the NBER complained that Hansen “deal[t] with 
critical issues in a slippery way."836) Though Kuznets expressed doubt about the 
imminence of secular stagnation, he seconded the call for “more active participation by 
public authorities in economic affairs,” a trend which he regarded, in any case, as 
“inevitable.”837 The question was not whether the state would become more powerful but 
how it would use these new powers. Blending the empirical and the ideological, he urged 
the formation “of a fiscal philosophy, system of accounting, and an arsenal of 
procedures” tailored to the age.838 He concluded by turning to “a wider view” that, he 
acknowledged, “might lead us far outside the realms of traditional economic discipline” 
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but was nonetheless essential.839 Citing Germany under Hitler and Britain before 
Churchill as cautionary examples, he warned that economists must consider the 
pernicious ends a newly empowered state might serve. 
Kuznets’s forebodings were amplified in the most sustained, and most critical, of 
the book’s reviews. The University of Chicago economist Henry Simons—like Kuznets, 
another of Friedman’s mentors—was known among economists for supporting what he 
termed “a positive program for laissez-faire” that set him at odds with the vision catching 
fire in Cambridge and Washington.840 Simons began his lengthy essay with a tribute, 
calling Hansen’s book “the academic apology par excellence for the inner New Deal” and 
predicting that it would “become the economic bible for that . . . recklessly collectivist” 
band of intellectuals he opposed.841 After perceptively designating the book “a strange 
amalgam of Keynes, Schumpter, and Spiethoff,” he castigated Hansen for his continued 
belief in business cycles—like Fisher, Simons was a doubter—and for dismissing the 
value of monetary policy. From Simons’s perspective, Hansen’s proposals were just 
another kind of monetary policy, and Hansen the perpetrator of a linguistic trick that 
restricted the definition of monetary policy to actions undertaken by central banks. 
Simons favored a broader definition—here, again, sharing much with Fisher—that 
encompassed a more robust agenda. For Simons, this was more than quibbling over 
terminology. Hansen’s sleight of hand disguised the real debate between advocates of 
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increased government deficits and those, like Fisher and Simons, who still believed that 
increasing the money supply was sufficient.  
Simons recognized that arguments over economics were inevitably political. 
Failing to acknowledge this was yet another weakness, he argued, of Hansen’s text. He 
chastised supporters of fiscal policy for obscuring this point by using the supposed 
necessity of public investments to avoid secular stagnation to avoid what should be 
political debates about the merits of government ownership. He foresaw a system with 
“no clearly defined socialized sector but only promiscuous intrusion of governmental 
enterprise all over the place,” a condition that “should be even more distressing to good 
socialists than to old-fashioned liberals” like himself.842 Then there was the question of 
how much leeway policymakers should have—a question Simons believed was especially 
important to ask in a democracy. “Only with rules of policy,” he argued, “can 
government by intelligent discussion prevail” and democracy be protected against the 
threat posed by corrupt special interests and self-interested politicians.843 The country 
needed a “a real monetary religion” that would provide the foundation for a “monetary 
constitution grounded in expert and popular approval and binding upon” the state.844 
Discretionary policymaking was, from this vantage point, inherently undemocratic—the 
smiling face of an elite claiming to act for a public not capable of governing itself.  
Confined to the pages of a scholarly journal, Simons’s argument gained little 
traction even within the academy, but it would eventually find a more receptive audience. 
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A better marker of where the profession was heading at the time came not from any of 
the reviews but in one of the book’s most striking chapters in Hansen’s book. On the 
surface, there was little in it to attract attention. Technically, it was not even a chapter, 
just an appendix with the unpromising title “A Statistical Analysis of the Consumption 
Function.”845 Composed in a more mathematically demanding style than the rest of the 
text, it was presented in a smaller font that made it literally more difficult to read.  The 
appendix was not even written by Hansen, but by his protégé, Paul Samuelson, at the 
time a Harvard graduate student.846  
Despite all the warning signs, the section revealed much about what economics 
was becoming. The consumption function was the name given Keynes’s attempt to 
establish a mathematical relationship between consumption and income, and it was one 
of the crucial weapons in the Keynesian arsenal. Samuelson’s rigorous analysis of the 
consumption function, which relied heavily on Kuznets’s statistical research, offered 
tentative support for Keynes’s conclusions. But the steps taken to reach that endorsement 
indicated how much room for adaptation remained. It also pointed to a much larger 
transformation within economics that would have profound consequences for the battle to 
define Keynesianism—a battle that would soon be won by advocates of an approach that 
Keynes’s students in Cambridge termed “bastard Keynesianism.”847  
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Samuelson became his generation’s most effective proponent of this 
bastardized—or, as he saw it, modernized—Keynesianism. But he was explicit about his 
debt to Hansen: “my own early reputation,” he wrote, “received much too much credit for 
merely analyzing mathematically what was essentially Hansen’s own system.”848 A new 
kind of economics was emerging, and Samuelson would become a key broker between 
policymakers in Washington and practitioners of the more mathematically sophisticated 
work that would become the field’s cutting edge. At the close of the 1930s, however, a 
different set of concerns and a different kind of expert were setting the tempo of the 
debate.   
 
WELL INTO ITS SECOND TERM, the New Deal had not yet developed a “socio-
economic” policy.849 This was the conclusion of a telegram sent to Warm Springs, 
Georgia, Roosevelt’s favorite retreat from the White House. Its author, Beardsley Ruml, 
was a familiar figure among New Dealers.850 Even before Roosevelt’s 1933 inauguration, 
Rexford Tugwell had called Ruml one of the country’s “chief social inventors.”851 A 
majordomo of the social sciences in the 1920s, when he was an important figure in the 
Rockefeller philanthropic empire, in 1935 Ruml had taken the position opened by 
Mitchell’s departure from the National Resources Committee. It was a fitting move, since 
it was on Ruml’s suggestion that Tugwell had urged Roosevelt in 1933 to consider the 
recommendations for a planning board made by Hoover’s Committee on Recent Social 
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Trends.852  By that point, Ruml was on his way to becoming, as the New Yorker later 
dubbed him, “The National Idea Man.”853 
Although Ruml earned his doctorate in psychology, his portfolio had expanded 
since graduate school, and he had made himself a kind of all-purpose advisor on domestic 
policy.854 Willing to serve either party, he was a registered Republican who regularly 
pulled the lever for Democrats. As for his other tastes, according to a 1943 profile in Life, 
Ruml favored “bull sessions, Bach and bright blue pants but no exercise.”855 (The 
magazine had difficulty moving past Ruml’s physique: a picture of the portly Ruml 
resting on a couch ran above the caption “Ruml pursues his favorite exercise of sitting 
still.”856) In 1938, Ruml was not yet such a well-known figure, but he had his 
characteristic enthusiasm for ideas. At the time, no project occupied more of his attention 
than making a “socio-economic” policy for the New Deal.    
 Ruml contrasted his “socio-economic” agenda with a “socio-financial” approach 
that would offer unemployment relief while keeping spending and taxation steady.  These 
policies compelled government officials to accept the limitations imposed by the 
“financial necessities” of the existing system, and led to “economic strain and deficiency 
in production and on the financial side, no corresponding increase in confidence.”857 His 
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method—“economic” rather than “financial”—sought to expand productive capacity by 
using deficit spending to strengthen purchasing power. 
Along with the other members of the NRC, Ruml had been working on this 
program for more than a year. In June 1937, Roosevelt had announced the launching of a 
NRC study exploring ways the government could lift national income, though he refused 
to name a target.858 Begun at a time of economic optimism, the project took on greater 
urgency as recognition of the latest downturn spread. One week after meeting with 
Currie, Henderson, and Lubin in November 1937, Roosevelt called a special session of 
Congress, where he said the recent decline in national income was “a matter of definite 
concern.” In his State of the Union address two months later, Roosevelt shifted from 
expressing alarm to setting a target, declaring that “our objective is to raise it to ninety or 
one hundred billion dollars.”859 The “ninety or one hundred billion dollars” lacked the 
precision economists preferred, but even that broad suggestion marked a profound 
departure from his position just a few months earlier. 
How to achieve this goal was still unclear, and that was what brought Roosevelt 
and a team of advisers to Warm Springs in the spring of 1938. In the flurry of documents 
generated during this period, a memorandum drafted by Ruml with assistance from 
Henderson and a WPA deputy named Aubrey Williams exerted a special influence. One 
of the crispest rationales yet produced for compensatory fiscal policy, it revealed how far 
New Dealers had travelled since 1933. A conviction that fundamental structural changes 
demanding a comprehensive response from the government had carried over from the 
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early days of the administration; so had a belief that properly designed policies would 
benefit the nation as a whole, not just particular classes. But the authors emphasized the 
novelty of their ambitions, writing that the full program had only come together “within 
recent weeks,” and that if implemented it would “have a profound effect on current 
public policy.”860 Gone was the aspiration of remaking society outright; in its place was 
the hope—just as significant in its own way, but different in character—of creating an 
expanding economy. 
It started with mathematics. Drawing on studies from the National Resources 
Committee, Ruml and Henderson’s memo set out “the arithmetic of the present crisis.”861 
Achieving “reasonable full employment” required a national income of $88 billion, well 
above the current $68 billion.862 Estimating that it would take at least $7 billion of 
additional spending or investment to make up that difference, and assuming that private 
enterprise could generate at most $4 billion, that left $3 billion of government support as 
a “minimum.”863 (Ruml and Henderson would have preferred $6 billion, but they 
concluded that under realistic conditions “3 can be attained only with difficulty and 6 is 
out of the question.”864) The numbers were daunting, but they were dwarfed by a still 
greater figure: $200 billion, the amount the report estimated the United States had lost 
because of unused productive capacity since 1929. It was a bracing total, one that had the, 
presumably intentional, effect of making $3 billion seem paltry by comparison.  
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But the memo was more than an intellectual exercise. (An editor at Life might 
have commented that this was the only kind of exercise Ruml enjoyed.) Using the 
standard New Deal periodization, Ruml and Henderson depicted government spending as 
the solution to a problem created by the closing of the frontier. “If the tangible national 
domain has been exhausted and we are not agreeable for foreign conquest,” Ruml and 
Henderson argued, “the intangible national domain will provide a rich field for 
exploration by a new type of explorer.”865  
That was not the only aspect of their program tailored to the American frame. 
“National intervention to stimulate consumption,” they claimed, was “the democratic 
method” of economic governance. Policymakers looking to bolster purchasing power 
could stimulate either consumption or production. Ruml and Henderson termed the 
second approach  “planned economy,” and associated it with “the totalitarian state” 
favored by both Stalin and Hitler (and, in a less menacing comparison, Alexander 
Hamilton).866 Boosting consumption was democratic because it preserved competition, 
placing the desires of “the whole culture expressing itself through actions of individual 
consumers” over “the judgment or caprice of a few.”867 This was a nod to the anti-
monopoly tradition whose advocates had clashed fiercely with the social planners of the 
early New Deal. Competition was a fact of contemporary life, not some obsolete 
nineteenth-century ideal. There was, however, a caveat: “competition in a time of 
advancing purchasing power,” they wrote, “is a far different thing from competition at a 
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time when purchasing power is declining.”868  (A point Hansen also made in his critique 
of the administered-prices thesis.) Recession fostered combination, while expansion 
provided the ideal environment for a vigorous marketplace. Lifting national income 
would do more than maximize production and employment: it would fortify an economic 
system in danger of breaking down. 
Not that the order of things prior to the Depression could be maintained in every 
respect. Ruml and Henderson insisted that the 1937 downturn had deep causes—“much 
more fundamental,” they wrote, “than is generally recognized.”869 They were vague about 
what precisely those factors were, although they named a tendency toward 
overproduction encouraged by technological improvements. Whatever the cause, they 
were emphatic in their portrayal of deficit spending as a response to basic transformations 
in American life. As Currie phrased it, in a memo of his own, “we face chronic stagnation 
unless the Government, through its actions, provides a continuing outlet for saving or 
canalizes a portion of potential savings back into consumption.”870 This was structural 
reform, but of a very different kind than what anyone in the Brain Trust had envisioned in 
1933.  
Seen from this vantage point, the history of the New Deal took on a different 
shape. Consider Social Security. Meant to provide stability for the elderly, the program at 
first collected more in taxes than it disbursed, making it a frequent object of complaint 
from the deficit spenders. Hansen, who turned down an offer to serve as head economist 
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of the Social Security Board, was intimately familiar with the problem; so was Currie, 
who credited “long discussions” with Roosevelt on reforming Social Security’s financing 
with the president’s eventual support for deficit spending. 871 Then there was the New 
Deal itself. As one of Hansen’s reviewers noted in a discussion of Fiscal Policy and 
Business Cycles, judged by its overall deficits, the New Deal’s vaunted recovery program 
looked “pitiably small.”872 
But there was more to a socio-economic policy than recovery, and Ruml and 
Henderson insisted that much of the New Deal should be saved. Here, again, national 
income provided the lens through which they viewed the world. “[E]ven with a national 
income of from eighty to ninety billion dollars,” they wrote, “millions of people will fail 
through automatic processes to receive a share adequate to maintain a decent standard of 
living.”873 Roosevelt had earlier suggested the contrary, saying in a 1937 press 
conference that a sufficiently robust national income could mean the end of other welfare 
programs—“even relief of unemployables,” the New York Times reported, “for with the 
added income, some one [sic] in the family will take care of the needy.”874 That was not 
the program Ruml and Henderson, or Currie and Hansen, supported. For this group, fiscal 
policy was not an alternative to the New Deal; it was the means through which its 
greatest achievements could be protected.  
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TWO WEEKS AFTER RUML AND HENDERSON dashed off their memo, Roosevelt 
carried their message to a national audience. In an address to Congress, he proposed $3 
billion in new expenditures, lifting passages from the Warm Springs memo with minimal 
revisions. Millions more heard an expanded version of his argument that night, when 
Roosevelt made it the subject of a fireside chat. It was one of the longest radio addresses 
he had ever delivered, and one of the most remarkable. The president who in 1935 
complained after reading a collection of articles from academic economists that “it is 
almost impossible to figure out what they mean,” now refashioned himself as an 
evangelist for a breakaway faction within the discipline.875 Using colloquial language, 
Roosevelt translated economists’ debates—“jargon; absolute jargon,” he had called it—
into the stuff of everyday life, and he relied on the unprecedented reach a president 
enjoyed in an age of radio to make these arguments into, literally, household words.876  
National income was the outstanding feature in his tour of the economic 
landscape. Roosevelt was painstaking in his explanation, telling his listeners that national 
income was “not the Government's income”—a common definition in earlier decades—
“but the total of the income of all the individual citizens and families of the United 
States.”877 After summarizing the statistic’s fluctuations since 1929, he declared that “all 
the energies of government and business must be directed to increasing the national 
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income.”878 Only a rising national income, he continued, would boost employment and 
provide “a feeling of security to all people in all walks of life.”879 Echoing arguments 
from his economists, Roosevelt portrayed deficit spending as a successor to the donations 
of land the government had made in nineteenth century, making the expansion of national 
income a sequel to the geographical expansion of an earlier era. And, again following the 
counsel of his economic advisers, he traced the recession to weakness in consumer 
demand.  
But Roosevelt still insisted that his ultimate objective was more than simply 
economic. Insufficient purchasing power had caused the recession, and from this 
Roosevelt concluded that “it is up to us to create an economic upturn.”880 The campaign 
to raise national income provided another way for the public to act together—that is, 
democratically. This allowed Roosevelt to portray his latest turn as an extension of the 
New Deal’s most important project. “Your Government,” he announced, “seeking to 
protect democracy, must prove that Government is stronger than the forces of business 
depression.”881 A national income target pursued via deficit spending was a new 
variation, but, according to Roosevelt, the ultimate goal had remained constant.  
The speech drew praise from unexpected quarters. Even Irving Fisher, still a 
tireless advocate of monetary policy, had kind words for the president’s “magnificent 
message,” complete with “proposals big enough to meet the present emergency.”882 But 
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New Dealers were more concerned with the views of the general public. Growing 
attention to national income, encouraged by the administration’s setting of an explicit 
target, brought the topic into the spotlight. Specialists in national income were dragged 
along too: in January 1938, Simon Kuznets received his first mention in the New York 
Times, which attributed its coverage of his latest monograph to the “interest recently 
focused by President Roosevelt on the need of an annual income of 
$100,000,000,000.”883 That April, just a few days before Roosevelt’s fireside chat, the 
newspaper published an article that attempted to demystify the confusing subject, running 
under the headline “National Income: Just What Is It?”884 Returning to the question in 
January 1939, it published a story pegged to the Commerce Department’s forthcoming 
release of “undoubtedly the most monumental and complexly constructed single figure 
that comes out of any government accounting mill in an year—the figure on the annual 
national income of the American economy.”885 Again, the paper drew attention to the 
issue’s political relevance, noting that White House officials believed hitting their 
national income target would prove “the solution or at least the great amelioration of the 
country’s biggest problems.”886  
Increasingly sophisticated statistics justified this confidence, at least in the eyes of 
Washington’s Keynesians, who were often in charge of producing those measurements. 
The Commerce Department study of the national income reported on by the Times, for 
example, was co-authored by Richard Gilbert, a former student of Hansen’s at Harvard 
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and a driving force behind the publication of An Economic Program for American 
Democracy. At Commerce, Gilbert drew on statistics generated by the government over 
the last decade, with special reliance on Currie’s work, to make the case for 
compensatory fiscal policy. 887 
For those with the requisite training, the change from the use of national income 
statistics earlier in the New Deal was extraordinary. When earlier government agencies 
had used national income measurements, they had relied on them chiefly to explain 
trends within specific industries. By the end of the decade, they had become an essential 
tool for predicting the behavior of the economy as a whole, exposing the relationship 
between national income and employment, or that year’s expected tax returns. The New 
Deal’s economists were aware, too, of being part of a global trend. In 1939, the same year 
Gilbert’s report appeared, the League of Nation’s released national-income estimates for 
twenty-six countries.888  
1939 was also the year Roosevelt asserted “that down in their hearts the American 
public—industry, agriculture, finance—want this Congress to do whatever needs to be 
done to raise our national income to eighty billion dollars a year.”889 (A first step on the 
road to $90 billion.) Tying his presidency’s fate to a number would have seemed a 
curious strategy in 1933, but in Roosevelt’s telling it became the latest step in the New 
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Deal’s triumphant march. Reflecting on his administration’s record, his State of the 
Union address returned to the central theme of his first campaign for the White House. 
“Above all,” he said, “we have made the American people conscious of their 
interrelationship and their interdependence.”890 That shift in national consciousness had 
occurred in tandem with a reinvention of politics. “The tools of government which we 
had in 1933 are outmoded,” and the demands of the crisis had forced them “to forge new 
tools for a new role of government operating in a democracy.”891 Government by national 
income accounting was just another item in the repertoire. 
  Dwelling on this latest addition to the New Deal, Roosevelt contrasted two 
approaches to the subject. One believed “that because our national income this year is 
only sixty billion dollars, ours is only a sixty billion dollar country.”892 The other held 
“that this Nation ought not to be and need not be only a sixty billion dollar nation . . . that 
it can become an eighty billion dollar nation in the near future” with assistance from the 
government.893 Support for deficit spending became, implicitly, a test of faith in the 
United States. Did Americans believe their country was strong enough to become an 
eighty billion dollar nation? Or would they settle for a measly sixty billion dollars of 
what the speech referred to, patriotically, as “citizen income”?894 Returning to the 
emphasis on national cohesion that pervaded the early New Deal, Roosevelt insisted that 
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no group could rise by itself.  “Our capacity is limited,” he said, “only by our ability to 
work together.”895 
Roosevelt’s call for unity came from a position of weakness. Democrats had 
suffered major losses in the 1938 elections, and within the party southerners who once 
supported the New Deal had grown restive. The administration’s major fiscal policy 
measure—the Works Financing Bill, whose $3 billion price tag Washington’s deficit 
spenders considered an absolute minimum—died in Congress. The defeat stunned New 
Dealers, but even before this setback, Currie had been complaining about confusion in 
the White House. “I wanted a spending program,” he grumbled, “but not one that was 
hastily improvised and that is relatively inflexible”—that is, not the one that actually 
existed.896  The messiness of legislation posed potentially insurmountable obstacles to his 
vision. Balanced-budget orthodoxy was a persistent irritant, but even in the best 
conditions it was unclear whether Congress could move quickly enough when immediate 
action was required.  
Yet beginning in 1939 Currie could issue his protests from inside the White 
House, where he was brought on as a presidential assistant. The first economist to occupy 
such a role, Currie was also part of a larger movement. That same year, a Fiscal Division 
staffed by his supporters was set up in the Bureau of the Budget. At the Commerce 
Department, where Robert Nathan was a staunch ally, Richard Gilbert assumed 
leadership of a newly created Division of Industrial Economics.897  And, in a move that 
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symbolized the transition, Alvin Hansen was brought onto the NRPB, the former 
stronghold of Means’s attempt to revive the spirit of the early New Deal. Indicating the 
fluidity of the time, Currie later claimed that he and Means enjoyed “close working 
relationships.”898 It was in Means’s interest to make peace with Currie’s troops. By 1939, 
they had outposts across the government—at Commerce and the Bureau of the Budget, 
but also the Federal Reserve, Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, the SEC, and, thanks to 
Currie, at the president’s side.  
Though stymied by the political constraints of 1939, this group had advanced a 
great distance in a short period of time. Roosevelt was right: they had developed a 
powerful set of tools—new statistics, new theories, new institutions, new policies. Along 
the way, a new concept had broken into political discourse. When Hoover’s team of 
experts had completed their magisterial survey of American life six years earlier, it had 
treated the coming of comprehensive social planning as all but inevitable. Mastering 
“society” remained the horizon of their ambition, as it had been for generations of 
reformers.  
Even among those who still cherished that goal, another concern had recently 
intruded. That group included George Soule, a New Republic editor and chairman of the 
NBER. In 1932, Soule had caught the spirit among reformers with a book whose thrust 
was evident from the title alone: A Planned Society.899 He brought a different subject to 
the foreground in 1939 as part of a New Republic series titled “After the New Deal.” 
Relying on both the concepts and the analysis that had swept up Washington’s liberals 
since 1937, Soule ended his article by declaring, “In an expanding economy every 
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problem may be solved, in a contracting one all become unsolvable.”900 That much, at 
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Chapter 5: The Enemy Within 
 
SEVEN DECADES HAD PASSED SINCE Wesley Mitchell and Irving Fisher had called 
upon economists to help chart a path through a global order remade by the Great War, 
and, yet again, the world seemed on the brink of transformation. It was the summer of 
1991. The Soviet Union was imploding, self-styled advocates of the market were on the 
march, and pundits were decreeing the end of history. 
Looking at it all, Jude Wanniski verged on despair. A journalist who had made his 
reputation advocating supply-side economics during his tenure at the Wall Street Journal 
in the 1970s, Wanniski returned to the pages of his former employer in the summer of 
1991 to lament the sorry state of capitalism. Recession had spread across much of the 
globe, including the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Australia. Matters looked even 
worse, he observed, in “the Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America,” 
weighed down by “poverty, unemployment, inflation and debt.”901 These were grave 
problems, but Wanniski knew who was to blame. “All this misery befell the nations of 
the world,” he wrote, “because they acted according to the advice of the economics 
profession.”902 Not all economists were culpable, he made clear, only one prominent 
section of their discipline. Resurrecting a phrase from the high Cold War, the title of his 
article labeled macroeconomics “The Enemy Within.” 
Supply-siders had tangled with the economics profession before. The movement 
encountered withering scorn from economists on both the left and right during its early 
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days.903 Specialists in economic forecasting had been a persistent irritant to Ronald 
Reagan’s administration, which regularly fielded questions from a skeptical press corps 
about the gap between optimistic White House projections and the gloomier estimates 
offered by the three private firms that dominated the industry—Chase Econometrics, 
Data Resources International (DRI), and Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates 
(WEFA). The standing of forecasters had risen still further during George H.W. Bush’s 
presidency, when modelers could be found throughout the government, from the 
Commerce Department to the Federal Reserve.904  
To the frustration of supply-siders like Wanniski, the most prestigious 
econometricians provided seemingly scientific evidence against the claims of would-be 
tax cutters. Keynesian economics had been out of fashion among academics for decades, 
but the models that guided decision-making at both governments and corporations 
remained essentially Keynesian. Top-down affairs built out of macroeconomic statistics, 
they generated predictions reliably hostile to supply-sider assumptions. “A tax rate can’t 
be reduced unless the computers predict positive revenue effects,” Wanniski explained, 
which meant that “the macro computers actually control policy.”905 Nor was their 
influence confined to the United States. Models of national economies were a standard 
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element of policymaking across the globe, and they were crucial to the work done by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  
For Wanniski, econometric forecasting was a disease. In proper epidemiological 
fashion, he identified a patient zero. Lawrence Klein had received his doctorate from 
MIT in 1944, almost half a century before Wanniski singled him out for condemnation.906 
Klein was the first economics PhD in the university’s history, and the first student of a 
young Paul Samuelson, who later remarked, only partly in jest, “after Klein’s Ph.D., it 
was diminishing returns all the way.”907 
Though he ranged widely, Klein was best known for his pioneering research on 
large-scale econometric models. Systems built out of hundreds of equations based on 
massive amounts of data, these models were mathematical elaborations of fundamentally 
Keynesian principles. Klein had published his first scholarly article while still a graduate 
student, and during his long career he went on to write hundreds more. After being hired 
away from Oxford in 1958, he took up a post at the University of Pennsylvania, where he 
remained for the rest of his career. His furious productivity was rewarded by a profession 
that showered him with virtually every laurel it could bestow, including a stint as 
president of the American Economic Association and a Nobel Prize.908 He even earned 
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some notoriety in 1976, thanks to his position as chief economic adviser to Jimmy 
Carter’s presidential campaign.  
Klein was, quite literally, an academic entrepreneur. He was the founder of the 
WEFA, the first of the major econometric forecasting firms. This made him the broker of 
a union between academic economists and the corporate world, a marriage that yielded 
hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue from customers whose combined 
valuation totaled billions more. Clients paid hefty sums for the advice of these 
economists, and their public pronouncements were covered attentively by journalists. 
Forecasters discovered that they could influence the economy they claimed to be 
observing, an effect vividly displayed in the so-called “Klein shock” of 1977. Klein had 
been called to testify before Congress, and during the questioning he offered his thoughts 
on the possible consequence of a Japanese currency revaluation—thoughts that led to a 
surge in the value of the yen once his testimony became public.909  
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In almost every respect, Klein seemed the embodiment of the economic 
establishment. But his early career broke from the template. As Wanniski observed in his 
editorial, Klein’s early econometric work had taken place while he was “a young 
American still in his Marxist phase.”910 Wanniski actually undersold Klein’s radicalism. 
From 1945 to 1947, Klein was not just a Marxist; he was a member of the Communist 
Party, making him a rather different example of “the enemy within.” 
Later in his life Klein, downplayed his involvement with the Party, depicting it as 
a juvenile misadventure that had little connection to his subsequent career. That portrait 
understated the importance of Marxism in his academic work during the 1940s, but it was 
true that by the 1950s Klein had shed his youthful radicalism. Yet the commitments that 
had led him to Marx were not so easy to discard, and they would find a surprisingly 
receptive audience over his lifetime. 
Consider the models that incensed Wanniski. Fifteen years after he bemoaned 
their longevity, Waninski’s evaluation of the continued influence of Keynesian models 
within government was seconded by Gregory Mankiw, a Harvard professor who had 
recently stepped down as chair of the Council of Economic Advisers under George W. 
Bush. “The sad truth,” Mankiw observed, “is that the macroeconomic research of the past 
three decades has had only minor impact on the practical analysis of monetary or fiscal 
policy.”911 Beginning in the 1970s, a gulf had opened up between what academic 
economists valued and what economists working in government demanded. Mankiw 
embodied the new generation of academic economics, and he had just left an 
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administration headed by a man who styled himself the heir to Ronald Reagan, but even 
he was forced to employ models that he called “direct descendants” of the work Klein 
pioneered.912  
The history that comes into view when seen from Klein’s vantage point does not 
fit into the narratives that scholars typically rely on to interpret the recent past. Across the 
humanities and social sciences, the period is frequently interpreted as a neoliberal era. In 
the aftermath of World War II, so the argument goes, a generation of leaders chastened 
by the Great Depression and cowed by vigorous labor movements forged a political 
economy that united economic growth with a potent welfare (and warfare) state. Then in 
the 1970s something went wrong. The marriage of rising economic prosperity and social 
egalitarianism that had underwritten the postwar order crumbled. From the ashes of a 
splintered consensus, neoliberalism emerged. Suddenly the language of the market was 
on everyone’s lips, and deregulation, financialization, skyrocketing economic inequality, 
and a neologism called globalization carried the day. Franklin Roosevelt and General 
Motors stand on one side of this yawning chasm, Ronald Reagan and Goldman Sachs on 
the other.913 
Economists play a crucial role in this drama, which turns bespectacled professors 
into vanguard of a neoliberal revolution. The trajectory of the discipline, however, is 
often conflated with the history of one institution: the University of Chicago, which, 
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along with Wall Street, receives pride of place in discussions of neoliberalism’s rise. In 
this telling, the development of economics since the 1950s becomes a play in two acts. In 
the first, Milton Friedman leads a charge against Keynesian macroeconomics, receiving 
support from ideological sympathizers who make the case for the efficiency of markets at 
the microeconomic level. While that battle played out in the public sphere, act two shifts 
attention back to the academy. There, advocates of what came to be known as rational 
expectations theory use sophisticated mathematics to replace Keynesian models built out 
of bulky economic aggregates with systems based on the decisions of a single, far-sighted 
homo economicus. Models built on this assumption provided, in the language of the 
discipline, micro foundations for macro theorizing. Although controversial at first, the 
methodological turn propounded by supporters of rational expectations soon became the 
lingua franca of academic economics, a common vocabulary that even younger 
advocates of Keynesian policies had to attain fluency in if they wanted to defend their 
opinions—and their status—within the profession. This was another revolution housed at 
the University of Chicago, although the key figure was not Friedman but his former 
student Robert Lucas (B.A University of Chicago, 1959; PhD University of Chicago, 
1964).  
The shift can be described as a tale of textbooks: where students of introductory 
economics in the decades following World War II began their course by reading about 
the behavior of the economy as a whole, by the 1990s supply and demand had become 
the first order of business.914 Yet students who moved beyond that introductory class 
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learned a different lesson, one to which historians have paid much less attention. Courses 
in macroeconomics remained a staple of the economics major and a frequent stopping 
point even for undergraduates who did not intend on taking further classes in the subject. 
In these textbooks, students were informed that standard Keynesians arguments 
continued to offer the best explanation for the behavior of the economy in the short-run.  
Undergraduate lecture halls, corporate boardrooms, and the offices of government 
staffers all provided shelter for the Keynesian ghost in a supposedly neoliberal machine. 
This was not an age of fracture, but a period where a grand totality called “the economy” 
loomed larger than ever. The stubborn persistence of ungainly macroeconomic models 
was a practical consequence of the perceived need to govern the economy, but a much 
wider horizon comes into sight when seen from this perspective: a history defined not by 
a conservative movement trouncing the baffled leaders of a stagnant New Deal order, but 
by feverish experimentation across the ideological spectrum; a history where rhetorical 
tributes to the wisdom of markets coexisted with visions of economic management that 
rivaled the most ambitious efforts of Keynesians at their zenith; a history of practices that 
ramified across the globe, from Washington to Beijing; a history, in short, filled with 
figures like Lawrence Klein. 
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 A practitioner of what his colleague James Tobin called “practical 
macroeconomics,” Klein was a competent but conventional economic theorist.915 In the 
realm of economic knowledge, however, Klein’s efforts were groundbreaking. As a study 
prepared for the Nobel committee when he was being considered for the prize observed, 
Klein had “no great book, no outstanding single work which would by itself probably 
justify a seat in the hall of fame,” but “his practical influence has been enormous.”916 He 
established a template for research used by economists around the globe. It helped that 
many of the people conducting that research were Klein’s former students. “His model-
building activities,” the Nobel memorandum explained, “were essentially changing 
laboratories to which came students and government officials from all over the world to 
study applied econometrics.”917 This was Klein’s version of the “Chicago Boys,” who 
studied under Friedman and his colleagues before going on to shape policy in Augusto 
Pinochet’s Chile.918  
 The comparison with Chicago merits further consideration. Bold ideological 
commitments and remarkable success in the academy have made the university’s 
economics department an appealing target for scholarly inquiry. Like a flashy magician’s 
assistant, it has distracted from the more subdued activity taking place on the other side 
of the stage. The same shift toward rational expectations that made Chicago so influential 
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with academics curtailed its influence over Tobin’s “practical macroeconomics.” That 
was no accident. “As an advice-giving profession,” Lucas remarked in 1981, “we are in 
way over our heads.”919 His students received the message. Speaking to an interviewer, 
one of them quoted from a talk Lucas had given on his first day: “We here at Chicago 
believe that what we do matters and is more important than events in Washington.”920 
Even Milton Friedman’s reputation did not survive the transition unscathed. When a 
group of Chicago graduate students was asked by the same interviewer what they thought 
of the department’s most celebrated figure, one responded, “I think he is old.”921 Disdain 
for Washington would not damage an academic career, but it was anathema to would-be 
policymakers coming out of other economics departments. 
 During the waning decades of the twentieth century, those policymakers were 
more in demand than ever. “The ineluctable fact about any society,” the social theorist 
Daniel Bell commented in 1976, “is that there is no escape from economics”—which 
meant that there was no escape from economists.922 It was a keen insight. To understand 
its full implications, we can start by following the path of an economist who built his 
career upon it 
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“I WAS INTERESTED IN SOCIALISM, and I thought the Communist Party was a 
vehicle towards socialism.”923 That was the simplest version of the story Klein told the 
House Un-American Activities Committee in the spring of 1954. Unsurprisingly, the 
Committee wanted more. 
 Klein began his account a decade earlier. During his time at MIT, he underwent 
an intellectual awakening. “I worked very hard when I went to school as an 
undergraduate,” he said, which left no time for “political activities.”924 The radicalism 
that swept up other students in the 1930s reached Klein with a delay, hitting him only 
when he arrived at graduate school. He compensated for this tardiness by immersing 
himself in the socialist political scene, which included volunteering to teach at various 
adult education centers. After completing his doctorate at MIT in 1944, Klein moved to 
Chicago to take up a post at the Cowles Commission, where he was recruited to build a 
model of the American economy. He maintained his interest in adult education, which, in 
Klein’s telling, prompted an acquaintance to ask him to teach a course on Marxist 
economics for one of the Party’s local chapters, provided that he first become a 
Communist. He agreed and, though he never taught the class, remained in the Party for 
almost two more years, where his service to the movement consisted mostly of attending 
a handful of “thoroughly uninteresting and dull” meetings.925 A skeptical interrogator 
could have pressed Klein on the details of his story, but the committee was satisfied with 
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his repentance. The acting chairman described him as one of the many naïve intellectuals 
that Communist had “made fools of.”926 Klein accepted the judgment without complaint. 
 He had not always been so contrite. Shortly after joining the CP in 1945, he wrote 
to Paul Samuelson asking for a way to get in touch with a mutual acquaintance because, 
Klein explained, “I have his three volumes of Marx’s ‘Capital’, which I have been 
reading from time to time and would like to send them to him now.”927 He was, gently, 
provoking the liberal Samuelson. (Just five years older than Klein, Samuelson was by this 
stage of their relationship more an intellectual older brother than a parent.) A few months 
earlier, again while corresponding with Samuelson, he dismissed Chicago’s Henry 
Simons for being concerned with the threat of a “revolution of the bondholders and not 
the revolution of the unemployed.”928 Though he abandoned Communism, Klein did not 
renounce the beliefs that led him to the movement. “I am still sticking by my point,” he 
told Samuelson at the close of 1948, “that planning is superior to competition.”929 
 Klein did not limit his defense of planning to private conversations. Though he 
might have been a lackadaisical Communist, he was an energetic scholar, and his 
published writings from this period bear the mark of his politics. That includes his most 
famous work, The Keynesian Revolution, the book that grew out of his doctoral 
dissertation and helped popularize the phrase that gave it a title. Writing in 1947, he 
predicted that a “catastrophic depression” would arrive sometime in the 1950s, if not 
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earlier.930 He also contended that socialism could abolish unemployment, a fact that was 
obvious to him but remained a mystery to “Keynes, glorifier of bourgeois life.”931 “If we 
let nature take its course,” he warned, “the economic law of motion of capitalism will 
take us down the same road that Germany followed so recently.”932 He borrowed the 
phrase “economic law of motion” from Marx and the diagnosis of capitalism as fascism 
in embryo from Marxist writings of the interwar years.  
 Unlike conventional Marxists, however, Klein believed there was a chance that 
capitalism could be reformed. Properly implemented, Keynesian policies could shield the 
economy from the downturns that brought about high unemployment and led the way to 
fascism. But he was far from enthusiastic about Keynesianism’s prospects in the United 
States. “It is inevitable,” he wrote, “that the Congressional debating techniques will be 
much too slow and cumbersome to provide the flexibility needed for fiscal policy in a 
full-employment program.”933 Only a robust economic planning agency brimming with 
public works programs could guard against depression, and it would still need assistance 
from a price-control board to curb inflation. Keynesianism was economically rational, he 
conceded, but that did not mean it was politically viable. 
 The problem, in Klein’s view, was that Keynesians had detached their economic 
analysis from a social theory. Or, rather, most Keynesians—including Samuelson and his 
mentor Alvin Hansen—had done so. Klein did, however, draw attention to another 
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option, “much less known but nonetheless correct.”934 These were the Marxist 
Keynesians. Klein offered this description of their view, which also happened to be his 
own:  
The Marxists do not oppose the Keynesian program. In fact, they will be 
vigorous supporters of full-employment legislation. But they are not 
satisfied with full-employment legislation as a permanent solution. They 
consider it to be in the interest of the common man and therefore support 
it, but the only smooth-working long-run solution for them is socialism. In 
a socialist economy there is less of a problem in overcoming the activities 
of special-interest groups. In such a system there is central planning which 
coordinates the activities of each individual economic unit with the 
movement of the system as a whole.935  
 
Here, Klein mapped his distinction between Keynesian economics and a more 
comprehensive Marxist social theory onto another division over policy. Keynesians 
attempted to maximize the production of resources within a given economic and social 
order; they offered no guidance as to how those resources should be allocated in a 
planning regime willing to upset the status quo. “We may accept the Keynesian theory as 
a step toward the formulation of the comprehensive doctrines for which we are now 
groping,” he conceded.936 He did not need to say that there was a long journey ahead. 
From his perch at the Cowles Commission, it was easy for Klein to be optimistic. 
The group had become an unlikely hub for a transnational assortment of mathematically 
oriented, politically left economists. They had lofty aspirations for the postwar era, and 
for their own place in it. Klein had never left the United States, but despite his provincial 
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background, he fit in well at his new home.“[W]e imagined that we had the well-being of 
the economy right in the palms of our hands,” he recalled many years later.937  
Klein was cagy on the politics of this enterprise. In 1947, he published a lengthy 
attempt to translate what he called “Marx’s literary explanations” into “a determinate 
system of equations.” That same year, he also finished an article casting econometric 
models as purely technical devices.938 “[I]f fully developed and properly used,” he 
insisted, they “should lead all investigators to the same conclusions, independent of their 
personal whim.”939 Most promising, he noted, were new advances in the realm of 
economic forecasting, which, after the Employment Act of 1946, had become a 
governmental obligation.940 
Even before the Employment Act was signed into law, forecasting’s increased 
popularity gave Klein an early, and frustrating, experience with political engagement. He 
owed the opportunity to the Committee for Economic Development (CED). Launched in 
1942, the CED was dedicated to domesticating Keynesianism for the American 
businessmen.941 The organization was well-funded, eminently respectable, quite 
influential, and surprisingly close to Cowles. (That was literally true: they were located 
near each other in Chicago. One of the CED’s founders, Theodore Yntema, had also 
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served as research director at Cowles for several years.) In 1945, news of Klein’s work 
on a macroeconometric model of the United States reached CED. Seeing practical value 
in this piece of academic research, they asked Klein to use his model to project the 
consequences of different policies in the coming postwar demobilization. Klein was wary 
about subjecting his fledgling model to such a demanding test—especially since, given 
the prevailing consensus about the likelihood of a severe downturn, the forecast it 
reached would likely be grim.942 But the offer was too attractive to reject, and so, 
reluctantly, he agreed. 
Then came a surprise. “We simply could not find pessimistic projections for the 
postwar economy,” he later remembered.943 Defying those who prophesied a second 
depression, including a substantial number of Marxists, Klein’s model predicted an easy 
transition to peacetime. The news delighted his clients at the CED, who arranged a trip to 
Washington for Klein, where he met with economists at the Federal Reserve, Department 
of Commerce, and the Bureau of the Budget. They greeted the news with skepticism, 
putting a quick end to this phase of Klein’s career as policy adviser.  
At Cowles, the dismissal was not viewed as a total loss. “[T]he Washington 
experts,” one Cowlesmen observed to a colleague in Norway, “are very interested in 
adopting more sophisticated methods.”944 But the “experts” had competition from the 
sizable portion of the bureaucracy who questioned the reliability of policymaking through 
mathematics. By dismissing Klein’s forecast and arguing for the likelihood of a slump, 
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government economists had damaged their standing in Washington. In the future, the 
team at Cowles hoped, their suggestions would fall on more attentive ears. 
They would do so, however, without Klein’s participation. In 1947, he started an 
econometrician’s wanderjahr that eventually took him across much of Europe. 
Unprecedented opportunities were opening up for the small number of economists with 
his skills; Klein intended to take advantage of them. He left Chicago behind—and 
allowed his membership in the Communist Party to lapse.  
 
CANADA WAS THE FIRST STOP ON KLEIN’S TOUR. The government had 
requested that he serve as a consultant to a team of economists working on the first 
econometric model of the nation, a job that, with Klein’s help, was completed in a few 
months. After that, Klein left for Oslo, where he joined a research group overseen by 
Ragnar Frisch, founding father of econometrics. Though no longer a Communist, Klein 
remained an ardent defender of planning, giving three lectures on the subject while in 
Norway and writing an article outlining “The Case for Planning.” Trips to England, 
France, and Switzerland followed, but most important was his time in the Netherlands, 
where he worked under Jan Tinbergen at the government’s Central Planning Bureau. It 
was a valuable experience for Klein, whose work at Cowles had been inspired by 
Tinbergen’s earlier model for the League of Nations. (“What this country needs,” he was 
told while being recruited, “is a new Tinbergen model.”945) By the end of his tour, 
Klein—a native of Omaha who, by his own admission, had not thought much about the 
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outside world until graduate school—had started to build a network of connections that 
would soon encircle the planet. 
 However worthwhile the journey, Klein knew it would be temporary. Europe had 
a strong econometric tradition, but the future was in the United States. An offer from the 
NBER brought Klein back to New York at the close of 1948. The NBER was never going 
to be a congenial a home for Klein. By the time Klein arrived. the Bureau was in the 
midst of a feud with Cowles, and he always had the air of an interloper. Arthur Burns, the 
NBER’s research director, explained that they had brought on an expert in models “not 
because any member of our group has much faith in them but because we wish to check 
our judgment and give this approach an opportunity to prove its merits.”946 For his part, 
Klein observed that at the NBER he was “tolerated but not enthusiastically monitored.”947 
Klein soon moved to the University of Michigan, then home to a department eager to 
make itself into a bastion for the new style of economics he represented. 
Klein’s mathematical orientation marked the most obvious shift from older modes 
of economics, but one of his most important departures was as much conceptual as it was 
methodological. Though Klein dismissed the politics of Keynesianism, he was an 
intellectual child of its signal theoretical innovation—namely, the conviction that the 
economy could only be understood in its totality. “The central problem of Keynesian 
economics is concerned with the operation of the system as a whole,” Klein wrote, 
drawing a sharp distinction with earlier generations of economists “concerned with the 
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behavior of individual households and business firms.”948 Keynesians had created a 
comprehensive theory of the economy, an innovation Klein believed had no real 
predecessors in the history of economic thought. Even the most obvious candidate, 
general equilibrium theory, was based on atomistic premises. “A mathematical 
representation of this system,” Klein argued, would produce “an incomprehensible 
maze.”949 Viewing the problem with the eyes of an econometrician, Klein celebrated the 
useful simplicity of an approach that constructed a theory of the economy out of 
aggregates.  
Like all revolutionaries, the Keynesians encountered resistance. “The Keynesian 
theory,” he noted, “has been severely attacked by some economists because it is couched 
in terms of aggregate concepts . . . [that] get away from the more fundamental economic 
concepts of the individual.”950 For Klein, however, the intensity of the opposition served 
as a measure of Keynesianism’s achievements. 
So did a revealing adjustment to the discipline’s vocabulary. Beginning in the 
1950s, “Business Cycle” courses were relabeled “Macroeconomics,” a terminological 
shift that reflected major intellectual changes. As one economist who lived through this 
transition observed in 1981, over the preceding three decades macroeconometric 
modeling of the variety Klein practiced had “largely eliminated” what “used to be called 
‘business cycle research,’” just as “macromodel building has pretty much wiped out a 
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branch of economic theory that used to be called business cycle theory.”951 The birth of a 
new way of imagining collective life was evident in Klein’s own early work. A 1947 
comparison of Marx and Keynes, for example, noted that while both relied on 
aggregations, “The macrounits of the Marxian system are not only producers and 
consumers but also workers and capitalists.”952 “Producers and consumers” fit into a 
theory of the economy, but “workers and capitalists” pushed beyond it, to a world of 
class conflict more familiar to discussions of society—the larger context Klein 
reprimanded Keynesians for neglecting. “There is an infinite difference,” he wrote, 
between the Marxist claim that “Constant capital plus variable capital plus surplus value 
is equal to the value of total output” and the Keynesian belief that “Consumption, which 
depends upon income, plus investment, which is an autonomous variable, is equal to the 
value of national income.”953 Concepts like “national income” and “total output” did not 
exist in isolation; they belonged to different conceptual worlds, one filled with 
economies, the other with societies. 
 Devising models of the economy forced Klein to work out the implications of this 
division with painful exactitude. What deserved a place in the model? What could be left 
out? “Eventually,” he wrote in 1950, “we may hope to develop a complete social theory 
which leaves in the exogenous category only such variables as weather, earthquakes, and 
other ‘acts of God.’”954 It was a plausible aspiration, he argued, since Marxists had 
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already created such a theory. But dialectical scope came at the cost of empirical 
precision, and that was a fatal weakness in an econometric model. “It is, of course, not 
satisfactory to separate sociology and politics from economics,” he admitted, “but our 
purpose in pioneering will be served best if we make assumption which simplify our 
model as much as possible.”955 That meant limiting variables to “economic forces in a 
narrow sense,” i.e. the customary Keynesian aggregates. 956  
The product of all this selective exclusion was a system of twenty-two equations 
dubbed the Klein-Goldberger model. (Arthur Goldberger was a graduate student at 
Michigan while Klein was a professor there. “I was a clerk on the model,” he said, but 
Klein “was generous enough to put my name on it.”957) Despite the banal name, Klein-
Goldberger marked a pivotal moment in the history of economics. Picking up where he 
had left off at Cowles, Klein built what he described as “an up-to-date econometric model 
of the United States which others could apply to practical economic problems.”958 He 
cited Tinbergen as an inspiration, but the final result bore his signature, and it set a 
template that modelers followed for decades. 
In 1953, Klein and Goldberger used their model to produce retroactive forecasts 
for 1951 and 1952, an exercise that had academic interest but little general appeal. More 
striking were their predictions for the next three years, especially their conclusion that 
demobilizing from the Korean War would not lead to the extreme downturn that was 
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widely anticipated at the time. A debate in the pages of the Manchester Guardian with 
the British economist Colin Clark, who believed a painful slump was imminent, allowed 
Klein and Goldberger to go public with their opinion. When the recession failed to 
materialize, Klein and Goldberger claimed victory. The vindication came at an opportune 
moment for Klein, who had been forced out of his post at Michigan after the revelation of 
his onetime membership in the Communist Party and was about to take up a position in 
Oxford.  
Klein-Goldberger did not fare as well in 1955, when it missed an economic 
upturn. That was just one reason the modelers faced skepticism from many economists. 
By that point, however, a modeling boom was underway that drowned out the doubters. 
In January 1954, the New York Times breathlessly reported on a meeting of more than 
one thousand “top business executives and representatives of foreign and United States 
Governments” brought together by “The method that has aroused world-wide interest 
called ‘model-building.’”959 A few years later, two economists using an IBM 650, the 
first mass-produced computer, ran the Klein-Goldberger model through a variety of 
simulations and concluded that it displayed a “remarkable quantitative correspondence 
with reality.”960 Meanwhile, econometric modeling became an increasingly popular 
feature of academic training in economics. For many, it proved, in the words of one Klein 
student, “an exhilarating experience.”961 Reflecting on his time as an undergraduate in the 
early 1960s, another future economist recalled being “incredibly excited” when he 
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discovered econometric models: “it meant you could control the economy,” he said, “and 
it was obvious that was extremely important.”962  
A constellation of forces had come together to make the embrace of modeling 
possible. Rapid improvements in economic statistics, especially national income 
accounts, provided econometricians with material to work with; mathematical techniques 
used by Tinbergen in one generation and developed by figures like Klein in the next 
made the data tractable; a rising generation of economists, led by Klein’s mentor Paul 
Samuelson, provided intellectual and political support, along with a larger theoretical 
framework for their efforts; the increased production and declining cost of computers 
turned formerly laborious calculations into much simpler operations; and the forecasts 
themselves coincided with events closely enough to lend them credibility. Institutional, 
technical, theoretical, and material factors, plus a good amount of luck, all pushed 
modeling foreword, turning it into the intellectual underpinning of the Keynesianism’s 
golden age. This was, to be sure, an elite trend, but that made it no less significant, 
especially when the elites smitten with modeling’s promise had access to hefty sums of 
cash.  
Governments provided modelers with their most important early patrons. They 
received little support under Dwight Eisenhower, whose Council of Economic Advisers 
was chaired first by model skeptic Arthur Burns and then by Burn’s ally Raymond 
Saulnier, but the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were reliable backers. Though 
Klein did not serve under either, he moved in the same Keynesian milieu as Kennedy and 
Johnson’s economists—a clan with Samuelson as its unofficial chieftain—and passing 
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along the results of his forecast was a matter of sending a letter to a friend. The 
Department of Commerce established a more formal relationship when they picked up a 
model of the economy Klein had put aside. Klein was also a favorite at the Treasury 
Department’s “Econometric Forecasting Unit,” which requested his assistance with a 
project examining the impact of changes in tax policy on the economy.963   
 Model-building’s popularity reached far beyond the United States. Where 
modeling spread Klein was rarely far behind. The Canadian government continued to rely 
on its model, and, with his help, Israel, Mexico, and Japan soon had models of their own. 
In Japan, for example, Klein co-authored the nation’s first model and helped launch an 
econometric journal produced jointly out of Osaka and Philadelphia. He also began 
consulting for the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
which was then assembling their own models of “less developed countries.”964 Through 
his students, Klein extended his influence even farther. About half of the graduate 
students in the economics department at Penn during Klein’s time there came from 
outside the United States, and constructing models of their native countries became a 
routine dissertation subject for his students. The completed models could then follow the 
newly minted PhDs after their graduations—back to a job working for the government at 
home, or to the UN, or to a private forecasting agency.  
 The most ambitious model-building effort, however, was taking place in the 
United States. Begun in 1960 under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council, 
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it later shifted to the Brookings Institution.965 (Funding was also supplied by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the National Science Foundation, but 
the final result was known as the Brookings Model.) Klein took a leading role in the 
project, which drew on the work of more than thirty economists, along with 
mathematicians, statisticians, and—a new arrival—computer scientists. The enterprise 
operated under a modified version of pot-luck-dinner rules: different economists were 
charged with producing equations that captured different parts of the economy, all of 
which were then stitched together to produce the final result. Combining the influences of 
Tinbergen’s demand-side approach with Wassily Leontief’s input-output system, it 
sought to account for both total national income and the contributions of different 
industries. The model’s supporters hoped that it would become the definitive 
representation of the American economy. Weighing in at more than three-hundred 
equations, it was certainly the largest. But that size also made it difficult to operate and to 
update, which ensured that it would never live up to the hopes of its creators. Just a few 
years after debuting to much fanfare, the Brookings Model was quietly abandoned. 
 Yet the model had a more significant legacy that its speedy demise suggests. For 
the economists who helped create it, the Brookings Model illustrated the potential of 
collaborative efforts they had previously not considered possible. As a model, Brookings 
failed; as a template for how to build other models, it was a triumph. At the zenith of 
American Keynesianism, economists were starting to glimpse new vistas on the horizon. 
Governing national economies was a challenging task, but a manageable one. What 
would come next? 
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 Klein was ideally positioned to help answer that question. His stay in Oxford had 
been a short one. Frustrated by the comparative immaturity of econometrics in the UK, he 
had been eager to return to the United States. His opportunity came in 1958, thanks to an 
offer from the University of Pennsylvania. There was more than a little irony that a 
university housing one of the world’s leading business schools would toss a lifeline to the 
former Communist, but Klein had long since tempered his radicalism. “[T]hose war and 
post-war years were rather trying ones,” Samuelson wrote on his former student’s behalf, 
“and I believe that the subsequent years have given Klein a maturity of judgment.”966 
And Klein’s academic reputation was formidable enough to compensate for the potential 
backlash. After receiving what he later called “assurances from the university 
administration that I would have full academic freedom,” he returned to the United 
States.967  
 Perhaps it was inevitable, given his surroundings, that Klein would grow more 
interested in the workings of business. But any potential curiosity received further 
stimulus from the zeal corporations displayed for econometrics—more specifically, in the 
opportunity they saw to make a profit. Companies were hiring economists in 
unprecedented numbers, and some of those companies had tasked their economists with 
building models of the national economy that could help them plan their budgets. A style 
of governing the present by calculating the future that had emerged within governments 
now migrated outside them. Klein watched this trend unfold from his distinctive position 
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at the juncture of the academy, the corporate sector, and the world of policymaking. Then 
he had an idea.  
 
WHARTON ECONOMETRIC FORECASTING ASSOCIATES may have been the first 
company founded in order to support graduate students. Klein’s ambitions were growing, 
but so were the costs of his research. Building econometric models was a labor-intensive 
process, and much of that labor was carried out by graduate students. The network of 
foundations that bankrolled projects like the Brookings Model could not be trusted to 
exhibit such generosity indefinitely. In 1963, while Klein wrestled with this dilemma, an 
economist from General Electric requested that he help them build a proprietary model of 
the American economy; soon after, a former student who had become an economist at 
Standard Oil of New Jersey presented him with the same proposal; and then, after that, an 
economist from IBM asked if he would advise the company on how to improve its 
already existing model.  
 Klein saw that these were all variations of the same problem. Why not consolidate 
these efforts and put them under the supervision of academics trained to navigate the 
terrain these companies were hurrying to enter? Grants from the Rockefeller Foundation 
and the National Science Foundation had recently allowed Wharton to fund a research 
institute that included an “Econometric Forecasting Unit” (EFU) and could provide the 
necessary manpower. Klein made his pitch to a handful of business economists, and he 
soon had five clients on his roster: GE, IBM, Standard Oil of New Jersey—the three who 
had given him the idea—along with the John Deere Company and Bethlehem Steel. For 
just five thousand dollars a year, a team of researchers at Wharton would provide these 
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firms with quarterly forecasts of the economy. Profits would be used to fund graduate 
students, and, with that, Klein’s problem was solved.968 
 But the forecasters had not anticipated the demand their project would unleash. 
As word spread among corporations, their client list grew. Then news of the venture 
reached Business Week, which offered to publish some of their findings. Klein agreed, 
and interest exploded. Six years after their quiet start, the EFU had more than sixty 
customers, including AT&T, Dow Chemical, Boeing, Chrysler Motors, Aetna, Bank of 
America, and Goldman Sachs.969 Meetings that had once consisted of fewer than ten 
people ballooned to more than fifty. The requirements of running what had become a 
sizable business—mailing letters, making phone calls, managing a budget—strained the 
capacities of academics who had expected a smalltime affair. So they decided to 
incorporate, and in 1969 Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates was born.  
 The WEFA was a nonprofit firm, but it was a creature of corporations from the 
start. Each quarter, following the release of the latest figures on the Gross National 
Product, staffers met with economists sent by their customers to discuss the results 
arrived at by the company’s two models (one short term, the other long). By 1975, more 
than 150 subscribers—including companies in Mexico, Canada, Europe, and Japan, along 
with public agencies and international organizations—consulted the WEFA’s models.970 
Findings tailored to specific industries—oil, steel, lumber, and many more—
complemented their more general conclusions. Meanwhile, the wheels of their funding 
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machine continued to turn: money poured into academic research, which was then used to 
revise the WEFA’s models, which then allowed them to advertise their latest innovations 
to clients, which generated new funds for research, which started the cycle over again. 
With business thriving, discussion at the WEFA turned to when, not if, they would 
become a for-profit corporation. And the econometricians owed all of this to models that 
were unapologetically Keynesian.  
 Economic forecasting was not a new industry. It had flourished in the 1920s, 
before a collective failure to predict the Great Depression popped the bubble.971 
Mounting esteem for economists in the aftermath of World War II revived the industry. 
(In 1953, a young Alan Greenspan started his own firm while studying for a doctorate in 
economics at Columbia.972) But econometricians introduced something new. For 
corporate leaders with an academic bent, the scientific promise of modeling turned a 
guessing game into a legitimate endeavor. When combined with an impressive track 
record of predictions in the 1960s, this credibility wiped away whatever stains had 
continued to blot forecasting’s reputation. 
 The WEFA’s successes were startling enough to lure other contenders into the 
ring. By the 1970s, the firm had two main competitors. Following a stint in Lyndon 
Johnson’s CEA, the Harvard economist Otto Eckstein founded Data Resources 
International. To Eckstein, the shift in careers was an easy choice. “At the moment, any 
sizable corporation that isn’t doing this sort of forecasting is apologetic about it,” he 
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crowed in 1972.973 Chase Econometrics followed soon after, growing from under ten 
clients in 1971 to more than a hundred one year later.974 Neither firm shared the WEFA’s 
academic ambitions, and both were more aggressive in their pursuit of profit. The 
prospect of higher rates of return was the entire point of Chase’s existence—the company 
was headed by Michael Evans, formerly of the University of Pennsylvania, where he had 
helped Klein launch the WEFA. The money was certainly better: Evans charged up to 
$20,000 a year for his services. Rewards like that were substantial enough to draw 
competitors, like General Electric, which described its “Mapcast” model as a more 
accessible alternative to the big three.  
 Through recession and expansion, the econometricians thrived. At the end of 
1977, an article in the Wall Street Journal observed that “hunger for glimpses of the year 
ahead has grown positively insatiable.”975 Forecasts now came at a monthly clip, not 
quarterly, and clients were pushing for weekly updates. By 1979, not even that was fast 
enough. “Within 24 hours of a national or local event, our customers are using our model 
to study the consequences," Klein reported with pride.976 
  Competitive pressure had increased, but so had profits. In 1976, Eckstein 
reported, annual revenue at DRI had risen by 40%, to $24 million.977 Two years later, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
973 Lindley Clark, Jr., “Figuring the Future,” Wall Street Journal, August 23, 1972, 1. 
 
974 Clark, Jr., “Figuring the Future,” A10. 
 
975 Alfred Malabre, Jr., “The 78 Scene: Analysts Find Ways To Improve Forecasts Of Economy’s 
Course,” Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1977, 1. 
 
976 Harry Anderson, Phyllis Malmaud, Connie Leslie, “The Bonanza in Econometrics,” Newsweek, 
July 30, 1979, 60. 
 
977 Malabre, Jr., “78 Scene,” 15. 
	  
	   342	  
number had climbed to over $30 million, which supported a staff of 600.978 In 1979, the 
company’s fundamentals looked strong enough to justify the behemoth publisher 
McGraw Hill acquiring it for $103 million (about $340 million in 2015 dollars). Not 
everything worked—an “Econometric Gaming Kit” released by Macmillan never found 
its audience—but that failure was a lonely exception to the rule.979  
 In a competitive market, the WEFA occupied a distinct, and lucrative, position. Its 
grounding in the academy made the firm into the thinking CEO’s forecasters. Klein’s 
brainchild mixed scholarly research with business savvy more effectively than any of its 
rivals. “What we do is half magic, half science,” one executive admitted.980 It was an 
attractive pairing. By 1973, the company had more than 100 clients; by 1977, over 200.  
 What was most striking about the forecasting boom was that it occurred despite 
the modelers’ repeated failures. The vaunted Brookings Model had stumbled out of the 
gate. It predicted a downturn in 1968, a year when growth continued and inflation 
climbed upward. Almost every forecaster missed the 1974 recession, at the time the 
deepest slump since the Great Depression.981 The recession they had not foreseen turned 
out to be good for business. In the words of a headhunter who placed economists in 
corporate jobs—a career path that could not have existed a short time earlier—“this is the 
first recession we’ve seen when the demand for economists has been countercyclical.”982 
DRI’s Eckstein had an explanation for the trend. “The essential problem of the time is 
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economic,” he said in 1979, “and you really cannot cope with today's economic problems 
using the traditional methods of theoretical analysis.”983 The remark echoed, probably 
unknowingly, Daniel Bell’s observation of few years earlier. What for Bell was a 
question of social theory was for Eckstein a chance to earn a profit. (And quite a sizable 
one: Eckstein made $20 million from DRI’s sale.) For Klein, it was an academic 
opportunity. In 1976, he drafted a proposal for a Wharton course on “Econometrics for 
use in corporate planning.”984 
 Corporate leaders were not the only figures seeking guidance on the economic 
future. National governments had provided econometricians with their first supporters, 
and they remained staunch backers in the 1970s. The WEFA counted numerous public 
agencies as subscribers to its model and conducted special investigations for 
organizations like the Department of Defense and the Department of Labor.985 By the 
1970s, enthusiasm for modeling had spread to states and localities. Private 
econometricians followed, adding state and regional forecasts to their list of services. 
Chase modeled each of the fifty states, while the WEFA created more elaborate versions 
for Pennsylvania and helped make Philadelphia one of the first three cities with model of 
its own. (Detroit and Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, were the other early adopters.)  
 The entry of private firms into local forecasting set up conflicts with state 
governments, which had begun issuing their own econometric projections, turning 
municipal governance into a contest over economic futures. In 1981, for example, the 
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Republican chairman of the New York State Senate’s Finance Committee enlisted the 
WEFA’s help in a parochial skirmish with the state’s Democratic governor. As the New 
York Times explained, in battles over state finances, “the Governor, citing the authority of 
a computer model of the state economy developed by his budget office, generally carries 
the day.”986 But independent projections from the WEFA would allow Republicans to 
“even up the debate.”987 That announcement came shortly after the WEFA unveiled a 
model of New York City three years in the making. Consisting of about 1,500 equations, 
it offered grim tidings: in the year ahead, the WEFA predicted, New York would lose just 
under 100,000 jobs. In fact, the city added about 36,000, but the company’s credibility 
was sturdy enough to weather another missed call.988  
 Then there was the world outside the United States. Klein had been casting his 
eyes abroad since the 1960s, when DuPont asked him to create econometric models of 
Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil.989 He agreed, on the condition that his team at Wharton 
would be able to use the models for continued research. Out of this arrangement came 
Wharton’s Departamento de Investigaciones Econometricos de México. “From a base of 
a few private-sector supporters in Monterrey and Mexico City,” Klein bragged in 1990, 
“this has evolved into a self-sustaining system with some 150 supporters—U.S. 
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companies, Mexican government agencies, international organizations, and others.”990 
The diversity of Klein’s graduate students—i.e. his pool of potential researchers—
encouraged this broadening of geographical horizons. Close relationships with UNCTAD 
and the IMF opened the WEFA to an international audience. So did more formal 
arrangements: Japan’s central bank, for example, sent economists to the company on a 
semiannual basis to receive training in the WEFA’s methods.991    
 One challenge proved a special source of fascination for the company. Socialist 
countries had been swept up by the same wave of interest with econometrics that dragged 
along businesses in the United States. A 1970 conference of econometricians in Russia 
marked the onset of a serious effort to build a relationship between model-builders on 
both sides of the iron curtain.992 Klein travelled to the USSR, struck up a correspondence 
with the eminent Soviet economist Leonid Kantorovich, and met with officials in 
Budapest to review the details of Hungarian planning. Funding from the United States 
government allowed the WEFA to build a model of the USSR’s economy.993 A 
“Centrally Planned Economies Project” followed, buoyed by the participation of 
economists from Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and by Klein’s own travels in 
the region, where he helped foster nascent model-building projects.994 The theoretical 
challenge of applying Keynesian methods to socialist countries allowed him to explore 
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terrain he had surveyed from a more abstract perspective in The Keynesian Revolution. 
He might also have taken emotional satisfaction in revisiting questions that had 
preoccupied him thirty years earlier, minus the existential drama of the early Cold War.  
 From a modest beginning, the WEFA had grown into a multi-million dollar 
enterprise with a global clientele. Along the way, it helped invent a booming industry. 
But the company’s success encouraged Klein to reach for an even loftier goal. National 
models were proliferating, and so were models pitched to industries, states, and cities. 
Yet one target remained, the grandest that Klein could imagine: the world economy. 
 
TO ITS ARCHITECTS, THE FIRST MODEL of the world economy seemed a logical 
extension of the attempt to depict a national economy. Like the WEFA, the impetus for 
developing a global model came, in part, from the Brookings Model. Klein was the 
motivating force behind the project, and initial support for the idea came from the same 
SSRC committee behind the Brookings Model. As Klein explained it, their goal was to 
accomplish “internationally what we had done in the Brookings model project on a sector 
basis.”995 Breaking down the world economy into discrete components and then 
connecting them back together would allow economists, finally, to trace the relationship 
between national and global, just as national models provided necessary context for 
understanding economic fluctuations in states and cities. National and global were 
complementary frames, not clashing alternatives. 
  Project LINK was the name of the endeavor. It started in the 1960s with the 
humbler goal of tracking the consequences of shifts in the dollar’s exchange rate at a time 
when a postwar dollar shortage was giving way to a global dollar surplus. A team of 
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econometricians from the United States, Europe, and Japan soon came together with the 
goal of devising a joint model of their economies to examine the consequences of 
swinging exchange rates. They would rely on the same principles that guided the 
Brookings project, using teams of researchers separated by vast distances and divided 
according to specialty. After realizing the IMF would be more likely to fund a project 
with larger ambitions, they extended the scope of their proposal to include developing 
countries; then conversations at the UN encouraged them to add socialist countries. 
Suddenly, a model once limited to the world’s richest nations had taken on a global 
cast.996 
 In recognition of Klein’s leadership, the University of Pennsylvania became the 
headquarters for the early stages of Project LINK. But the program never could have 
advanced beyond infancy without support from a global network. Funding for research 
centers also went to Stanford, the University of Toronto, the Free University of Brussels, 
Bonn University in West Germany, Kyoto University, and the London Graduate School 
of Business Studies. Additional support came from, among other organizations, the IMF, 
UNCTAD, the Bank of Canada, and the Bank of Japan.997 LINK was meant, in part, to 
turn this scattered band of researchers into an international community.  
 LINK’s directors also hoped to inspire programs in countries that had not yet 
developed models of their own. A favorite example was Italy, where economists at the 
University of Bologna created a model after receiving a boost from LINK. In countries 
without obvious institutional backers, they scrambled to find other candidates. Just a few 
weeks after Project LINK’s first meeting, in September 1969, Klein wrote to an 
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economist in France pleading that they were “desperately in need of French participation” 
and promising financial assistance.998 The site of their first meeting illustrated the global 
character of the enterprise: the town of Hakone, located in the mountains west of 
Tokyo.999  
 Despite that cosmopolitan gesture, LINK’s “Coordinating Center” remained in 
Philadelphia, where it was run out of the University’s Econometric Forecasting Unit, 
which doubled as the WEFA’s academic counterpart. The academic program matured at 
a healthy pace, and in 1970 a report maintained that “the project has become fully 
operative as a living system.”1000 By 1972, it had grown to include twelve national 
models, with the whole system totaling almost 1200 equations.1001 That same year, 
however, Klein grumbled to the head of LINK’s European division about “a real budget 
squeeze” that was holding back research outside the United States.1002 Other practical 
difficulties slowed their advance. Economists relying on different programs left the 
system’s computer “nearly exhausted.”1003 Conveying significant amounts of information 
across the world presented its own obstacles. Regional groups met regularly, and the 
entire team came together at least once a year, but communicating between these sessions 
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proved difficult. As Klein later admitted, their first solution—“big boxes of cards”—was 
also “very clumsy.”1004  
 For LINK’s proponents, the intellectual payoff more than justified the toil. At 
their most grandiose, they believed LINK could change the economist’s geographical 
imaginary. “Not only are we able to prepare a whole set of world forecasts,” Klein 
declared, “we can also think about the world as a whole in macro magnitudes such as 
world GDP, world trade volume, world inflation, world unemployment, world capital 
formation, etc.” “This,” he concluded, “provides the economist with a global view.”1005 
But this “global view” was seen through a Keynesian lens. For all of LINK’s innovations, 
it was a clear descendant of the Brookings Model and, before that, Klein-Goldberger. It 
was a system built out of the usual Keynesian aggregates, with national income 
accounting as its ultimate point of reference. Klein recognized the potential dangers of his 
venture. “There is a basic question,” he observed, “whether conditions exist that make the 
Keynesian analysis pertinent to the developing countries.”1006 But after noting those 
anxieties, he moved ahead with the effort anyway. 
 More damaging than concerns about the portability of Keynesianism were the 
difficulties of predicting the behavior of a global economy undergoing a wrenching 
transformation. LINK was born in the era of Bretton Woods, a system that collapsed 
almost as soon as the model began operation. That inaugurated a decade where LINK’s 
economists scrambled to keep a moving target in their sights. Continued efforts to forge a 
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post-Bretton-Woods international economic order, a recession that spread across much of 
the world, and repeated shocks to oil prices were just some of the surprises that kept 
forecasters revising their models. Catching his breath amid the confusion, Klein remarked 
in 1975 that work on LINK was now “largely a question of the models catching up with 
unfolding reality.”1007 The difficulty of that project was reflected in LINK’s failure to 
anticipate the conjunction of sagging growth and rising inflation rates that baffled 
policymakers and bedeviled Keynesians.  
 Despite all these setbacks, LINK’s institutional advance continued. Reflecting on 
a decade’s progress, Klein announced in 1979 that “the LINK system has expanded in 
virtually every dimension,” resulting in a model of more than 5000 equations that was 
“global in scope and virtually complete in geographic coverage.”1008 The number of 
robust national models had increased, and so had the more ad hoc efforts needed to fill in 
the gaps for other countries. Greater scope imposed more financial demands, but 
anxieties on that front had receded. More than twenty funders—ranging from the 
Bundesbank to the State Department, along with early supporters like the UN—
bankrolled the operation. Some of LINK’s financial backers, including the IMF and the 
Federal Reserve, had also begun developing global models of their own. LINK’s 
operators, meanwhile, allowed the WEFA to market some of their work for commercial 
purposes. That transaction was facilitated by Klein, who remained the project’s chief 
organizer.  
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 Confidence in the powers of Keynesian analysis had diminished, but no viable 
alternative to the models that had become an indispensable component of policymaking 
had yet emerged. That institutional foothold allowed Keynesians to undertake a major 
effort at intellectual renovation. In histories of this period, it can often seem as if 
Keynesians ran aground by refusing to adapt to changing circumstances while their 
rivals—whether monetarists, rational expectations theorists, or supply-siders—charged 
ahead. But Keynesians did not merely stare with incomprehension as events unfolded. 
Klein’s attempt to convert a theory designed for national economies into a tool for 
making sense of global economic interdependence became an important part of a larger 
effort to adapt Keynesianism for a new world. And his work was far from over. 
 
THE DURABILITY OF LARGE-SCALE MODELS WAS all the more surprising given 
the extent of the criticism they received. Having stagflation catch them by surprise cast 
doubt on econometricians in the general public. But the more serious intellectual 
challenge came from within the academy. While monetarism gained ground with 
policymakers in the 1970s, among economists rational expectations theory presented the 
more serious alternative to Keynesianism. But rational expectations did not begin by 
targeting Keynesianism as a whole. It arose, instead, out of an attack on one specific 
feature of that larger edifice. As Robert Lucas and his frequent collaborator Thomas 
Sargent explained it, despite the baroque mathematics required to support their argument, 
their central thesis was simple: “modern macroeconomic models are of no value in 
guiding policy.”1009  
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 Modeling had been a fundamental part of economics for Lucas and Sargent from 
their time as graduate students. As Lucas put it, Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic 
Analysis “was just a bible for my generation of economists.”1010 At the start of his career, 
Lucas considered himself a Keynesian, and for him that entailed both methodological and 
political commitments. “[W]hen I think of Keynesian economics or at least the 
Keynesian economics I signed on for,” he recalled, “it was part of this econometric 
model-building tradition.”1011 He did not care for Keynes’s General Theory, which he 
considered a morass of inconsistent verbiage; but he did like The Keynesian Revolution, 
which he read in his first graduate course on macroeconomics (“a pretty nice little book,” 
he later commented).1012 Econometrics had transformed Keynes’s “disconnected, 
qualitative ‘talk’ about economic activity” into a coherent theory grounded upon 
statistical relationships that could direct economic policy.1013 When Lucas turned against 
that tradition, it was because he believed that a better alternative had arrived, not because 
he renounced modeling as such. 
 Rational expectations theorists issued fervent denunciations of Keynesian theory, 
but they adopted a more cautious stance when describing their own efforts. “I don’t see 
economics as pushing that deeply in some respects,” he claimed. “We’re programming 
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robot imitations of people, and there are real limits on what you can get out of that.”1014 
Professions of humility had a political edge that could fit with conservative denigrations 
of liberal hubris. Unlike their Keynesian antagonists, however, proponents of rational 
expectations expressed an ambivalent relationship with the political implications of their 
work. Macroeconomists took a wrong turn, Lucas argued, when they started asking 
themselves “What would I do if I were on the Council [of Economic Advisers]?”1015 
Sargent seconded Lucas’s dismissal of any partisan motivation, claiming that the bulk of 
rational expectations theorists were “liberal Democrats.”1016 Returning to the founding 
claim of the movement, he insisted, “These are technical issues about staring at 
models.”1017 
 Though reluctant to tarnish the scientific status of his economics by yoking it to 
political debates, Lucas proved an insightful analyst of the political shifts that made the 
rise of rational expectations possible. Writing in 1980, he summarized the state of 
economic theory with two words: “total chaos.”1018 For more than thirty years, Keynesian 
economics had provided a “middle ground” between “socialism” and “laissez faire.”1019 
Lucas acknowledged that Keynesianism had its critics on the right, but he was just as 
attentive to the restraints it imposed on the left: “how bad off could we be,” he asked, “in 
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a country where Paul Samuelson is viewed as a leftist?”1020 What followed the 
breakdown of this compromise was not a period of liberal retreat and conservative 
advance; instead, debate had exploded, and in the resulting turmoil economists were 
being pulled in every direction at once.  
 The cacophony made for exciting times in economic theory, but, Lucas warned, it 
had more troubling implications for economic practice. “The collapse of the center means 
the end of consensus economics,” he wrote, predicting that debate would revert to the 
pre-Keynesian contest between “laissez faire” and “socialist/fascist detailed 
interventions.” He cited legislation put forward by congressional Republicans Jack Kemp 
and William Roth that would have instituted massive tax cuts as evidence for a resurgent 
laissez faire. As for the “socialist/fascist” position, Lucas found confirmation of his thesis 
in the career of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act.  
 Humphrey-Hawkins was the disappointing outcome of a campaign that had begun 
with grand ambitions.1021 Part of a broader revival of enthusiasm for planning, its 
congressional history commenced with a bill cosponsored in 1975 by Hubert Humphrey, 
the Democratic Party’s nominee for president seven years earlier, and the long-serving 
Republican Senator Jacob Javits. The starting point for the legislation, as an aide to 
Humphrey explained, was the conviction that “Macroeconomics has not borne the fruits 
we expected.”1022 Resurrecting an expansive vision of planning meant repudiating the 
belief that fiscal and monetary policy alone provided sufficient tools to manage an 
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economy. The movement behind this program was broad enough to make for unlikely 
partnerships. A conference on “Economic Planning in a Free Society” included Paul 
Sweezy, as devoted to Marxism as he had been when Klein lionized him in The 
Keynesian Revolution; but it also had the chief economist at General Motors and Leon 
Keyserling, architect of growth liberalism under Harry Truman.1023  
 Opposition from Gerald Ford stymied the bill, but it was revived in modified form 
during Jimmy Carter’s administration, when it was also rebranded Humphrey-Hawkins. 
Yet the version that ultimately passed was a feeble thing when compared to the original. 
Though it dedicated the government to ensuring unemployment and inflation rates no 
greater than 4 percent, it lacked enforcement mechanisms to give those obligations teeth.  
 Klein was skeptical about Humphrey-Hawkins, which he regarded as “naïve,” but 
he aligned himself with those who wanted, in his words, to move “beyond Keynesian 
macroeconomics.”1024 “We are searching,” he said, “for a theory of economic policy that 
is appropriate for the 1970’s and 80’s in much the same way that Keynesian economics 
was a product of the times in the 1920’s and 30’s.”1025 Unlike the early Keynesians, 
however, Klein did not think an intellectual revolution would be needed to respond to the 
challenges of the moment. He called for supplements to the existing framework—
“natural extensions of its original base”—not a total break from the past.1026 
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 Characteristically, he believed that solving the crisis of Keynesianism would 
begin with better econometric models. He admitted that even the best of the mainstream 
models had profound limitations, but he was convinced they remained the best available 
guides to policy. Replacing them with systems built upon the assumption of perfectly 
rational actors would mean swapping models that tried to capture the messy realities of 
economic life with a fantasy that placed the consistency of its mathematics above loyalty 
to empirics. Dismissing rational expectations as “a contrived argument to show that 
macroeconomic policy is futile,” Klein urged the creation of elaborate models that would 
cover everything from the price of food to population demographics.1027 He gave special 
attention to one subject. “Energy in a very convenient inexpensive form,” he wrote, “was 
accepted as a fact of life during the development of the Keynesian Revolution.”1028 That 
premise could no longer be taken for granted, and it offered one of the most pressing 
justifications for overhauling Keynesianism.  
 Klein gave his version of this reformed Keynesianism a surprising name: supply-
side economics. According to Klein, structural problems—above all, waning productivity 
growth—had arisen that macroeconomic adjustments alone could not address. These 
were problems of supply, not demand. Starting with the Brookings Model, 
econometricians had tried to extend the challenge of modeling aggregate supply by 
adding input-output tables to their systems. In Klein’s words, this approached fused the 
traditions of Leontief and Keynes. But this was just one aspect of a program dedicated to 
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achieving what he called “the empirical implementation of the Walrasian system.”1029 His 
summary of the genealogy behind this ambition doubled as a Whiggish outline of the 
history of macroeconomics as seen by Klein.  
Essentially Tinbergen implemented the Keynesian system and Leontief 
implemented a part of the Walrasian system. By putting the two together, 
with due allowance to Kuznets for making the data bases of final demand 
and national income available, a complete synthesis of supply and demand 
in the economy as a whole can be put together.1030 
 
Tinbergen, Keynes, Leontief, Walras, and Kuznets: Klein had assembled an eclectic 
canon, but in his eyes their work fit together into a coherent whole. Now their successors 
were tasked with converting that theoretical project into models revealing the interplay of 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply.  
 Yoking this intellectual agenda to a practical diagnosis of the ills afflicting the 
American economy of the 1970s, he called his program supply-side economics because it 
extended the repertoire of available policies beyond Keynesian demand management. 
Klein lumped a daunting range of problems under the category of supply: “development 
of new, greater energy supplies, protection of the environment, controlling the exhaustion 
of resources, enhancing agricultural supplies, balancing population development, and 
others of like nature.”1031 All of these issues, he elsewhere noted, “deal[t] with situations 
of particular groups, particular processes, particular markets” that fell outside the grasp of 
fiscal and monetary policies targeted at the manipulation of economic aggregates.1032  
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 What the times demanded, Klein believed, was a new style of economics capable 
of managing the economy as a whole when macroeconomics—the system of thought that 
had emerged for precisely that purpose—could no longer accomplish the task by itself. 
The latest trend, of course, had more than a casual resemblance to earlier vogues. When 
asked by a professional journal whether his brand of supply-side economics was just 
another name for “national economic planning,” Klein replied, “you and I know what it 
means. But if we use any explosive language then we won’t get anywhere.”1033 He had 
learned to play a more cautious game. 
 For Klein, all this was an intellectual challenge; for policymakers, it was a 
political imperative. Commentators from every perspective treated the need for intelligent 
management of the economy as a fundamental element of effective governance. Writing 
in 1974, the Marxist social theorist Claus Offe portrayed this obligation as a 
responsibility that states had brought upon themselves. Encouraged by the assurances of 
their economic advisers, politicians had claimed that the state could keep inflation 
restrained and employment high.1034 After taking the credit for accomplishing those goals 
during boom times, they could not shirk blame during slumps. Examining the question 
from a very different perspective a few years later, Robert Lucas arrived at a similar 
conclusion. According to Lucas, the roots of the contemporary dilemma reached back to 
the Great Depression. A half century after its onset, the Depression remained “the central 
political fact governing discussions of economic policy,” and, as a consequence, “the 
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view that the economy needs to be managed on a year in, year out basis is almost 
universal.”1035  
 Klein did not articulate the problem with the same clarity, but he did not have to. 
He had already devoted his career to mastering the politics of the economy. That 
expertise might have blinded him to a history more distant observers like Offe and Lucas 
could see, but it came with advantages of its own. Klein had helped turn his commitment 
to modeling into part of what it meant to govern an economy, and, through the WEFA, he 
had also made it a not insignificant part of that economy. His greatest opportunity to use 
his theories to shape practice, though, arrived in 1975, when he met a long-shot candidate 
for president named Jimmy Carter. 
 
“WHO IS JIMMY CARTER?”1036 That, Klein remembered, was his reaction upon being 
asked by the dean of the Wharton School if he would advise the Georgia governor on 
economic policy. Given Carter’s obscurity outside his home state, Klein’s initial 
uncertainty was understandable. Meeting Carter dispelled this confusion, and Klein 
signed on as his economic adviser.  
 For a second-tier Democratic presidential candidate like Carter, Klein had an 
attractive combination of characteristics. He was respected by other economists, both in 
the academy and outside it. By 1975, he had even become something of a public figure. 
Klein did not seek the limelight, but his role at the WEFA had turned him into a valuable 
source for reporters who needed an expert to quote on the state of the economy. That 
reputation led PBS to choose him as one of their chief commentators in a three-hour 
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special it aired that January to complement Gerald Ford’s State of the Union Address. As 
the New York Times observed, the report, which preempted regularly scheduled 
programming like “Feelin’ Good” and “Theater in America,” called upon Klein to 
“predict by means of a computer the effect on the economy of President Ford’s proposed 
new policies.”1037  
 Despite his increased public standing, Klein was still not quite a member of the 
elite circle of policy-minded economists. He had consulted governments, including the 
Ford administration, and participated in a committee of economists supporting Eugene 
McCarthy in 1968, but he had not served in a major office like the Council of Economic 
Advisers. From Carter’s perspective, that made Klein an even better choice. If Klein had 
been too celebrated, he would have been out of the campaign’s reach.  
 That Carter needed an economic adviser was never in doubt. “The economy is the 
issue of 1976,” a key member of the Democratic National Committee noted early in the 
campaign season, expressing the conventional wisdom of the time.1038 What issues 
covered by the broad ambit of “the economy” would bubble to the surface remained 
unclear: “big government, high unemployment, inflation, New York City’s financial 
collapse, deficit spending and tax reform are all possibilities,” the New York Times 
observed.1039 Economists had a privileged ability to advise on these subjects, which made 
them an indispensable element of a modern campaign. “[N]o Presidential candidate,” the 
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paper of record concluded, “would brave the race in the post-Keynesian 1970’s without 
one or more economic advisers.”1040  
 The logic at work here paralleled the explanations for the continued rise of 
econometric consulting in the same period. The faith that had lifted economists to 
positions of influence during the postwar boom, the faith that economists had mastered 
the workings of the economy—that was gone. But government agencies and major 
corporations had come to depend on the knowledge economists had claimed they could 
provide. Lacking any suitable replacements, their managers felt compelled to seek out the 
advice of their humbled economic experts. The economy might now seem more like a 
fickle god than an object of technical control, but understanding it had become a 
necessity, and economists were still better positioned than anyone else to offer guidance. 
Institutional exigencies outweighed intellectual failings. 
 Carter was also drawn to Klein for more personal reasons. During his time as 
governor, Carter had brought on an economist from Georgia State University to serve in 
the newly created post of “economic adviser to the governor.”1041 In 1974, Carter 
encouraged that adviser to research the uses the state government might have for a model 
of Georgia’s economy that was being built in conjunction with the WEFA. (Carter’s 
fascination with modeling continued in his presidency. A few months after taking office, 
he told an aid, “Find out for me how many different econometric models we are using for 
international analysis and whether the CIA needs one.”1042) After meeting Klein, the 
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former nuclear engineer discovered that he shared an intellectual temperament with the 
econometrician. Carter was “bewitched,” one economist recalled: “every time he wanted 
to know what this or that policy would do, Larry would give him a batch of computer 
printouts with precise answers.”1043 Such precision could be comforting, even though 
both men knew the margin of error was substantial.  
 Klein’s work extended well beyond forecasting. As head of a task force charged 
with designing the candidate’s economic agenda, Klein was part of a larger research team 
run by Carter’s aides. By the time Carter secured the nomination, this “political think 
tank,” in the words of the Washington Post, had become “one of the most ambitious such 
operations ever assembled in a presidential campaign.”1044 They had pliable material to 
work with. When asked by a reporter early in the campaign whether he was a Keynesian 
or a monetarist, Carter responded, “I don’t know.”1045  
 Klein recruited an ideologically diverse group of counselors, but the final result 
mirrored his own views. His influence was most visible in the campaign’s chief statement 
on economic policy, a position paper released in the run-up to an important primary in 
Pennsylvania. Much of the document elaborated positions that any Democrat running for 
the presidency in 1976 could have endorsed. Though adamant on the need to restrain 
inflation, it labeled unemployment the nation’s chief economic challenge. But the 
statement was not just campaign boilerplate. It supported “coordinated government 
planning” on a litany of issues familiar to Klein’s readers: “structural unemployment, 
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inflation, environmental deterioration, exaggeration of economic inequalities, natural 
resource limitations, and obstructions to the operation of the free market system,” with 
that last nod to the virtues of the market constituting the only significant addition to 
Klein’s standard litany.1046 To help implement this program, the paper called for a 
redesigned CEA empowered to “deal with long-range problems of individual sectors 
fitted into a [sic] overall economic plan for the economy as a whole, as well as to deal 
with considerations of supply, distribution, and performance in individual industries.”1047 
This was the CEA reborn as a tool for executing Klein’s version of supply-side 
economics.  
 There was even a gesture toward one of Klein’s most cherished goals. “Problems 
of inflation, unemployment, scarcity of resources, and economic stabilization,” it argued, 
“cannot be accomplished without a coordinated effort with the rest of the world.”1048 
Here was the vision of globalized economic policy behind Project LINK. In the plodding 
language of a campaign manifesto written by committee, an outline of what Klein 
elsewhere called a “New New Economics” had come together.1049  
 Reviews were tepid. “Carter Offers Broad Economic Program Lacking in Details 
but Emphasizing Jobs,” ran one representative headline.1050 The candidate himself 
appeared only vaguely attached to his program. While discussing the paper with 
reporters, he deferred repeatedly to his economic advisers, afterwards telling one, “You 
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can see how much I need your help on these questions.”1051 Compared to what his major 
rivals for the nomination were offering, Carter’s platform seemed cautious. That was one 
of its goals, to project an air of moderation and reassure voters that Carter would be a 
prudent manager of the national fisc. Whatever the policy merits, it was enough to help 
him win a decisive victory in Pennsylvania, and, eventually, the presidential nomination.  
 Klein himself burst into the headlines only once during the campaign, and for an 
entirely predictable reason. In October, with just a few weeks to go before the election, 
the state chairman of the Texas Republican Party declared, “I don’t want a man as 
President whose chief economic adviser is openly a former member of the Communist 
Party of this country. Lawrence Klein is such a person.”1052 What might have been a 
scandalous revelation a decade earlier quickly fizzled. Most journalists seemed to feel 
that discussing the subject was in poor taste. Those who brought it up, including People 
magazine in a short profile of Klein published that August, soon moved on to other 
subjects. They did so with Klein’s encouragement. “It was an act of youthfulness 30 
years ago,” he told People. “I just don’t think of those problems now.”1053 In October, a 
terse comment from Klein was enough to put an end to the story. With that problem 
disposed of, he could return to his major public event that week: a public debate with his 
counterpart in the Ford administration, and fellow economic forecaster, Alan Greenspan. 
 Greenspan was chair of Ford’s Council of Economic Advisers, and whether Klein 
would take up that position in a Carter administration remained an open question. During 
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the campaign, he dismissed the question. “I am just a school teacher,” he said to one 
interviewer, “and I intend to stay right here.”1054 Klein echoed those comments later in 
his life, always denying that he ever wanted the job. In the aftermath of Carter’s victory, 
however, matters did not seem so clear. Even when rejecting the notion that he might 
serve on the CEA, Klein had hinted to journalists that he might be willing to serve in 
another capacity. Days before the election, he identified a need for an adviser “who can 
put all the marbles together” on international economic policy, a position for which he 
just happened to have the ideal résumé.1055 During the transition to Carter’s 
administration, rumors that he was up for the CEA post regularly appeared in the press, 
and Carter’s team floated Klein’s name along with fifteen others on a list of potential 
economic advisers.1056 As late as December 20, Newsweek was reporting that Klein had 
“temporarily removed himself from competition to pursue his research, but changed his 
mind last week and remained a possibility.”1057  
 Behind the scenes, on the day that Klein’s former membership in the Communist 
Party caused a brief stir in the national press, Samuelson wrote a defense of his former 
student to one of Carter’s closest advisers. “On the basis of detailed knowledge of Klein’s 
economic writings and lecturing over the last 33 years,” he declared, “I believe that I am 
in an authoritative position to testify to his political moderation, ideological sagacity, and 
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general good character as an American citizen.”1058 Describing the mature Klein as the 
follower of “a middle-of-the-road viewpoint,” Samuelson did his best to clear a path for 
an eventual nomination, asserting that there was “nothing in his record of the last 30 
years that would other than commend him to Committees of Congress and to the 
President representing either major political party.”1059 But Samuelson’s validation could 
not erase concerns about what Republicans would do with Klein’s record—concerns that 
a source later told the New York Times led Klein, who “wanted to avoid any digging into 
past left-wing connections,” to withdraw his name from consideration for the CEA post 
only after the election.1060 
 Instead, the office went to Charles Schulze, director of the Bureau of the Budget 
under Lyndon Johnson and a prominent figure at the Brookings Institution.1061 Unlike 
Klein, Schultze was a quintessential Washington economist who made up for a lack of 
glittering academic qualifications with a record in government and a network of 
supporters inside the beltway. Klein still talked with Carter occasionally, sometimes over 
the phone and sometimes in person.1062 He was close enough to the administration that, in 
the summer of 1979, when Carter was selecting participants for a summit at Camp David 
preceding his famous televised address on a national “crisis of confidence,” Klein was 
one of two economists chosen. He also had other, more indirect encounters with the 
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president: in 1977, for example, simulations run through the WEFA’s model concluded 
that the administration’s economic agenda was hopelessly unrealistic.1063  
 Except for these sporadic interventions, Klein watched from the sidelines as 
Carter’s presidency unfolded, and unraveled. He watched as the administration pursued 
an internationalized Keynesianism premised on the conviction, known as “locomotive 
theory,” that a coordinated stimulus program in the United States, Germany, and Japan 
could drive an international economic boom.1064 He watched as the difficulties of 
coordinating domestic policies across national governments and the fallout from another 
oil crisis led Carter to discard that agenda. He watched as Carter told the nation that “our 
economic cup no longer overflows,” condemned rising inflation rates, and announced 
that “fiscal restraint has become a matter of simple public duty.”1065 And he watched Paul 
Volcker take over as Chairman of the Federal Reserve and begin an aggressive campaign 
to break the back of inflation.  
 Although Volcker had majored in economics as an undergraduate at Princeton, he 
did not have a doctorate in the subject (the last Fed chairman, so far, without that 
credential).1066 But he had studied economics as a graduate student at Harvard’s Littauer 
School of Public Policy, where he took a class on Money and Banking taught by Alvin 
Hansen. Years later, one book from the course remained lodged in his memory: 
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Lawrence Klein’s The Keynesian Revolution, which, Volcker said, provoked in him a 
“visceral suspicion that the world was a lot fuzzier” than Klein let on.1067  
 Despite the disappointments, Klein remained, in his words, a “friendly critic” of 
the administration.1068 Often, “friendly” outweighed “critic.” “Rarely has a government 
been so severely criticized when most performance statistics of the economy have been 
quite good,” he wrote in the spring of 1978.1069 Two years later he offered Carter more 
direct flattery, asserting that “the President has had a way of outguessing the experts on 
the economy.”1070 Only after Reagan’s election did he offer a sustained, public criticism 
of the man he had helped put into office. “In the end,” he concluded, “it was excessive 
reliance on conventional policies of aggregate demand management and a failure to take 
up the challenges on the supply side that led to the dismal performance of the Carter 
Administration.”1071 Thanks to this failure—part political, part intellectual, part 
institutional—advocates of a very different version of supply-side economics were about 
to move into the executive branch. 
 Klein held back on publishing this evaluation until after he had one last meeting 
with Carter in the White House. In October, he had won the Nobel Prize in economics, 
and he was then invited to participate in a ceremony honoring nine Americans who had 
received the award. “Long after the work of statesmen has been forgotten,” Carter said, 
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“the work of these men will be remembered.”1072 Two months later, Ronald Reagan 
became President of the United States. 
 
REAGAN’S INAUGURATION SIGNALED THE BEGINNING of a chastening period 
for econometricians, but discontent had been rising for some time. The academic charge 
against Keynesian modelers gathered momentum as the 1970s advanced. Later in the 
decade, it received unexpected support from supply-siders. While the two groups shared a 
common enemy they had distinct visions for the future. Supply-siders did not want to do 
away with bulky macro models; they wanted to revise them to produce results that 
demonstrated the wonders of tax cuts. While journalists proselytized in the public sphere 
and activists at the grass-roots mobilized to pass ballots initiatives, in Washington 
supply-siders turned econometrics into another front in their campaign to transform 
policy.  
 Paul Craig Roberts was the movement’s point man in this battle of the models. An 
economist with a doctorate from the University of Virginia, Roberts became economic 
counsel to two of the leading supporters of tax cuts in Congress, Representative Jack 
Kemp and Senator Orrin Hatch. Soon, a push was underway to question the legitimacy of 
projections issued by the forecasters the government relied upon, chiefly the WEFA, the 
DRI, and Chase Econometrics. Government economists were hauled before 
congressional committees and asked to justify their predictions. Alice Rivlin, director of 
the Congressional Budget Office, provided supply-siders with a valuable weapon when a 
memo she had written calling skeptics of models “an extreme right-wing claque who 
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should not be given an audience” made its way to Hatch.1073 For Hatch, the stakes of the 
conflict were clear. “Republicans would be more effective,” he argued, “if they ceased 
supporting faulty econometric models that serve as ramps for Democratic spending 
programs.”1074 Others were not so sure. A staffer on the Senate Budget Committee 
questioned Hatch’s fixation “on this tangent, which few people know or care about 
outside the economics profession.”1075 
 Roberts was doing his best to persuade the public, or at least politically engaged 
conservatives, that they neglected econometrics at their peril. Taking his crusade to the 
major organs of the rightwing press, he portrayed the ostensibly technocratic models as 
instruments of a political agenda. “[O]nce such models are accepted,” he told readers of 
National Review, “their emphasis on demand sets the limits to the debate, regardless of 
the political persuasion of the participants.”1076 The claim to have transcended politics 
was what made these models so politically effective. “The fight,” he later observed, 
“went on so long and so hard because more was at stake than economic reputations. The 
real issue was political power.”1077 Roberts’s condemnations highlighted a paradox 
inherent to the politics of neutral expertise: technical mastery can be an intimidating force 
if its authority is recognized, but undermining that legitimacy can push the experts into a 
political contest they are not prepared to fight, turning what had been the source of their 
strength into a major vulnerability. 
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 Undermining the credibility of their opponents accomplished only half the job. 
Supply-siders needed models of their own, and they lacked a figure with the expertise to 
build them. A solution to this problem came from the modelers themselves. Here, again, 
the denial of an explicit political agenda worked in the supply-siders’ favor. Conventional 
econometric modelers could not afford to sacrifice their reputation for impartiality, which 
provided them an incentive to reach out to critics. There was a more mercenary rationale 
at work, too. As proponents of tax cuts gained sway over the decisions made by 
congressional committees and government bureaus, critics turned into clients—clients 
that the managers of for-profit econometrics companies wanted to keep happy. Well 
before Reagan’s election and the Republican takeover of the Senate in 1980, the Senate 
Finance Committee selected Chase Econometrics—the firm managed by Michael Evans, 
Klein’s former colleague at Penn and a co-founder of the WEFA—to build its first 
supply-side model. “A new element has been injected into the ongoing economics 
debate,” Klein told the Wall Street Journal in 1981.1078 He was less diplomatic in other 
venues, where he denounced the “national pre-occupation” with tax cuts.1079 But Klein’s 
opposition did not stop the WEFA from touting the revision of its models along lines 
friendlier to supply-siders.  
 Klein soon concluded that matters were even worse than he had feared. Officials 
in the Reagan administration dismissed Keynesian models as, in the words of David 
Stockman, new director of the Office of Management and Budget, “cynical and 
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destructive.”1080 Treasury Secretary Donald Regan told the Senate Budget Committee 
that the standard models were relics of the past.1081 Based on historical patterns that 
prevailed before the tumult of the 1970s, they could not offer reliable guidance in the 
decade ahead. Reagan was even blunter, referring to a CBO projection as “phony.”1082 He 
would remain a skeptic throughout his time in office. “Those projections, frankly, I pay 
no attention to them,” he told a press conference in 1985.1083 That skepticism was 
convenient for an administration whose optimistic forecasts exceeded even the brightest 
predictions coming from outside the White House.  
 Predictably, Klein was outraged. Writing in the Los Angeles Times, he asked and 
answered his own rhetorical question: “Should we accept an economic program without 
an accompanying forecast that is believable? I say, decidedly not!”1084 While far from 
infallible, the econometric models used at firms like the WEFA remained the best option 
in an imperfect catalogue. In their place, Reagan’s team substituted “highly subjective 
policy formation, without precedent, without track record, without economic scientific 
credibility.”1085 At the WEFA, however, other senior staff adopted a more restrained 
approach. “It’s not so much an argument about results, it’s an argument about timing,” 
one of them told the Wall Street Journal, adding that the surge in growth predicted by the 
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administration “could happen. We just think the probability is low.”1086 Like other private 
forecasters, staffers at the WEFA were reluctant to offend one of their most important 
customers. 
 For econometricians who sought to turn their expertise into profits, matters were 
about to get much worse. Forecasters had missed the downturn that helped usher Reagan 
into the White House, and they were surprised by the boom that arrived in time for his 
reelection campaign. Failing to anticipate the recovery was especially damning because, 
unlike the 1980 recession, which could be written off as the product of supply shocks, the 
upturn in growth was spurred by tax cuts and spending increases, textbook instances of 
fiscal stimulus. The Reagan administration twisted the knife by reducing expenditures on 
forecasting and directing the funding that remained to companies friendlier to supply-
siders. By 1982, those cutbacks had forced the WEFA to shrink its workforce by about 15 
percent.1087 That was one example of a general malaise: profits dwindled at DRI, while 
Chase Econometrics and the WEFA fell into the red. Rueful forecasters blamed their 
gloomy situation on themselves. “For two decades, we let businesses, the media and the 
public think that models were perfect crystal balls,” said one DRI executive, “maybe now 
we’re paying the price.”1088 Here was one last toll exacted by claiming scientific 
accuracy: having raised themselves up to such lofty heights, econometricians had much 
farther to fall.  
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 Their most urgent financial troubles, however, had more material roots. 
Forecasting had given the field its glamor, but projections had never been that profitable. 
The major source of revenue, even for prestigious modelers like Chase and DRI, came 
from renting out time on their computers so clients could run their own projections. As 
the WEFA’s chief economist noted, customers “spen[t] hundreds of thousands of dollars 
per year to hook on to these mainframes, just to plot the consumer price index.”1089 By 
the 1980s, the spread of personal computers allowed companies to perform those 
operations by themselves. Improvements in computer technology had made the industry 
possible, but continued advances now threatened its existence. Forecasters who wanted to 
survive had to offer more tempting services to their clients. The shift toward specialized 
projections tailored to individual firms and updated with metronomic frequency 
accelerated. Macroeconomic models alone could no longer earn healthy profits.  
 Yet the WEFA, the firm most closely associated with those holdouts from the 
golden age of Keynesianism, was uniquely well positioned to survive in the lean years. 
Time-sharing from its computers accounted for only around 10% of its revenue.1090 This 
had slowed their growth during the boom—DRI dwarfed the WEFA in size, and even 
Chase was larger—but it cushioned them during the crash. For customers who still 
believed in the value of large-scale models, the WEFA had the biggest of them all. Their 
model of the American economy included some 1,600 equations, twice as large as DRI’s, 
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and more than five times the size of Chase’s; and that model was still turning a profit, 
even in the bleak year of 1982.1091 
 Profits were increasingly important because in 1980 the publishing company Ziff-
Davis purchased eighty percent of the WEFA from the University of Pennsylvania. While 
maintaining Klein as chairman, the deal turned the firm into a profit-seeking enterprise at 
the brink of an industry-wide contraction. The WEFA continued to bleed red ink, and the 
company soon found itself in a corporate version of hot potato. Ownership passed from 
Ziff-Davis to a company owned by the French government; then a merger with Chase 
Econometrics; then an acquisition by Bain Capital, which sold it to an information 
technology company; then in 2001 another merger, this time with DRI, that produced a 
new firm called Global Insight. The surviving remnant of this winnowing process, Global 
Insight boasted about $70 million in annual revenue, five hundred employees, and thirty 
offices scattered around the world.1092 
 Despite the dwindling profits and frantic shuffling of ownership, the WEFA 
retained the power to shake markets. If anything, thanks to an expansion of its 
international coverage, its influence rose. A critical report on the finances of the 
Philippine government, for example, prompted an irate response from the nation’s chief 
central banker on the day of its release.1093 Even more dramatic was the company’s 
revelation that Bulgaria’s chief export in 1982 had been weapons sold to countries— and 
terrorist groups—in the developing world, a finding the WEFA based on a previously 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1091 Hertzberg, “Slump,” 53. 
 
1092 Jon Hilsenrath, “McGraw-Hill, Thomson Units Merge to Form Separate Entity,” May 7, 2001, 
B12. 
 
1093 Eduardo Lachica, “Philippines May Be Forced to Stretch Out Payments to Banks, Wharton 
Study Says,” November 1, 1982, 34; Eileen Alt Powell, “Philippines Central Banker Disputes Forecast 
That Nation Will Need to Reschedule Its Debt,” November 2, 1982, 34. 
	  
	   376	  
unpublished report from the Bulgarian government.1094 Though companies outside the 
United States constituted a progressively larger portion of its client base, the WEFA also 
nurtured its domestic market. In 1984, the firm predicted a narrow win for Reagan in the 
coming election based on its economic forecasts.1095 Their margin was closer than the 
landslide that followed, but it was still an effective publicity stunt. Even better was the 
company’s accurate projection of that year’s GNP. Meanwhile Klein, who stayed on as 
chairman of a “scientific advisory board,” continued to benefit from the publicity his 
association with the WEFA supplied. Like the company as a whole, his attention was 
drawn more and more outside the borders of the United States. 
 On that front, the steady expansion of Project LINK compensated for setbacks at 
the WEFA. (The former also helped support the latter by providing it with technology 
that it could employ in its models.) In 1988, the LINK system totaled about 20,000 
equations and included eighty national models. Day-to-day management fell increasingly 
to the United Nations, which took over full responsibility in 1989. By that point, LINK 
had over seventy branches around the world. Some one hundred economists from these 
research centers came together at annual meetings held in the UN. Those gatherings 
attracted a growing number of socialists, including representatives from Poland, 
Hungary, and China. Though about half the national models had been developed at LINK 
headquarters, the group also stimulated local efforts. Spain was one case. Leaders of that 
undertaking named their forecasting center after its inspiration: El Instituto de Predicción 
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Económica “Lawrence R. Klein.”1096 As for that group’s namesake, Klein remained 
deeply involved with LINK, leading investigations into the dynamics of the world 
economy that he hoped would lay the foundation for another attempt to globalize 
Keynesianism.1097 
 That ambition remained a distant hope, but closer to home modelers had better 
luck with a more modest goal. Backlash against the deficits accumulated during Reagan’s 
first term put an end to the forward march of supply-side economics, and despite repeated 
efforts rational expectations had yet to generate models that appealed to policymakers. 
After more than a decade of polemics, models derived from Keynesian premises 
remained the only plausible candidate to fill this vacuum, and so they resumed the place 
in government that would soon prompt Wanniski’s fulminations about “the enemy 
within.”  
 
THE ENEMY IN QUESTION began the 1980s worried about the decade ahead. Klein 
believed sluggish growth, higher inflation, and greater unemployment appeared the most 
likely outcome, not just in the United States but across the industrialized world. He 
identified the twinned threats of costly energy and a rising price level as 
“overwhelmingly” the major issues of the time. “An actual shortage of energy or its high 
price makes former growth rates seemingly unattainable,” he argued.1098 There were two 
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options, neither of them encouraging. An outright shortage of oil—which, despite the 
catchall reference to “energy,” was Klein’s real concern—meant that the growth rates 
that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s could no longer be reached. Even with enough oil 
to sustain those growth rates, its high price ensured greater inflation, along with 
untenable trade deficits for oil importers like the United States.  
 While other economists, according to the Wall Street Journal, had grown “almost 
euphoric” with anticipation for a Reagan administration that placed “economic efficiency 
over social objectives,” Klein warned about the dangers presented by this “new breed of 
politician.”1099 Slashing tax rates and government spending offered little hope of 
reversing the slide into stagnation. Klein looked instead, as he had under Carter, to the 
international economic order. “The best way to deal with the economic issues of the 
80’s,” he maintained, was “to develop an approach through policy coordination among 
the leading economic powers.”1100 Advocates for planning were on the defensive, but 
synchronized monetary and fiscal policies remained at least a possibility, even under 
conservative governments. In that prospect, Klein found some hope. 
 Beginning in 1979, the Los Angeles Times gave Klein a platform to share his 
views. The paper had started a weekly feature it called the “Times Board of Economists,” 
which promised “analysis of important issues” from a rotating cast of dismal 
scientists.1101 Klein appeared regularly, authoring dozens of op-eds in the eight years he 
held the post. The columns bristled with statistics, but the prose was clunky, and he 
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lacked the flair for the dramatic that successful popularizers bring to their work. One 
typical piece—a consideration of the relationship between exchange rates and interest 
rates—built to this sedate conclusion: “It is more correct in terms of economic science to 
say that the relationship could go either way, [sic] than to try to be falsely definitive and 
unambiguous. It all depends.”1102 A valid point, but it is still easy to see why the columns 
did not propel him into a career as a public intellectual.  
 Klein was not always so even-tempered. He took an early and vigorous stance 
against increased dependence on the Federal Reserve, writing in the fall of 1979 that 
“monetary policy alone cannot do the enormous job of bring[ing] the American economy 
into a range of good performance.”1103 Regular updates on the WEFA’s forecasts 
provided ammunition for his fusillades against the Reagan administration. In September 
1982, he alerted readers that conditions had become so dire that “economic depression 
with chaos in financial markets” had become a real possibility.1104 Perhaps not 
coincidentally, that column appeared in the week’s preceding that year’s congressional 
elections. By election day, Klein’s attitude had brightened, and he claimed that a recovery 
was underway.1105  
 During the boom, Klein’s criticisms increasingly focused on the mushrooming 
budget deficit. In 1983, he reported himself “amazed in contemplating today’s 
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astronomical figures.”1106 One year later, with the expansion proceeding apace—though, 
he emphasized, it was “very much an average recovery”—he called for restraint in fiscal 
policy, a blow he wanted softened by a more expansive monetary policy.1107 Revealing 
how far he had come from his revolutionary youth, Klein turned almost lyrical when 
paying tribute to the merits of fiscal rectitude. “There is,” he claimed, “something 
aesthetically pleasing about a well-balanced policy.”1108 Next he demonstrated how much 
distance had opened up between his current position and the confident Keynesianism of 
the 1960s. “A smooth, gradual adjustment or accommodation to the deficits could be an 
outcome,” he acknowledged, “but the economy is not always that kind to us.”1109 Seen 
from this chastened perspective, caution became one of the policymaker’s paramount 
virtues, and even more robust strands of Keynesianism ran the danger of utopianism. 
 Yet Klein reserved his most aggressive criticism for apostles of the market. “It is 
not on a sound basis of observation that economists are asserting that the market should 
be relied upon,” he insisted, but on “subjective belief in the power of the market 
mechanism.”1110 Anticipating a trend that would gather force in a few years, when 
Democrats began to search for their party’s version of supply-side economics, he called 
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in 1980 for “an aggressive industrial policy that tries to outguess the market.”1111 The 
international scene had become an arena of fierce economic conflict, and in this contest 
dogmatic assumptions about the wisdom of the market had become a potentially fatal 
hindrance. “For the sake of a philosophical position,” he lamented, “many U.S. 
economists are willing to be lapped in the race for survival.”1112 
 Klein did not oppose the fashions of his moment entirely. He agreed that a 
“lighter touch on regulation” was needed, but he still felt that put him outside the 
consensus in “the economics fraternity of Washington.”1113 “Economic ideology at its 
extreme, based on unwavering faith in the market mechanism,” had captured too many of 
his colleagues.1114 He paid special attention to the hazards of financial deregulation, 
which he judged “a mistaken policy” that “will not contribute to the ethical soundness of 
our banking system or to the stability of our economy.”1115 (He returned to the subject 
again in 1990, writing, “my arguments for tighter regulation of financial affairs is 
definitely a minority position but I see the possibility of serious trouble ahead unless the 
financial system is more closely watched.”1116) 
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  When Klein invoked the specter of a Hobbesian international marketplace, he 
offered a fearsome portrait of a subject that had become the central theme of his work. 
“There are no longer any closed economies,” he declared in 1988, which meant that the 
ultimate frame of economic analysis must, inevitably, be the world economy.1117 When 
his thoughts turned to the future of that world economy, he was less concerned by the 
prospect of waning American hegemony than by the likelihood of a clash between rich 
and poor nations—class struggle on a planetary scale. “Both economic and political 
stability,” he wrote in 1987, “require that a more humanistic and less materialistic view 
be taken by the more prosperous countries.”1118 An international problem required an 
international solution—in Klein’s words, “a Global Marshall Plan” yoked to 
internationalized Keynesianism.1119  
 The cornerstone of his proposal was major relief for debtor nations in Latin 
America and Africa, along with the Philippines. LINK simulations on the consequences 
of that program, combined with further research into the benefits of fiscal and monetary 
policy coordination, provided a technical justification for the agenda. When he discussed 
these questions, Klein’s rhetoric at times recalled the mixture of academic economist and 
idealistic activist that characterized his radical youth. “Humanity needs an international 
General Manager,” he wrote in 1989, “capable of reviving global economic activity by 
promoting economic growth.”1120 The message resonated with surprising audiences, 
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including Carlos Menem, Argentina’s newly elected president, and a self-described 
admirer of Klein’s.1121 (After taking office, though, Menem followed policies closer to 
the deregulatory agenda Klein opposed.) 
  Klein had a more mixed reception from academic economists at home. Now a 
senior member of the profession, he admired some members from the rising generation, 
and in 1990 he described the policy-oriented liberals Jeffrey Sachs, Lawrence Summers, 
and Paul Krugman as especially impressive.1122 But he remained unbending in his view 
of rational expectations theory. “I think it’s ridiculous,” he told an interviewer.1123 Yet its 
influence had spread across macroeconomics, producing a cohort “over-impressed with 
pure theory-spinning”—a “fruitless turn,” in his view.1124 The pressure to publish had 
contributed to these problems. Even with the assistance of computers, building the 
elaborate models he favored required a team of researchers. That prospect had little 
appeal for a young economist racing against the tenure clock, especially when models 
using less data and more sophisticated mathematics could be produced at a faster clip by 
individual authors and then go on to be published in prestigious journals where 
colleagues would laud their rigor. 
Against the tide in academia, Klein remained a resolute defender of a style of 
modeling his colleagues increasingly regarded as antique. “Economists like simple 
things,” he said in 1987, but that useful prejudice became a handicap when applied 
outside the classroom: “economic life is necessarily complicated, detailed and 
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explainable only in terms of a big system”—“the largest possible system that can be 
managed,” if he had his way.1125 While acknowledging the waning support for that 
perspective among academics, he took solace in the continued popularity of these models 
in the government. “The economy definitely needs guidance,” he wrote, “and it is up to 
professional economists to provide public policy makers with the right information to 
deliver such leadership.”1126 Amid all the changes in his long career, that belief remained 
a constant. 
But a wistful note had crept into his reflections. Klein felt himself on the 
defensive, not so much from academic contemporaries, although their skepticism was 
real, but from the expectations of his youth. Reminiscing about his time at Cowles, he 
noted that after he left Chicago in 1947, “we accomplished much more by way of model 
building and using than we ever thought possible in our wildest dreams of postwar 
America, but it was never good enough.”1127 He did not worry about the flaws typically 
ascribed to their project; the best models, Klein believed, always had a better track record 
than their critics allowed, even in the 1970s. The problem was their own disappointed 
expectations. Since the 1940s, they had lived with the hope that they were on the brink of 
“a complete breakthrough”; instead, they had made “very tiny improvements.”1128 
“Dreary empirical research over the years with improved data bases, better statistical 
methods, better analysis of the functioning of the economy, better hardware, and better 
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software”—the progress was real.1129 So was the regret. “We thought it would be much 
easier, at the beginning,” he said, “but it is not all that easy.” 
Following that line of reasoning too far, Klein feared, would lead to policy 
nihilism. Better to act with imperfect information than to do nothing. If anything, he 
wanted to expand the range of subjects economists could address. The economic 
ramifications of AIDS, or pollution, or of disarmament following the collapse of the 
USSR—all of these subjects could be brought within the economist’s purview. In 1991, 
he endorsed replacing GDP with the broader “Measure of Economic Welfare” James 
Tobin and his Yale colleague William Nordhaus had created.1130 His politics, meanwhile, 
continued to lean left. In 2004, a few weeks shy of his 84th birthday, he told the Wall 
Street Journal that a country whose balance of “socio-political-economic policies” 
seemed to yield some of the most admirable results was Norway.1131  
Norway’s was not the only alternative to political economy, American-style, that 
captured Klein’s attention in these years. The collapse of socialism in the Soviet bloc had 
taken him by surprise.1132 By the time the Soviet Union fell, however, Klein’s focus had 
already turned to a nation that had come to fascinate him, and would return him in the 
twilight of his career to a subject that had transfixed him at its outset—the future of 
socialism.  
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KLEIN FIRST TRAVELLED TO CHINA IN 1979. The United States had recently 
normalized diplomatic relations with the country, ending decades of non-recognition. He 
arrived as the leader of a team of economists visiting under the auspices of the National 
Academy of Sciences. Lawrence Lau, then a professor at Stanford, was part of that 
delegation. Lau and Klein had met years earlier, after Lau constructed the first 
econometric model of mainland China, which Klein persuaded him to incorporate in 
Project LINK. Klein and Lau were back in China the next year, again at the head of a 
group of American economists, this time to preside over a seven-week workshop on 
econometrics attended by one hundred Chinese students.1133 With Klein’s 
encouragement, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences founded an Institute of 
Quantitative and Technical Economics that, among its other activities, eventually took 
over the work of maintaining Lau’s model of the Chinese economy.  
 These trips marked the beginning of Klein’s engagement with the development of 
Chinese economics. He returned to the country again in 1984, and at the start of 1985 he 
joined a newly formed committee organized by the Ford Foundation and dedicated to 
redesigning economics programs at major Chinese universities along American lines. 
(The idea had come from one of the Foundation’s Asian specialists, Peter Geithner, father 
of future Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner.1134) Working in tandem with the Chinese 
State Education Commission, they brought the building blocks of American economics 
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education—as the committee’s chairman put it, “micro, macro, statistics, accounting, 
international trade, economic development, and money and banking”—to China.1135 
More conferences followed, along with more visits from Klein, and a translation of his 
1991 book A History of Macroeconometric Model-Building. Chinese economists also 
came to Klein, joining the long list of economists from around the world that had taken a 
pilgrimage to Philadelphia to study under him. 
 China had seized Klein’s interest from his first visit. Writing for the Los Angeles 
Times in 1980, he described the “exhilarating” feeling of touring a country moving ahead 
with “boundless enthusiasm.”1136 This dynamism contrasted with his otherwise bleak 
diagnosis of the global economy: “when the rest of the world is, for the most part, poised 
for recession, slowdown or moderate growth,” he predicted, “China should stand out as a 
star performer in the world economy.”1137 Five years later, Klein was just as optimistic. 
“More tall modern buildings, more hotels, more fashionable clothes, a varied fleet of 
imported cars, well-stocked shelves in stores and a wide variety of modern consumer 
goods,” he reported, “are the highly visible and impressive signs of economic 
change.”1138 Klein acknowledged the multiplication of markets and the inrush of foreign 
investment, but a less striking transformation lifted his enthusiasm to even greater 
heights: a proliferation of econometricians trained in the latest techniques, relying on up-
to-date computer technology and an expanding array of reliable statistics.  
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 The boom in econometrics was caused by, and contributed to, a larger shift in 
Chinese economic policy. Keynesian economics arrived in China not long after Klein did, 
and state officials looked to their economists for guidance on how it could be 
implemented.1139 The transition happened swiftly. After starting the decade as a foreign 
concept, by 1985 econometrics with a Keynesian bent had become an element of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. 
 Klein was formally recruited to this project in 1992, when the Chinese State 
Information Commission, part of a larger State Planning Commission, appointed him as 
an adviser. (He was the first Westerner, it appears, to have served in this capacity.) The 
post formalized duties that Klein had already performed for more than a decade. “I will 
train Chinese students and research scholars,” he explained, “and help the State 
Information Centre, through data systems and econometrics, in preparing and building 
models to study China's economy.”1140 The decision was made shortly after the 
Communist Party had declared its intention to expand the role of markets, a position that 
struck some American observers as ludicrous. Commenting on the story, Time sniffed 
that China’s leaders “hope Klein's wisdom can help them build a ‘socialist market 
economy,’ Deng's newest oxymoron.”1141  
 For Klein, ideological labels mattered less than the details of policy. In September 
1993, the State Planning Committee hosted a week-long meeting of Project LINK in 
Beijing. On the second day—“China Day,” in the program schedule—subjects covered 
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included “Chinese Financial Reform,” “Chinese Energy Models,” and “Taking a Market-
Oriented Direction And Pushing Forward In A Gradual Way—A Basic Experience of 
China’s Economic Reform.”1142 Back in the United States, he tried to connect Chinese 
economists with their American counterparts—attempting, for example, to arrange a 
meeting with James Tobin at the UN for a group sent by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences. Years spent researching Chinese statistics also made him a valuable, though 
qualified, defender of their accuracy. Speaking to a journalist in 2004, Klein did not rule 
out the possibility that government statisticians had committed unintentional errors, but 
he insisted that “they weren’t cooking the books.”1143 He also commented on China’s 
economy in academic venues, including a coedited volume, published in 2000 under the 
title Econometric Modeling of China, summarizing the latest research in a field that had 
not existed twenty years earlier. 
 China was a preoccupation, but it did not monopolize Klein’s attention. His reach 
was global, and within Asia alone he contributed to econometrics research in Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and India—the latter, especially, proved a source of considerable 
interest. (His students at Penn had built many of the country’s earliest econometric 
models.) Yet China continued to hold a distinct claim on him, perhaps partly because of 
his own elevated place in its economic debates. That position was suggested by an 
offhand comment Zhao Ziyang, then General Secretary of the Communist Party, made a 
few months before students began protesting in Tiananmen Square. Speaking to the 
visiting American economist Stanley Fischer, Zhao noted that Fischer’s perspective 
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diverged from the positions held by economists he was already familiar with—namely, 
Milton Friedman and Lawrence Klein.1144  
 
THE AUDIENCE FOR ZHAO’S COMPARISON was strangely appropriate. Like Klein, 
Fischer had received his doctorate from MIT, and his subsequent career spun alternate 
versions of the integration between economic theory and policymaking that Klein 
described as the dominant theme of his career.1145 When he spoke to Zhao, Fischer had 
recently stepped down from a professorship at MIT to become chief economist at the 
World Bank. He followed that with a stint at the IMF and then, in a move that caught the 
temper of the times, a job at Citigroup. Fischer left that post in 2005 to become the head 
of Israel’s central bank, a title he held until 2013. His retirement was brief: in January 
2014, Barack Obama nominated him to serve as vice chair of the Federal Reserve.  
 Fischer’s success was exceptional, but it also fell within a pattern. Students who 
passed through MIT’s graduate program in the eleven years Fischer spent teaching there 
included two future chief economists at the IMF (Olivier Blanchard and Kenneth 
Rogoff); two heads of the Council of Economic Advisers (Gregory Mankiw under 
George W. Bush and Christina Romer under Barack Obama); four heads of central banks 
(Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve, Mario Draghi of the European Central Bank, 
Duvvuri Subbarao of the Bank of India, and Lucas Papademos, who ran the Bank of 
Greece before becoming the nation’s Prime Minister); and influential outside 
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commentators like Paul Krugman. Two years after receiving his doctorate, Krugman 
joined Fischer on MIT’s faculty, where the two shared departmental space with future 
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and future Governor of the Bank of England 
Mervyn King. In some respects a diverse group, they are united by the same 
commitments that linked Fischer and Klein—along with the benefits they have reaped 
from deploying a particular kind of economic knowledge. 
 The macroeconomic models whose value Klein championed have not fared as 
well in the corporate world. Econometric forecasters survived the shakeout that began in 
1980, but the industry never returned to the heights it reached during its boom. Though a 
lucrative field for the surviving remnant, it also fell adrift intellectually. An enterprise 
that had arisen half a century earlier from the meeting of academic research and corporate 
demands grew distant from the economics profession. Corporations, meanwhile, 
pioneered a new method for managing the risks presented by an uncertain future: 
financial derivatives, which promised a more remunerative protection against economic 
fluctuations. The shift was most pronounced in the banking sector, first an ardent 
proponent of modeling, and then one of the most enthusiastic converts to planning 
through derivatives.1146 This introduced a novel way of governing the present through the 
future—a future illuminated not by a model but by the verdicts of financial markets. 
 Yet, for all the setbacks, macroeconomic modeling survived, shorn of its grandest 
ambitions, but essential nonetheless. Sometimes, the purpose could reach beyond the 
narrowly economic. In 1997, the WEFA issued a forecast predicting that proposed 
regulations on carbon emissions would cost Americans thousand of jobs; funding for the 
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study had come from an consortium of companies opposed to a pending climate change 
treaty.1147 
 Models were still more important for the institutions charged with governing the 
economy, institutions that also provided forecasters’ with their most reliable customers—
institution such as the Federal Reserve, which remains an unapologetic devotee of macro 
modeling. That preference caused a brief outburst among economists in 2014, following 
the publication of FRB/US, the bank’s core model. As a staffer at the Federal Reserve 
had explained a few years earlier, FRB/US has “a very central role in macroeconomic 
analysis at the Board,” where it provides simulations of the consequences produced by 
shifts in policy and, at a more abstract level, “the intellectual framework around which 
the staff organizes its thinking about economic developments.”1148 After the full model 
was published, academic blogs erupted with frustration. Dredging up names from the 
distant past, one noted, “if Klein and Goldberger were alive, I don’t [think] they would 
find the FRB/US model an unfamiliar object.”1149 That was precisely the problem. 
“Academic macroeconomists haven't used or studied this type of model in decades,” 
another observed, seemingly embarrassed for both parties.1150 Yet this archaic remnant 
had survived, and somehow managed to shape policy at the Fed.  
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 For economists throughout the government, in fact, the models—with their 
assuring size, easy fit to the national income accounts, and ability to generate a variety of 
forecasts for the economy as a whole—remained indispensable.1151 They had advocates 
outside the United States as well—at the United Nations, for example, where Project 
LINK continues to be updated. Responsibility for that work has passed to Pingfan Hong, 
a Chinese economist who received his doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania, 
where he studied under Lawrence Klein.  
 And it was not just the models. Paul Volcker had explained the situation well in 
the 1980s. “We are all Keynesians now,” he said, “in terms of the way we look at things. 
National income statistics are a Keynesian view of the world, and the language of 
economists tends to be Keynesian. But if you mean by Keynesian that we’ve got to pump 
up the economy, that all these relationships are pretty clear and simple, that this gives us 
a tool for eternal prosperity if we do it right, that’s all bullshit.”1152 Specific Keynesian 
policies could be discarded, but the practices they had brought into policymaking—
national income statistics, econometric forecasting—were harder to shrug off. So, too, 
was the imperative that had emerged in tandem with Keynesianism: the need to manage 
the economy. 
 One of the most astute explanations for this state of affairs came from a surprising 
corner. Speaking in 2003, Robert Lucas observed that while the battle over Keynesian 
models had ended in the academy long ago, victory among the professors had not yielded 
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the changes in practice that he had hoped. But he did not regard this as an outrage. In 
fact, he blamed himself, and those who had come after him. Despite their analytic 
advances, the latest wave of models had weaknesses of their own: “there’s a residue of 
things they don’t let us think about,” he admitted.1153 The Great Depression in the United 
States, the long downturn Japan entered in the 1990s, the financial crises that had shaken 
countries in Latin America and Asia in the same period—all of that was left in darkness. 
“We may be disillusioned with the Keynesian apparatus for thinking about these things,” 
he said, “but it doesn’t mean that this replacement apparatus can do it either. It can’t.”1154 
If officials charged with governing an economy neglected these subjects, they would not 
last long in their posts. With that audience, an imperfect model that could plausibly claim 
to yield some insight would always trump mathematically consistent ignorance. 
Economic theorists could trust in the market, but economic management required a 
different way of thinking. 
 After 2008, Lucas’s catalogue of omissions would have grown even longer. The 
politics of the economy had their own logics, and they could make for curious 
partnerships: China and the United States, for instance, both of which instituted 
quintessentially Keynesian stimulus policies in 2009.1155 By themselves, models offer no 
guarantee of policy outcomes, as any witness to the fever for austerity that has swept 
across Europe in recent years can attest.1156 Yet their importance should not be 
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underestimated. They have become part of the vocabulary of policymaking, and mastery 
of this language grants a distinct kind of power. 
 In the twentieth century, few revealed the sinews of that power better than 
Lawrence Klein. From his first days as a graduate student, his career led him through 
some of the most important sites dedicated to understanding, and taming, the economy: 
MIT, where he helped establish a distinctive theory and politics of the economy its 
adherents called Keynesian; the Cowles Commission, where the synthesis of cutting-edge 
mathematics, economic theory, and grand visions of economic planning became an object 
of widespread devotion; then the nascent field of econometric modeling building, which 
took him to corporate boardrooms for the WEFA, Jimmy Carter’s White House (at least 
for the occasional visit), and governments across the world for Project LINK. Klein 
began this career dedicated to a more radical ambition—not governing the economy, but 
revolutionizing society. Eventually, he found himself fighting to hold onto what had 
already been achieved and defending the technicians who could carry on the tradition 
after he had gone. But he need not have worried. Although the moment that gave rise to 
the politics of the economy had receded into the past, the commitment to managing the 
economy endured. So did the experts who attended to this chronically ailing patient—a 
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Conclusion 
 
IN DECEMBER 2011, WITH A REELECTION campaign impending and his approval 
ratings underwater, Barack Obama sought to revive his flagging administration by falling 
back on the gift that had made his run for the presidency possible in the first place. He 
would give a speech, a wide-ranging reflection on American politics of the kind that had 
turned him into a celebrity after the 2004 Democratic National Convention. Frustrated by 
Republican intransigence, sniping from fellow Democrats, and his own failure to forge 
consensus in Washington, Obama wanted to put aside the compromises of his first term 
and recapture the spirit that had animated his campaign for the White House.1157 The 
speech also gave him an opportunity to respond to Occupy Wall Street, the movement 
that had burst into national prominence three months earlier, pushing economic inequality 
to the forefront of political debate and attracting more than a few disillusioned former 
Obama supporters along the way.1158 With his presidency in the balance, one subject 
loomed in Obama’s mind—and in the title of the address, published by the White House 
under the heading, “Remarks by the President on the Economy in Osawatomie, 
Kansas.”1159 
The choice of location had been just as deliberate as the choice of subject. Almost 
a hundred years earlier, Theodore Roosevelt had traveled to the same Kansas town, 
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where he outlined his vision of a “New Nationalism.”1160 Obama cited TR repeatedly in 
his talk, casting himself as the inheritor of the progressive tradition Roosevelt embodied. 
As Obama explained it, when Americans of an earlier generation wrestled with the 
changes making their country an industrial colossus, Roosevelt had charted a path 
between extremes. “He praised what the titans of industry had done to create jobs and 
grow the economy,” Obama said, but he also “understood the free market only works 
when there are rules of the road that ensure competition is fair and open and honest.”1161  
Now Americans had reached another crossroads. Arguing that Republicans 
offered a “brand of ‘you’re on your own’ economics,” the president insisted that only 
Democrats would create “an economy that’s built to last.” Marrying this proposition to a 
favorite theme of another President Roosevelt, Obama linked economic progress with the 
recognition of interdependence: “rebuilding this economy based on fair play, a fair shot, 
and a fair share,” he said, “will require all of us to see that we have a stake in each other’s 
success.” A vibrant democracy and an expanding economy—this was the progressive 
agenda that Obama had come to Osawatomie to revive.1162 
It was not, however, the progressive agenda Roosevelt had thought he was 
advocating in Osawatomie a century before. Early in his speech, Roosevelt had connected 
“the triumph of a real democracy” with “an economic system under which each man shall 
be guaranteed the opportunity to show the best that there is in him,” but that was his last 
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mention of anything like the economy.1163 Instead, Roosevelt moved on to more pressing 
matters. An outraged New York Times editorial summarized Roosevelt’s program. 
“Taking all corporations under Federal regulation,” “reaching out the Federal hand on all 
the vast natural resources of the land,” and “intervention regarding sanitation and home 
life” were just some of his “various schemes.”1164 The paper could have continued: an 
income tax, inheritance tax, investigation of the causes and possible remedies of financial 
panics, and an independent commission of experts charged with setting tariffs also made 
Roosevelt’s docket. All were united, the Times concluded, by the “obsessing idea that the 
Federal Government shall take control of the daily life, the earnings, the property of 
every American citizen.” 
 Roosevelt phrased it differently. While he acknowledged that his litany of 
proposals would enhance the government’s influence over “social and economic 
conditions,” he depicted the extension of state power as a practical way of promoting “the 
welfare of the people” and “the right type of good citizenship” in the age of 
incorporation.1165 Roosevelt believed Americans had not yet figured out how to rethink 
democracy for this new world, and he intended to confront that fundamental challenge.  
Both Roosevelt and Obama portrayed themselves as guardians of the common 
good, but their understandings of how to carry out that duty were separated by a century 
that had redefined what it meant to exercise political power. Roosevelt was an archetypal 
representative from the age of social politics, Obama a creature of the technocratic 
regime that supplanted it, where the invention of the economy had solved the problem of 
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the corporation. Roosevelt’s speech contained portents of what was to come, and echoes 
of the past sounded in Obama’s, but they belonged to different worlds. 
 
THE SAME TRANSITION CAN BE FOUND in the writings of the figures charged with 
filling in the details of the projects sketched by presidents. Start with David Wells, a 
Yankee engineer who turned his hand to political economy during the Civil War.1166 An 
1864 study conducted by Wells on the Union’s ability to pay off its debts led to the 
creation of a National Revenue Commission. Wells joined the group, where he presided 
over early attempts by the federal government to produce economic statistics meant to 
guide policymaking. After his stint in government, Wells authored a series of books on 
economic affairs, culminating in the 1889 publication of Recent Economic Changes and 
Their Effect on the Production and Distribution of Wealth and the Well-Being of 
Society.1167  
Wells’s title signaled his concerns: the chasm opening up between classes, and the 
danger this posed to society. He could not go long without highlighting the immensity of 
his subject. “The epoch of time under consideration,” he wrote, “will hereafter rank in 
history as one that has had no parallel.”1168 Groping for a vocabulary that could describe 
this process, Wells noted the record-breaking “expansion of all that pertains to what is 
called ‘business,’” and “the now much-talked-of ‘periods’ or ‘cycles’ of panic and 
speculation, of trade activity and stagnation” that had afflicted the country since the onset 
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of the panic of 1873.1169 Elsewhere, reflecting the novelty of the vocabulary, he quoted 
the Economist observing that in 1887 the United States “did a distinctly bigger business” 
than in 1886.1170 Verifying that claim proved difficult, because in the absence of reliable 
statistics would-be diagnosticians had to rely on “a general concurrence of opinion.”1171  
Undeniable, however, was the reaction all this provoked. Wells termed it “an 
attack on the whole present organization of society,” quoted one friend who pronounced 
the existing order a “preposterous fraud” and another who suggested the country was 
“unconsciously, and from sheer force of these new elements, drifting fast into a form of 
actual socialism.”1172 Scientific inquiry provided the only escape from this volatile 
situation. Americans needed to “to understand the situation as an entirety” so they could 
devise “remedial action on the part of society for acknowledged societary evils.”1173 
Wells believed the mechanics of society had grown so intricate that the slightest 
interference could derange the whole system, but he recognized the limits of his insight. 
More research was needed, perhaps orchestrated by “commissions of great states,” to 
master this strange new world.1174  
Four decades later, one of those commissions published its findings in a volume 
that was also called Recent Economic Changes in the United States. The similarities in 
their titles only underscored the distance between the texts. Wells’s book, which brought 
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together articles previously published in journals like Popular Science Monthly, was a 
solo effort produced by a self-taught economist. Its successor was the work of a team 
supervised by arguably the most respected economist in the nation reporting to the future 
president of the United States. Anxiety emanated from Wells’s pages, while Mitchell’s 
researchers thrummed with excitement. By 1928, the economic and social transformation 
that once seemed to endanger civilization now appeared tame. Complete mastery had not 
been achieved, but apocalyptic rhetoric had given way to confident assurances about the 
fundamentally sound character of what the report called, just once, the American 
economy. 
Despite everything that separated Wells’s tidy volume and Hoover’s economic 
encyclopedia, the two shared an important assumption. Hoover intended Recent 
Economic Changes in the United States to serve as the prologue to a final opus, the even 
more ambitious study of society released in 1933 under the title Recent Social Trends in 
the United States. The confidence in the durability of the status quo that coursed through 
Hoover’s earlier survey had cracked under the weight of the Depression, but faith that 
knowledge of society held the key to unlocking prosperity—that had survived. 
Fifteen years later, a very different set of assumptions shaped a book that would 
familiarize generations of undergraduates with the study of economics. Paul Samuelson’s 
Economics: An Introductory Analysis was first published in 1948, the same year its 
author turned thirty-three. Over multiple editions and subsequent decades, it went on to 
sell more than four million copies.1175 For its early readers, Samuelson presented an 
accessible synopsis of what economics was becoming; soon enough, it summarized what 
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economics had become. A partisan of the field that had not yet acquired the label 
macroeconomics, Samuelson opened by contrasting the devastation of the Depression 
with the wartime boom that followed. “It is the first task of modern economic science,” 
he wrote, “to describe, to analyze, to explain, to correlate these fluctuations of national 
income.”1176 Samuelson used simple mathematics to elucidate the principles an 
increasing number of his colleagues employed to interpret these shifts. Only after a 
thorough examination of this subject did he move to the more familiar terrain of supply 
and demand.  
To justify this recalibration of priorities, Samuelson emphasized the political 
salience of what some of his colleagues had dubbed a “national income approach.”1177 
“Perhaps present-day Americans will have no more important civic duty,” he speculated, 
“than that of approaching critically the President’s Economic Report to Congress.” Most 
of his countrymen would not have agreed with that conjecture, but Samuelson hit closer 
to the mark when he claimed that being able to reflect upon subjects like inflation, 
unemployment, and the national debt had become a prerequisite for good citizenship.  
Hanging over the textbook was a pervasive uncertainty about the economic future. 
The first discussion question in the book asked, “How do you expect to fare in the next 
depression?”1178 “There is no vaccination or advance immunity,” he warned, “from this 
modern-day plague”—an especially dire threat for an age when successful economic 
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management had become vital to “the political health of a democracy.”1179 To remind 
students of how badly policymakers could bungle their analysis, Samuelson cited the 
experience of the “distinguished committee” that produced Hoover and Mitchell’s Recent 
Economic Changes in the United States: “despite their confident expectation that the 
American economy would remain in an excellent state of ‘balance’ and ‘dynamic 
equilibrium,’” he wrote, “this Committee stood unknowingly on the edge of an 
abyss.”1180 
Samuelson excised that reference in later editions of the book. Backward-looking 
gloom had less of a place in these volumes. As he phrased it in the third edition, 
published in 1955, while he had earlier focused on depressions, he now stressed “efficient 
growth and security.”1181 Not all the news was good. The Cold War had split the globe in 
two, and the enemies of the United States were on the ascent, buoyed by collectivist 
economies that had slain the business cycle. “Either we learn to control depressions and 
inflationary booms better than we did before World War II,” he wrote, “or the political 
structure of our society will hang in jeopardy.”1182 Despite these concerns, Samuelson felt 
optimistic when he looked ahead. “The American economy is in better shape in the 1950s 
than it ever was in the past,” he declared, and it could look forward to sustaining that 
performance in the years to come.1183  
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Advances in economic theory deserved no small credit for that achievement, 
Samuelson believed. National income remained the centerpiece of his analysis. “The 
whole of our discussion of Part One leads up to and can be summarized by the important 
concepts of national income or net product,” he wrote, adding for the historically curious 
that “only in the last 20 years have we had any adequate statistical data on these 
important concepts.”1184 But he had coined a new term for this approach, one that better 
captured his theoretical ambitions. Eschewing the Keynesian label, Samuelson 
announced that “a grand neoclassical synthesis” had reconciled the two great traditions in 
economics.1185 “[P]erhaps for the first time,” he wrote, “the economist is justified in 
saying that the broad cleavage between microeconomics and macroeconomics has been 
closed.”1186 From one perspective, this healed a rupture that reached back at least to 
Adam Smith; from another, one more attuned to the recent arrival of both 
“microeconomics” and “macroeconomics” in the discipline’s lexicon, the timeline was 
significantly more compressed.  
This was more than just an intellectual union. A healthy economy, Samuelson 
argued, was a precondition for smoothly functioning markets. In his words, “solving the 
vital problems of monetary and fiscal policy by the tools of income analysis will validate 
and bring back into relevance the classical verities.”1187 Twentieth-century economists 
had invented devices that could make the world their nineteenth-century predecessors had 
foreseen into a reality.  
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 While Samuelson did not predict that arguments over economics would die out, 
he hoped a consensus among economists would provide a shared framework for political 
debates. “There is not one theory of economics for Republicans and one for Democrats,” 
he wrote, “not one for workers and one for employers”—just as there had never been, 
contrary to Nazi assertions, a Jewish physics and a German physics.1188 Transcending 
political divisions was as much a part of making economics into a proper science as the 
increasingly sophisticated mathematics used by the discipline’s rising stars. Already, the 
mixture of countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies that served as the practical 
corollary of the neoclassical synthesis was gaining ground outside the Soviet bloc. All of 
this was underpinned by economists’ distinctive vantage point—their ability, in 
Samuelson’s words, to see “the working of the economy as a whole.”1189 
The neoclassical synthesis was the economic counterpart to the much-vaunted 
liberal consensus of the postwar boom years, and it fared just as poorly in the fractured 
decades that followed. But Samuelson’s volume continued to set the standard against 
which new textbooks were judged. Though he revised it to reflect changes in the political 
climate, pushing back the explication of macroeconomics and moving supply and 
demand forward, his focus on the economy as a whole remained part of the book’s 
analytic core.  
That would also be the case for the work that replaced it as the intellectual trendsetter 
in the field, Gregory Mankiw’s Principles of Economics. Published to much anticipation in 
1997, almost half a century after Samuelson made his debut, Mankiw’s textbook began with 
an etymology of its chief subject: “The word economy,” he wrote, “comes from the Greek 
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word oikonomos.”1190 In a list of reasons justifying the study of economics, Mankiw led with 
the claim that it would answer “many questions about the economy that might spark your 
curiosity,” followed it up by noting that “it will make you a more astute participant in the 
economy,” and concluded by observing that it would help students decide their positions on 
questions political leaders faced, such as “How does a government budget deficit affect the 
economy?”1191 Aspiring intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and politicians all had something to 
discover because they were all part of the economy.  
Old standbys of Samuelson’s exposition of the economy also made their way into 
Mankiw’s discussion. Both, for example, mapped the circular flow of dollars through an 
economy with what Mankiw called “a very simple model of the economy.”1192 
 
 
Figure 1: Paul Samuelson and Gregory Mankiw’s circular-flow diagrams.1193 
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The circular-flow model had distant roots in François Quesnay’s tableau économique, but 
where the Frenchman’s illustration had been inscrutable even to his followers, no special 
training was required to grasp Mankiw’s diagram. Unlike Quesnay’s tableau, it fit 
seamlessly into a larger intellectual infrastructure built by a community of researchers 
over generations. “To understand how the economy works,” Mankiw insisted, “we need a 
model that explains, in general terms, how the economy is organized and how 
participants in the economy interact with one another.”1194 Modeling had had become the 
essence of economics around the same time the first edition of Samuelson’s textbook 
appeared, and in Mankiw’s hands the circular-flow diagram became an introduction to 
the practice of economics. An obscure idiosyncrasy in the eighteenth century had become 
the foundation of the discipline. 
Then there was the question of audience. In less than two decades, Mankiw’s 
Principles has sold more than a million copies and been translated into twenty languages, 
providing him with a readership Quesnay could only have imagined.1195 At $280 each, it 
also turned a tidy profit, earning its author, by one estimate, more than $40 million.1196  
The textbook is just one element of Mankiw’s public profile. The Harvard 
professor frequently consults with prominent Republicans, writes regularly for the New 
York Times, runs a popular blog, and teaches one of his university’s most popular 
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courses—introductory economics.1197 He also exercises a subtler kind of influence. 
Though a Mitt Romney adviser in 2012, he took comfort after the election in Barack 
Obama’s choice to head the Council of Economic Advisers: Jason Furman, who had 
written a doctoral dissertation at Harvard under the supervision of one Gregory 
Mankiw.1198  
 Except for his reluctance to dabble in private consulting, a standard practice 
among his colleagues that earnings from his textbook make less tempting, Mankiw is a 
characteristic representative of the elite economist in the twenty-first century.1199 The 
demarcations between the state, the academy, and the corporate world are clear in theory, 
but the most respected economists move across them, shuttling from government posts to 
lucrative positions in business and finance, all while maintaining footholds in their 
universities. They are part of an informal but cohesive system that effaces the boundaries 
that supposedly divide public and private.1200 It is no coincidence that Mankiw’s resume 
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includes stints at two organizations that embody this fusion of supposedly contradictory 
imperatives: the NBER and the Federal Reserve. 
Mankiw’s gift for simplifying complex economic arguments, expertise in 
macroeconomics, and faultless credentials all made him an attractive candidate for the 
role of Samuelson’s successor; they also led George W. Bush to select him in 2003 as 
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. At Mankiw’s inauguration ceremony, his 
four-year-old son tottered over to the President and delivered a warning. “Don’t be mean 
to my daddy,” young Peter Mankiw said. Bush’s response was less than reassuring: “As 
long as the economy improves.”1201  
  
THE ENSEMBLE OF FORCES THAT SHAPES the production of economic knowledge 
today—and makes a career like Mankiw’s possible—first came together in the United 
States at the turn of the twentieth century. At the time, the only person employed by the 
federal government with the title of economist was an “economic ornithologist.”1202 By 
World War II, that number had ballooned to five thousand. Despite an initial retreat in 
peacetime, when economists returned to the academy, by the 1970s the total was back at 
wartime levels, where it has stayed ever since. And the federal government is just one of 
the prospective employers vying for the attention of talented economists.  
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Figure 2: Economists in United States federal government, excluding Congress and the 
Federal Reserve, 1955-2002.1203 
 
 Consider the Federal Reserve 1204 Today, it includes over two hundred economists 
on its payroll in Washington D.C. and about 250 more at the regional banks scattered 
across the country.1205 The importance of these regional banks should not be 
underestimated: the St. Louis branch of the Federal Reserve supplied an important 
incubator for monetarism, and the Minneapolis bank served a parallel function for 
rational expectations theory. But the staff at the Federal Reserve Board alone is a larger 
supporter of economic research than any university. Federal Reserve economists 
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specialize in James Tobin’s “practical macroeconomics,” and they are supervised in this 
work by Tobin’s former student, and current Federal Reserve Chair, Janet Yellen.  
 It is easy to think of economists as just another kind of academic, like 
philosophers who happen to deal with money. That analogy had some merit in the time of 
John Stuart Mill, the quintessential philosopher-economist. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, however, economics became a different kind of undertaking—
something much more like medicine, another profession built out of mixing the public, 
the private, and the scientific. Economists traded in their philosophical aspirations and 
refashioned themselves as doctors of markets and the economy. Yet forsaking these 
ambitions gave economists a credibility that turned them into the closest thing the 
country had to public philosophers. That combination of intellectual power, practical 
influence, and career security has also made economics into one of the country’s most 
popular majors, arousing a passion for the subject that could surprise even economists: in 
the aughts, one father informed his daughter, an undergraduate at Stanford, that unless 
she graduated with a degree in economics he would divorce her mother.1206 
Such success (and family psychodrama) exceeded anything Irving Fisher and 
Wesley Mitchell could have envisioned when they called for an institute devoted to 
economic research at the end of World War I. As the years passed—through slumps and 
booms, intellectual failures and triumphs—the strangely coherent hodgepodge of 
institutions undergirding the production of economic research continued to grow. Starting 
with tentative first steps, it moved to a confident stride and, eventually, a headlong sprint 
that continues to this day. Fisher and Mitchell, along with Gardiner Means and Lauchlin 
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Currie, Simon Kuznets and Alvin Hansen, Wassily Leontief and Jan Tinbergen, 
Lawrence Klein and Robert Lucas, were some of the most acute observers of this 
evolution, and they did their part to hasten its acceleration.  
Though often portrayed as an apolitical endeavor, this transformation had a 
profound impact on the practice of politics. In the era of Theodore Roosevelt and 
Woodrow Wilson, economic management proceeded along discrete tracks—one for 
tariffs, another for currency, another for trusts. What agenda, if any, could turn these 
disparate subjects into a unified economic program remained uncertain. The political 
goals were clear, the means for achieving them opaque. That ambiguity persisted in the 
1920s. Though it was an era filled with obituaries for the business cycle, questions 
persisted about what powers the government could bring to bear on this phenomenon, as 
did arguments over what part the Federal Reserve should play in this emerging program.  
New Dealers built upon foundations Hebert Hoover’s team had laid, in part 
because so many of them moved easily from one administration to the next. Yet the 
problem of making a cohesive politics of the economy endured throughout Franklin 
Roosevelt’s time in the White House. Caught between conflicting imperatives—revive 
expansion or accept the limits of economic maturity—Roosevelt’s team made little 
progress in this goal during his first term. But talk of the economy had exploded, and a 
litany of bold plans for bringing order to its workings had followed. Distinctions between 
capitalism and socialism appeared shakier by the day—if either of those concepts could 
be trusted to make sense of the new order coming into sight.  
A comprehensive analysis of the economy with practical methods that could be 
used to implement its recommendations emerged under the sign of Keynesianism. 
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Preoccupied with unemployment, confident in the efficacy of fiscal policy, and centered 
in the White House, with due consideration for Congress, this was the first true program 
for governing the economy in American history. It did not preclude aggressive economic 
planning, but it did undercut assertions that such planning was indispensable for 
managing a modern economy. 
When the expected postwar depression turned into an unprecedented boom, the 
fears of unending stagnation that had accompanied the first theorizing of the economy 
melted away, replaced by vistas of perpetual growth. Samuelson’s neoclassical synthesis 
provided one marker of the time’s optimistic temper; the craze for econometric modeling 
that propelled the career of his student, Lawrence Klein, offered another. Instead of 
clearing a path for detailed economic interventions, prosperity encouraged political 
leaders to move their attention elsewhere. With economic growth assured, Lyndon 
Johnson promised a Great Society, not a Great Economy. Economists, meanwhile, saved 
monetary policy from the disrepute it had fallen into during the Depression, making it 
fiscal policy’s equal partner in economic governance. Taxes and interest rates provided 
levers that experts could manipulate, allowing them to set the economy’s course at an 
Olympian remove.  
The twinned ascents of inflation and unemployment in the 1970s brought 
economists back to earth. Yet the reaction to stagflation proved as much a surprise as the 
phenomenon itself. Alan Greenspan, head of Gerald Ford’s Council of Economic 
Advisers, later recalled that “anyone who could have foreseen 9 percent unemployment 
would have expected massive demonstrations and barricades in the streets.”1207 Instead, 
discontented focused on rising prices. Without formal legislative action, responsibility for 
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stabilizing the economy shifted to the Federal Reserve. At a moment rife with complaints 
about unruly electorates and the spineless politicians who appeased them, transferring 
authority to central bankers promised to drain the politics from policymaking. At the 
same time, it passed responsibility for the pain inflicted by monetary tightening onto 
bureaucrats protected from irate voters.  
Persistent inflation is an accepted fact of life today, but in the middle of the 
twentieth century it was still a novel phenomenon. Prices had risen and fallen across the 
nineteenth century, but they had demonstrated more stability over longer horizons: in the 
United States, the price level in 1910 was about the same as it had been forty years 
earlier.1208 Inflation had not figured in the debates over the Federal Reserve’s creation 
because legislators assumed the gold standard would determine the price level in the long 
run. But decades of change—the breakdown of the gold standard, the ascent of robust 
welfare states, and the growing conviction that small increases of inflation could boost 
employment—had created an environment more vulnerable to climbing prices. With both 
interest rates and inflation running high, central bankers had a problem to solve and a 
blunt but effective set of tools for solving it. 
The Fed was not stealing power; it was filling a vacuum. Hamstrung by deficits 
that exploded under Ronald Reagan, neither Congress nor the President could propose a 
credible alternative program. Not even members of the Fed seemed prepared for the 
powers all but thrust upon them. “It is wrong for the Federal Reserve to try to run the 
economy, but that’s the position we were put in,” said Frederick Schultz, Vice Chairman 
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of the Fed from 1979 to 1982. “It’s wrong, but there we are—struggling to be the 
economic czars for the entire country.”1209 
Those anxieties waned under Alan Greenspan’s watch. Average growth rates 
were lower than in the postwar boom, but stability was greater, and inflation controlled. 
Even former opponents marveled. Asked to explain the Fed’s improved performance, 
Milton Friedman said, “I’m baffled. I find it hard to believe.” In the 1960s, Greenspan 
was a skeptic of Keynesians in Washington who believed fiscal policy could tame the 
business cycle.1210 Thirty years later, he used monetary policy to achieve the same goal. 
Greenspan was a different kind of expert operating a different set of instruments, but this 
acolyte of Ayn Rand—and former student of Wesley Mitchell’s protégé Arthur Burns—
had become the country’s de facto economic planner.  
 
THE FED HAD TRANSFORMED, and so had the typical Fed official. A half century 
ago, the archetypal monetary policymaker was a financier who had spent time in the 
government bureaucracy, or vice versa. Over the last generation, a different kind of 
expert has risen in stature. Combining the claims to expertise of the Wall Street alum 
with the impartiality of the academic, economists gained unprecedented sway over 
policymaking across the world. A survey of government leaders in 160 countries found 
that by 1998 about half of them had an economics degree, and that 16 had a doctorate in 
the subject from a university in either the United States or Europe.1211 The links being 
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forged between academic economics and the exercise of political power quickly became 
evident to even the profession’s newest recruits. “Two students here came up to me and 
said that they wanted to rule the world,” a graduate student in Harvard’s economics 
department told an interviewer in 1985. “They were serious.”1212  
Yet the growing influence of economists coincided with a mounting anxiety over 
the state of their profession. In 1991, a commission established by the American 
Economics Association warned that economics departments had become manufacturers 
of “idiots savants.”1213 Mathematics had become the vernacular of economics in the 
middle of the twentieth century, but the leaders of this earlier turn feared they had 
unleashed a monster.  
An empirical turn resolved this predicament in the decade that followed. Today, 
economists are more likely to praise colleagues for statistical ingenuity than baroque 
mathematics. Less concerned with the behavior of prices, economists have expanded 
their purview to cover the study of incentives construed in the broadest sense. 
Experimental economics has made laboratories and randomized control trials into agents 
of economic inquiry, while expanding computer power has turned calculations that once 
required days of effort by teams of researchers into tasks that can be completed with a 
few clicks on a keyboard. Meanwhile, the emergence of behavioral economics has 
opened new lines of communication with psychologists, and led an increasing number of 
economists to discard assumptions about rational utility maximizers for more 
complicated models of human behavior. In the age of Freakonomics, the discipline 
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covers a larger range of subjects, but it does so with greater confidence in its analytic 
core.1214  
  Reinventing microeconomics, however, did little to address the problems facing 
macroeconomists. By 2000, the fevered conflict between Keynesians and their opponents 
that had defined the previous generation of macroeconomics had waned, replaced by 
what one much-cited article labeled, with echoes of Samuelson, a “new synthesis.”1215 
Acceptance of a specific kind of economic model—dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium, or DSGE—provided the basis for a rapprochement. DSGE models used 
technical innovations pioneered by Lucas and his followers but they could justify 
conclusions that retained a place for countercyclical economic management. Chicago 
won the battle over theory, MIT the argument over policy. The models require 
simplifications that even their proponents admit strain credulity, but these assumptions 
allow them to attain greater mathematical sophistication, trading empirical precision for 
theoretical rigor.1216 
After 2008, the limits of this approach—and of contemporary macroeconomics 
more generally—came into the foreground. Economists who had moved into 
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policymaking were especially severe critics. “In September 2008, central bankers were in 
desperate need of a playbook,” said Narayana Kocherlakota, former president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.1217 “Macroeconomics should have been able to 
provide that playbook. It could not.” According to Lawrence Summers, former Secretary 
of the Treasury and head of Barack Obama’s National Economic Council, the field 
“abstracts away from most of what is important” and has not “informed the policy 
making process in any important way.”1218 In a 2010 interview, one former Fed official 
dismissed the fashionable models as “a caricature that’s so silly that you wouldn’t want to 
get close to it if you were a policymaker.”1219 In the summer of 2010, the barrage grew 
loud enough to prompt the House of Representatives to hold a hearing on the failures of 
DSGE models and consider what a committee report termed more “realistic” options.1220  
Judgments from within the academy could be just as harsh. “We are digging 
ourselves deeper and deeper into a fantasyland,” wrote MIT economist Ricardo Caballero 
in 2010.1221 Caballero’s language was dramatic but not exceptional. A graduate student in 
Caballero’s department had remarked a few years earlier that his courses in macro were 
“pretty worthless,” adding, “We don’t see why we have to do it, because we don’t see 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1217 Narayana Kocherlakota, “Modern Macroeconomic Models as Tools for Economic Policy,” 
The Region (May 2010), 5. 
 
1218 Lawrence Summers, “Advanced Economies Are so Sick We Need a New Way to Think About 
Them,” Washington Post, November 3, 2015, available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/11/03/larry-summers-advanced-economies-are-so-
sick-we-need-a-new-way-to-think-about-them/; “A Conversation on New Economic Thinking,” Larry 
Summers, April 8, 2011, available at http://larrysummers.com/commentary/speeches/brenton-woods-
speech/.  
 
1219 Mark Sniderman, “Interview With Laurence Meyer,” Forefront 1.3 (Fall 2010), 24. 
 
1220 Building a Science of Economics for the Real World, 5.  
 
1221 Ricardo Caballero, “Macroeconomics after the Crisis: Time to Deal With the Pretense-of-
Knowledge Syndrome,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24.4 (Fall 2010), 90.  
	  
	   419	  
what is taught as a plausible description of the economy.”1222 One of his colleagues had a 
shorter explanation: “Macro sucks.”1223 
Despite the complaints over the state of macroeconomics, the importance of 
governing the economy went unquestioned. If anything, harsh economic times pushed the 
economy even further into public consciousness. As one frustrated liberal political 
consultant observed, both Republicans and Democrats were “absolutely guilty of . . . 
putting ‘the economy’s’ needs and desires and wants—as if it were our crotchety uncle—
ahead of everything else.”1224 The term was just as likely to appear in the wider culture, 
whether mass (one character in a popular sitcom fumed, “the economy stinks, bees are 
dying, movies are pretty much all sequels now”) or highbrow (an acclaimed short-story 
collection featured grumbles about “self-important snobs from their effete enclaves, 
bringing the entire economy with them”).1225 Those sentiments were reinforced by the 
President of the United States. Coming off his 2012 victory, where for the second time he 
had won an election in which most voters listed the economy as their most important 
concern, Barack Obama issued this announcement in the first State of the Union address 
of his new term: “A growing economy that creates good, middle class jobs, that must be 
the north star that guides our efforts.”1226 
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PERVASIVE AS THE ECONOMY APPEARED, there was something fragile in its 
ubiquity. Paul Krugman, the New York Times columnist and Nobel Prize winning 
economist, captured both facets of this phenomenon in two entries published less than 
half an hour apart on his widely read blog. Describing a recent drive along the New 
Jersey Turnpike, Krugman wrote that during the trip, he “had one of those moments when 
the sheer scale of the world economy hit me.” Not even his doctorate from MIT had 
equipped him with the tools he needed to understand such a leviathan. He had been 
trained to “analyze this gigantic system using stylized little models that reduce all this 
vastness to a couple of intersecting lines,” but in truth “nobody can picture the reality of 
our getting and spending.”1227 Twenty-three minutes later, Krugman was up with another 
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post, this one warning, “if you believe that officials have the economy—any economy—
under control, you’re setting yourself up for a big disappointment.”1228 An object that had 
to be governed but could not be commanded, that was everywhere and nowhere at the 
same time—the economy seemed both more secure and less certain than ever. 
Discussion of the economy can quickly take on a metaphysical cast, but the 
concept attained its centrality because of a particular set of assumption that converged at 
a specific moment—assumptions that are increasingly dubious, and a moment that is 
receding farther into the past. For a generation scarred by the Great Depression, 
economic growth seemed like a panacea. With a rising tide lifting all boats, the lives of 
every American could be trusted to improve. From the aftermath of World War II 
through the 1970s, most of the total earnings from economic expansion flowed to the 
bottom 90 percent of Americans. That came to an abrupt end in the 1980s. Although the 
Clinton years posted marginally better tallies on this front than the Reagan era, the record 
since 2001 has been abysmal, and the worst has come under Obama. From 2009 to 2012, 
the last year with reliable data, incomes for the lower 90 percent have declined, while 
those for the top 10 percent have increased at a healthy clip, with the greatest accruing to 
the top one percent and above.1229 
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Figure 3: GDP per capita and median family income, 1947 to 2007.1230 
While the benefits of economic growth for the average American have become 
increasingly fuzzy, the costs have snapped into focus. Before the Industrial Revolution, 
economic growth was held in check by the pace at which animals could labor, crops 
mature and soil recover from depletion (or unexploited territories be acquired). Shifting 
to fossil fuels—first coal, then oil—upended that system. Energy previously supplied by 
immense tracts of land worked over decades now came from lumps of coal formed over 
millions of years. Thus commenced a revolution of economic time and space, with 
exponentially rising energy consumption propelling economic growth, a flight from the 
countryside to towns and cities, and a population explosion. Though restricted in the 
nineteenth century for the most part to Europe and the United States, that revolution has 
since spread across the planet. Between 1950 and 2000, the world’s population more than 
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doubled, petroleum consumption more than tripled, and the global economy expanded 
sevenfold. Meanwhile, the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere rose by almost a 
fifth. That has prepared the way for an as yet undetermined statistic: how far and how fast 
the earth’s temperature will climb.1231 
 
Figure 4: Fossil-fuel based carbon emissions, 1900-2011.1232 
“There is no mystery to what an economy is,” Gregory Mankiw’s textbook 
informs students. “Whether we are talking about the economy of Los Angeles, the United 
States, or the whole world, an economy is just a group of people dealing with one another 
as they go about their lives.”1233 Others are not so sure. “The economy is our god today,” 
the Bishop of London said in 2013, “but we have no idea what it means.”1234 Both are 
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right. The economy is one way to interpret the collision of forces—social, ecological, 
economic, political, technical, and cultural—that makes up collective life. In an age when 
other terms that had once brought order to this assemblage—notions like society, and 
history itself—fragmented in popular discourse, the economy loomed more prominently 
than ever, so unavoidable that children felt qualified to weigh in on the subject, even if 
they could not quite spell it. Inevitably, different people imbued it with different 
meanings. Tracing the concept’s genealogy shows that much. But examining the 
surprisingly short life of the economy also demonstrates that the categories used to 
understand the world have changed before, sometimes abruptly—and no history can 
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